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February 1989

Managing ~~editors~~ John Eggleston, Ronald Frankenberg,
and Gordon Fyfe

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Solidary labour: its nature and marginalisation

Kathleen Lynch

Abstract

This paper represents an attempt to analyse the labour involved in producing and reproducing caring relationships as a form of work. The term 'solidary' or 'love labour' is coined to differentiate this kind of work from other forms of human service work, domestic work and/or economic labour.

We suggest that solidary labour cannot be understood as a structural necessity emanating from the political and economic requirements of the wider system. Yet, the latter approach has been the modal one in both structural functionalist and Marxist analyses of caring. Caring and being cared for involve the construction of symbolic bonds regardless of the economic context in which they are embedded. The sociological understanding of these, demands that we take account of the situated meaning of solidary relations and not merely reduce them to by-products of structural forces.

In the latter part of the paper we use time-budget studies and other surveys to show how solidary labour is being marginalised in our society. In particular, we argue that both domestic labour and productive maternal labour are in open competition with solidary labour for the use of time. Research to date would suggest that solidary labour is the loser in this competition.

People work, as Stacey (1981) has pointed out, has been given little attention in the analysis of labour. Classical theorists have been remiss in ignoring the whole question of human service as a form of work. What classicists have tended to do is to define human labour in terms of an industrial model which generally fails to take cognizance of non-industrial human service work, unpaid domestic work and the solidary labour required to produce supportive and caring relationships.

In her critique of classical theory, Stacey does not analyse the different forms of 'people work' in any detail. While recognising that people work may or may not be altruistic or, may or may not involve symmetrical exchange etc., she does not inform us about the contexts in which people work takes on these different characteristics (Stacey 1985). Our interest in this paper is in delineating the parameters of one form of people work, namely solidary labour as distinct from other kinds of human service work. A basic assumption is that the production and reproduction of solidary relations – such as friendships, kinship relations, intimate sexual relationships, parent-child relations – requires time, effort and energy, in other words, work, just as much as the production of goods and other human services do. Labour and love cannot be analysed separately without doing injustice to both.

We will begin our analysis by differentiating our perspective on solidary labour (or what might equally be called love labour) from that found in structural functionalist and Marxist theory. As solidary labour is generally construed in both as part of domestic labour and as taking place in the family, we will address our initial remarks to caring in family contexts.

Structural functionalist and Marxist perspectives on caring

Caring is defined in structural functionalist terms as an expressive task performed primarily by women within the family. The expressive (female) roles of socialisation, pattern maintenance and integration enacted in domestic life are contrasted with the (male) instrumental roles of goal attainment and adaptation which take place in the economy (Parsons, 1956: 313–15). Parsons regards the structural differentiation between expressive and instrumental roles as necessary for the survival of society. If all members of the family were involved in competition within the occupational structure, this would put serious strain on the solidarity of the family unit and thereby jeopardise the family's integrative functions.

As Beechey (1978: 158–65) has pointed out, Parsons' view of expressive work is predicated on culturally specific, normative and evaluative assumptions about sex roles. It assumes that it is natural for women to perform expressive roles and for men to perform instrumental tasks. It also fails to link women to the economy by ignoring their economic role within the household as domestic labourers and their increasing functioning as wage labourers.

Finally, it provides no framework for the analysis of sexual inequality

Marxist analyses of caring, by contrast, represents care (child care especially) as one of the general domestic activities through which women are exploited in bourgeois-style families. Caring is regarded as a highly significant economic activity, the unpaid care provided by women frees men on a daily basis to gain public power which they use in turn to oppress women. Their unpaid care also reproduces new generations of wage labourers for the capitalist labour market. For Marxists the central question has been, 'what functions does women's domestic labour in the home serve for capital?' (Barrett, 1980, 172)

The limitations of the Marxist approach have been clearly identified by Barrett (1980). In particular she shows how the oppression of women is not confined to capitalist societies. Both pre-capitalist and socialist societies operate with an oppressive ideology of familialism which is not dissimilar to that found in capitalist states. She suggests that the ideology of familialism may play a more powerful role in reproducing unequal gender relations than capitalism *per se* (Barrett 187-226)

The first problem with both structural functionalists' and Marxists' analyses, from our perspective, is their reductionism. What happens within the family is explained in terms of external factors (Barrett 189). The functionalists construe the family as being primarily a socialising institution through which the values, norms and status expectations of the wider society are learned. The family is also represented as a haven for the alienated male worker. Marxists, on the other hand, explain the family in terms of its role in reproducing the relations of production. In both, caring is merely represented as a structural necessity reducible ultimately to the political and/or economic requirements of the wider system. Although no one would deny the politico-economic significance of caring, to analyse it solely as a structural necessity is to greatly oversimplify its social reality. While there is no doubt, as Graham has observed, that 'caring is an integral part of the process by which society reproduces itself, and maintains the physical and mental health of its workforce', caring and being cared for is also 'intimately bound up with the way we define ourselves and our social relations' (1982: 13). The problem is that sociologists have only addressed themselves to one aspect of caring relationships, namely that which links the carer to the labour market and/or the political system. They have rarely examined the dynamics of the

relations between carers themselves as these are subjectively experienced. The latter question has generally been left to psychologists (Graham 17), and consequently part of the sociological nexus within which caring occurs has been left unexplored. In saying this, we do not deny the importance of contributions of feminists in their analyses of 'caring as women's work'. The latter have shown how caring not only involves producing and reproducing workers cheaply for the capitalist labour market but also how it involves the exploitation of women's labour because of its invisible, devalued and privatised nature in a patriarchal society (Beechey, 1978). However, to represent caring as merely involving the reproduction of labourers and the exploitation of women is to take an entirely objectivist and economically reductionist approach to social analysis. The subjectively situated meaning of caring is not necessarily that of exploitation and reproduction.

Caring is more than this: a kind of domestic labour performed on people. It can't be 'cleaned up' into such categories without draining the relationship between carer and cared-for of the dimension we most need to confront. Caring cannot be understood objectively and abstractly, but only as a subjective experience in which we are all, for better or worse, involved (Graham, 1982: 26-7).

Caring and being cared for involves the construction of symbolic bonds regardless of the economic context in which they are embedded. The social bonds which constitute caring relations, or what we call *solidary relations*, whether these are ones of mutuality or dependency, are social phenomena in their own right. The situated sociological meaning of such relations needs to be explored. Undoubtedly there is great cultural variability in the character of the solidary bond formed between kin, friends, etc., in different societies; what we need to do is to explore such differences and examine their significance for the actors involved. A further question which is in need of examination is how productive labour conflicts with solidary labour in industrial societies. Although Parsons did identify normative conflicts between family and work organisations, there is more than normative conflict involved. Caring activities or solidary relations are in open competition with productive labour for time and energy investment in those societies in which the demands of both are not formulated to take account of each other.

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While conflicts between solidary and productive labour are increasingly resolved through the commodification of care (for those who can afford it), this does not remove the conflict entirely: the old person has to be visited in the old folks home; the child has to be minded when the creche is closed, the handicapped person must be taken home for the holidays, etc. Furthermore, certain solidary relationships – particularly those based on mutuality rather than dependency – are not so readily open to commodification. One cannot pay a substitute to visit a friend or to be at home in the evening with one's spouse or lover without qualitatively changing the relationship completely.

Whatever one's approach to sociological analysis therefore, one needs to explain the dynamics and implications of the changing context of caring in our society. Suggesting that caring is merely a by-product of structural forces tells us little about the real social changes occurring in daily life.

In arriving at a sociological understanding of caring and the solidary relations to which it gives rise, we must also dissent from the view that caring is a prerogative of families. In their rightful anxiety to highlight the exploitative character of domestic labour, Marxists and feminists tend to lose sight of the fact that the family is only one of the sites in which caring takes place. Structural functionalists tend to ignore extra-familial caring for almost the opposite reasons – because of their idealisation of the family as a key unit in maintaining social stability. Solidary labour takes place in a variety of extra-familial contexts. Friendships are generally extra-familial and are, by definition, only as strong as the solidary labour invested in them. Relationships between lovers are also solidary and extra-familial. Furthermore, increasing numbers of people live outside family contexts in our society, so it is clear that families have no monopoly on caring: first, the number of single parent households is increasing, second, family life comprising of parents and children living in the one household is only a temporary phase in most people's lives, finally, unmarried childless adults tend to live alone or with friends. All of these latter groups may be involved in caring networks, albeit extra-familial ones.

Solidary labour as distinct from symbolic labour

Solidary labour is a form of symbolic labour. It is not a labour which is productive either of cash profit or any other material

good The motivating force behind solidary or love labour is not an economic one, rather it is symbolic, the promotion of the bond *per se* is the goal of solidary labour

Not all symbolic labour is however, necessarily solidary. In his study of Kabylia, for example, Bourdieu (1977) shows how symbolic labour (undertaken in the context of secondary tribal relations) can be productive of tradeable symbolic capital Smiles, handshakes, compliments, attention, etc., are given for the purposes of creating a bank of symbolic capital with those in whom they are deposited. The donor can then call on these reserves when necessary Although the labour is symbolic in these latter situations, it is profit-oriented albeit in a symbolic sense Symbolic labour which is primarily solidary must be distinguished therefore from symbolic labour which is profit-oriented

Solidary labour and the generic materialist conception of labour

In Capital Vol 1, one finds one of the clearest definitions of the materialist conception of labour.

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. (Marx, 1976 edn 283)

We can see here that labour has been traditionally conceived as a subject-object relationship man (the subject) is seen as purposefully acting on nature (the object) to control the natural world in his own interests Love labour or solidary labour is distinguishable from material labour firstly therefore as it is a subject-subject relationship. The intersubjectivity of the solidary labour however, only differentiates between itself and one form of material labour, namely man/woman-nature relationships. It does not distinguish solidary labour from the subject-subject relationships of the services sector which are both intersubjective and profit-oriented What distinguishes solidary labour from the subject-subject relations of the services sector is the purpose or goal of the relationship. In the latter the relationship is based on the profit principle; in the former it is focused on the reinforcing of the commitment or bonds As Hochschild (1983) has shown, the warmth and friendliness of the airline flight attendant is directed

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towards the promotion of business – it is part of the airline's package. Emotional labour is 'managed' to ensure increased business and profit. Such displays of warmth differ enormously from displays of affection and warmth between friends or between parents and children. In the latter contexts, emotional labour is engaged in for the purpose of maintaining and developing the bond itself. The context within which emotional labour takes place therefore, determines whether it will be solidary or not. When the intersubjective relationship is mediated by profit or gain, as is the case in the services sector, a solidary relationship tends to be precluded.

Solidary labour and domestic labour

Solidary labour can also be distinguished from domestic labour. Pahl (1984: 30) suggests that domestic work can refer to a diverse range of household activities including child care, roof repairs, fuel gathering, poultry raising, etc. In this account, and in most others, two general categories of work are identified as domestic labour – child care, and general household tasks including cooking, cleaning, repairing, etc. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between general household work and child care. To begin with, household work involves the transformation of nature – for example, food, clothes and garden – while child care work involves the transformation of persons. While child care does involve household tasks indirectly, such as cooking and cleaning etc., it involves much more than this. It involves giving affection, listening, talking, attending, all of which are symbolic activities productive of social bonds. Domestic work therefore should refer only to household work, while child care work should be defined as solidary labour.

To say that child care is solidary labour is not to deny that when the solidary work is done that commodity labour power is not reproduced. The labourer required for the capitalist market is no doubt produced indirectly through solidary labour. However, what we are suggesting is that solidary labour produces much more than wage labourers, it also produces social bonds which are subjectively experienced as solidary outside of their objective economic reality.

We are claiming therefore that solidary labour occupies a similar structural role in relation to one's affectual life that material

labour occupies in relation to the natural world Just as use-value-creating-labour can be seen as 'an eternal natural necessity' mediating between 'man and nature' (Marx, 1976: 133) so love labour is also an eternal necessity mediating human beings' relations to each other as affectual entities. While men and women prove themselves to be 'species beings' through their work upon the objective world (Marx, 1975: 329) so also do they establish their humanity through their solidary relationships. As Engels (1972: 71) points out, there are two processes involved in the production and reproduction of immediate life, one being the production of the means of subsistence and the other the production of human beings themselves. The production and maintenance of human beings involves both material and symbolic work. It involves the provision of food, clothing, etc., and the provision of care. The provision of care involves solidary labour.

The marginalisation of solidary labour

The neglect of caring relationships as forms of labour should come as no surprise to social scientists. After all social scientists have traditionally been male, consequently many of them have been removed for the greater part of their waking day from caring work. Their (male) domain assumptions predispose them to ignore matters which have traditionally been outside their own experience (Gouldner, 1970). One of the solidary issues which is undoubtedly of greater significance to women than men (given the present organisation of households in Europe anyhow) is the conflict between solidary labour and productive or material labour. While some men do experience conflict between the demands of job versus those of family or friends, the burden of this conflict is primarily borne by women. It is important in studying solidary labour therefore to examine the contexts in which conflicts between solidary labour and productive labour take place.

Time conflicts between solidary and productive labour

The most striking feature of research on the utilisation of time is the fact that no distinction is made between time spent on domestic tasks and solidary labour time. When conflicts over time are identified they are almost always presented in terms of a simple

dichotomy between waged labour time, and 'family life' or 'domestic time'. The labour required for solidary relationships is not even identified as a reality. Finch's (1983, 95-6) analysis of the diaries of the wives of clergymen provides an interesting example of such an approach. It makes no reference at all to time spent on non-domestic tasks. This, and other such studies, give one the impression that life is nothing but a continual round of materially productive and materially reproductive tasks. By failing to ask questions about time spent on solidary actions, researchers have effectively eliminated solidary labour from the sociological agenda. Allowing for this limitation, however, research on time usage does throw considerable light on the conflicts and dilemmas which must be faced in the distribution of time. It also gives us considerable understanding about changes and patterns in the allocation of time between different activities.

What research on time utilisation indicates firstly is that the length of the standard working week has declined over the last thirty years in a variety of industrial countries (Evans, 1975, Harriman, 1982; Geoghegan, 1985). This is by no means the complete picture regarding time spent on productive labour, however. While working hours may have declined, they still remain quite long in countries such as Ireland due to widespread participation in overtime working (Brennan *et al.*, 1980). A study conducted by the Health Education Bureau in 1980 shows that the average working day is in excess of nine hours (European Foundation, 1982: 9). Furthermore, a significant proportion of those employed are shiftworkers (12 per cent in the case of Ireland, McCarthy, 1981) who must work unsocial hours. Thus, if one takes account of time spent travelling to work, as well as time spent at work, it is evident that contemporary Irish workers are relatively restricted in the time available to them outside work during the working week. No doubt detailed analysis of time usage in other countries would show that this pattern is not unique to Ireland. Certainly there is considerable evidence internationally that conflicts between waged (productive) labour, and domestic and personal life are persistently experienced among the employed adult population. Pahl and Pahl's (1971) study of managers, Cain's (1973) study of the police, and Marsh's (1979) and McCarthy's (1981) studies of shift workers are all cases in point. A North American study conducted by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan shows that over one third of the work force who live in families experience moderate or severe conflict

between their jobs and family life (Harriman, 1982: 41). The principal factor precipitating time conflicts in all of these studies is the extent and/or nature of the time commitment required by one's job. The job can encroach on solidary labour time in several ways. Among the salaried middle management class for example, career advancement is frequently gained only through working in non-compulsory hours, promotion is contingent on what work one does *outside* the paid working day as much as what one does within it. In lower income groups, time encroachment is more likely to take the form of overtime required to make a living wage. Shiftwork can also precipitate conflicts: unsocial hours of work means that one is simply not available to participate in solidary social forms.

With regard to the time available for solidary relationships *per se*, one must also take account of the time demands of domestic labour. It is not only wage labour which is in direct competition with solidary labour time, domestic labour occupies a similar structural role. Gershuny *et al*'s analysis (1980) of BBC data shows that the average amount of time spent on housework per person per day in 1975 was three hours and three minutes. This represented only a 12 per cent decline from time spent on housework in 1961. (Needless to say these gross figures conceal major sex differences: in 1975 women spent an average of four hours and thirty minutes per day on domestic work while men spent one hour and thirty four minutes, Pahl, 1984: 109-10.) Although there is a danger of interpreting these figures too literally, what is noticeable is that domestic work has by no means been eliminated with the advent of technology. North American evidence on domestic labour also substantiates this claim. Vaneck's (1980) analysis of time spent on housework, by women who are not in the paid labour force, suggests that the amount of time spent on it has not changed much over the past fifty years. One reason why technology has not altered the time spent on either domestic labour or child care, is because the standards of performance have risen at the same time that the demands on one's physical strength have declined (Harriman, 1982: 45). Also, as Linder (1970) observes, affluence has created more household goods, and these require maintenance and servicing which make continuing time demands on the users.

Although research on time utilisation is limited by its traditional focus on either waged time or productive time, it does highlight a number of important features of time usage. It shows that the time workers are expected to devote to materially productive labour is quite considerable in spite of great advances in technology,

communications, transport, etc. Furthermore, as Hinrichs, Roche and Wiesenthal (1985) point out, when working hours have been reduced in recent years, the reduction has often been gained at the expense of giving management greater control in determining labour deployment. Although workers may work fewer hours on average over a year, they have less control over when they will work than in the past. Speaking of the metal industry in Germany, Hinrichs *et al.* observe that:

the outcome of the unions' working time campaign is a new working time *regime* which departs from the historical norm of *one* uniform hours standard for the whole industry. The new *regime* gives firms the flexibility to differentiate normal work periods temporally and socially (p. 222)

What is evident from research on time usage also is that domestic labour still commands considerable time and energy and that workers experience considerable conflict between the time demands of waged labour and domestic labour. Because no vocabulary exists in the research literature to conceptualise solidary labour, there has been no reference to the conflicts which undoubtedly ensue between domestic labour, wage labour and love labour. Indeed, insofar as we already know that wage labour commands considerable time, often at unsocial hours, there is no doubt that it is in direct conflict with solidary or love labour. As Liljestrom (1981) observes 'To set up and maintain binding social relationships costs material and symbolic investments. The question is one of *investing time*'. Yet, time for symbolic work can only be gained at the expense of economic labour (Bourdieu, 1977: 180). Indeed it can only be gained at the expense of domestic labour as well. Thus insofar as it becomes habitual or normative within a given society for people to work long and unsocial hours, it is clear that time for solidary labour is being squeezed out. Solidary relationships are being marginalised for the sake of materially productive ones. Equally, insofar as standards of domestic production and reproduction remain high, and the range of consumer durables to be maintained and replaced increases, domestic labour time is also in conflict with solidary labour time. Domestic labour may also serve to marginalise love labour by forcing into a residual time status during the working day.

It is not only for workers, however, that the time available for solidary relations is restricted in our society. It is also increasingly

restricted for school children, especially in those societies in which educational credentials play a key role in determining one's job opportunities. In a recent Irish study, for example, it was found that senior second-level students spend an average of four hours per night during the week on homework (Hannan *et al.*, 1983). As the school day lasts from 9am to 4pm approximately, and as the students also spend time travelling to and from school, eating meals, etc., it is clear that they have little time in their waking day for anything but materially productive work (i.e. homework). Time for solidary relations has to be borrowed from class time or squeezed in while travelling to and from school. Although weekends do allow time for solidary relations, productive work also encroaches here, as does domestic labour especially for girls (McRobbie, 1978).

Conclusion

In this paper we have shown how the classical (materialist) conception of labour seriously circumscribes one's understanding of social life. To illustrate this point we focused specifically on one form of symbolic labour, namely the labour that is required to produce caring relationships, solidary or love labour. Within social life there are a variety of forms of human labour which are socially productive without being either materially productive or reproductive. Up to now, however, these forms of labour have been lived almost namelessly; at least they have been virtually nameless in the social scientific world. By giving them a name we are making them part of a discourse and thereby making them more real.

A basic assumption of the paper has been that solidary labour occupies a structural role in relation to one's affectual life which is comparable to the role productive labour occupies in relation to the natural world. Women and men realise their 'species being' through their solidary relationships as much as they realise it through their work in creating material products.

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Emotional labour: skill and work in the social regulation of feelings

Nicky James

Abstract

I define emotional labour as the labour involved in dealing with other peoples' feelings, a core component of which is the regulation of emotions. The aims of the paper are firstly to suggest that the expression of feelings is a central problem of capital and paid work and secondly to highlight the contradictions of emotions at work.

To begin with I argue that 'emotion' is a subject area fitting for inclusion in academic discussion, and that the expression of emotions is regulated by a form of labour. In the section 'Emotion at home' I suggest that emotional labour is used to lay the foundations of a social expression of emotion in the privacy of the domestic domain. However the forms emotional labour takes and the skills it involves leave women subordinated as unskilled and stigmatised as emotional. In the section 'Emotion at work' I argue that emotional labour is also a commodity. Though it may remain invisible or poorly paid, emotional labour facilitates and regulates the expression of emotion in the public domain. Studies of home and the workplace are used to begin the process of recording the work carried out in managing emotions and drawing attention to its significance in the social reproduction of labour power and social relations of production.

I think there are some things it's useful being a female for. Especially with female patients. And I think your attitude is different from the male attitude to everything. Whether the patient's male or female. I think I rely a lot on intuition – non-scientific intuition. I think often the more minor emotional things are far more important than what pills they're on. And you know, I think it helps being a GP to work at the

intuition, because a lot of my time is spent doing social work basically, and helping people with emotional problems. Only, probably less than a third is actually real physical diseases, and even they are compounded by the emotional effects. I think this is where intuition comes in again. I couldn't write a book on how to deal with patients who are ill, and who have a terminal illness and family problems. I couldn't write it down. I think it's just something with each patient, and you have to sort of use your instinct to know what they want back from you. I think it's something so ill-defined I think a female does it better than a male in a lot of respects. I may be wrong.

This quotation from a female doctor highlights key points pertinent to 'emotional labour'. Firstly, there is her inability to define the skills she uses with patients, skills vital to her work but which cannot be described within the dominant medical phraseology. Secondly there is the reticence with which her ideas are put forward, not because she thinks her practice is wrong but because explanations involve 'emotion', 'intuition' and 'instinct', all vague, 'unscientific' phrases. Thirdly there is the importance she ascribes to gender for carrying out her work with people dying of cancer. She notes that women's attitudes are different, and that because the work is 'ill-defined' women do it better than men. In effect a vital part of her work, which could be described as 'emotional labour' remains undefined, unexplained and usually unrecorded.

Emotional labour

There are two parts to the development of the idea of emotional labour that need to be established. Firstly 'emotion' needs to be established as a fitting subject for inclusion in academic discussion, and secondly the idea that it can involve 'labour' needs to be explored.

'Emotion' and 'feelings' are notable for the dearth of modern theoretical reference and minimal recent sociological tradition. Elias' work on *The Civilising Process* (1978) and Heller's *A Theory of Feelings* (1979) are notable exceptions, though other work considers emotion tangentially through analysis of love (Greer, 1970; Firestone, 1979; Bertilsson, 1986).

Looking through abstracts, references to emotion and feelings are usually psychological, psychiatric, or biophysical, and signifi-

cantly, usually associated with disorder. Emotion is rarely seen as systematic or structured and is often, by direct reference or association, used as a contrast with 'rational'. It therefore contravenes the 'scientific' or 'objective' approach to which most academic theories aspire (Oakley, 1981, Graham, 1983a). Yet in 'Sketch for a theory of emotions', Sartre describes emotion as 'having meaning and signifying something', and says that it is 'not a chaotic relationship between the self and the universe: it is an organised and describable structure' (Sartre, 1981: 34).

Some scholars argue that the separation of feeling and rationality is a relatively recent historical development. The division of the 'organic whole' described by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts could be said to reach its apotheosis when 'rationality' and 'feeling' are not merely seen as separate but contrasts. 'Rationality' is held supreme, and 'feelings' have come to acquire negative connotations of unpredictability and irrationality. As one dictionary definition of 'feelings' notes:

Feeling – formerly opinion, now unreasoned opinion;
sentiment (Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1939)

Heller's work is a tour de force combining historical views of philosophy, anthropology and literature to develop a Marxist social anthropology of feeling. She accepts that the relationship between feeling and rationality is a central issue to a twentieth century theory of feelings but argues that 'the false contrast of feeling versus reason should be abolished'. In 'A Theory of Feelings' she attempts to prove that there is a final unity of thinking, feeling and morality and that 'unified man' is an empirical fact, but that the personality is split. She records the effects of social structure on feelings and 'dominating configurations of feelings' noting also that the norms regulating feelings have a moral content, thereby also regulating intention and behaviour. In taking an historical perspective on a 'sociology of feelings' she is able to distinguish the differential effects of social stratification on the 'emotional dynamics' and 'emotional households' (the frame within which an individual organises their feelings) and to describe the ways in which present society determines thinking, 'produces and fixates particularist feelings, perpetuates and reproduces the alienation of feelings and the unrestrainable character of certain affects' (Heller, 1979: 4). It is thus that though 'man' is 'unified', the personality is split.

Elias' two volume work *'The Civilising Process'* also documents an historical perspective and is able to note that the civilising process establishes the social regulation and management of emotions:

we . . . find in our own time the precursors of a shift towards the cultivation of new and stricter constraints. In a number of societies there are attempts to establish a social regulation and management of the emotions far stronger and more conscious than the standard prevalent hitherto, a pattern of Moulding that imposes renunciations and transformation of drives on the individual with vast consequences for human life which are scarcely foreseeable as yet. (Elias, 1978: 187)

Given the course of Elias' life, it is not without irony that this was written in 1938, although it was not translated into English until 1978. He also notes the paradox that the greater the control, restraint and concealment demanded, the smaller the unit held responsible, with the task of exercising constraint increasingly concentrated within the nuclear family. In this paper I go further and suggest that while this function is indeed carried out within the nuclear family, it is women who are largely held responsible.

In recent empirical sociology studies of women are the richest source of reference on feelings. Where emotion is mentioned in other studies, it is mentioned tangentially in debates on family, organisations and paid work – for instance Strauss *et al* detail 'comfort work' and 'sentimental work' as part of 'The social organisation of medical work' (1985). In referring to such studies it needs to be borne in mind that they too are shaped by historical developments which separate rationality from emotion, and are especially influenced by the sexual division of labour (Dex, 1985, Davies and Rosser, 1986; Hearn and Parkin, 1987).

Evidence that emotion and feelings are part of everyday life are most easily verified by self-examination. Arguments that the social expression of emotion is not the unpredictable, illogical behaviour which directly contrasts with 'rationality' are persuasive. Russell Hochschild in an article on 'emotion work' sees the 'emotive experience of normal adults in daily life' as 'orderly' and gives examples of individuals managing their emotions. In an interactive account of emotion which she describes as being 'between' Goffman and Freud, she emphasises that emotion work is regulated by social exchange' (Russell Hochschild, 1979).

The embodiment of extremes of emotion in rites and rituals is an indication that social regulation of feelings is universal, but I suggest that these elements of the management of emotion are the tip of the iceberg. For the most part management of emotion is a routine, predictable process, less reliant on personality than Russell Hochschild suggests, and rather more reliant on the 'emotional labour' of others.

The management of emotions has many of the connotations associated with labour – the relatively modern definition of labour as productive work, in addition to older senses with labour meaning any kind of difficult effort, and labour as pain (Williams, 1983). Emotional labour is hard work and can be sorrowful and difficult. It demands that the labourer gives personal attention which means they must give something of themselves, not just a formulaic response. Its value lies in its contribution to the social reproduction of labour power and the social relations of production, with the divide between home and work and the gender division of labour influencing the forms in which it is carried out. The contribution of emotional labourers is explored in more detail below but my argument is that it is a form of skilled, regulatory labour which is carried out in the 'public' domain of the workplace as well as in the 'privacy' of home.

The management of emotion is learned since all humans experience emotions, though the forms in which they are expressed vary within any single culture and inter-culturally. Historical, political, social and material influences on the expression of emotion have far reaching consequences so current forms of emotional labour have complex historical and cultural antecedents. Although detailed work beyond the scope of this essay is necessary to detail the specific links between emotional labour and capitalism, changed approaches to death and mourning can be used as general illustrations.

The time of impending death is a particularly obvious example of how the form in which emotions are expressed is subject to social expectations and negotiation. Tolstoy's *Death of Ivan Illich* lucidly details the ways in which Illich's family and friends, presided over by a cleric, are part of how he comes to terms with his death. Modern death is more likely to take place in an institution, with health care professionals doing the 'work' formerly carried out by the family and shaping the ways in which the predictable emotions associated with death are expressed – or repressed.

Compared to a century ago, socially endorsed forms of bereavement have changed enormously (Gorer, 1965). Now it is health care professionals in hospital who are most likely to set the tone immediately after a death, although they appear to be poorly equipped to do so (Wright, Cousins and Upward, 1988). It has been suggested that a society which requires equilibrium for the production of wealth must minimise the impact of death (Pine and Philips, 1970). With fewer people taking a day off work to attend a funeral than formerly there is less disruption in the workplace, but an increase in the amount of pathological grieving (Blauner, 1966) with hidden costs in health care. For those who define 'rationality' in a narrow, scientific form, the exercise of 'reason' excludes taking account of emotions and yet Parkes' study of bereavement gives evidence of the value of expressing (rather than repressing) them as a means to healthy survival (Parkes, 1986). The repression of emotional expression may appear to lead to greater efficiency in production, but it does not mean the emotions disappear, merely, in Elias' term, that they are 'concealed'.

The social structures affecting the forms emotional expression takes make it a suitable subject for core sociological study, but the more specific notion of emotional labour connects it with ideas of paid work. From a study of nursing the dying (James, 1986), the 'labour' element of emotional labour became apparent not only because it connects the management of emotions with the workplace, but also because it denotes the association with a process which can be demanding and exhausting, and subject to different forms of organisation.

At a hospice where I spent five months as a participating observer the guiding ideology, as it is in most hospices, was of 'total care'. This is defined as 'social, spiritual, emotional and physical' care and thus encompasses elements of care which are usually obscured in medical settings. In particular it highlights the point that social, spiritual and psychological difficulties require management and attention in the same way that physical symptoms do. It was not that the emotions were 'irrational', far from it. A period of grief, anger, loss, despair and frustration were anticipated and entirely appropriate responses in coming to terms with death, the final 'life event'. However the expression of such emotions can be painful to watch, and awkward to respond to. In particular such expressions are fraught with contradiction as they do not fit in with standard ideas of what should occur at the workplace nor with standard ideas of workplace skills.

One 19-year-old nurse described the intensity of emotion being dealt with as she gave a moving account of her supposed failure to care adequately for patients:

Possibly because I feel very young, very inexperienced, and how dare I go up to these people who are in great mental and physical suffering and offer my easy platitudes. Sometimes it's easier to give them an injection, take away the pain. You remember Mr Toon? The time he was buzz, buzz, buzz, calling for us. And it was never really very much he wanted. It worked as well to come and just stand by his bed, and just hold his hand. Often he'd just grab your hand, someone to hold on to. Walking in the valley of the shadow of death. It's not just the physical act of dying, it's all the mental anguish that goes round it. That's what this place is trying to treat. There are so many instances of people being scared, patients being scared. Crying out for someone to help them. I feel very inadequate.

This is a dramatic example of a relationship between carer and cared for which involves the management of emotion. In less dramatic forms such management is a day to day matter. In domestic care, each child learns appropriate expressions of fear, joy, pain, desire, loss, anxiety and pleasure. In circumstances where one adult cares for another, the expression of emotions is a negotiated process involving a mutual sounding out of what is acceptable. Inappropriately expressed emotions may mean that the person becomes subject to intervention by others (Goffman 1961) for instance when arrests are made for assault or medical attention is sought for 'pathological' disorders like hysteria or depression (Turner, 1984, 1987).

In defining emotional labour as the labour involved in dealing with other people's feelings I am emphasising that it is a social process. In noting that the regulation of emotion is a core component of emotional labour I am highlighting the centrality of the management of feelings within social processes. In the following sections I look at the structure and organisation of emotional labour at 'home' and in the 'workplace' in order to note the contradictions of emotion at work.

Emotion at home

Emotional labour is most easily recognised as part of the caring role of women in the home. Although the social regulation of emotions is brought about through emotional labour, as a form of labour it appears to be insulated from other forms of labour, and is poorly recorded and under-explored. It is my contention that this is precisely because it involves both women and 'emotion' with their negative connotations. Because emotional labour is seen as 'natural', unskilled women's work, because it is unpaid and because it is obscured by the privacy of the domestic domain where much of it takes place, the significance of its contribution and value in social reproduction is ignored.

Separation of emotion by gender

Chodorow proposed a model to account for the general and 'nearly universal' differences which she observes as characterising male and female personalities and roles. She suggested that the differences are reproduced from generation to generation, and are not the result of biological sex differences, or of deliberate socialisation patterns, but arise from the roles women take in early child care and socialisation (Chodorow, 1976). Chodorow details how women identify with girl children but treat sons differently, usually by emphasising his masculinity in opposition to herself.

Ironically the 'naturalness' of women's roles in early child care appear to be emphasised in this psychoanalytic account of sexual inequality. Ironical because it can be argued that ideas of 'naturalness' perpetuate the inequality. Thus the supposed 'naturalness' of women's caring role is central to the significance, value and invisibility of emotional labour and its development through gender identity and work roles. Part of women's caring role is that they are deemed to be 'naturally' good at dealing with other people's emotions because they are themselves 'naturally' emotional – though this does also mean that they are also unreliable.

Debate on the origins of gender inequality focus on relations between the family and the means of production and Chodorow is criticised for the relative autonomy she attributes to each of these and thus a failure to take adequate account of their joint influence on the gender division of labour (Sayers, 1982; Burton, 1985). An effect of workplace organisation on the expression of emotions has

already been briefly noted, but can only be properly understood by also taking account of the gender division of labour

Outcomes of the gender division of labour are well documented by theorists and empirical studies (for example Walman, 1979, Burman, 1979, Gamarnikow *et al.*, 1983a, 1983b; Sharpe, 1984, Dex, 1985, Redclift and Mingione, 1985) Men are held responsible for bringing an income to the household while women have responsibility for the routine running of the home and childcare. Women's responsibility is sustained even when men are no longer earning (Morris, 1985, Hutson and Jenkins, 1987; Ungerson, 1987)

One of the results of the gender division of labour is that women carry the prime responsibility for working with emotions. More than that though 'emotional' becomes part of a major cluster of other adjectives by which 'masculine' and 'feminine' are differentiated and through which the emotional/rational divide of female/male is perpetuated.

Zaretsky explains the gender division of emotion as being the result of the capitalist mode of production.

The split in society between 'personal feelings' and 'economic production' was integrated with the sexual division of labour. Women were identified with emotional life, men with the struggle for existence (Zaretsky, 1976: 64)

Heller (1980) explains the 'emotional division of labor' as a recent development, a derivative of the social division of labour. Hearn (1982) addresses the same theme looking at the implications of the systematic management of emotions. He considers the control of emotionality to be a matter of patriarchal socialisation. Zelditch (quoted in Oakley 1974: 181) takes a functionalist approach and claims that 'the system must differentiate behaviours and attitudes in order to continue to exist as a system, and . . . some specialization

(must) occur in responsibility for the attitudes and behaviours involved'. The woman's role then is:

To act as the provider of emotional warmth and stability for the whole family, to maintain good, tension-free relationships between the family members; to keep the family together (Oakley, 1974: 181)

Women's emotional labour involves preparing children for their

environment and circumstances, shielding them and defending them as they age and preparing them for work. This work can be carried on in a variety of ways, by listening, gentle persuasion, by firm direction, by discomforting the person and by force

(Mum) used to run after us and clobber us, yes, or if anyone else had a go at us in the street, she was out, rolling her sleeves up

She used to say, 'No-one touches. Only me. I'm the one who touches them and no-one else' (Cornwell 1984: 48)

It can also be carried out wrongly, in which case the woman is to blame for the future deficiencies of the adult

Much more serious is the child who has been deprived of mothering from the start – such a child is denied the opportunity of experiencing deep maternal affection, consequently his relationships with people, when he becomes an adult, are likely to be superficial (Oakley, 1974: 205, quoting from the *Times*, 8 December 1976)

The result of women undertaking this necessary regulation of emotional expression and protecting others from the demands of 'emotion' is that they act as society's emotional sponges.¹ As Jean Baker Miller notes,

women by their very existence confront and challenge men because they have been made the embodiment of the dominant culture's unsolved problems. (Baker Miller, 1988: 58)

A particular problem for capitalism is how emotions can be safely and usefully expressed without interrupting the mode of production

Separation by place

Graham, like Chodorow, believes that caring, and being cared for is intimately bound up with the way women define themselves and their social relations, but thinks Chodorow takes too simplistic an approach. She believes that caring relationships are constructed through a network of social and economic relations, within both the home and the workplace. Women then take the responsibility for emotional and material needs of children, husbands and 'the elderly, the handicapped, the sick and the unhappy' (Graham,

1983b: 22), but she explains that this is associated not only with women but with the 'private places' where intimate relations with women are found. The expression of emotion is believed to be appropriate to the privacy of home, and the maintenance of physical and mental well-being builds on 'emotional bonds'. By contrast

relations in the labour market are seen to engender a degree of social distance incompatible with the giving of care. (Graham, 1983b: 18)

Rowbotham phrases it a different way, putting the onus for the exclusion of 'sentiment' from work as its incompatibility with the workplace:

because this caring work goes on in the context of a society where work is predominantly divorced from care, because she is isolated in the home, bearing the load of all the sentiment which is out of place in the man's work, and because of the division of labour which relegates caring to women and brands women as inferior, distortion is inevitable. (Rowbotham, 1973: 77)

Both these views develop from the domestic labour debate which began to specify the contribution women make to the production of value and in which authors consider why so much of this work remains invisible. It was argued that the division between the private domain of the home and the public domain of the workplace compounds the already low status of 'natural', 'unskilled' women's work, carried out under the auspices of the gender division of labour. Burton (1985) claims that the greatest contribution this debate made was to allow the relation between paid and unpaid work, particularly that of women, to be exposed. But despite the attention given to women's work in the home, and their part in the processes of social reproduction, 'emotion' and 'feelings' have largely remained sub-categories. They are seen only as part of mothering and caring, instead of also being considered as a key factor in social regulation.

Organisation of emotional labour

I have suggested above that the regulation of emotion is likely to be shaped by the place, people and organisation under which it

takes place. Emotional labour does not exist in isolation from the conditions under which it is carried out, rather the circumstances under which it takes place influence the content and form of emotional labour. Since the early work of regulating emotion is carried out in the privacy of the 'home' the emotional labour is shaped by the responsibilities and status that go with 'caring work'.

Caring, which often includes routine maintenance of the household, could be described as having emotional labour, physical labour and organisation as its component parts (James 1987), so that the emotional labour is carried out within the context of the organisation and physical labour which must also be carried out.

In the home emotional labour is fitted in as part of the range of maintenance requirements of children to be put to bed, clothes to be washed and ironed, shopping that needs to be bought, meals to be planned, husband coming in from work, and cleaning that takes the cleaner from room to room. Although 'being available' is a key factor in emotional labour, the flexibility of place and circumstances in which it can be carried out can be made to have advantages. For example intimate conversations are more likely to take place in the bedroom or the bathroom than at the shops.

Emotional labour is flexibly organised so that it can be responsive to the needs of others. To be effective the 'labourer's' skills must include firstly, being able to understand and interpret the needs of others, secondly being able to provide a personal response to these needs, thirdly being able to juggle the delicate balance of each individual and of that individual within a group, and fourthly being able to pace the work, taking into account other responsibilities.

Emotional labour requires learned skills in the same way that physical labour does. Access to the skills is open to anyone who has the interest or who has an obligation to learn them, but some practitioners are better than others. Like physical labour, there are certain techniques which, if adeptly applied, give a better outcome to emotional labour, both for the person caring and for the person being cared for. In some circumstances advice is sought, in others action is required, and in others a sense of perspective, of 'rightness', is to be established.

Thus this aspect of 'care' involves hard practicalities, as well as its symbolic value of personal attention, warmth, involvement and empathic understanding but as Shirley Dex notes, the nature of skill, far from being clear and unambiguously defined, is integrally

bound up in the sexual division of labour. She goes on to point out that the caring occupations like child-care, nursery nurses, and a whole array of social servicing jobs done by women are also thought to be generally fairly unskilled. In practice what this means is that the skills involved are not recognised as skills, either by employers or society or often the women themselves.

Dealing with other people's feelings is labour not only because it contributes to social reproduction but also because it is hard work. Emotional labour can be as exhausting as physical labour. Sitting with a distressed person (child, friend, relative) listening to someone when they are angry, courageous, resentful or sad, and acquiring the ability just to 'be' with someone who is lonely, frightened or in pain, is taxing and requires an appropriate response. Comfort, confrontation, humour, empathy or action may each be appropriate in different circumstances. As with physical labour, after a sustained period of emotional labour, an alternative or a rest are necessary; for coping with a friend whose wife has just left is as tiring as comforting a child whose best friend has abandoned them and both demand close attention from the listener.

When emotions are thought to be 'irrational' it is hard to associate them with organisation, yet managing them requires anticipation, planning, timetabling and trouble-shooting as does other 'work', paid and unpaid.

It is interesting that Hutson and Jenkins note the role of mothers in relation to their children's preparation for work. They comment on the mother's balancing role in dealing with unemployed children, which involves giving support but also keeping the children prepared for employment.

The job of being a mother is not simple in this respect as in other things. The conflict between the desire to cushion unemployed children from hardship on one hand, and 'keeping them hungry' on the other has already been mentioned. There is also, however, a conflict between giving children independence and 'keeping an eye on them' (Hutson and Jenkins, 1987).

This is not a matter of setting down rules and timetables but of developing a balance. They observe that women are important in children's preparation for work and adulthood.

Mothers and fathers, but particularly mothers, cajole, support,

Nicky James

comfort, bully, constructively neglect, and push their children into adulthood (Jenkins and Hutson, 1987)

The management of day to day emotions, as well as the more dramatic management of life crisis emotion, thus requires the skills of adjustment and flexibility. It requires listening, being there, talking and waiting mixed with giving direction, advice or actively making plans. Graham describes the experience of 'caring' as an 'unspecific, unspecifiable kind of labour, the contours of which shift constantly' (Graham, 1983b: 26), but also claims that it cannot be understood objectively or abstractly, only through subjective experience. I would dispute this, and attribute the problems of specifying caring work, and particularly of the emotional labour which is part of caring work, to the minimal attention which has been paid to it. The low profile and low status historically attributed to such work, contribute to this for it is a form of labour which is recognised not when the outcome is right, but on those occasions when it goes wrong. The product itself is invisible. The value of the labour is only recognised in negative forms, in disorder, rather than in its positive form of 'adjustment'. So for the main part the value of the labour is as hidden as the value of the routine management of emotion.

Effect of the divisions

Different clusters of adjectives are used to describe the attributes of women and men. 'Emotional' people are to be regarded with caution because they are unpredictable, therefore inefficient and so women are mistrusted. In effect, their contribution to social reproduction through the management of other people's emotion is ignored. Men are supposedly independent and instrumental in their behaviour, women are expressive, actively involved with others, and so male is to rational what female is to emotional.

Stereotypical images of masculinity and femininity guide, direct and shape perceptions of why women are unreliable in the workforce (because they have to look after the children) and why men may be preferred for being dependable and independent. None of this is without cost and masculine determination and autonomy, like any other kind of managed and repressed emotion, may also be expressed pathologically:

Male anorectics seem not to be rejecting their gender, but

strangely celebrating one masculine ideal: the perfect male body, devoid of emotion, not needing the support of other (Dave Berry, *Guardian* 27 May 1987)

Emotional labour is organised and managed both in the private domain of home and the public domain of the workplace. The forms it takes are affected by the dominant organisation so that the form of emotional labour within the relatively pliable routines in the home differs from that which is possible within the rigidity of workplace organisation, where principles of timetabling and control are vital. Emotional labour requires a flexibility of response to different circumstances and different people's needs and requests that cannot be timetabled and routinised as easily as physical tasks are.

In practice, both males and females regulate and repress feelings. But the distinction between home being the primary place for 'personal feelings' and associated with women, and the workplace being for 'economic production' and associated with men may have implications for the extent to which emotion is expected to be regulated at home, but repressed in the workplace. The repression of feeling which is sanctioned at work as a condition of efficient production does not mean that the feelings disappear. Rather the feelings are temporarily banished, but will eventually be expressed elsewhere – at home, or possibly in leisure pursuits. Thus, by making the expression of feelings in the workplace unacceptable, labour processes affect not only how feelings are expressed in the workplace, but also the emotional labour which is likely to be necessary at home.

Emotion at work

If the significance of emotional labour in social reproduction is underestimated and the skills of emotional labour are unrecognised, the question arises of what happens when emotional labour is used in the workplace. In this section, I raise the notion of emotional labour as a commodity, and use the concept to highlight the tensions between emotion and the workplace.

Meg Stacey in 'The Two Adams', explains the lack of conceptual and theoretical understanding of the emotional impact of 'people work' as being the result of theories which focus on the labour of the market place and the state, that is of the public

domain. Thus domestic labour, where social relations are based on family and kin, is usually ignored. In reviewing traditional analyses of work, she considers that analysis of paid work has failed to take adequate account of the range of labours normally associated with work in the domestic domain (Stacey, 1981). Stacey has also argued that the women's movement has had great impact by showing that traditional analyses have failed to take account of the range of work situations where 'loving and caring' are involved, with the result that:

These conceptual confusions also leave women in occupations such as nursing without any clear understanding of the cross pressures which assail them (Stacey, 1982)

Emotional labour and the labourers' skills in managing emotion are a commodity, especially prominent in 'people work'. The skills are those that women employ in the privacy of the domestic domain. The circumstances under which they are employed in the public domain may not only leave them unrecognised, but may use their low status in the domestic domain to define the equivalent paid work in the public domain as unskilled and therefore low-paid.

Emotional labour as a commodity

Although Stacey's comments on the lack of theoretical and conceptual understanding of 'people work' still hold good, empirical and theoretical evidence is beginning to accumulate which can lead to the development of such theories.

Emotional labour is a commodity in the sense that it is expedient for industry, commerce and services to make use of it. Although it is an area that needs further exploration, I am not the first to suggest that emotional labour is a commodity (Russell Hochschild, 1983).

Russell Hochschild's analysis of 'flight attendants' in *The Managed Heart* illustrates one way in which a specific, highly public form of emotional labour is directly appropriated for the purpose of maximising airline company profits. I use the concept of emotional labour in a broader sense than Russell Hochschild, to cover the processes through which emotional labour are carried out in the public and the domestic domain, and I suggest that the more common form of emotional labour is that where its centrality

and value are not recognised. In the workplace the employment of emotional labourers is widespread in tasks where close personal attention is required, though the value of what they do is often unrecognised. Instead low-paid, low status women are employed to manage the emotions of others, thereby facilitating the labour of others. Usually incorporated as part of another job or task, the work of dealing with other people's emotions is moulded by a more dominant role. However the hidden component of the work does not stop it from being vital to the work.

Davies and Rosser observed the skills required of Higher Clerical Officers, a branch of managerial officer working in the health services. They noted a particular form of this job where the skills involved were those of 'mature women'. They show that the HCO's job draws on the women's

organisational skills developed in household management and on their experience in the home handling emotions and creating an appropriate atmosphere for the task in hand (Davies and Rosser, 1986: 105)

Davies and Rosser coined the term 'gendered job' to explain 'one which capitalises on the qualities and capabilities a woman had gained by virtue of having lived her life as a woman'. Through their research on HCO's they showed that gender had been built into the labour process. Their interviews showed that such women were unlikely to be given the status and promotion prospects associated with key jobs:

If you've got somebody in there who is doing the job exceptionally well, they don't half keep the mess out of your hair, and you perhaps become reluctant to suggest to them that there are other things in the world apart from what they're doing now (Davies and Rosser: 103)

or as another manager interviewee said

'If she has made herself indispensable, then that's her fault' (Davies and Rosser: 106)

Though only part of the work was of a kind that could be described as emotional labour, it was a crucial part of the work. The women described having to be 'tactful' or 'diplomatic', 'be a counsellor'

and 'smoothing things over', 'not throwing your weight around'. Where too many of these HCO jobs were taken by men and to a lesser extent young women, disruption was likely to ensue

Examples of emotional labour also arise in commerce (Russell Hochschild, 1983), prison services where babies are watched over by 'motherly' prison warders (Adriana Caudroy, *Observer* 4 October 1987) and throughout industry and business in the form of personnel services. Where a company emphasis is placed on employee services, the personnel manager may spend a lot of time talking to employees, making themselves available to staff and providing a 'listening ear' (Coleman, 1976). It is interesting though that as personnel services gain power by developing principles of 'scientific management', this element of emotional labour, which requires direct contact with the workforce, is reduced. Instead, it is thought that:

It seems logical that in the future, personnel will become increasingly involved in organizational, rather than strictly 'personnel' concerns (Coleman, 1976: 43)

It seems that power and decision making, usually male, managerial roles, may transform services in which emotional labour played a part

Emotional labour in the workplace

Hearn proffers the male dominated professions such as medicine, the law and the church as examples of 'emotional managers', 'characteristically involved in the selective control of the emotions of themselves and others' (Hearn, 1987). But he notes that although they may define the limits and action of emotion for other workers and clients, the problems of dealing with the emotional control are primarily located through others. Thus male professionals set the parameters while others, usually female 'semi-professionals', do the work.

The hospice referred to earlier is a good example of this. At hospices, unlike the HCO job, emotional 'care' is recognised as part of the job. Nevertheless, though the male Medical Director was in charge of coordinating the 'total care', much of the difficult work of emotional labour, for instance telling people they are going to die, fell to the female physician first quoted. More significant though is the aftermath of such disclosure, which may

go on over days and weeks, and is largely managed by the female nursing staff.

They come to a stage to begin with when they dinna want to accept it, and a little while later they just want to speak about it And want to just sorta say, look, I'm dying, ken, and give me some sympathy. That's what happens from the times I've seen it A wifie in her 40s and she came in and she was telt (told) And I went through and she burst out She roared and greet (cried) I just held on to her and she said 'How would you feel dying when you're only 40 and leaving the kids?' She just wanted comfort She just wanted to speak about it (19-year-old auxiliary nurse)

In terms of the organisation of emotional labour the hospice staff took it as part of their work, and integrated it to the extent that they felt they had not completed their work properly if that type of caring work had not been part of their day

They need so much Really so much attention, and when you canna gie them it, it's really horrible. 'Cos you go off work feeling shattered, and feel you haven't done anything for them 'Cos sometimes I go off duty and feel I've done nothing for any of them I mean all you've done is their backs (pressure areas) and made them comfy. You're not really doing anything

The emotional labour at the unit, as in domestic general labour, was structured by the routine working day The circumstances in which it might take place were the moments of intimacy, such as bath time, where the nurses had been taught to make the most of their opportunities.

Claudia: We've had some nurses come – they think it's like a busy surgical ward – but they havna lasted long. Zoom, zoom, zoom, round the patients, tidy the beds, and that's it You've done your patients and they've got their basic nursing care But we were taught to chat away to them when you were washing them – maybe find out what's worrying them.

In this example the auxiliary contrasts the personal approach of hospices with the depersonalised hospital, further highlighting the importance of emotional labour being a recognised aspect of the

work. Although for the most part the emotional labour can be integrated with other work, occasionally it must be carried out on its own. Sometimes a specific event means that routines must be dropped, and time taken to 'be with' and 'talk to' ill people and families without the structure of other practical work intervening. Domestic routines can often be made to accommodate this without great disruption to large numbers of other people, but in public, paid work time spent with one ill person and their family usually means that others, perhaps with as much need, have less spent on them. At a different hospice, a nurse visiting a patient at home described the start of what turned out to be a bad day.

A battle royal started. The older one hit the younger one across the face, and the father wanted to get the police to evict the elder daughter because she wouldn't go. And while all this was going on the little lady upstairs was breaking her heart because she could hear the row. In the end I had to go downstairs and really shout, because they didn't listen to me talking quietly. I said 'Your mother is dying upstairs, and you really ought to get your priorities right'. And I was there about an hour and a half trying to placate them. And that was my first call. And I didn't feel I could go on. I came out absolutely emotionally drained. I really didn't feel I had anything much left to offer anybody else.

On this occasion, had the nurse not worked with the family, the police might have been called upon to intervene not through any maliciousness on the part of the individuals, but because of their inability to negotiate their differing views at a time of crisis. The work of dealing with so much anger, frustration, guilt and fear took its toll on the nurse, who nevertheless had to go to visit other patients who were waiting for her.

It takes time to work through frightening or worrying feelings, helping ill people and their families to work out a strategy they can live with. In addition, some events require that emotional labourers are available to give a spontaneous, personal response. If blocks of time cannot be made available on demand, together with the more routine moments of personal intimacy, emotional labour is lost amongst apparently more pressing demands. Emotional labour cannot, therefore, just be slotted in as an extra within a job, the job has to be designed to be flexible enough to accommodate emotional labour. The predominance of the working routine, of the physical labour over emotional labour, shows even

at hospices, particularly at times of pressure when it is the physical work which has primacy

If you're really short, you go at such a rate. On lates, if there are 4 staff on, 2 do drugs. That leaves two to do oral hygienes and start backs. Recently I've had a few lates with the new girls, and its quite a strain, and I get all excited wondering if I'm getting through the work

In these circumstances, the nurses accept a commonsense understanding of 'work' as 'doing something', physical work, thus excluding emotional labour from their definitions of work. The insidious effect of pressure to 'work' is that tasks gradually become pre-eminent, and then other work, such as emotional labour, is carried out as 'time' allows. From being part of a 'whole', gradually, through the circumstances in which it is carried out, the psycho-social work becomes secondary.

Strauss *et al*'s observations of 'comfort work', which is usually technologically based, and 'sentimental work', which includes 'composure work' as a means of helping patients sustain their self control, show both as being subject to time constraints, usually invisible, but necessary to the completion of medical tasks.

a great deal of nonsentimental work could not be carried out as easily, efficiently, or at all if the requisite sentimental tasks were not done' (Strauss *et al* , 1985: 145)

As Strauss *et al* describe them, comfort work and sentimental work are secondary to the main purpose of efficient medical care and particularly in the United States, efficient medical care means profit. The limitation of this account of goal oriented work is that being gender blind it fails to note the gender division of labour associated with the work. Further, though they note that the existence of an ideology emphasising sentimental work enhances its explicitness, they fail to note the conflict of dealing with emotions within a highly technologised, science based schema. Thus the limitations of even explicit ideologies is obscured.

Building in staffing ratios which take account of psychosocial elements of nursing work is a relatively new concept. As Armstrong pointed out, until the 1970s the 'caring role' of the nurse was restricted primarily to biological functioning of the patient (Armstrong, 1983) and even now there is a tendency to assess patient:staff ratio according to physical dependency.

At the hospice it was agreed that the older auxiliaries were key people in understanding the patients' greatest concerns:

Do you remember me telling you I get a tinge jealous wishing I was nearer the patients than I am? They put on such a front in front of the doctors. And they're fine. Everything's fine. And they get a different picture. Everything's reasonably fine with me. But the girls (auxiliaries), the ones that get the real stories are the ones that do everything for them. The older auxiliaries, they're the backbone of the unit. Doing the things they need most. And I mean we're doing essentials, like pain controlling them, but that's not the close thing to a patient. (Sister for the hospice)

As with domestic emotional labour, the forms the emotional labour takes and its visibility in the public domain, is subject to the circumstances in which it is carried out. Where emotional labour is employed but unrecognised, its value in maintaining the social regulation of emotions is obscured. Since the skills are merely 'housewives' skills, based on women's domestic work, the organisation, training, and reward systems which reinforce 'valued' practices, are minimal or nil. It was therefore interesting that the hospice staff believed the auxiliaries to be the most valuable staff because of their ability to 'be close to the patients'. They had skills the trained nurses called upon:

At that time I just didn't know how to cope. And luckily the older auxiliaries were there. If Maggie hadn't been on that day I don't know what would have happened. I just didn't know what to do with this poor woman. She just completely broke down and collapsed in front of me. I went to get Maggie, and said, come and help me please. And Maggie was very firm with her, but very sympathetic at the same time. (Hospice staff nurse, talking about an auxiliary)

A contradiction in the auxiliaries role was that despite their skills and their importance to the patients and the running of the hospice, the auxiliaries pay was, of course, the lowest except for the cleaning staff. As women are likely to be under-represented in nursing management, so men are likely to be under-represented at the levels at which emotional labour takes place, and yet it will be these managers who are responsible for defending the emotional

labour component of the nursing work. It is estimated that only 10 per cent of the 378,000 nurses and midwives are male (HMSO, 1985). In 1980, to every nineteen female auxiliaries and assistants there was one male, one male to every ten female student nurses, one male to every five female registered nurses in all specialities, but nearly half the top management and education posts were occupied by men (Salvage, 1985).

While not all emotional labour is carried out by women, it builds on skills women learn as part of what Oakley refers to as their 'long apprenticeship' (Oakley, 1974). With new systems of scientific management being implemented, and management accountability at a premium (see Griffiths report, 1984) it is hard to imagine where the work carried out by emotional labourers will fit in. Since the work is rarely recognised, management methods of accounting for it are even rarer, and where they exist at all they are in their infancy. Yet this does not detract from the evidence that such work is done in the public sector, in industry and commerce, and will continue to need to be done.

Contradictions of emotion at work

Emotional labour is subject to the circumstances in which it is carried out. It does not exist on its own, but it requires a form of organisation which allows for spontaneity, flexibility and space to initiate and respond to need for attention. It is not that the expression of emotions, or even the emotion itself, is unpredictable, rather that the logic behind emotion is of a different quality and calibre to that of, for instance, the logic that goes with supposedly 'academic' thinking.

The contradictions of emotion at work, and of emotional labourers in the public domain, are those which arise because 'emotion' is held to contrast with 'rational', because 'emotion' sits uneasily with workplace values of timetabling, predictability and efficiency, because emotions belong at home, they are women's work and unskilled.

The contradictions mean that although women may be employed on the basis of their skills in dealing with other people's feelings, they are given no credit for those skills. Well remunerated, often male, professionals, have years of training to learn to manage emotion as part of their job. These professionals, for instance psychiatrists, get the prestige for their work in 'emotional control', when the bulk of the work is carried on unrecognised, unrecorded,

low paid, and usually by women. Where men are associated with such work in the public domain, they are more likely than women to move away from it, either through promotion, such as in nursing or by transforming their profession, such as personnel management. The emotional work still has to be done, but even if the work is recognised, it is secondary work, integrated into the labour process through 'gendered jobs'.

Hospices are an interesting example of a public institution in which credence is given to the demand for emotional care. Hospices attempt to give a quality of care similar to that of the family, and that includes making provision for emotional labour. But as the family is subject to the pressures of the workplace, so in hospices, 'family care' is doubly subject to workplace organisation. Within the privacy of the domestic domain, emotional labour is shaped by family demands. Emotional labour carried out in the public sector is imported through domestic notions of the 'family', but is then vulnerable to the organisation within which it is carried out. In the workplace the subtleties of emotional labour, are likely to be overwhelmed by the dominant organisation and by people who are unnerved by the expression of emotion. As P. D. Anthony explains in the *Ideology of Work*:

The expectation of a consistent and dependable performances among workers was part of a framework in which economic values had attained the highest regard, economic goals had displaced other social and spiritual objectives, and industrial requirements had become more demanding in terms of the requisite behaviour of subordinates. (Anthony 1977: 301)

Traditionally the workplace is not a place where emotional expression is thought to be appropriate. Emotion is, yet again, contrasted with rationality, although, for instance, controlled aggression may be sanctioned as it contributes to healthy competition. One analysis of executives notes:

many executives have engineering, scientific, legal or financial backgrounds. Each of these fields places a heavy emphasis on cognitive rationality and measurable or verifiable facts. People who enter them usually are trained from childhood to suppress their feelings, to maintain a competitive, aggressive, non-emotional front. They are taught to be highly logical, and they seek to impose that kind of rationality on organizations. (Levinson, 1973)

A good labour force is one in which feelings are controlled, and only those sanctioned as useful for specific types of work are employed, such as 'aggression' or the sensitivity that breeds business 'creativity' and thereby profit for the company (Patrick, 1976). Where consistency of performance may be an appropriate expectation in the workplace, the demand for 'emotional labour' with 'listening', 'being there', giving affection etc., has to be fitted into a timetable that is designed to achieve efficient 'work' practices. Anthony specifically notes the exclusion of the social and spiritual objectives to which the hospices aspire, in favour of economic objectives.

The artificial division between emotional and rational

The purpose of this essay has been to show that the regulation of emotions is a problem because of the way capitalist production is organised and, in exploring the problem, to highlight the contradictions of emotion in the workplace. Since the skills in the management of emotion which are learned by women as part of their domestic labour are also made use of within paid employment, the artificial dichotomy between domestic labour and workplace labour is exposed. This dichotomy obscures the significance of women's labour.

It has been my argument that emotional labour carried out in the public domain is subject to the same key forces as emotional labour in the domestic domain, leaving it unrecognised, unrecorded and unrewarded in both. Though emotional labour is shaped by the conditions under which it is carried out, the flexibility of emotional labour means that it can be at least partially adapted to specific circumstances, including those of the workplace. Though the significance of their emotional labour is as invisible in the workplace as it is in the domestic domain, women may be employed specifically to make use of these 'natural' skills.

The material, political and social consequences of emotional labour are obscured. Though emotional labour is a core part of the maintenance and continuity of labour power and the social relations of production in the workplace and in the domestic domain it remains unrecognised as a form of labour. This is both the result of and contributes to the gender division of labour through which women's skills and labour are undervalued, because they are women's not men's. There exists a distorting,

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divisive conceit through which men are associated positively with rational thought and action while women are negatively associated with emotional reaction. This false distinction facilitates a gender division of labour through which men's labour is understood to be central to the creation of value, while women's work is considered peripheral, subordinated as merely 'support' work, equally marginalised in private and public domains. Though the imperatives of patriarchy and capitalism need emotional labour, it is the dominance of those imperatives which hide and deride both the labour and the labourers.

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Men, women, and clergymen: opinion and authority in a sacred organization

Alan Aldridge

Abstract

The Church of England faces a potential crisis over the ordination of women to the priesthood. This article presents survey and interview evidence of patterns of clerical opinion on the problem, showing that the trend of clerical opinion is in favour. However, the organizational context of clerical life means that whereas a clergyman's opinion is fateful for women it may have little consequence for the man himself. Clergymen have an assured status conferred by their priest's orders, they are integrated into professional structures and social networks, they exercise an authority which is seldom openly challenged, and they enjoy a high degree of autonomy and freedom from accountability. Since they are able, if they wish, to insulate themselves from women's ministry, they are often indifferent to its future course. It is not therefore, a matter of material concern in the working lives of most parish clergymen. Yet women's admission to the priesthood is symbolically momentous. Clerical ambivalence about women priests reflects conflict within the sacred organization between the forces of tradition, charisma and rational-legality.

One of the sharpest controversies in the Church of England concerns ordination of women to the priesthood. It has become a central issue in Church politics, and dominated the 1986 elections to the current General Synod.

Schism is feared. Many people look to Dr Graham Leonard, Bishop of London, as the potential leader of a 'continuing' Church, a Church which would claim loyalty to the 'catholic' faith and order from which it would deem the rest of the Church of England to have departed.

Even if schism is averted, the worldwide Anglican communion is already divided against itself. Commentators disagree about the impact that ordination of women priests has had on other branches of the Anglican communion. The problem has been imported into England by Anglican women priests who conduct 'illegal' celebrations of the Eucharist, one even took place in Church House, Westminster. The apparent turmoil in the Anglican communion has left ecumenical overtures to the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches in disarray. Conversely, schemes of *rapprochement* with protestant churches have foundered partly because they have women ministers.

Interpreting their exclusion from the priesthood as the fruit of deep-rooted sexism in the Church, feminist Christians have contested the subordinate role to which the Church has traditionally allocated women. There has been a reaction: the Movement for the Ordination of Women is now confronted by Women Against the Ordination of Women. Many feminists have come to the conclusion that feminism and Christianity are incompatible.

Not surprisingly, sociologists and clerics have diagnosed the conflict over the ordination of women to the priesthood as a key component of the Church's alleged crisis of identity. The cohesion of the Church of England, the integration of the Anglican communion and its articulation with other Churches are all apparently threatened. Underlying this is a conflict over the *raison d'être* of Anglicanism.

My purpose in this article is twofold. First, to present an analysis of the current state and main trends of clerical thinking about the ordination of women to the priesthood. Second, to examine the social significance of clerical opinion by locating it in an organizational context. Given the Church of England's authority structure and decision-making procedures, clerical opinion will be decisive in determining the future of women's ministry.

The evidence I shall present derives from three related sources. In November and December 1983 I sent a postal questionnaire to all the serving Anglican parochial clergy in one English diocese, completed returns were received from 178 respondents, 82.4 per cent of the population. From May to July 1985 I conducted interviews with a sample of forty clergymen drawn from these 178. The sample was selected, on the basis of respondents' answers to key items on the questionnaire, to represent four Anglican traditions: ten were evangelicals, ten liberals, ten centrists and ten conservative Catholics. During the same period I also interviewed

eighteen of the twenty deaconesses and accredited women lay workers in the same diocese

Although no one diocese could possibly represent all the others, this diocese is not idiosyncratic. A spectrum of socio-economic conditions is displayed. There is a large conurbation with relatively affluent suburbs, some impoverished inner areas and deprived peripheral estates. The diocese contains declining industrial communities and prospering market towns, villages, too, range from affluent to poor.

Although there are no national data on the distribution of 'churchmanship' among clergy, comparison with other studies shows that the diocese I selected is not grossly atypical in its mix of Church traditions.

Table 1 *Distribution of Anglican churchmanship among respondents in three surveys*

	<i>Ranson et al</i> 1971	<i>Bryman</i> 1985	<i>Aldridge</i> 1983
Anglo-Catholic	12.1	14.3	7.9
Prayer Book Catholic*	19.6	17.1	17.4
Catholic Charismatic*	—	—	6.7
Central/Broad Church	33.2	21.7	18.0
Modernist/New Theology	9.0	4.6	1.7
Liberal Evangelical	13.1	9.1	6.2
Conservative Evangelical	5.0	13.7	9.6
Evangelical Charismatic*	—	—	12.9
Other	8.0	19.4	19.1

*On my questionnaire I used the term 'Liberal Catholic' instead of 'Prayer Book Catholic', so as to avoid confusion with the controversy surrounding liturgical innovation and the abandonment of the 1662 Book of Common Prayer. I also introduced the categories 'Catholic Charismatic' and 'Evangelical Charismatic' to allow for the impact of the charismatic movement.

Ranson, Bryman and Hinings' 1971 research encompassed three dioceses, and Bryman's 1985 restudy selected one of these (Bryman, 1988). The relatively conservative cast of my diocese is illustrated here. *Avant-garde* clergy are few. I had difficulty in identifying ten 'liberal' clergymen for interview, and it became clear that some of them might have been more accurately designated 'centrist'. The Anglo-Catholic wing is numerically

under-represented and appears to feel beleaguered; evangelicals are in the ascendant.

There has been nothing unusual in the treatment of women's ministry in the diocese. The traditional ministries of women have been gradually developed, so that in recent years the number of deaconesses, and now women deacons, has been a little above the average for all dioceses.

A profile of clerical opinion

My postal survey reveals majority support among the parochial clergy for the ordination of women to the priesthood in the Church of England. Only 32 per cent said they were opposed whereas 53.9 per cent were in favour; 12.4 per cent were uncertain. This result is similar to the findings of two subsequent opinion surveys. In one enquiry, conducted for *The Independent* by Horack and Associates in December 1986, clergymen below the rank of bishop were randomly selected from *Crockford's Clerical Directory 1985-6*. Of the three hundred in their achieved sample 60 per cent were in favour of the ordination of women to the priesthood, 33 per cent against and 7 per cent classified as 'other'. A similar distribution of clerical opinion was found in a survey carried out by the Association for the Apostolic Ministry – an Anglican pressure group opposed to the ordination of women to the priesthood – and published in the *Church Times* on 1 July 1988. Their questionnaire was returned by 8,780 clergymen, 73.8 per cent of the population. 57.1 per cent of respondents were in favour of the ordination of women, 39.0 per cent opposed and 3.9 per cent undecided.

To explore the reasons for support and opposition, my questionnaire presented a number of theological arguments against the priesting of women. Clergymen's responses are shown below.

These theological arguments against ordination of women to the priesthood received remarkably little support. Admittedly, the nuances of theological disputation cannot be conveyed in a postal questionnaire. Was the phrasing of each statement too crude to elicit agreement from some respondents who were nevertheless sympathetic to the underlying theological reasoning?

I would say not. First, the arguments I presented on the questionnaire, though telescoped, would be easily recognised by clergy. These propositions are common coin in theological debate,

Table 2 *Clerical opinion on theological objections to the ordination of women to the priesthood*

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Other/DK</i>
1 Christ's restriction of his choice of apostles to men shows us that women are not to be admitted to the priesthood	15.2	70.8	11.2	2.8
2 St Paul's teaching makes it clear to us that women are not to be admitted to the priesthood	18.5	65.2	14.0	2.2
3 Since God incarnate was a man He can be represented sacramentally only by a man	12.9	73.0	10.1	3.9
4 Women are divinely ordained as subordinate to men and so cannot possess priestly authority	5.1	83.7	9.0	2.2
5 There are no valid theological objections to the ordination of women to the priesthood	62.4	21.3	14.0	2.2

(Percentage figures, n=178)

and are found not just in abstruse but also in popular treatments of the ordination of women priests. Second, if the questions are poorly worded then, rather than simply disagreeing, respondents might have said they were uncertain, or refused to answer, or taken the opportunity to write additional comments. (This latter was an offer that many respondents accepted in a later section, where they demanded to know what I meant by the term 'fundamentalist'!) Instead of this, a clear majority in each case signalled their disagreement with the statements presented to them. Third, 62.4 per cent agreed that there were no theological objections to the ordination of women to the priesthood. Thus of

the thirty-eight respondents who thought that there are valid theological objections to women's ordination only six failed to agree with any of those presented on the questionnaire. Two of the six wrote that they were unhappy about the Church's concepts of 'priesthood' and 'ordination' as applied to men, so they were not merely objecting to my formulations but refusing to take part in the debate as it is currently constituted.

These theological propositions command so little support, I shall argue, because they fail to connect with the experiences and interests of parish clergymen.

The responses in Table 3 show the level of support for two of the main theological arguments for the ordination of women

Table 3 *Clerical opinion on theological arguments in favour of the ordination of women to the priesthood*

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Other-DK</i>
1 The Holy Spirit is leading the Church of England towards the ordination of women to the priesthood	44 9	23 6	30 3	1 1
2 The fact that many women in the Church of England feel a vocation to the priesthood shows us that they should no longer be excluded from it	28 7	50 6	19 1	1 7

Comparing figures from Tables 2 and 3 shows a marked decline in clerical support for women's ordination as one moves from the general to the particular, from abstract theologizing to concrete commitment to change in the ministry of the Church of England. Thus, although 62.4 per cent see no valid theological objections to the ordination of women to the priesthood, only 53.9 per cent are in favour; only 44.9 per cent believe that the Holy Spirit is leading the Church toward ordaining women priests, and a mere 28.7 per cent see the professed vocations of women to the priesthood as a

decisive argument. This is evidence, as I shall argue later, of the low salience of the issue in the professional lives of most parish clergymen.

It is often supposed by members of the Church of England that clerical opinions on the ordination of women to the priesthood are significantly related to the clergyman's age and length of service in holy orders. Younger men are thought to be more 'progressive', and the experience of training alongside women at theological college is typically seen as a solvent of 'prejudice'. My own evidence does not confirm these hypotheses. Neither age nor length of service in holy orders proved to be significantly correlated with clerical opinion on women's ordination.

The clergyman's 'churchmanship' was a significant variable. Following Ranson *et al.* (1977: 41 ff.), churchmanship is to be seen as a framework of religious belief which defines 'a person's relation to God in specific forms of devotional and ritualistic activities' and the interpretation and enactment of faith in the secular world. The various traditions of Anglican churchmanship represent, then, rival schools of professional *praxis*. Ranson *et al.* and Towler and Coxon (1979) show the salience of churchmanship in the clergyman's conception of his role. Clergy exercise autonomous professional judgement in freely aligning with a tradition, and that tradition carries a conceptual framework for understanding the clerical role and women's relation to it.

Opposition to the ordination of women was concentrated in Anglo-Catholicism. This was the only churchmanship group where a majority (71.4 per cent) were opposed to the priesting of women, and where a majority (64.3 per cent) also held that there are valid theological objections to the ordination of women. My interviews showed the firmness of Anglo-Catholic convictions. Ten interviewees had been selected as 'conservative' Catholics, all of whom, from the questionnaire, were opposed to women's ordination. Not one had changed his mind.

Although the evangelical tradition has been the other locus of organized opposition to women priests, my evangelical respondents showed little sign of this. 60.8 per cent said they were in favour of the ordination of women to the priesthood, with only 23.5 per cent opposed. There was scant support among evangelicals for the theological arguments offered against the ordination of women (as presented in Table 2 above). Even the propositions that have traditionally carried weight among them – that the teaching of St Paul shows women's unfitness for the priesthood, and that God

created women as subordinate to men – received only 12 per cent and 10 per cent support respectively.

Those in the central/broad church category combine support for the ordination of women priests (59.4 per cent in favour, 28.1 per cent opposed), rejection of theological arguments against women priests (68.7 per cent agreeing that there are no valid theological objections, 9.4 per cent disagreeing), and relatively high levels of concern about the internal consequences for the Church of England (48.4 per cent expecting major schism) and for ecumenical initiatives (43.7 per cent agreeing that these would be undermined). This profile of opinion characterizes not only central churchmen but the dominant official stance of the Church of England. It is encapsulated in the concept of the 'unripe' time.

As pressure has grown within the Church of England for the ordination of women priests, so opposition has mobilized. Over the last decade, patterns of voting in the General Synod on the ordination of women have shown an upward trend in favour but some volatility.

Table 4 *Trends in the proportion of members in the three Houses of General Synod voting in favour of legislation permitting the ordination of women to the priesthood, percentage figures*

	1978	1984	1987	1988
Bishops	65	87	80	57
Clergy	39	57	66	57
Laity	53	63	69	59

On each occasion, opposition has been most organized and determined among the clergy. The motions before Synod in these debates were different, so conclusions about trends have to be drawn cautiously. Some clergymen who assented in 1987 to the preparation of legislation were voting not for women priests but for damage limitation: if women are ordained, then the 'safeguards' recommended by the bishops should be implemented. The 1988 vote, showing a drop in support in all three Houses, reflected fears of disruption if women enter the priesthood. The immediate outlook for women priests is, then, far from clear. Any legislation permitting ordination of women to the priesthood will require, at the stage of final approval, a two-thirds majority in all three Houses of the General Synod.

In order to assess clerical expectations, I asked respondents whether, in their judgement, the Church of England was likely to ordain women to the priesthood before the end of the century. Whereas 56.2 per cent believe that this will be so, only 17.4 per cent think that it will not; 25.8 per cent are uncertain. Expectation and desire are significantly related, as found by the Horack survey for *The Independent* and as shown by my data in Table 5.

Table 5 *Crosstabulation of clerical opinion on the desirability and probability of ordination of women to the priesthood, row percentages*

		In your judgement, is the Church of England likely to ordain women to the priesthood before the end of the century?			
Are you in favour of the ordination of women to the priesthood?		Yes	No	Uncertain	Other
Yes		72.9	14.6	12.5	0 (n=96)
No		31.6	29.8	38.6	0 (n=57)
Uncertain		54.5	0	45.5	0 (n=22)
Other		0	0	66.7	33.3 (n=3)

Chi square=96.2, df=9, $p < 0.01$

Confidence that theirs is the winning side is far greater among supporters of women's ordination. My later interviews with forty clergymen drawn from respondents to the questionnaire revealed that most advocates of women's ordination expected it to happen fairly soon. Opponents, on the other hand, were less sanguine, and some were resigned to defeat.

Many clergymen would prefer the Church to hurry slowly to ordain women to the priesthood, as Nancy Nason-Clark (1987) found in her research on Anglican clergymen in the south of England. She asked her respondents to rank their degree of support for or opposition to the ordination of women to the priesthood on a ten-point scale. A (somewhat arbitrary) banding of the results produced this distribution: 38.1 per cent in favour, 38.1 per cent against, and 23.9 per cent 'in the middle'. Almost a quarter of her respondents appeared to lack strong convictions either for or against women priests. Many of these clergymen, she

argues, believe the time for women to enter the priesthood has not arrived. They are echoing the position adopted in 1975 by the General Synod, which resolved, after an emotionally charged debate, that although 'there are no fundamental objections to the ordination of women to the priesthood', the time was not 'ripe' for women to proceed. Prominent among the stated reasons for delay are fears that ordaining women to the priesthood will tear the Church of England apart and destroy the ecumenical movement

Table 6 *Clerical opinion on the impact of the ordination of women to the priesthood*

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Other/DK</i>
1 The ordination of women to the priesthood would cause a major schism in the Church of England	46 1	25 8	25 8	2 2
2 The ordination of women to the priesthood would undermine the ecumenical movement	38 2	39 9	18 5	3 4
3 Should women canonically ordained as Anglican priests overseas be allowed to officiate in the Church of England if formally invited to do so when visiting this country?	(Yes) 46 6	(No) 42 1	10 1	1 1

(Percentage figures, n=178)

Opinion was almost equally divided over whether Anglican women priests from one of the overseas provinces that have already ordained women to the priesthood should be allowed to celebrate the Eucharist if formally invited to do so when visiting England. A motion proposing this change was subsequently debated in the General Synod in July 1986, where it required a two thirds majority in all three Houses. Despite the clear support of the Archbishop of Canterbury the motion failed in the Houses of

Clergy (57 per cent in favour) and Laity (62.5 per cent in favour) Here again the clerical representatives showed themselves the least eager for change. That the integrity of Anglicanism stood in jeopardy was prophesied by both sides in the debate.

The pattern of opinion among parish clergymen on the ordination of women to the priesthood may be summarized as follows. A clear majority state that they are in favour of the ordination of women priests. There is evidence, from my sample and from clerical representatives on General Synod, that opinion is moving in favour of women in the priesthood, most clergymen acknowledge this trend. The firmest opponents of women priests are found, as expected, among Anglo-Catholics; opposition among evangelicals is less extensive and less determined. Overtly theological arguments against women priests appear to carry little weight. Yet there is widespread concern among parish clergymen that the ordination of women may prove disruptive, both within the Church of England and to the wider ecumenical movement. Hence the appeal of the argument that the time to ordain women priests is not ripe.

Principal elements of the clerical role

Clerical theorizing about women and priesthood is embedded in a social and organizational context. When Anglican clergymen address the question of ordination of women to the priesthood, they draw on experiences of ministry and career expectations that are fundamentally different from those of women ministers. Four crucial elements of the clergyman's structural position are examined in the following discussion.

Characteristics of careers in the Church of England

<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Status	Anomaly
Integration	Isolation
Authority	Subordination
Autonomy	Heteronomy

Status/Anomaly Even though secularization and the decline of community have rendered problematic the social status of the clerical profession in the wider society, within the Church itself the clergyman's standing is assured. Granted there are conflicting

theological understandings of the nature of priesthood in which different elements of the role are elevated above others. Six of the clergymen interviewed, all of them evangelicals, rejected the concepts of priesthood and ordination as these have been traditionally understood in the Church of England. They did not object to women's performing the 'priestly' sacramental acts, but declared that women ought not to have authority over men. These respondents were challenging neither the social standing nor the authority of the clergyman, on the contrary, they were reaffirming his status and authority. Nor were they doubtful or confused about their own role. Rather, they were seeking to reformulate the Church's dominant interpretation of that role. Their choice of a distinctively evangelical framework is one manifestation of clerical autonomy, for clergy are free, within the elastic constraints of Canon Law, to enact a ministry which is unassailably evangelical, catholic, charismatic or whatever.

For women ministers it is otherwise. The status of deaconess is profoundly anomalous (Aldridge, 1987). Although they are set apart symbolically from lay people – by their title 'deaconess', by their blue cassock and pectoral cross, by their staff status in the parish, by the specific vocation that is required, by their training at theological college, by their initiation through the laying-on of hands by a bishop, and by their lifelong vows – they are ontologically lay people, licensed not ordained, in orders but not in holy orders. The order of deaconesses was deliberately constituted in such a way that they could not be considered clergy. In Durkheimian terms they were to be firmly on the latter side of the great divide between sacred and profane.

Not all deaconesses accept the official definition of their status. Deaconess Morgan suggested with irony that she was presumably in unholy orders. Deaconess Gunn said that she considered herself a deacon already, and Deaconess Barnett said it would be 'hurtful' to have to undergo ordination to the diaconate since her current ministry was diaconal, even priestly. Many said that *diakonia* was the essence of all Christian ministry. All but one were in favour of women's ordination to the diaconate because this would reduce the anomalies and perhaps bring greater recognition. The term 'ordination' was used by many deaconesses to refer to their own initiation. Mrs Baker gave as her main reason for wishing to remain a lay worker 'the element of ordination' in becoming a deaconess, though she recognised that officially deaconesses are not ordained.

A deaconess who challenges the ontology of her orders mounts an individual protest against the Church's definition of her situation. A clergyman who questions the received idea of priesthood may align himself with one of the 'parties', politely called 'traditions', in the Church of England. She privately rejects an ascribed status, he identifies with legitimate and organized *praxis*.

In 1987 the Church of England began to ordain women as deacons. Figures from Church House (kindly supplied to me by Alison Harding) show that the Church had at that time approximately - Church records are often fuzzy! - 601 deaconesses. Only twenty-one of these did not proceed to ordination as deacons. Since the order of deaconesses is being wound up, with no new entrants admitted, the ratio of deaconesses to women deacons will dwindle. In 1987, 103 women completed their training for the ministry and were ordained to the diaconate. Given that a similar number of graduates is predicted for 1988, there will be at least thirty-seven women deacons for every deaconess.

Despite this inflow of women into the diaconate, a telling anomaly remains: for men, the diaconate is a one-year probation before being priested; for women, it is a terminus.

Integration/Isolation At the time of my fieldwork there were two hundred and fifty-two clergy in the diocese plus sixty-six retired clergymen holding the bishop's permission to officiate. In contrast there were eighteen deaconesses and two accredited women lay workers.

The clergyman is integrated into the Church's organizational structure. There are frequent meetings with brother clergy for him to attend and there are many clerical societies for him to join. If he aligns himself with one of the 'churchmanship' groups, he gains access to a nationwide network of debate, information exchange, sponsorship, sociability and friendship. This is not to deny that a sense of isolation lurks in the dark side of clergymen's experience. Ironically, a priest under stress and with personal problems may find there is no one to whom he can turn for comfort and counsel. By comparison, nevertheless, women ministers are poorly organized and lack institutional support.

Authority/Subordination The Church of England vests a high degree of authority in the parish clergy, and many lay people expect the clergy to display firm leadership. Thus, for example, the

clerical voice is usually decisive in choosing forms of worship, despite the need to win over the Parochial Church Council. Roger Homan (1979) has described some of the tactics available to clergymen who wish to persuade reluctant lay people to introduce for a supposedly trial period the new rites of the Alternative Service Book, as a prelude to dispensing with the 1662 Book of Common Prayer. Not one of the clergymen I interviewed was chafing under an uncongenial Prayer Book regime; those who had wanted to introduce liturgical change had succeeded. The Prayer Book Society's campaign was seen as remote from their immediate concerns, and none claimed to have been significantly affected by it (Aldridge, 1986).

The rhetoric of lay participation is widespread but the authority of the clergy remains paramount. The charismatic movement is a telling example. An important part of the movement's self-conception is that it has a strongly anti-authoritarian thrust. 'Spontaneity' is a core value for charismatics. They draw satisfaction from their 'rediscovery of the laity' and their encouragement of active lay participation in worship through prophecy, tongues, dance, song and touch. Their principles of 'every member ministry' and 'priesthood of all believers' seem to be an open denial of clerical dominance.

Charismatic renewal is a movement which ostensibly implies what Bryan Wilson (1976) calls the 'destruction' of the churches. Though often divisive, charismatic renewal in the Church of England has been clerically orchestrated, and has tended not to undermine but to reinforce the position of the clergyman (Davies, 1984). Even if he is assisted by a team of 'elders' he will be pre-eminent. Elders often undercut the authority of other lay people, such as those who serve on the Parochial Church Council, while leaving the authority of the incumbent intact. Three of the clergymen I interviewed were prominent in the charismatic movement and their churches were well known as theatres of charismatic renewal. These respondents said that charismatic phenomena – prophecy, healing, glossolalia – are powerful and dangerous. Because of this, they saw social control within the charismatic congregation as imperative. One said:

The whole rationale within which you allow these things is that they are regulated and discerned and evaluated and tested by those who are leading the service – and normally if somebody

wants to share something they must come up front to share it alongside me. Then we will either affirm what they're saying or say we don't sense that's from God. And there would be very strong – or at least the aim would be for a very strong – leadership at that point. You need in a church like ours very very strong leadership because somebody at the back can take over and I wouldn't have that.

This respondent's switch to the first person singular is revealing. 'In principle', he added, it should be the elders who test and evaluate the charismatic gifts, but 'in practice' he did so himself. The second respondent shared the conviction about social control to ensure that the phenomena were genuine, and to provide the security that lay people need in the face of the charismatic, 'It has to be quite firmly led from the front'. The third respondent said that 'strong direction' was essential, and this he believed was relatively easy to achieve within the structures of the Church of England. Among his own congregation, lay people who sense that they have been vouchsafed a prophetic word are 'invited' to 'share' it with him so that he can 'evaluate' it before it is imparted to others.

Deaconesses and women lay workers have no authority formally vested in them by the Church. Ontologically they are lay people. The Canons of the Church of England make it clear that a deaconess or lay worker discharges her duties under the direction of the clergyman to whom she is directly accountable; this will be so for women deacons. It follows, as Deaconess Gunn said, that 'the most crucial thing is the man we work with rather than the situation'.

Autonomy/Heteronomy The clergy enjoy, at least within their parishes, a degree of autonomy and lack of accountability that is increasingly anachronistic even in the 'free' professions (Russell, 1980). In the wake of the disastrous attempt in the nineteenth century to discipline the liturgically wayward ritualists (Bentley, 1978), and following recurrent embarrassing failures to bring liberal Churchmen into line (Stephenson, 1984), Church authorities have little relish for battles with parish clergymen who may be able to command greater public support than they themselves can muster. Renegade clergy may forfeit promotion prospects but in the Church this is often a small sacrifice. Clergymen are, by comparison with most role performers, remarkably free to develop

their own distinctive mode of practice and to declare strong opinions within the context of their work itself

Women employed in occupations where men predominate typically have far less control over the course of their careers than do their male colleagues (Spencer and Podmore, 1987 *passim*). This holds for women ministers in the Church of England. Fewer positions are open to them. Rarely does a woman have patronage to dispense, so a woman minister's sponsors are almost invariably men. Women's career experiences are contingent on career decisions taken by men. When asked about their career aspirations hardly any of the women interviewed appeared to have a coherent plan. Some said that financial and domestic constraints restricted the options open to them, others felt they were lucky to be where they were and could not fare better elsewhere. Most had adopted a passive waiting role.

Clerical opinion in its social context

Most clergymen are able and willing to express 'an opinion' on women priests for the benefit of social surveys and opinion polls. Yet what follows from this? Nancy Nason-Clark argues that clergymen's opinions must be analysed in the wider context of their attitudes to gender roles in society. Her research leads her to conclude that the opinions of Anglican clergymen (and their wives) about women priests 'were more strongly related to their attitudes toward female rights and responsibilities within society and the family than they were to their theological or scriptural position'.

If a clergyman's sex-role ideology is typically stronger than his theological persuasion as a predictor of his view of the priesting of women, what then is the role of theology? It is, says Nason-Clark, to supply a rationale for his opinions. Theology is more important in the maintenance and rationalizing of sex-role attitudes than in their creation. Theology is therefore secondary to and derivative from sex-role ideology.

Even if clergymen's opinions are set in the context of their sex-role attitudes, the analysis still requires grounding in the social and organizational power structures in which clergy operate. Only then can the salience and impact of clerical opinion be assessed. For theology is not just a rarified academic discipline. Clergymen wield authority in the sacred organization through their practical

theologizing. Here the four features of the clerical career, outlined above, are decisive, for these are the structurally operative (though not necessarily the ideologically official) principles that govern the clerical function. The clergyman's position of *authority* guarantees that the role of parish theologian is his. *Autonomy* implies that he is seldom held accountable for his opinions. *Integration* into the clerical community gives protection against effective challenge. All this is rendered legitimate by his *ontological status* as priest. How, then, do these four principles bear on the specific issue of women's ordination to the priesthood?

Theological discourse is supreme If (and only if) God exists, theology is the supreme science, having 'good reason to claim to be dealing with the ultimate reality behind all other realities, all other objects of study which there may be' (Hebblethwaite, 1980 3). Or, as Locke wrote c.1698, theology 'is the comprehension of all other knowledge, directed to its true end' (quoted in Richardson, 1969). In the discourse of the Church, theological arguments are trump cards, overriding merely temporal considerations. What is to count as a theological argument is itself problematic. One crucial facet of authority in the Church is that it bestows entitlement to formulate arguments that are treated as theological.

Theology has been a male preserve Given the nexus between theology and authority, theology has been predominantly a male, clerical activity. Many of the women I interviewed confessed their lack of scholarly qualifications or theological expertise, only one said that theology was her *métier*. She observed that 'It requires quite an enlightened vicar, though, to let a woman come in and be the theologian in the parish. It's not one of women's traditional roles.'

Clergy can define the situation for women If he joins a parish where a woman is on the staff, the new incumbent will be able to define the situation for her. She is dependent on him for task allocation. It is also for him to decide how far she is to be involved in decision-making. A clergyman's opinion on women ministers is therefore fateful for any woman who works with him.

Women are poorly placed to challenge clerical opinion Three respondents had been in serious conflict with their parish priest,

and none had found a forum in which her difficulties could be discussed with a prospect of resolution. Each one had tackled her problem as an isolated individual. In one case the clergyman moved to a more desirable post, in another he reached the age of retirement and in the third the problem remained. None of the problems had been solved through any formal or informal grievance procedure.

Women are seen to deliver conventional performances As Janet Finch has shown in her study of clergy wives (Finch, 1980), the subordinate role is the one they are likely to play. Structurally they are 'incorporated' into their husband's work. Ideologically they are doubly bound by the internalized norm of loyalty both to husband and to parish priest. The mildest attempts to break free from the conventional role may be threatening or incomprehensible. Most clergy wives, therefore, outwardly conform to stereotype even when they have private reservations.

Women ministers are in a similar position to clergy wives. The structures of the Church oblige them to enact a role in which they depend on the clergy for 'help'. Women who are not entirely happy with the conventional definition of their role lack opportunities to voice dissatisfaction, so it often goes unrecognized. Some of the deaconesses Nason-Clark (1987) interviewed told her that it was not in their interest overtly to support the ordination of women priests. There is, to a casual observer, no behavioural difference between contentment and passively waiting for change. So it is that clergymen who reluctantly find themselves in the presence of women ministers are able to attribute to them ideas, feelings and aspirations they do not possess. Deaconess Richardson, for example, said that the clergy in her team ministry had asked her neither about women's ordination in general nor about her own calling:

And I'm no fighter, I'll be honest, I'm all for keeping the peace you see, but do you remember when we had Partners in Ministry (*sc* Mission) in the diocese? We had a group of people come to us, and they came to see us as a team. And we had a young Methodist girl – by young, I mean in her early twenties, very sharp girl she was – and she put the question at the team. And she asked the team the question that I hadn't asked and so it was interesting to see the team's reaction.

Men, women and clergymen

Deaconess Richardson had expressed for the first time in front of her clerical colleagues her own views and aspirations. Until an intervention from outsiders had precipitated the exchange, clergy had been unaware of her opinions and feelings.

One respondent said that it is only when clergy are happy with a positive answer that they ask her if she feels called to priesthood. By not asking, other clergymen protect themselves from the unwelcome news.

Clergy are able to insulate themselves from women's ministry One feature of clerical autonomy is that clergy who choose to insulate themselves from women ministers have hitherto found it easy to do so. As Fr Swales said, 'In a sense this isn't a problem for a male priest because he is the one person who is not likely to be receiving the ministry of women'. Mr Knowles saw being a priest as 'a refuge from the ministry of women'; the clerical profession enjoyed 'the atmosphere of a man's club, perhaps. It's actually quite a safe place not to be nagged at'. The diocesan authorities will try to avoid placing women for training in parishes where the clergy are reputed to hold a constricted view of the ministry of women. An incumbent who wants nothing to do with women ministers will not find one thrust upon him. Of the women I interviewed only two were currently working with clergymen who were outright opponents of the ordination of women to the priesthood.

Ordination of women to the priesthood is an issue of low salience in the lives of many clergymen Here is a paradox. On the one hand, the Church of England is riven with conflict over the ordination of women to the priesthood. On the other hand, this turmoil has little practical importance in the working lives of parish clergymen, the professional guardians of the sacred.

In my interviews, I was often struck by the casual way in which clergymen discussed the question of women priests. Impressionistically, I would say that no more than eleven of my forty clerical interviewees expressed strong convictions on the subject. I had expected to be offered a variety of professionally grounded expert opinions, but this was only occasionally so. Some clergymen sought to avoid discussion, claiming that they were 'simple' parish priests and not theologians. Others referred to their own prejudices. Many confessed difficulty in articulating a coherent position.

Since their own structural location does not require them to be otherwise, many clergymen are insulated from women's ministry. It

is not their problem. They are seldom challenged publicly to justify their opinions. Hence their opinions about ordination of women to the priesthood are not grounded in but detached from their professional expertise and experience.

In my interviews with clergymen, I asked all opponents of the ordination of women to the priesthood what they would do if it took place during their lifetime. Only one said that he would resign his orders. Since he was not drawn to Rome, he thought he might investigate the Eastern Orthodox, about whom he knew little. In any case, he was shortly due to retire. Other respondents either evaded my question, despite my promptings, or else said that they would carry on in the Church of England. Even if women are ordained to the priesthood, avoidance will still be open to men, because of the structures discussed above. Until women arrive at senior ecclesiastical positions – which is not in prospect for the near future – strategies of insulation will continue to work for men.

In terms of material interests – such as salary, promotion prospects, power and influence – parish clergymen have little to gain or lose by the entry of women to the priesthood. The only material interests at stake are those of the women themselves. Ordination of women to the priesthood would have little direct impact on clergymen's professional working lives. Clerical opinion about it is fateful for women but, typically, of low salience to men.

At the same time, clergymen are reluctant to conceptualize the problem simply in terms of material interests. The Church is not just an organization but a sacred organization, and the clergyman is not merely a role incumbent but a person with a sacred ontological status. The material and the ideal are theoretically fused in the Church and the priesthood.

Clergymen's ambivalence about the ordination of women to the priesthood reflects deep-seated dilemmas in the sacred organization. Here, more acutely than in secular organizations, is felt the interplay between tradition, rational-legality and charisma. Tradition weighs against the admission of women to the priesthood. Rational-legal imperatives press in favour: talented personnel are required for the priesthood, women can obviously do the work well and are currently under-employed in the diaconate. The charismatic is not so readily specified, yet in the sacred organization it is fundamental. Charisma can sweep aside tradition, and nullify rational-legality. All parties to the debate try, therefore, to harness charisma to their cause. Prophets announce that the Holy

Spirit is leading the Church toward the ordination of women priests. Women lay claim to a divine vocation and ask for it to be put to the test. Confronted with this, opponents of women priests emphasize that the tradition is itself sacred and charismatic.

The stance adopted in 1975 by the General Synod, and echoed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in his speech to Synod in July 1988 – that there are no fundamental objections to the ordination of women to the priesthood, but the time to proceed is not 'ripe' – has attracted ridicule from unsympathetic observers. It frustrates advocates of women's ordination and alarms opponents. Yet it truly reflects the 'opinions' of many rank-and-file clergymen. Unless a clergyman is convinced either that ordination of women to the priesthood would negate the Church's sacred character, or that failure to ordain women priests is an injustice that threatens the Church's mission, the conflict is likely to seem an unnecessary distraction from the 'real' work of the Church.

Faced with acute theoretical dilemmas over the clash of tradition, rationality and charisma, but recognizing that their own material interests are not at stake, many clergymen find refuge in the opinion that the time to ordain women priests is not ripe.

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Gender differences and anti-school boys

John Abraham

Abstract

This paper explores and contrasts the gender value systems of two groups of anti-school boys. It suggests that cultural differences in specifically gender values can lead to (i) polarisation between anti-school boys and (ii) confrontation with school authorities in ways not explained by the traditional theory of culture clash between the working class pupil and the middle class school. It is also noted that the label 'counter-school' used by Willis to convey the culture of some working class boys ('the lads') may need to be refined if the culture is reassessed in a way which acknowledges the commonality between the gender value systems of 'the lads' and those of the school. In fact, the research reported in this paper found that another group of anti-school boys (not working class) was much more counter the gender value system of the school than 'the lads' and did not uphold traditional masculine values.

Introduction

Since the 1960s there have been numerous studies of boys' subcultures in schools. Most of these have focused on how boys develop either anti- or pro-school values and orientations. In some cases these have documented social class related polarisation between anti-school and pro-school boys. For example, the research of Hargreaves (1967) in an English boys' secondary modern and Lacey's (1970) study of an English boys' grammar school. In other cases the focus has been on the detailed nature of working class boys' 'counter-school' culture as in Willis's (1977) study of a boys' secondary modern in England and Corrigan's (1979) study of boys in an English comprehensive.

In the 1970s other researchers (mostly women) pointed quite

correctly to the absence of studies of girls' subcultures or groups in schools. The male dominance of sociology of education and the tendency of male researchers to consider boys as more exciting research subjects have been suggested as possible reasons (Acker, 1981; McRobbie, 1978). Research such as that of Willis appeared to be problematic because it made claims about the school cultures and resistance of 'kids' yet no girls featured in any of the investigation. As a result several studies concentrating on girls' 'subcultures' and groups were carried out.

These have shown, amongst other things, that generalising from boys to all pupils is often not justified. McRobbie (1978) argues that girls are just as visible as boys in adolescent subcultures but the girls' concerns are different. Researching in an English youth club she found that the working class girls, in particular, tended to seek status through attractiveness to boys and denigrated girls who would not 'go out with' boys. However, as Anyon (1983) emphasises in her study of girls in working class schools in the USA, this status stands alongside the further subcultural norm that girls should not make themselves too 'available'. On the other hand, Furlong's (1976) study of black girls in an English secondary modern indicates that they may not form subcultural groups as such in the first place. Furlong argues that the notion of tightly knit subcultures and friendship groups did not apply to his sample of girls whose behaviour and values appeared to be situationally based rather than constrained or determined by subcultural norms and group approval. Related to Furlong's results is Lambart's (1976) finding in an English girls' grammar school that girls tend to be less polarised along a pro-/anti-school axis than previous studies of boys had shown. Indeed, Meyenn (1980), in his study of twelve and thirteen year olds in an English middle school had difficulty placing the girls in his study along a pro/anti-school continuum at all. Davies (1984) has noted that this may be because girls invest less importance in the schooling process as a whole than boys do. Furthermore, in a mixed comprehensive in England Davies found that for working class anti-school girls (the 'wenches'), unlike Willis's 'lads', there was no eager anticipation of shopfloor work with its concomitant allegiance to the 'counter-school' culture.

Research studies of girls have done much to develop the discussion of sex differences within schooling as well as provide important insights into how girls do, or do not, form subcultures. Importantly because of the way sex and gender are intertwined

these studies have added to an understanding of what is meant by feminine and masculine adolescent genders. It is now possible to refer to subcultures of femininity which are derived from the practices and beliefs of schoolgirls and not schoolboys. However, most of the research concerned with school subcultures whether taking boys or girls or both as samples have neglected any *explicit* study of *gender* differences within the *same* sex. Though there have often been implicit explorations of gender differences within a sample of boys or girls, usually differences between boys or between girls have been related to some intervening variable such as social class, ability grouping or occasionally ethnicity (cf. Willis (1977), Lacey (1970) and Fuller (1980) respectively).

Gender differences within the same sex, then, have been neglected in the sociology of education. Such neglect is particularly problematic in view of the point made by Hearn (1987) that there are many different types of males and females. He remarks

What we generally call 'men' and 'women' are themselves shorthands for classes of persons in determinate social relations (Hearn, 1987: 58)

Aims of the paper and Willis's theory of 'counter-school' culture

As Wood (1984) notes, studies of adolescent sex and sexuality have been rare in the sociology of education even amongst feminist research. Willis, however, was one of the first ethnographic researchers to include a discussion of masculinity and sexism within boys' 'counter-school' culture. For that reason, amongst others, *Learning to Labour* is an extremely significant work. Yet on reading Willis, one is left with the impression that working class boys' 'counter-school' culture is, on the whole, sexist and machismo, and the alternative group is the conformists (both working and middle class) who are apparently inept in their relationships with girls but from Willis's account seem to have no gender characteristics worthy of much description. Though Willis notes the polarisation between 'the lads' and the conformist 'ear 'ole' culture he does so very much from 'the lads' perspective. More importantly, because the 'ear 'oles' are conformist it is difficult to assess how much their polarisation from 'the lads' is due to conformist versus anti-school antagonism and how much due to

gender differences. Willis's research gives the impression that the two dimensions are rigidly associated, conformism entailing non-masculinity and anti-school behaviour entailing machismo masculinity.

Notwithstanding the general criticisms made of drawing sharp distinctions between conformist and anti-school pupils by Furlong (1976) and Turner (1983), Willis surely overstates his case not only by assuming that his study of boys can be the basis for a general theory of how 'kids' (boys and girls) are to be understood but also by generalising his study of 'the lads'' culture to all working class culture. Willis's study has been influential, so much so that his work has often been defined as the authority on the culture of working class boys in school. Yet even Willis admits that there were working class boys, some of the 'ear 'oles', who did not share the culture of 'the lads'. What Willis's book mostly reveals, in fact, is the culture of a subset of working class boys who are specifically 'counter-school' as defined by their breaking of school rules and opposition to the academic values of the school. Furthermore, and of central importance, Willis claims that much of 'counter-school' culture (a) is derived from a clash of values between the middle class school and working class pupils and parents and (b) has as its major dynamic working class pupil resistance.

Despite the many insights of Willis's *Learning to Labour* there is a danger that the *counter-school* element of 'the lads'' gender might be exaggerated on account of their overall (particularly social class-derived) culture clash with the school. In fact, it remains an open question how far one would be justified in defining Willis's 'lads' as *counter-school* if the focus of attention were on the clash between the gender values supported by the school and those held by 'the lads'.

The aim of this paper is to explore and describe the gender culture of boys from two different friendship groups of 'counter-school' pupils as defined by similar criteria as Willis (i.e. have bad behaviour records with school, oppose school rules etc.). One group is all male and predominantly working class, and the other mixed and lower middle class.¹ The problems to be considered are: (i) the relevance, if any, of the concepts of polarisation and resistance to the gender value systems of the two friendship groups; (ii) whether or not gender (specifically masculinity/non-masculinity) has a 'counter-school' function, possibly involving resistance, with respect to boys (middle class as well as working class) in ways not captured by Willis's study of some working class

boys; and (iii) the extent to which 'the lads' *gender* value system is, in fact, *counter* the school.

The school and methodology

The fieldwork on which this paper is based was carried out in a comprehensive school in a conurbation in the south of England from May–July 1986. Approximately 1,300 pupils attended the school, almost all of whom were white and English. The comprehensive, which will be called Greenfield, was mixed (approximately 50 per cent boys and 50 per cent girls) and mixed social class (with an estimated 30 per cent middle class take-up). I selected this type of school because I wanted to be able to study readily social class, sex and gender differences.

The approach followed in the tradition of ethnographic case study research as outlined by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983). It was designed to explore processes of gender differentiation, polarisation and resistance. A sample of 127 fourth year pupils (52 boys and 75 girls) were observed in class and in informal school settings. The pupils were streamed by setting in the fourth year and these pupils were drawn from eight classes, three of which were top ability groupings, three middle ability grouping and two bottom ability groupings. The pupils completed questionnaires (including friendship questionnaires), school records were examined and teachers and pupils were interviewed. I also observed in the staffroom and made staffroom notes as well as lesson notes. I was a visiting researcher at Greenfield and did not at any time take on the teacher role though I did help pupils with their work as individuals and in groupwork in the classroom. This also enabled me to talk to the pupils about some of the interesting classroom dynamics as they were occurring.

The standard method of 'checking' friendship groups and pairs by comparing the answers to the friendship questionnaires with observation was employed (Gronlund, 1959). I became particularly interested in the gender differences between anti-school boys in two different friendship groups, namely, 'the lads' and the 'gothic punks'.

Studying the gender dimensions of 'counter-school' culture presupposes that the school itself upholds (consciously or unconsciously) certain gender values. The notion of school gender

values is not unproblematic just as the idea that the school presents any single set of values is controversial. For example, Hammersley and Turner (1980) are particularly doubtful that the school and all its teachers maintain one coherent middle class value system. In short they attack the use of the notion of 'school values' as oversimplified and misleading, and although their criticisms have been levelled at assumptions about middle class school values they could also apply, in principle, to the notion of school gender values. However, I think such criticisms can be countered. I would argue that it is possible that there is some variety of views and practices regarding sexism and masculinity in the school but that these operate within a dominant institutional 'gender regime' (Connell, 1987: 120). The gender regime is constituted by dominant gender values which one can approximate to the school's gender values. Methodologically, this is not misleading so long as one always appreciates that some approximation is involved.

Greenfield comprehensive contained a few teachers who had sympathy with feminist ideas and a few teachers who would have been prepared to let the pupils wear whatever clothes they chose instead of the uniform. However, out of the eight teachers, whose classes I observed, two were very hostile to feminism and had no objections to newspaper pornography, five were critical of feminism or had no interest in it, whilst one was a mild supporter of feminism. Also the school uniform was strictly enforced by all teachers including those who, in principle, would have supported its abolition. The Headteacher and two Deputy Headteachers were all men and responsible for the execution of serious punishments and ultimately the maintenance of discipline. Regularly sheer physical terror² was part of the technique employed by these Headteachers to achieve their disciplinary goals. In classes disruptive boys would be made to sit with the girls on the assumption that that would keep the boys quiet. The sports given the most importance by the school were football, rugby and cricket. In one of my discussions with the Headteacher he told me that he was in favour of girls and boys having equal opportunity to study different subjects 'but at the end of the day boys and girls are different and in certain respects must be treated differently'. Overall, then, it is reasonable to conclude that the dominant gender values at Greenfield are traditional and that, to a first approximation, these can be regarded as the gender value system of the school.

Limitations of the data

The findings reported here will be based almost entirely on only seven boys who were part of two anti-school friendship groups comprising thirteen pupils.³ Unlike Willis I will not make grand claims about the generalisability of the findings. Nor do I hold any pretensions that the samples involved can be considered as statistically representative. Quite the contrary, the research should be viewed as exploratory and much further research is required in this area. The data function as illustrations of how gender can be a category of fundamental importance in refining definitions and interpretations of 'counter-school' culture amongst pupils of the same sex. In particular, I do claim that by focusing on the gender characteristics of anti-school boys one is led to a rather different interpretation of their confrontation with the school to the dominant one portrayed by Willis and Corrigan, for example. Though, for the purposes of focus, the discussion in this paper concentrates on boys the overall research project did not and I am certainly not claiming that the findings regarding boys apply equally (or perhaps even at all) to girls.

Elements of a subculture: 'the lads'

I quickly became aware of a group of working class boys who referred to themselves as 'the lads'. There were eight such boys who were friends or associate friends. Four of them, Nigel, David, Ronnie and Mike, however, formed a closely knit friendship group and only these four will feature here. They were all in the bottom ability stream. They all had manual working class job aspirations such as 'car mechanic', 'builder' and 'carpenter'. Mike's father had a small menswear shop and his mother worked as a 'cleaning lady' in a canteen. Mike might be defined as having a lower middle class or working class background depending on one's classification. The others had manual working class backgrounds.

All these boys looked forward to leaving school because they thought it was a 'dump' and leaving would bring them 'freedom' – 'no nagging of teachers'. David and Ronnie did mention, however, that leaving school might be unfortunate because they would miss their mates. This ambivalence derives from the fact that 'the lads' tended to use the school setting as a *resource* for 'havin a laugh' or

'chatting up the teacher' They would sit together in class and plan ways of fooling the teacher, call out joke answers to the teachers' questions and so on.

In conversation with me some of the teachers also referred to these boys as 'the lads' or 'the cowboy faction'. Although 'the lads' provided their own audience for each other they were always willing to extend their audience to a friendly observer and I found myself being regularly invited to sit with them. During their time at the school they had all been either suspended or sent to the work centre.⁴ All had had letters sent home to their parents about unsatisfactory work or behaviour and all except Mike had been involved in fighting in the school. Each was keen to recount their confrontation with the school's rules especially if they had in some sense 'got away with it' For example.

Mike. The other day me and some friends got done for shouting abuse – calling the caretaker names an' that and we got called for detention by Mr Fielding [the Headteacher] and we didn't go. Fielding's always got something on his mind so he forgets! The day before we'd been havin' a laugh with the caretaker and then this time David decided he'd take advantage and start calling him names so we got done

Ronnie: I like jokey teachers. But don't like teachers who make you sit dead quiet and won't even let you speak. Like Mr Aston, he's a good teacher, you can have a laugh with him.

JA Can you give me an example?

Ronnie: Well, Mr Aston you can take the mickey out of him and he just takes it. David calls him chicken legs and he don't do nothing'!

Mr Wood was also popular with David and Ronnie 'cause you can have a bit of a joke with him'. The feeling seemed to be reciprocated since Mr Wood told me that he generally got on better with boys because they had more in common with him such as in sports – football etc. Ronnie and David were particularly interested in football and they would also play football regularly at lunchtime.

Part of the identity of these boys was defined by their sense of distinctiveness from girls. This seems to support the view that traditional masculinity is associated with well-defined and rigid ego boundaries (Craib, 1987: 730). Inevitably this involved defining

girls and girls' roles rather narrowly yet it was this sharp dichotomy between the sexes in their perceptions which led females to be regarded as objects of sexual fantasy and also of mystery. This process is very close to what Connell (1987) calls the construction of 'hegemonic masculinity' – a cultural ideal which need not correspond to real interpersonal relations at all. According to Connell 'hegemonic masculinity' is constructed in relation to women and subordinated masculinity.

The definition of masculinity illustrated by 'the lads' lends some support to Willis's thesis that it is derived from the reproduction of shopfloor culture⁵ but the domestic division of labour is also important.

David: In C.D.T. [Craft, Design and Technology] and P.E. boys get more attention 'cause they're doin' something like football or rugby but with Childcare or Typing or Home Economics girls get more attention 'cause it's their kind of subject.

JA. Why do you say it's their sort of subject?

David. Because women do the cooking, it's a girl's subject whereas as with C.D.T. you don't see women working in a factory with technology you see a man so it's a boy's subject or a man's subject

Overall these boys viewed the girls as unexciting in class. For 'the lads' the girls do not, and cannot, contribute to 'havin' a laugh' ⁶

JA: Why do you think girls get more attention in Art?

Ronnie: In Art you've got a woman teacher. Some of the girls in there are really soppy so it can be boring – you can't have a laugh and you're not allowed to talk. The girls in there never get separated, only the boys get separated.

Nevertheless, 'the lads' were acutely interested in girls and women from a heterosexual point of view. Importantly the attraction is almost exclusively built on images rather than relationships

Mike: I like Miss Jackson 'cause you can see her bra under her T-shirt

JA: Are there any girls in the C.D.T. class?

David: Yeah, two

JA: How do you get on with the girls?

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Mike: I like Miss Jackson 'cause you can see her bra under her T-shirt.

JA: Are there any girls in the C.D.T. class?

David: Yeah, two.

JA: How do you get on with the girls?

David: Don't speak that much with the girls. They're always in the other room

JA: Are you interested in girls?

David: Yeah, damn right!

JA: But not in the ones in the C.D T. class?

David: No, no-one in this school

JA: Why not?

David: They're not very nice. Lot of very nice girls in Old Park but not in this school.

JA: Why do you say that?

David: Their looks are better and their attitudes are better. Here sometimes they'll talk to you, the next moment they won't. Here one minute they're silly and really stupid and then they'll be really serious. But girls in Old Park are always serious with you, good attitude

All 'the lads' claimed to have had girlfriends although Nigel admitted that his girlfriends usually only lasted for about a week. However, as David's account suggests the distance that 'the lads' keep from any relationships with girls means that there is a great deal of uncertainty involved in any interactions they do initiate. This is highlighted by the prospect of one of 'the lads' acting on his sexual desires.

JA: Do you have any girlfriends now?

Ronnie: No, like a load though.

JA: Are they at this school?

Ronnie: Yeah, some of them are

JA: Have you done anything about it?

Ronnie: No, haven't got the courage. I'm too embarrassed but I might pluck up the courage one day.

JA: Are they fourth years?

Ronnie: I don't know them. I don't even know their names. I know one is a fourth year.

Not surprisingly Ronnie was rather nervous about 'asking out' a girl whose name he did not even know. This illustrates further the importance of 'looks' and images to 'the lads' sexual preferences. It also indicates the price the boys have to pay for their culture of masculinity. Along with the idea that one needs to be able to boast about girlfriends goes a high cost of rejection by a girl. Boasting about girlfriends reflects a masculine ideal which 'the lads' strive for even though they cannot become the idealised cultural

stereotype. A possible consequence of this striving, Craib argues, is that males find it difficult to risk themselves in relationships. Risking rejection by a girl, therefore, requires courage, and fantasy may be a more tolerable form of sexual being when 'courage' is not forthcoming. In addition, the heterosexual fantasy has a straightforward lineage with the use of the school setting as a resource for excitement. Just as teachers are there to tease so female bodies are visually available to be sexually objectified and during the boredom of the school day 'the lads' would move easily from one activity to another.

Fighting was seen as an acceptable way of resolving certain disputes with other boys including disputes about girls.

JA Do you get into any fights?

Ronnie: Had a fight with David in the second year. That was over one of my girlfriends.

JA: What happened?

Ronnie: Well, I was going with this girlfriend and he started calling her names and I didn't like it. He said he was only taking the mickey and then we started squabbling in the dinner queue and ended up punching. But David's one of me best mates now.

The physicality of these boys as signalled by fighting was also a way in which they could define power relations and status. Fights were always recalled with tremendous accuracy and boys who were just 'all mouth' earned no respect. One final characteristic of 'the lads'' masculinity was their periodic shouting in a loud, rough voice, imitating an angry male teacher. Using this voice they would shout at another pupil in the hope that the reaction would be a source of amusement.

Insofar as the anti-school activities of 'the lads' are defined as resistive, the evidence reported here tends to support the findings of Connell *et al.* (1982) in an Australian working class school that the production of the dominant form of masculinity is achieved through resistance to the school.

Elements of a subculture: the 'gothic punks'

One friendship group which had a high profile in the school was the 'gothic punks', as they described themselves. The 'gothic

punks' were much more of a minority group in the whole sample than 'the lads' although a friendship group of five will be mentioned here, namely, Alan, Malcolm, Tony, Kate and Susan. Tony and Susan were of lower professional middle class backgrounds (II) and Alan, Malcolm and Kate were lower middle class (III). None of the boys had working class manual job aspirations. Alan and Tony wanted to go to some type of Art related technical college and Malcolm did not know, nor apparently care, about a future job. Their friendships were not explained by the streaming system. For the main academic subjects Alan was in the bottom ability stream, Malcolm the middle, and Tony the top.

The 'gothic punks' were noticeable for two reasons. Firstly, they were a fairly closely knit *mixed* sex group and, secondly, part of their style was to wear all black clothing. The school uniform varied for different years but for fourth years it was mostly grey and not black. Consequently, the 'gothic punks' were regularly ticked off for being out of uniform and in the case of Malcolm several letters from the Headmaster and Deputy Headteacher complaining about his 'appearance' were sent home to parents. Malcolm not only dressed in black but also dyed his long hair and wore conspicuous long pointed 'rocker style' boots. He was frequently in trouble and sent to the work centre. Similarly, Alan and Mark were sent to the work centre for 'bad behaviour'. Alan was also known to the school for truancing ('blunking off') but according to the 'gothic punks' themselves they all truanted. It was interesting that this fact emerged rather casually in conversations rather than in the way 'the lads' would boast about their rule-breaking exploits. For example

JA: Do you know where Susan is?

Alan: Yeah, she decided to have a day off. She's gone up to London.

Alan's response was given in a tone which would have been equally appropriate had he been telling me that Susan was in her French lesson.

Like 'the lads', the male 'gothic punks', all stated that they hated school. They claimed to spend less than half an hour per week on Mathematics homeworks and an equally small amount of time on English homeworks except for Tony who would spend less than half an hour on Mathematics but between two and three hours per week on English. Their school records implied that this

was probably accurate since despite repeated ploys, such as pretending to have forgotten homeworks, they received many missed assignment reports. Checking school records minimised the possibility of a serious underestimate of the 'gothic punks'' actual commitment to schoolwork due to peer group 'identity management' (Turner, 1983: 125-34). Susan and Kate also stated categorically that they hated school.

The 'gothic punks' can be contrasted with 'the lads' in several ways. Firstly, there is a rejection of the idea that scientific and technological subjects are the ones for boys. All the male 'gothic punks' had Art as their favourite subject and Alan had opted for Home Economics, his third favourite subject. Though he had chosen Physics in preference to Biology, this was not because he thought Physics was a better subject for a boy but because he objected to dissecting animals – an objection usually voiced by girls (Measor, 1983).

Secondly, they rejected the mainstream masculine sports such as football and rugby. They suggested that these should be replaced by 'setting up bands within the school', 'running' and 'rock climbing – generally more exciting things'. Susan and Kate also objected to football being the main school sport. They wanted more activities appropriate to girls' interests to be given more recognition in the school. As a mixed group the 'gothic punks' 'went round to each others houses to listen to music and talk' or 'went to see bands'. This kind of leisure activity is reminiscent of the girls' groups of 'teeny boppers' reported by McRobbie (1978) rather than the all male gangs similar to Willis's 'lads'. Malcolm claimed to be out most nights and Alan helped to run a disco once a week.

Thirdly, they complained about the violent elements of their enemies – violence which 'the lads' tended to respect. For example:

JA: What do you dislike about Philip R.

Alan. Well, he's a casual⁷ but he's overviolent. It's stupid really. Like in Physics they're always sitting in the other table and they're insulting us. So I asked him what it is they've got against us and he told me to shut-up and asked me if I wanted a fight which isn't really a response. Stupid.

JA: Have you been in any fights?

Alan. No, I try to avoid them.

Thus the male 'gothic punks' do not conform to the generalisation proposed by Delamont and Galton (1987: 87) that boys, particularly those who are anti-school, value prowess at fighting very highly and get pleasure from it. This does not imply, however, that the gothic punks did not enjoy spectating on fighting incidents⁸ in the classroom but such enjoyment derived from the fact that classroom fights were yet another diversion from the boredom of school rather than the celebration of machismo values found by Beynon and Delamont (1984) in their study of boys' perception of school violence in an English boys' comprehensive.

A recurring theme for these boys was a rejection of 'the lads' form of masculinity whether reflected by pupils or teachers.

Malcolm: I don't like people who think they're hard. In the corridor they might shout after me 'freak'. They'll say 'get your hair cut'. They just make comments about the way I dress 'cause it's not the same as them.

JA: Do teachers make comments about your dress or appearance?

Malcolm: Well Mr Fielding suspended me for it. That was when I wore what he described as a scruffy overcoat. When I wore a nice pair of big boots I got told not to wear them or my black jeans.

JA: What sort of things make you dislike teachers?

Alan: Depends on their whole attitude. Well Mr Shuttle and Mr Wood are always ones to make out they're right lads. I just think they're prats.

Another striking difference between the male 'gothic punks' and 'the lads' was the absence of objectifying girls or women as sexual objects, at least in open conversation.⁹ They tended to speak about female 'gothic punks' as companions with whom they socialised and their 'girlfriends' were people they went out with a lot and had a good time. The female 'gothic punks' themselves did not uphold the traditional feminine stereotype in their appearance or views. Some girls in the school rebelled against the uniform regulations by wearing jewellery and make-up but Susan and Kate did not attempt to present themselves in this way. Neither aspired to a traditionally feminine job and both objected to the prospect of marriage on the grounds of loss of independence. As Susan put it 'Generally I don't think women do well out of marriage, getting bored at home while the man goes out to work'.

Gender differences and anti-school boys

The relationship between the female and male 'gothic punks' did not seem to be a traditionally dependent one from the girls' point of view

JA: Would you say you prefer boys or girls as friends?

Kate: Well, no not really Some boys can be a pain – mouthy an' all that, but the ones I go about with are O K.

JA: What do you like about Alan, Tony and Malcolm?

Kate: Same sort of interests We like the same kind of music and dress and we do interesting things together Susan is my best friend though.

JA: Are you interested in boyfriends?

Kate: I have been but I think really I prefer going out in a group – it's more fun. I'm not really very romantic and boyfriends can be boring

This evidence supports the theory of a relational dynamic of gender proposed by Connell (1987) in which 'hegemonic masculinity' is associated with 'emphasised femininity' in relationships between men and women. With the 'gothic punks' 'hegemonic masculinity' and 'emphasised femininity' were associated by their simultaneous lack of significance

The 'gothic punks' were unpopular with some of the teachers Mr Wood, who Alan described as someone who tried to be 'one of the lads', told me at the end of a lesson in which he had sent Alan to the work centre:

I don't like that boy There's a whole gang of them that are into drinking, drugs and God knows what

He also described Alan as 'effeminate', 'softly spoken like a girl' and 'unusual for a boy of his age because he always sits with the girls'. This teacher engaged in activities which he himself described as 'laddish' such as going out on a Saturday night with 'the lads in the team after a football match' (He played football for a local team)

This teacher also admitted that he generally preferred teaching boys because he had more in common with them He was fond of some of 'the lads' in the class even though they appeared to be no more committed to schoolwork than Alan. The implication is that it was essentially the differences in gender orientations that led to the conflict between Alan and Mr Wood. The Deputy Headteacher

also made similar comments and clearly identified with teaching groups of boys as 'lads'. It was equally clear that he disapproved of the lifestyle of the 'gothic punks'. On one occasion after disciplining Malcolm and Alan, the Deputy Headmaster remarked: 'some of the fourth year in this school [referring to Malcolm and Alan and possibly other 'gothic punks'] are trying to grow up too quickly'

In fact, a lot of the time the 'gothic punks' gave the impression that they had outgrown school and it was now a tedious infringement on their 'real lives'. As Tony put it 'I hate school, it takes up so much of my time'. Rather like the 'wenches' studied by Davies the 'gothic punks' saw school as irrelevant to the most important aspects of their lives which concentrated on music, night life and relationships. Thus the gender profile of the male 'gothic punks' was not machismo and in some ways it has similarities with previous studies of some anti-school girls' groups.

Polarisation, recusance and resistance

There was some polarisation between the two groups which derived from the gender differences between them. With the 'gothic punks', as I have noted already, polarisation from 'the lads' was implicit in their rejection of values and interests held by teachers or pupils who could be identified as defining themselves as 'lads'. 'The lads' themselves were much more explicit in their objection to the behaviour of 'effeminate' male 'gothic punks'.

JA: Why do you not like Alan H.? [David had put Alan as one of his dislikes on his friendship questionnaire]

David: He's coyness. He's always hanging on to girls and he's mouthy. He's all mouth. That's what most of them are like.

JA: What do you mean he's always hanging on to girls?

David: Well most of us go around with boys and girls but he just goes around with girls even in class. That's all he does, he even talks like a girl.

he phrase 'hanging on to' is one which is reserved for this kind of 'effeminate' behaviour. Normally 'the lads' would talk about 'hanging around' with boys. The 'hanging on to' metaphor is seemingly to imply an unmanly activity in which the boy is hanging

on to girls for security rather like hanging on to a parent's apron. There are some parallels here with the polarisation between 'the Bloods' and 'the Cyrils' in an Australian ruling class boys' school reported by Connell (1987: 176-7). Connell notes how conflict arose between the two groups because of different masculinities. 'The Bloods' persecuted 'the Cyrils' because being a 'Blood' involved an active rejection of what they regarded as effeminacy.

It is also significant that David's dislike for Alan is justified by the 'normality' of what 'most of us' do. Though the 'gothic punks' were unusual, David's view was inaccurate, at least for the fourth years in the school. The vast majority of friendship groups were single sex (particularly including 'the lads') and the 'gothic punks' were a mixed sex friendship group. In fact, if 'normality' was to be defined by 'going around with boys and girls' it would be 'the lads' rather than the 'gothic punks' who would be unusual. David's appeal to 'normality', with all its inaccuracies, is an attempt to undermine the worth of the *kinds* of relationships the male 'gothic punks' had with girls in which the girls were treated more as equals and sometimes advisers. As Measor and Woods (1984: 130) also found, such relationships broke the dominant informal 'cross-gender rules'. Consequently, 'the lads' sought to subordinate them with the rationalisation that they were abnormal and, therefore, deserved to be rendered inferior.

In summary, the main objection 'the lads' had to the male 'gothic punks' was their breaking of gender codes, e.g. having girls as 'steady' friends as well as girlfriends. This polarisation was reinforced in the school by teachers regularly threatening disruptive boys with the 'punishment' of being made to sit with the girls. Whether or not the behaviour of the male 'gothic punks' represents any *resistance* to the dominant gender relations in the school is a different matter.

Resistance to schooling is a very complex and troublesome concept. For example, Connell *et al.* argue that the presumption that *individuals* can be identified as resisters because of certain behaviours is itself problematic. They maintain that resistance is about forms of relationships rather than kinds of individuals. However, this does not solve the problem of how one defines resistance in the first place. As Hargreaves (1982) has noted, many of the studies of school resistance have tended to conflate the task of defining how resistance can be identified with the desirability of it being identified for purposes of social transformation. In a study of middle class anti-school boys and girls at an English college of

further education Aggleton and Whitty (1985) tried to tackle this problem. Their research was concerned with the degree to which these pupils could be defined as resisters to the sociocultural reproduction of dominant social class and gender relations. They found that the pupils were not 'actively oppositional' to patriarchal relations and thus concluded that little resistance to the dominant gender relations was evident. However, the significance of *differences* in gender identities (as between 'the lads' and the 'gothic punks') for sociocultural reproduction does not lie solely in their resistive *effects* or active opposition to patriarchal relations. Gender identities are also relationally significant so that the creation of gender differences through some subcultural formation affects the dynamic of gender reproduction. This is perhaps why Connell *et al.* are inclined to define resistance relationally rather than as individual essence.

Certainly I found no evidence that the 'gothic punks' were 'actively oppositional to the continuance of patriarchal relations in general' (Aggleton and Whitty, 1985: 70) and hence it may be more correct to define them as 'recusants' (Walker 1985) rather than resisters. On the other hand, they did occasionally display, if crudely, criticisms of schooling as a system. For example, Malcolm scrawled on his questionnaire:

THE SYSTEM IS F**KED. The teachers don't care if you don't try, they just give up on you and leave you to rot in the corner.

Later when I asked him why he thought this about 'the system' he replied: 'It doesn't really work unless you're good at academic subjects. They do well and everybody else doesn't'.

Many of the complaints of the 'gothic punks' were similar to those of the middle class anti-school boys and girls reported by Connell *et al.* (1982: 83-4) in both Australian High Schools and Private Schools. These 'troublemakers' (as they were known to the staff) with professional middle class backgrounds criticised the school for abuse of authority, sadistic punishments, irrelevancy, hypocrisy, boredom and archaic uniform regulations and Connell *et al.* are in no doubt that this was a form of resistance. This opposition to the school system cannot be explained by the oppositional nature of working class culture to the school since neither the 'gothic punks' nor the 'troublemakers' belong to that culture. In fact, Connell *et al.* put the 'troublemakers' resistance

down to family tensions. The pupils in question were using misbehaviour at school to rebel against futures which parents had tried to impose on them. Family tension is one possible contributory explanation for the 'gothic punks'' rejection of 'hegemonic masculinity'¹⁰ but the important point in this analysis is that the school does not embrace that rejection thus maintaining the tension between the 'gothic punks' and the school.

Connell *et al.* also found that the male 'troublemakers' resisted by exaggerating traditional machismo tendencies and concluded that resistance is an assertion of masculinity and, therefore, amongst boys likely to mean hypermasculinity. This is a conclusion reached by Turner as well in his study of an English comprehensive.

There appears to be an element of 'male refusal' in resisting schoolwork. Indeed the work restriction norm hinges on values concerning masculinity. (Turner, 1983: 120-1)

Insofar as the 'gothic punks' are to be regarded as asserting anti-school resistance their form of resistance does not support these generalisations. The subculture of the 'gothic punks' implies that boys' resistance *can* revolve specifically around *rejection* of traditional masculine values.

By contrast, 'the lads' never talked about 'the system' and although they disliked the 'boffins' and 'creeps' in the top ability groupings, it was their opinion that the 'boffins' and 'creeps' were 'brainy' or 'really bright'. I found little or no evidence to support the contention that 'the lads' were resisting the school as a system even though they experienced excitement in their tension with certain elements of the system. This is not, of course, to say that these boys did not represent a *potential* to want to see schooling as a system changed.

Conclusions

Perhaps the quest for resistance is not the most fruitful project in attempting to understand the significance of the gender differences outlined above. One could conclude that these gender differences are simply derived from the differences in the social class make-ups of the two groups. However, as Connell *et al.* stress, there is no simple relationship between class and masculinity. Certainly this conclusion would be an implausible and an oversimplified

interpretation of the findings since many middle class boys at the school did not share the gender orientations of the male 'gothic punks'. But even if social class is the fundamental generator of these gender differences it does seem important to note that where gender identity is concerned, 'the lads' in this study (which have many similarities with Willis's 'lads') are less of a *counter-school* culture than the 'gothic punks'. Indeed some of the practices of some of the teachers rested on the same fundamental assumptions about sex roles and gender as were held by 'the lads'. Institutionally, the school uniform also acted as a continual reminder of how a boy should look as compared to a girl. The 'gothic punks' (females and males) complained about the uniform whereas 'the lads' generally accepted it.

Whilst Jackson and Marsden (1962), Willis (1977) and others have been right to explore the social class culture clash between working class pupils¹¹ and the middle class school, it may be an oversimplification to locate 'the lads'' version of masculinity as a subset of *counter-school* culture.¹² Even in the case of Willis's outspoken 'lads', it was rarely their sexism *per se* which involved them in conflict with the school, though their form of masculinity sometimes led to fighting and other types of behaviour defined as disruptive by the school authorities.¹³ Insofar as 'the lads'' sexism is part of their working class culture one could argue that one reason why they tend to obtain *masculine* working class jobs is because the school does *not* explicitly counter these boys' assumptions about gender.¹⁴

The subculture of 'the lads' in Greenfield lends support to the central theories of Connell (1987) with respect to the construction of 'hegemonic masculinity' and its dynamic relationship with 'emphasised femininity'. Similarly, the subculture of the 'gothic punks' seems to fit this dynamic by default since the female 'gothic punks' did not aspire to the traditional feminine role just as the males did not aspire to 'hegemonic masculinity'. However, the subculture of the 'gothic punks' is at odds with any generalisation claiming that boys' anti-school activities/resistance are necessarily forged through the demonstration or celebration of 'hegemonic masculinity'.

The research reported in this paper is exploratory and based on a small sample but it does indicate that further research into gender differences between members of the same sex (boys or girls) might refine our understanding of pupil polarisation and resistance/recusance in schooling. In particular, such understanding

could significantly inform initiatives in anti-sexist education for pupils and teachers

Lee (1983) has described how adolescent sex education is a 'minefield' of misunderstandings and mystifications but a critical examination of the role of schooling on adolescent gender formation may be even more so. A considerable body of research has been concerned with how schooling reproduces gender relations between men and women in the occupational structure (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Deem, 1978). This study of boys' gender polarisation shows the seeds of division between different types of men being sown. Each group has their dismissive and derogatory picture of the type of boy in the other group. A picture based on appearance, voice, and interaction with members of the opposite sex becomes a major criterion on which to judge a boy's friendship value. The school's role in attempting to maintain conformity to a traditional male stereotype through uniform, discipline techniques, and sports priorities appears to increase the polarisation between underlying gender identities. Amongst anti-school boys at Greenfield the school did seem to reproduce the dominant *male* gender fairly smoothly.¹⁵ The 'gothic punks' resistance through rejection of 'hegemonic masculinity' implies that the school seemed to reinforce the 'deviant' male gender, but ironically by attempting to uphold the traditional one.

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Notes

- 1 This is not to suggest that gender and social class can be mechanically separated in the real experiences of pupils

- 2 It is important to distinguish between physical violence and physical terror. Male teachers would often rebuke pupils for serious misdemeanours by shouting whilst towering over them. This involves physical terror because as one male teacher explained 'there is always the threat of physical violence'.
- 3 Willis concentrated on twelve boys.
- 4 The work centre was a large room to which mischievous pupils were sent by classroom teachers during the school day. The work centre would be supervised by another teacher.
- 5 It is of course more correct to say a reproduction of shopfloor culture as perceived by 'the lads'. In fact, many women work with technology in factories. In his account Willis seems to accept the view of 'the lads' too uncritically, seemingly assuming that shopfloor culture is a male preserve.
- 6 The lads' felt that 'the boffins' also had nothing to offer their exploits in class. 'The lads' defined these as pupils who worked a great deal at their academic work and did not go out in the evenings.
- 7 'Casuals' were people who dressed 'traditionally' and 'smartly'. The 'gothic punks' disliked 'casuals' of either sex.
- 8 Alan recounted with some amusement a notorious incident in which a male teacher and a boy entered into a dispute which culminated in them having a fight in front of the class. Teachers and other pupils were also aware of this event.
- 9 It could be argued that the male 'gothic punks' did hold the same views about females as 'the lads' but simply chose not to express them in general. However, even if this is the case, not expressing such views is significant. Lees (1986) notes how sexist discourse reinforces sexist views amongst the pupil culture.
- 10 The parents of both Malcolm and Alan had been to speak with the Headteachers because they were concerned about their sons' progress at school. Malcolm had been instructed by the Deputy Headteacher to keep a diary of the number of hours he spent each week on Maths homework and to bring the homework to him. I did not speak with these parents directly but according to the Deputy Headteacher they clearly wanted their sons to do well academically at school.
- 11 Jackson and Marsden (1962) studied a sample of boys and girls.
- 12 Certain very visible aspects did bring conflict with the school. For example, pupils caught with pornographic magazines (what the school referred to as 'dirty magazines') were cautioned and sometimes a letter would be sent home to parents reporting the incident. On the other hand, one teacher (male) told me that he had no objections to pupils looking at nude women in daily newspapers.
- 13 This is not synonymous with saying that fighting defines the boys' masculinity. Whether fighting should be considered as a specifically masculine form of behaviour amongst pupils is not immediately obvious. Examination of school records showed that almost as many girls as boys had been recorded as being involved in fights and there is plenty of more detailed evidence that schoolgirls get involved in fights (Campbell 1981). The choice is then whether to regard these fighting girls as 'masculine' or to allow fighting *per se* to have masculine and non-masculine qualities depending on the context of the behaviour. The latter choice is preferred here in view of the evidence suggesting that girls frequently fight for reasons quite different to those that motivate boys' fighting (cf. Smart and Smart, 1978).

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- 14 This is not to say that the school had any conscious policies of sexism. On the contrary, there was a conscious policy to encourage girls to opt for science subjects together with a common interest amongst many of the teachers in equality of opportunity between the sexes. However, the 'hidden curriculum' is a much more important factor in defining the school's impact upon the genders of 'the lads' and the 'gothic punks'.
- 15 But this process may be quite different for anti-school girls (cf. Gaskell, 1985).

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On social aspects of the usage of guide-dogs and long-canes¹

Shlomo Deshen and Hilda Deshen

Abstract

The paper argues that discredit pertains not only to individuals, but also to the implements of aid that discredited persons use to overcome their situation. Focusing on the mobility aids of blind people, the paper demonstrates that as a consequence of the diffusion of discredit, the users of guide-dogs and long-canes mould their usage practices in particular ways. Namely, according to norms which the users conceive to be unobjectionable to sighted people. Thus cane-users considered the sound that their canes emitted to be embarrassing, and tried to avoid causing it. Also guide-dog usage was inhibited as a result of traditional Middle-Eastern attitudes towards dogs. In concluding, the ambiguity of blind people toward their mobility aids is juxtaposed with their accepting attitude toward television sets in their homes. The latter are conceived by blind people as a natural element of the material culture of the sighted environment. Consequently, even blind people for whom television sets are manifestly unsuited introduce them into their lives. This leads to the conclusion that material artifacts are conceptualized in society generally, according to practices that are attuned to the dominant social stratum. The data are drawn from observations made in the course of ethnographic field-work in a population of blind people in Israel.

When physical handicap is culturally constructed through concepts of stigma the physically impaired individual is prone to various forms of discredit. The elucidation of these social consequences constitutes a major trend in the literature on discredited people ever since Goffman.² In addition to the consequences of stigmatization of handicapped individuals themselves, the literature also highlights the effect of stigma for individuals who are part of the ambience of the discredited person. Such individuals, although themselves able-bodied, are prone to be subjected to 'courtesy stigma' (Jones *et al.*, 1984: 71-6, and citations). Another major

focus of the literature on discredited people is on the reaction to, or management of stigma, on the part of individuals. Some of the ethnographies of physically disabling conditions in particular, such as Ablon (1984), Schneider and Conrad (1983), Groce (1985) (to mention just some of the recent ones), provide vivid insight as to various strategies that handicapped individuals employ

The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the fact that discredit does not pertain only to individuals, but also to material objects, and paradoxically even to the implements of aid that handicapped people use to assist themselves. This perspective on the study of physical handicap is also pertinent in the more general socio-anthropological study of material culture. One approach to that area has been that of the classical Chicago school of urban sociology as exemplified by Ogburn (1933), and many associates, and now interestingly resuscitated by Claude Fischer (1985, 1988), and others. These scholars seek to demonstrate the social effects of technologies. But whereas the older work was framed in generalities, the new work is relatively much more specific, both in terms of the problems formulated and of the empirical fields subjected to research. Material culture has also been approached from the anthropological angle. Scholars such as Douglas and Isherwood (1978), Csikszentmihaly and Rochberg-Halton (1981), and the contributors to the Appadurai (1986) collection, have demonstrated that mundane household artifacts which people bring into their homes, are pregnant with cultural meaning, often attributed idiosyncratically by their owners. According to this view a major, though certainly not the sole function of the acquisition and consumption of goods, is to make order and discriminate. The sociological and anthropological approaches are thus complementary: the latter illuminates subtle cultural and personal existential factors that operate beside the more overt social, organizational, and material forces. The present study, dwelling upon a unique category of material objects, mobility aids for the blind, is part of the current wave of interest in material culture. In particular it draws together the strands of disparate approaches, seeking thereby to underpin the theoretical significance of the various approaches.

Following upon the aforementioned insights into material culture one may concede with the general statement, that 'medical technology is moulded in no straightforward sense by a simple goal of efficacious healing' (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985: 306). However, while socio-anthropological perspectives have enlightened our understanding of medical knowledge, they have on the whole

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not been brought to bear upon the study of the social shaping of the material artifacts and technology of medicine (but for a recent, pioneering attempt see Locner and Kaufert, 1988). MacKenzie and Wajcman go on to suggest plausibly:

Prevailing medical theory, the social nature of the doctor-patient relation, institutional frameworks such as hospitals . . . divides of gender, class and race, the role of the state – all these appear to have a place in shaping medical technology. (*op. cit.*)

Focusing now upon the mobility aids of blind people, as part of the broad complex of technology designed to assist people with physical disorders, will contribute to fill the lacuna in our understanding of the dynamics of material culture.

I Methodology

In the course of anthropological fieldwork of seventeen months' duration in the Tel-Aviv area in Israel, the senior author participated in the activities of several associations of blind people (an advocacy group, an encounter group, a sports and leisure club), and worked daily for about three months in a sheltered-workshop. Individually and jointly, we visited various local groups and individuals throughout the metropolitan area. Our focus was on people of working age who were blinded pre-vocationally, and whose condition did not permit them to be mobile unaided. We obtained information on fifty-seven men and women who fitted into the category upon which we focused, and whom we came to know by 'the snowballing technique'. Most of them were between 35 and 50 years old, about equally divided by sex, predominantly of Middle-Eastern immigrant background. Despite their non-Western background these people were much exposed to westernized culture, due to the nature of the general Israeli setting. The quality of the relationships we developed with individuals was the result of mutual preferences. Our relationships in the field were very informal, the talk flowing freely without much direction. The information gathered constituted about 800 pages of handwritten notes, and forms the data-base of a general ethnography.¹

II Long Canes

Impaired mobility caused by blindness, besides being a major component of the stigmatic image that the sighted have of the blind, is

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a matter of crucial concern for blind people themselves. The writer Ved Mehta recalls in his memoirs an incident that highlights this. Mehta was a seventeen-year-old graduate of a school for the blind, taking leave of a sighted teacher who had trained him many years:

'Son, what's the most precious thing you're taking from us?' Mr Wooly asked, breaking the little silence in the car – it seemed that none of us knew what to say 'Mobility,' I said unhesitatingly. I was surprised at the baldness of my reply. (*New Yorker*, 25 November 1985: 129)

The era of electronics has brought with it promises, that electronic pathfinders would revolutionize blindness-linked mobility. But certainly in Israel this has not been realized. At present there are only half a dozen electronic canes in the country, and even these are not in constant operation, because their fragility leads to breakdowns which necessitate servicing overseas.

The predominant mobility aids are of two types: the long cane and guide dogs. Failing those, the blind person is destined either to dependence on sighted guides or to immobility. For all its deceptive simplicity, the long cane is the single more important achievement of technology for the blind. Essentially it is an extended limb, that enables blind pedestrians to ascertain the nature of the immediate space facing them. Being virtual extensions of limbs, collapsible long canes are very personal objects. The people whom we studied exhibited a possessive attitude toward them. Usually they were careful to have them within reach, either in personal cases or handbags, or actually clutched them for long stretches of time. Prior to the perfection of long cane mobility technique blind people used only ordinary canes. These are helpful for orthopaedic purposes but healthy blind people do not require this type of assistance. For guidance purposes the value of ordinary canes is very circumscribed.

For all its advantages long cane-aided mobility involves number of tangible difficulties. It is stressful, demanding constant concentration in its implementation, and it is laboriously slow. Compared to other pedestrians, the cane-aided traveller requires an inordinately large sidewalk territory. In heavy pedestrian traffic a blind person with a cane presents an obstruction to rushing sighted people who, in most instances, are unprepared for encounter with this radically different type of pedestrian. Many blind people have had the traumatic experience of having the

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canes damaged by sighted pedestrians carelessly stepping on them, and consequently some harbor a constant fear of such an occurrence. Not only the impatient and uncouth pedestrians, but also the patronizing and overly-solicitous ones present hazards to the blind cane-user.

Such situations are exemplified by the following account by a computer operator:

The routes that I travel regularly I can do very fast. I have my signs of street details, and I count my steps from one to the next. So my orientation is very good. The other day as I was rushing to get the bus to work, I hear a man shouting from a distance, 'Adoni! Adoni! (Sir! Sir!)'. The man continued shouting while running towards me, so I stopped walking. When the man reached me panting, breathless, he just asked, 'Sir! Sir! where do you want to go?' That angers me! That confuses me! I lost the signs I have of my route. If I require assistance I ask for it!

Volunteered help on the street is thus a mixed blessing. The unrequited do-gooder assumes that a person, by the mere fact of blindness, cannot manage without assistance. Such a volunteer, while having good intentions, interferes and makes the adept cane-user's task more difficult. On the other hand, for the inept cane-user, there is frequently a paucity of volunteered help.

Cane-aided mobility has also created a highly visible marker of the blind condition. In contrast to the short cane, the long cane is unique to the blind. Since the former is also used by the aged and halting, it is not so clearly a marker of the blind.⁴ The new long cane technique, while emancipating the blind from their previous association with other handicaps, has created a new clearly stigmatizing marker, definitive for the blind alone. This is especially true when the long cane is properly used in the fan motion, accompanied by characteristic tapping sounds. People using this improved mobility aid thus pay a price, they are walking advertisements of their exception.

Our informants were often aware of this and expressed embarrassment, not just because of the visibility of the cane to the sighted but also because of its tapping sound. The latter property was referred to in conversations on cane usage. The informants even innovated linguistically to express this sound, by formulating the natural sound as a Hebrew verb (*le'takteik*). People sometimes expressed a yearning to be able to escape using the cane. One

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woman Rivka Buskila,⁵ persisted in her attempts to walk about in her neighbourhood without mobility aids. She recounted that in doing so, she repeatedly crashed into obstacles, and that she had broken the dark glasses she wore four times. Thereafter she began to wear cheap plastic spectacles. Rivka explained her behaviour by saying that her neighbours used to encourage her to walk about unaided, 'You walk so well. What do you need a cane for?' Though Rivka may have received such thoughtless encouragement, her actual behaviour reflects how much she yearned to escape usage of the cane.

Rivka is a woman burdened with grave material and family problems, living in a run-down neighbourhood and working in a sheltered-workshop. Another person, Yoram Peres, though a man in a situation very different from that of Rivka, behaved similarly. A telephone-switchboard operator who had contacts with middle-class professionals, and lived in a comfortable supportive environment, Yoram was free from overt burdens. He was an able person endowed with a superb memory and a good sense of direction, who moved about efficiently with the aid of his cane. Yoram used to boast about his self-reliance and being superior in some ways to his sighted colleagues. At the same time however, Yoram avoided using the cane whenever he could. Like Rivka, he frequently negotiated routes familiar to him, without a cane and like her, he paid the price of suffering minor accidents (such as falls and a bruised nose).

The behaviour of Yaffa Makhluf, also a switchboard-operator, while again illustrating attempts at evading cane usage, also demonstrates several modes of acceptance. For many years Yaffa used to walk to work from her city apartment, a distance of a few blocks, without using a cane. The route did not entail any busy crossings, and was not crowded with pedestrian traffic. At that time, collapsible long canes were not available in Israel, only the cumbersome one-piece canes. Two elements thus operated in Yaffa's situation encouraging her to move about unaided, the availability of only a particularly visible and, in her estimation, repulsive instrument, and the feasibility of an easy route. It is also possible that Yaffa was endowed with a measure of 'facial vision' which bolstered her confidence.⁶ After some years Yaffa changed her place of employment. Although this too was within walking distance of her home, it required negotiating a major thoroughfare, crowded with children rushing to school and adults to work, and included several busy intersections. At that time collapsible canes

had already become available in Israel, and Yaffa resigned herself to cane usage.

However, Yaffa's cane technique is not the standard fan spread. She explained that she only holds the cane in front of her so as to prevent hurrying people from bumping into her. Thus she said, she spares herself the embarrassment of tapping her cane in public. But Yaffa claims to forget her cane sometimes. Once, she recounted, she came home from visiting in an outlying distant suburb, and noticed its absence only upon alighting from the bus, some blocks from her home. Thereupon she walked home unaided. Yaffa thus reports three modes of using the cane for improved mobility: the standard fan technique, usage as a symbol only, and deliberate non-use. Her account reflects the ongoing struggle to attain independent mobility, while minimizing as much as possible usage of a stigmatizing aid.

III Guide dogs

The major alternative to cane-aided mobility are guide dogs. However, relatively few people in Israel avail themselves of this possibility. Altogether there are only about 120 guide dogs in the whole country, and of these about one-third are owned by a particular category of blind people, veteran soldiers. In fact, unless they suffer from additional handicaps such as impaired limbs, which make the use of guide-dogs impossible, most blinded veterans employ this type of mobility aid. In this the veterans are exceptional. Thousands of other blind Israelis do not employ guide dogs. There are a number of reasons for this, such as the difficulties to be overcome in acquiring a guide dog. These include the fact that the dogs are obtained overseas and that is costly. The problem however, is usually alleviated by funds being donated by public institutions and philanthropists. Applications for guide dogs are screened by a committee of the Israel Guide Dog Association which selects applicants who meet given prerequisites, such as physical fitness, understanding and ability for animal care, and ability to bear the cost of maintenance of the dog. Successful candidates are then assisted in acquiring a guide dog.

Given this support system, the remarkably small number of guide dog users in Israel does not seem to be rooted only in the difficulties encountered in acquiring a dog. We suggest that it also stems from limited demand. In our field work we did not meet a

single cane-user, who earnestly sought to own a guide dog and failed to obtain one. On the other hand, we did encounter a number of cane-users who deliberately eschewed using guide dogs, and even one who had had a guide dog and who had reverted to cane usage. On the surface this is astonishing since it is generally recognized that usage of guide dogs improves mobility performance.⁷

The clue, we suggest, lies in the different patterns of ownership of guide dogs in Israel and the United States. This difference leads us to an insight into the socio-cultural moulding of mobility practices of the Israeli blind. Israeli guide dog users are predominantly members of upper strata (in terms of the stratification of the blind proposed in Deshen, 1986). In the US, however, guide dog users are to be found not only in the upper strata, one commonly encounters guide dogs on central city streets being used by blind persons who clearly belong to low social strata, the poor and the racial minorities. Even dog-guided beggars can be met on US city streets. The social range of Israeli guide dog users is comparatively small. This limited spread of guide dog ownership is in part linked to the particularly centralized Israeli blindness system and its role in allocating support for acquiring guide dogs.

That however, is only part of the explanation. There is also an element rooted in the culture and social life of Israelis.⁸ In Jewish culture as in Middle Eastern culture generally there is a repugnance of dogs as unclean beasts. In Israel the keeping of dogs as domestic pets, while common now, still clashes with social impulses rooted in tradition. This negative attitude towards dogs applies, by and large, to guide dogs too. The feeling is particularly potent among people who are close to tradition, declining as they distance themselves from tradition. The overall situation is very different from that of societies, such as those of Western countries, where the dog is romantically viewed as 'man's best friend'. Consequently members of tradition-bound social strata in Israel, and for historical reasons they comprise most of the adult blind, have a sound cultural basis for refraining from having recourse to guide dogs as mobility aids.

In one of the social groups in which we participated, there was only one guide dog user, the rest were all cane-users. Some of the latter expressed repugnance at the presence of the dog in the room. Out of the dog-owner's hearing, Rivka Buskila repeatedly expressed her dislike of what she claimed was the dog's bad odour.⁹ But dogs are problematic not only for people who have such strong aversions, but also for the owners themselves. Danny

Akram exemplified this ambivalence. Married to a woman blind since childhood, he himself suffered from a condition that had permitted him a degree of unaided mobility until his early twenties. Thereafter, his eyesight deteriorated and he required an aid, but he did not manage to become competent with a long cane. When his little son grew, Danny used him for street guidance, but that too proved to be unsatisfactory. Danny felt that the child's service disrupted his other activities and perverted the overall relationship between father and child. Danny was wisely concerned that his family should not suffer from the development, of what has come to be termed 'a parental child'. Therefore, although not being naturally predisposed to keep a dog (he came from a traditional Middle-Eastern background), Danny resigned himself to acquiring a guide dog.

When we met him, Danny was a satisfied dog user. While waxing eloquent on the usefulness of the dog, Danny also elaborated on the difficulties he had reconciling family life with dog ownership. The presence of the large animal in his small apartment was disturbing. The children sometimes played with the dog as a pet, disrupting the animal's discipline and diminishing its usefulness. Danny believed that the dog was often unruly in the small apartment because of the children's doings. In the context of a tightly-knit family, inexperienced with handling dogs, and particularly a meticulously trained guide dog, Danny's solution to his mobility problem is a mixed blessing which, in his case, clashes with harmonious family life.¹⁰

The experiences of other people parallel those of Danny. Yaffa Makhluף, whom we met earlier, is a single woman living by herself far from her family and old friends. On the surface it would appear that Yaffa has social characteristics, compounded isolation, that should lead her to successful dog-ownership. In fact, Yaffa had reservations similar to those expressed by Danny. She said that basically she disliked dogs. She felt that were she to go visiting with a guide dog, she would harm relationships with her parents and married siblings, as they would not feel comfortable with a dog in their homes. Another woman, Yemima Kagan, used a guide dog because, like Danny, she felt inadequate at cane-aided mobility. Yemima was eloquent and reserved about dog-usage, in virtually the same breath. Using images drawn from Jewish mysticism, she waxed poetic about the faithfulness of her dog. 'The soul of a very saintly person (*sadiq gadol*) has transmigrated into my dog!'¹¹ But immediately she went on talking about the

inconvenience of dog guidance, elaborating on the many situations that did not permit the presence of a dog (such as formal visits on occasions of festivities and mourning, and at synagogue). The compound effect of a culture that has a negative attitude towards dogs, together with the kind of close social ties the blind maintain with the sighted, is a major factor that inhibits the widespread usage of guide dogs.

Even when adopted, the efficient use of guide dogs is hampered by unfamiliarity with dogs in general, and guide dogs in particular. Owners of dogs must contend not only with the doings of family members, but also with those of their whole social ambience, people whose fundamentally negative attitude towards dogs is based on unfamiliarity with the animal. At the industrial plant where he was employed as an assembly worker, Danny Akram used his dog to move on the shopfloor, threading his way between machines and irregularly placed equipment and materials. However, Danny complained, the behaviour of his co-workers made using the dog difficult. Having shed their basic cultural disposition, and lacking a tradition of maintaining and disciplining dogs, people such as Danny's co-workers are prone to indiscriminate petting. Both revulsion and improper handling are problems that inhibit the most effective usage.

IV Conclusions

Our observations demonstrate that mobility aids are prone to symbolization like other artifacts in the domestic environment. This symbolization can lead people to stigmatize the artifacts and to shun them. That process, it needs hardly be said, is not universal; it is there potentially and only sometimes actually. Also in the ambience of the Israeli blind people whom we studied, the mobility aids, guide dogs in particular, were often incorporated favourably, even with love and warmth.¹² The present discussion focuses upon only one form of incorporation of the material aids of the handicapped in society, that of stigmatization. It is remarkable, that the potential for this kind of symbolization can move not only sighted but also blind people. The existential situation of the latter is radically different from that of the former, in reference to the role of mobility aids in their lives. Nevertheless, the common

culture that both sighted and blind share in a given context, can lead to certain elements of symbolization being common to both kinds of people.

At this point a comparative mention of the place of television in the lives of blind people will be illuminating. Although in Israel people devote little time to television in comparison to many other countries, Israelis are highly-regimented viewers (about 80 per cent of television-owners view a certain daily programme, Kahanman, 1986. 4). Among the blind people of this study however, we encountered many negative expressions about televiewing. People said it caused them to be superfluous among the sighted.¹³ One man said 'Abroad [in Baghdad] life was better for the blind Sighted people used to accompany me But now television intrudes (*mafria*); it separates (*marhiq*) the sighted from us Technology hurts us!'¹⁴ But in marked contrast to such expressions, television sets were much in evidence in these same people's homes; even in many households composed solely of blind couples or singles. One rationale for this, offered by blind television set owners, was that the sets served to entertain sighted guests who also provided a running commentary to their blind hosts. Another rationale was, that ownership of a television set enabled listening to the news on the television. But both explanations are factually dubious. Most people own radios that have access to the television channel, making ownership of television sets superfluous. Secondly, many sighted viewers are not sufficiently articulate to be able to give their blind companions a running commentary. The purported explanations are actually part of a puzzling phenomenon, and themselves require explaining. Gaining an insight into this is pertinent to our understanding of the social construction of the usage of mobility aids by blind people.

We were afforded such an insight visiting a young man, Shime'on Cohen, who lived in a distant part of the country. Having business there we had arranged, through a telephone introduction by a mutual friend, to visit him. Shime'on had been only vaguely informed of the purpose of our coming, and he was unsure how to host us. We were seated on a settee opposite the television set, and after serving us a drink, Shime'on asked if we would like to watch the evening news. Few people in Israel miss that program but we were not interested, and onto our polite refusal we pegged an elaboration of the purpose of our visit. Our host reacted with relief; he went on to say that he too was more

interested in talking than in having us viewing. Shime'on explained that he had thought we would not want to miss, what he surmised, was part of our daily routine. He went on to say that he kept the television set only for the needs of sighted visitors.

In being considerate of the putative wishes of his visitors, this man was thus willingly foregoing his personal convenience, in his own home. The incident highlights the ambivalent, virtually dialectical effect of television in such situations. It both lessens and increases the gap between sighted and blind, depending upon the level and kind of interaction. There is, we now suggest, a parallel in the roles of television and mobility aids in the lives of blind people, despite the fact that the former is particular to the condition of the sighted and the latter to that of the blind. Namely, blind people frequently incorporate television into their lives in their striving for integration, bolstering, in fact, their marginality at one level of their interaction with the sighted. Similarly blind people sometimes reject mobility aids, to enhance integration, among the sighted, impairing thereby their mobility.

The symbolization of material objects in society is linked to their being adopted and used in particular ways. One aspect of this, that when an object is widely adopted, even extraordinary individuals (in the present context blind people), for whom it is unsuited, are driven to adopt it. On the other hand, objects that are designed for discredited people are prone to be symbolized accordingly, to be stigmatized. Mobility aids are incorporated into the symbolic system of the general culture, and are conceptualized similarly to the way that blind people are conceptualized. Material artefacts are conceptualized and symbolized in society according to practices that are attuned to the dominant stratum only.¹⁵ The implications of this conclusion range far beyond guide-dogs and long canes. People in a great variety of physical conditions require technical aids, such as wheelchairs, hearing aids and respirators, and the social effects of these objects can be ambivalent. The elucidation of the effects of these developments of technology is a challenge for the socio-anthropological study of handicap.

The foregoing observations finally have practical import. They should encourage a humanistically informed view of technological development in the service of handicapped people. The paper demonstrates that people use material aids within given socio-cultural contexts which are inseparable from the aids. Material aids for the handicapped are prone to be culturally constructed, symbolized, by stigmatizing impulses, like the handicapped indivi-

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duals themselves (and their able-bodied companions). Hence the development and diffusion of these aids require as much sensitivity and imagination, as do the immediately personal aspects of the welfare of handicapped people.

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Notes

- 1 We are indebted to the Tel-Aviv University Sapir Center and the Jerusalem Center for Anthropological Studies for material support. David Clark-Carter, Haim Hazan, and particularly Nurit Bird-David, also anonymous readers of the *Review* offered useful comments. An early version was presented at the 'Handicap and Stigma' session of the American Anthropological Society meetings in Chicago, November 1987.
- 2 For a concise summary see Ffuhl 1980, particularly chs 6, 7, for later work see Jones *et al.*, 1984, Ainlay *et al.*, 1986. One of the anonymous readers for the journal suggested that the writings of the enomethodologists might be useful in conceptualizing the issues of this paper. My ignoring most of this literature is deliberate. I am not impressed by the fruitfulness of the ethnomethodological approach, for the kind of concrete socio-anthropological issues, that concern me overall in my disability research project. Latching on to that approach would, in this case, entail theoretical eclecticism, a dubious practice in my view.
- 3 Other portions of the study have been reported in Deshen, 1987a, b and forthcoming.
- 4 The white cane, linked the blind with other categories of handicapped people, and had the deleterious effect of sustaining the erroneous popular notion that blindness implies diffuse invalidity.
- 5 All the names used are pseudonyms, as conventional in ethnographic writing.
- 6 The condition of rare individuals who move unaided where other blind people require mobility aids. In the past this used to be explained in terms of extraordinary sensitivity to changes in air pressure resulting from the position of obstacles. More recently psychologists link the condition to acute and disciplined audition (Kohler, 1964).
- 7 Traffic-crossings can be negotiated without having to wait for volunteered assistance, and walking speed is increased. Mobility by guide-dogs is also safer and more relaxed (Clark-Carter *et al.*, 1986).
- 8 A striking illustration of this deep-rooted repugnance lies in one of the traditional Jewish explanations of the term 'mark of Cain' in the biblical story of the prototype fratricide (Genesis 4). Developing an idea, that figures in much earlier sources, Nahmanides (Spain, thirteenth century) understands the mark of Cain to be a dog. Thus God gives Cain a dog that would always precede him in his wanderings. Nahmanides writes:
Wherever the dog would turn that would be the road that God had ordained for Cain to take and the sages understood this despicable mark (*ot nivzeh*) to be appropriate to him (Nahmanides on Genesis 4:13).
Remarkably this image of the dog includes some elements of the modern guide-dog, but it is wedded to a profoundly negative association and negatively

- 10 The guide dog paper drew out to guide dog usage in Israel one of my students (David Bar'am (unpublished)). She outlined many pertinent situations including similar ones to that which I have indicated
- 11 Bar'am (p. 17) also demonstrates that owning a guide dog can be a burden upon harmonious relations between spouses, because of both an intruding affective element and the complications of daily domestic arrangements entailed by the maintenance of the animal
- 12 Bar'am (p. 18) documents another symbolization of a guide dog. A woman talking about her dog repeatedly fell into a slip of the tongue. Instead of saying *hadelet sheli* (my dog) she said *hadelet sheli* (my son)
- 13 An anonymous reader of the paper for the journal suggested another reason for the Israeli pattern of guide dog usage: veterans due to their particularly disciplined background may more than other Israelis be disposed to use dogs correctly, avoiding the poles of indiscriminate petting and revulsion. While in the present research, which excluded veterans, this idea cannot be considered, it is an hypothesis to be borne in mind in future research
- 14 People expressed the feeling of being superfluous not only in the context of actual viewing, but also in the context of conversations that viewers held thereafter about the programs. Thus for one blind person, Fridays were annoying, because then sighted people talk about the weekly Thursday evening basketball game that is shown on TV
- 15 There are very few detailed accounts of the integration of handicapped people among the able-bodied in technologically-retarded societies. But two extant ethnographies, one on blind and one on deaf people, provide dramatic views of the deeply-rooted integration of the handicapped (Gwaltney, 1970, 1980, Groce, 1985)
- 16 The commonality of consumption patterns, aligned with the practices of those who dominate, is well illustrated by observations of group-drinking in a British pub. The group included three sighted and one blind man. All our observations show that the majority of pub-goers tend, when drinking in a group, to drink level and very often there is not a quarter of an inch difference between the depth of beer in glasses of a group of drinkers. As soon as the mugs are brought they lift them to their mouths with a slow 'follow through' motion, and keep them there for about four seconds, then put them down simultaneously. After this, sometimes the blind man starting, sometimes the others, in no special order, but gulp for gulp they drink level to within a quarter of an inch throughout (cited in Douglas and Isherwood, 1978: 124-5, from a paper in 'Food Connections', Penguin Education 1970: 47, by Richard Mabey).

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Viewpoint:

Bosanquet's social theory of the state

Dorothy Emmet

Abstract

Bosanquet's political philosophy was a social theory of the function of the State as 'hinderer of hindrances to the best life', where individual development was supported by relationships within a community. This was worked out in the context of considerable knowledge of conditions among the London poor at the turn of the century, and reinforced by his wife's practical work and research. He sympathized with Durkheim's pioneering sociology, and was in contact with him through the Sociological Society. His 'New Liberal' approach, seeing problems of poverty as to be met by informed charitable activity, was restricted by insufficient recognition of the structural aspects of social problems and conflicts. The bearing of his Idealist Metaphysics is critically considered, and it is claimed that, although a good deal of this may not be acceptable, it gave a background to a kind of social thinking which is of interest to those looking for a communitarian type of political philosophy.

That political life goes on in a social milieu is something sociologists take for granted. Nevertheless they may not be particularly concerned with the distinctive role of the State. Political philosophers, whose concern this is, may be less interested in the social milieu, indeed the civic culture, which sets the conditions for political activity. Contemporary political philosophers, at any rate in Britain and the United States, tend to write in an idiom more suited to the interests and actions of individuals, particularly in discussions of Utilitarianism and Rights (see for instance Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1977; Frey, 1985). There are indeed some voices asking for a more communitarian approach (for instance Scruton, 1980; Sandel, 1980). They speak

mainly from the Right, and are more concerned with criticism of Liberalism than with giving a social philosophy in the round.¹

This was not so with the English Idealist political philosophers at the end of the last and the beginning of this century, who combined Hegelian communitarianism with British Liberalism. No doubt their views can no longer be adopted in the form they gave them either philosophically or politically, and the social milieu in which they wrote is no longer ours. Nevertheless, we may think that they were asking the right questions, and that some of their answers could merit a fresh look.

The most outstanding of these were T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. There has been a revival in interest in Green, as shown by some recent books (Gordon and White, 1979; Inglis, 1982). A M. McBriar has written about Bosanquet in connection with the Poor Law Commission of 1909 (McBriar, 1987), but less attention has been paid to him among political philosophers, with the notable exception of A. Vincent and R. Plant in their *Philosophy Politics and Citizenship* (1984). Yet, of the two, Bosanquet was the more deeply involved with the actual social conditions of a political culture, in both senses of 'conditions' – as making something able to function and as its social setting. In this paper I shall be looking at him with some of our present discontents in mind. The concern will be implicit rather than explicit; this is not the place to advocate or to attack particular social policies. Nor am I suggesting that Bosanquet has 'a message for our time'. But I realise that, because he was dealing with questions which *mutatis mutandis* are also our questions, this will not be a purely analytical paper, nor a pure 'history of ideas' one, nor purely a piece of political sociology.

Bosanquet was a serious professional philosopher who for most of his life was not an academic, but closely associated with the life of the London poor. He was born in 1848 at Rock Hall near Alnwick in Northumberland. His family were of Huguenot extraction; some of them still live in Rock, although not now at the Hall. His father was a parson with strong local interests. After Harrow, he went up to Balliol in 1867 to read Honours Classical Moderations and Lit. Hum. (Greats). It was a great age in Balliol, and one in which undergraduates were encouraged to think that philosophy could help them to take an intelligent part in public life. T.H. Green was teaching this intellectually, while Jowett was getting them fitted out with the best jobs. After taking Greats, Bosanquet was for a time a Fellow of University College in

Oxford, where he had a considerable load of teaching in ancient history as well as in (largely Greek) philosophy. On acquiring a private income, he resigned his fellowship in 1881, and went to live in London, where he settled into continuous work in philosophy. Indeed, he continued to write substantial books throughout his life, except for the period from 1903–11, when he had accepted an invitation to be professor of moral philosophy in St Andrew's. During those years he thought all his time should be given to preparing his lectures, seeing his students, and taking a full part in university business.

In London he combined writing philosophy with an active concern for social work. In the first years there he gave a number of lectures for the London Ethical Society (in those days it was not opposed to religion, but was broadly Unitarian in its stance). He came to think that the Sunday lectures of the Ethical Society were too occasional and too precious in their style to communicate with the mass of people without much education. 'What is wanted' he said, 'it seems to me, in nine cases out of ten, is not moral suasion – which one may compare to medicine – but new resources in life, intellect and feeling – which one may compare with wholesome food'. He wanted to help organize 'the material of noble life, so as to bring it within the reach of all'.² He turned to giving extension lectures at Toynbee Hall (the pioneer University Settlement) recently founded and named after Arnold Toynbee, who had been a pupil of T. H. Green's. The lectures were said to have been stiff but exhilarating. What he meant by 'the material of noble life' was primarily moral and intellectual development, but also had regard to actual material conditions. With these interests Bosanquet became a very active chairman of the Charity Organization Society (COS). Here he worked closely with Helen Dendy, who had previously taken a First in the Cambridge Moral Sciences Tripos at Newnham. They were married in 1895, and after 1897 lived first at Caterham and then at Oxshott in Surrey, travelling frequently to London for the COS. (Helen remarked that by living in the country they could be out of reach of trivial engagements.)³

The COS has come in for a good deal of criticism as a body through which members of the upper classes patronized the poor. A. Vincent and R. Plant in *Philosophy, Politics, and Citizenship*, give a splendid account of the social influence of the British Idealists. Vincent and Plant (1984: 99) more judiciously see the COS as in a transition between a conception of welfare as an indiscriminate *gift* of charity and as a *right*. This transitional status

came out in arguments in the COS relating to what should be done for the relief of the destitute and the incapable, which established the principle of a right to receive help from the state, though only in limited spheres, and also of the duty of citizens to give help. The crucial distinction was between those who were capable of improving themselves as a result of charitable help, and the feckless residuum who were judged incapable, and best left to the Poor Law. In the parlance of the COS the distinction between the 'helpable' and the 'unhelpable' came to take the place of the older distinction (immortalized by Mr Doolittle) between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. The Bosanquets always opposed the terms 'deserving' and 'undeserving', and they also broke with the old Poor Law notion of deterrence. They saw the issue in terms not of deserts but of the chances of a person's being able to profit in self-improvement if given certain kinds of support. These chances were to be estimated through careful individual case work; indiscriminate charity was to be resisted at all costs. Instances of the kind of help which might profitably be given were finding opportunities for jobs, fares to go to them, training, convalescence, some kinds of medical treatment – above all, ways of tiding over what might be temporary difficulties. The Bosanquets also saw the importance of the co-operation between statutory and voluntary bodies which was to become such a feature of British social policy. Bosanquet put this case in an address 'Politics and Charity' in *Social and International Ideals* (1917).

There were other ways of looking at charity in Victorian England, besides indiscriminate doles or COS discipline, on one of which Helen Bosanquet (1914: 7) remarked:

Another outlet for ill-considered charity was found in the Thieves' Suppers or Prostitutes' Meetings, which were fashionable at the time [c 1870]. 'We are doing all we can' said Sir C. Trevelyan, 'to form the thieves and prostitutes into a class. Without such helps they could not consist as a class, but must be brought face to face with the Poor Law and the Police and then there would be an end of them'. This was perhaps an over-sanguine view to take, but certainly the encouragement of thieves and prostitutes in their official capacity is a form of philanthropy we have done well to abandon.

The aim of charitable work should be to reinforce people's wills to 'make the best of themselves' (a favourite phrase in both Green

and Bosanquet, referring to 'spiritual capacities'. Nowadays it might suggest cosmetics, a connotation the prostitutes might have appreciated). For Bosanquet the development of spiritual capacities (in a broad sense which included intellectual and aesthetic as well as moral ones) answered to a deep-seated tendency in human nature. This was in tune with his philosophical Idealism, which had its precursor in Aristotle's teleology, where things grow to the fulfilment of their proper natures.

Bosanquet combined this spiritual teleology with evolutionary doctrines, and in particular with the Darwinian notion of Natural Selection. He could do this because he did not see moral self-development as meant to be easy. With regard to spiritual teleology he used the expression 'soul-moulding', an echo of the saying of Keats' that the world was a 'vale of soul-making' (Bosanquet; 1913: Lectures III & IV). Evolution, he held, showed a world of living things responsively adaptive to their environment, their success depending on their finding a niche which could provide opportunities they could exploit. Those who failed to do so fell by the way. It is this aspect, where the environment produces conditions for survival, rather than the aspect of competitive struggle, which Bosanquet took up in his form of Social Darwinism. He has a forceful statement of this in a paper 'Socialism and Natural Selection' (1895).

At the human level society is an environment which can give support through co-operative efforts. At the same time, the pressures of what can be a stern environment can encourage and develop most of the qualities necessary for survival. He held that the unit for natural selection in human society should be the family, and the task of a charitable agency such as the Charity Organization Society (now significantly called 'The Family Welfare Association') should be to assist families to make constructive efforts to cope with the graver difficulties presented by their circumstances. But he did not want to see any 'collective guarantee of support to all children, or still worse to all adults, without enforcing the responsibilities of parents, or of sons and daughters' (1895: 306). Life, as a milieu for 'soul-moulding', is not meant to be easy, and indeed it is quite good for people to have 'some possibility of falling into distress by lack of wisdom and exertion' (1895: 300). Constructive forms of assistance would be those which encouraged 'wisdom and exertion'; non-constructive forms made it possible to dispense with these. This of course left open a vast problem over provision for the 'feckless or feeble minded'.

Bosanquet accepted the necessity of doing something for these, but the feckless at any rate, he thought, should be relegated to the Poor Law and not be subjects for voluntary charities. This was the operational meaning of the substitution of the notion of the 'capable' and the 'incapable' for the 'deserving' and 'undeserving poor'. What Bosanquet says sounds harsh, but it needs to be read in the light of the polemic the COS was waging against what they saw as the fruitless and often deleterious effects of indiscriminate charity.

Helen Bosanquet had an opportunity to present her views through her membership of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law which reported in 1909. Here she was confronted by Beatrice Webb. A detailed and documented account of their exchanges and of the work of the Commission is given by Professor McBriar in his recent book *An Edwardian Mixed Double: the Bosanquets versus the Webbs a Study in British Social Policy 1890-1929* (McBriar; 1987). The metaphor of the tennis match is designed to bring out that each of the lady protagonists had a husband as partner, though neither Bernard nor Sidney was on the Commission. Both the Majority Report, which largely represented Helen's views, and the Minority Report, which represented Beatrice's, were agreed on the need to replace the Poor Law Guardians by a Public Assistance Authority.⁴ The Majority Report wanted all benefits to be under a single system of Public Assistance Committees co-operating with voluntary aid committees, these being in the first line through registered charities. It emphasized the case-work principles of treating each person's needs as a whole, and encouraging independence. The Minority Report, which had the Webbs behind it, advocated statutory provision and major administrative reforms whereby different kinds of provision should be dealt with by different bodies of experts. The Webbs' penchant for proliferating administration makes one recall a remark of Churchill's: 'If you create some new institutions you have to create further ones in order that these may work. This is called not being static.' Their approach, of course, came nearer than the Bosanquets' to what was to become the Welfare State. To some extent the rival views appear in a later generation in Wootton's chapter on 'Contemporary Attitudes in Case Work' (Wootton, 1959: Chapter IX). She quotes from literature which describes the relationship of case worker to client in terms reminiscent of the Bosanquets, but within more flowery language and with psycho-analytic overtones. Her own astringent view is

that the job of social workers is to possess such information as will enable them to put their clients in touch with the various agencies and government departments relevant to their needs, and make them cognizant of their rights. Now once again we are hearing Bosanquet-like noises sounding for private charity rather than public provision, but they do not always express the Bosanquets' strong concern to *help* people to help themselves.

Helen Bosanquet supported the principles of National Health Insurance, and Unemployment Insurance, while favouring their being based on voluntary contributions. In the case of Health Insurance these should be made through the Friendly Societies who could be given a subsidy to work the scheme. (Lloyd George's Act of 1911, while using the Friendly Societies, instituted compulsory insurance.) In the case of Unemployment Insurance, Helen Bosanquet acknowledged that 'if after the lapse of a sufficient time it became clear that any large number still continued to apply for public assistance in periods of unemployment, it might become necessary to make insurance compulsory' (*The Poor Law Report of 1909*) (Bosanquet, 1909: 258). The Bosanquets, while wanting to see assistance for hard times, always had the fear that a compulsory State provision would sap people's will-power, and take away the incentive to exercise their capacities in a social environment which should not be expected to be an easy one. However, in justice to Bosanquet, we should recognize that, though he believed the life of 'finite selfhood' was perforce one of 'hazards and hardships', (1913: V & VI) he was very aware that certain physical conditions made it all too difficult for people to 'exercise their capacities', still less to 'make the best of themselves', and achieve 'noble life'. Foremost among these conditions were bad housing and bad sanitation, as well as lack of proper educational opportunities.⁵ How far statutory State intervention should come in was a question he struggled with in seeing the function of the State as the 'hinderer of hindrances to the best life'. The State should certainly be concerned to remove obstacles, such as special legal disabilities, and to protect rights: how much more should it do? This sounds like a *laissez-faire* Liberalism. But Bosanquet was a philosopher of the New Liberalism of the turn of the century, which was out for social reform (cf. Vincent and Plant, 1984). He also had a sympathy for the nascent Labour movement, of course not then as collectivist or Socialist as it was later to become, and he strongly believed in the value of Trade Unions.

In *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899) he says that intervention in aid of housing, wage levels, and the educational apparatus 'occupy a very interesting middle region between mere hindrances of hindrances and the actual stimulation of mind and will' (p 198). State compulsion may not secure this latter; its conditions are not purely external, since as *social* conditions they can themselves express 'mind and will'. He instances how 'a pretty and healthy house, which its inhabitant is fond of, is an element in the best life'. So there is a case for intervention in moving a family from a bad to a good house, but this should be where 'there was a better life struggling to utter itself, and the dead-lift of interference just removed an obstacle which bound it down'. The corollary might appear to be that the feckless, who showed no sign of a better life struggling to utter itself, should be left in the slums. I doubt whether Bosanquet would explicitly have drawn this conclusion, though he would have been uneasy. On the other hand, T.H. Green, who, in general, was less directly acquainted with social conditions, was very highly aware that 'the untaught and under-fed denizen of a London yard' had little chance of making the best of himself 'with gin shops on the right hand and on the left' (Green 1924: 8). (Green put more emphasis than Bosanquet on control of the liquor trade.) His lecture 'Liberal Legislation and the Freedom of Contract' given in 1880, (Green, 1885) was a strong defence of legislative limits on what had been traditional Liberal principles: the right to make contracts and the right of a person to do what he liked with his own. Green presses the point that a contract is not likely to be free and fair where one of the parties is in a weak position. So he argues for Employers' Liability Acts, Factory Acts, Public Health and Education Acts, as promoting and not diminishing freedom. when described in terms of people's self-realization of a moral life in which they supported each other in contributing to a common good. Green's language sounds over-moralistic to our ears. we may even (I think unnecessarily) feel embarrassed by expressions like 'the good life' and 'the common good'. A more serious difficulty is that Green's and Bosanquet's Idealist faith in the tendency for human nature to develop towards its proper good gave them a fundamental optimism which led them to underestimate how deep-seated were certain kinds of social conflict. A closer study of Marx than was likely in England at that time might have shaken this complacency. Bosanquet refers rather briefly to Marx in *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899: 28-9) criticizing him for 'economic

determinism'. Without being Marxist, one may ask whether a serious consideration of Marxism might not have led him to see certain conflicts as more deep-seated and intransigent than he allowed. Marxism was hardly taken seriously either by the New Liberal reformers or by the Fabians, who saw it as Utopian and revolutionary. It was known chiefly through the Social Democratic Federation and its secretary H.M. Hyndman. C.F.G. Masterman in *The Condition of England* (1909: 150) refers to current Marxist activity as 'complete illusion in the gathering together of Hyndman and Lady Warwick' (see Vincent and Plant, 1984: 78).

Yet however strong their view of the primary importance of will and character, both the Bosanquets were well aware that these had to develop not only within a context of material conditions, but also within a network of social relations. This led Bernard Bosanquet in particular to take a strong interest in the rising study of Sociology, and in particular in the work of Durkheim, whose *De la division de travail social* had come out in 1893. Bosanquet appreciated Durkheim's work as much more important for the development of Sociology as a distinctive study than had been that of his predecessors, such as Comte and Herbert Spencer. He came into direct contact with Durkheim's views at a meeting of the Sociological Society of London at the London School of Economics in June 1904 (*Sociological Papers*, 1905), 'On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy'. Bosanquet was in the chair and read Durkheim's paper in his absence. His comments are recorded along with a translated abstract of Durkheim's paper. Durkheim was claiming that Sociology should become a unified science of society, drawing on other specialisms such as economics, political science, history, ethics, and giving effective recognition to the unity of all social phenomena on the basis of their interdependence. Such a systematisation would pass from philosophy to sociology, but 'it may be predicted that these sciences, once organized, will return with accumulated interest to philosophy what they have borrowed from it'. Bosanquet's remarks probe perceptively into how this systematisation might proceed. He dismisses the view that it could be primarily a classification of all the specialisms dealing with society, a view suggested by Mr V. Branford, a second speaker, who was Secretary of the Sociological Society. Nor could the systematisation be a matter of producing a few very abstract generalisations. It would call for 'the analysis and estimate of the contents of special provinces of experience'. Each may be concerned with a distinct

type of experience, and in each there will be a distinct aspect which can be called sociological and one which goes beyond sociology. Sociology should deal with the distinctive character of the social aspect, as manifested in and through groups of persons. Bosanquet has a characteristically Idealist metaphor about finding the unity of social science not as an abstract generality, but as something akin to entering into the concrete quality of a living thing. This apart, I think he was suggesting a meaning for a 'unifying function' by which sociology could both draw on other social sciences and at the same time have its own distinctive subject matter.

Durkheim wrote a short reply acknowledging this and other contributions to the discussion, which are also recorded (see *Sociological Papers I*: 257). He said his aim was to present Sociology as a science which would 'disengage from the different specialist disciplines certain general conclusions, certain synthetic conceptions, which will stimulate and inspire the specialist'. He had not yet developed this aim, but, if he could do so, he would be glad to lay it before the Society in a further paper.

It is worth recording that *The Sociological Review* took over in 1908 from *Sociological Papers* as the organ of the Sociological Society. In a first editorial L.T. Hobhouse in effect echoed the foregoing discussion, describing what 'General Sociology' might be in language reminiscent of Bosanquet: 'a vitalizing principle that runs through all social investigations, nourishing and nourished by it in turn, stimulating enquiry, correlating results, exhibiting the life of the whole in the parts, and returning from the study of the parts to a fuller comprehension of the whole' (Hobhouse, 1908. 8). In less elevated language, this might be done by seeing how different sides of life in human institutions affect a wider social life, so that, for instance, 'every economic truth is a sociological truth'

This approach, attempting to analyse and appreciate the distinctive social nature of an aspect of experience, brings Sociology close to Philosophy. Bosanquet had said as much in the second chapter ('Sociological compared with Philosophical Theory') of *The Philosophical Theory of the State*. He says (1899: 51) 'Philosophy gives a significance to sociology: sociology vitalises philosophy' The main link is in seeing that 'social facts' are not just physical facts, and their causation not just material efficient causation, since they express people's thoughts and purposes. The form these take comes through social interactions, so their study will be social and not individual psychology. He looks to a

'psychological sociology', which in the end will coalesce with 'social philosophy' (1899: 48). So 'French Sociology today is a psychological science, though its founder (*sci.* Durkheim) banished psychology from his sociological method' (1899: 42). This was not really true; in his analysis of punishment, to which Bosanquet refers with high commendation (1899: 37), Durkheim emphasized that crime had to be seen as an offence against social sentiments, not only as action to be deterred because of its social disutility. In his methodology, Durkheim tried to distinguish social facts as *sui generis*, to be explained through other social facts, these being facts which depend on the character not of individuals but of groups. Both Bosanquet, and Durkheim believed that 'social facts' take the form they do partly at any rate through motivations that are produced in people's minds through their interactions with one another, through their attempts to adjust to the circumstances of their environment, and through the encouragement or the frustration produced by the structure of the institutions in which they have to act. It is attention in particular to this last which gives sociology its distinctive subject matter (thus perhaps providing the 'social aspect' of which Bosanquet spoke in his chairman's remarks), and it is this which distinguishes social psychology from individual psychology.

Bosanquet insisted that a society depended on what he called 'the whole working system of dominant ideas which determines the places and functions of its members' (1895: 325), and also on there being a tacit moral consensus about the character of its public life. He connected this with Rousseau's idea of the General Will. There are well-known difficulties about what this means – how it is to be distinguished from *de facto* majority opinion, and whether it needs to stand for some collective super-will over and above the wills of individuals. Bosanquet deals perceptively with the first of these difficulties by making the difference one between decisions made in the light of what people see as a common purpose for the 'common good', and 'the will of all' which may register a *de facto* majority interest. So far, so good. But he also presents decisions in terms of a common purpose as if they were decisions of a superior collective will. A great deal of effort has been given to attacking this notion; I shall not add to it since I doubt whether the notion of a collective super-will would have many present-day defenders. But in jettisoning it, we should not lose sight of more profitable aspects in what Bosanquet had to say about the General Will. Besides the chapters on this in *The*

Philosophical Theory of the State, there is an article in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* of 1912 (pp. 321–40), '*Les idées politiques de Rousseau*', where he speaks of the General Will as something to be formed through public opinion developed by discussion, and he interprets Rousseau's enigmatic 'Legislator' as a symbolic figure in the initiation of this. He sees such public opinion, especially in its moral aspects, as an underlying condition in an ongoing social life. Durkheim expounded Rousseau on similar lines in an article published in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* posthumously in 1918.⁶ Durkheim considered Rousseau's General Will, taken not as a temporary public opinion, but as an underlying social consensus, could answer to his own *conscience collective*. He thought Rousseau lacked a sociological perspective, and was hampered by his individualistic notion of the 'state of nature'.

Thus Bosanquet and Durkheim shared a common interest in the necessity of what Durkheim called '*représentations collectives*'. These are shared ways in which people see their social life. Durkheim was the more successful in interpreting these as social facts, actions not due to individual choices but to constraints in social relations. Bosanquet was stronger on the possibility, and desirability, of initiatives within the community, acting constructively on the deliberation and policies of governments. Putting the two together, the 'General Will' can be seen as standing for something of great importance in social life which can be disentangled from the notion of a group mind. T.H. Green (no friend of group minds) spoke of it as 'that impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears of a people'. Bosanquet puts this more positively in the article, 'The Reality of the General Will' in *Aspects of the Social Problem* (1895).

We may identify the general will of any community with the whole working system of dominant ideas which determines the places and functions of its members, and of the community as a whole among other communities. The system is never quite harmonious; readjustment is determined by the forces in collision, together with the other forces in collision, together with the other forces of the machine. Both the more important workings of the machine and especially the direction of its readjustment are the most familiar *expression* of the general will. But the general will itself is the whole assemblage of individual minds, considered as a working system, with parts

corresponding to one another, and producing as a result a certain life for all those parts themselves. . . .

Again, the general will is not identical with public opinion considered as a set of judgements which form the currently expressed reflections upon the course of affairs. It may include those current notions or part of them, but it certainly includes much more, because the ideas that dominate the will do not always appear in reflection or at least not with the importance which they have in life. The general will is more a system of wills than a system of reflections and appears in action quite as much as in discussion.

Again it is not merely the *de facto* tendency of all that is done by members of the community, though it is much more like this than like a vote or a set of opinions. It is, to a great extent, a *de facto* tendency, but only in so far as this tendency reveals active ideas with regard to the connexion of persons or groups of persons. (pp. 325–6)

A.D. Lindsay has a sympathetic interpretation of Bosanquet drawing on these passages.

Take away from these sentences of Bosanquet all notion of a will which wills anything. Press to their full consequences his admission that this that he is calling a will is largely unconscious and his distinction of it from all resolutions and acts of assembly and formulated principles. Neglect the occasional touches of that Hegelian complacency that all works out well whatever happens – a complacency which we in this time of crisis and peril find particularly difficult to bear. Do all that and there is a remarkable residuum.

Bosanquet has taken the hint conveyed in Rousseau's account of the general will as distinct from the will of all and has developed it into a masterly account of the elaborate system of institutions and mutual relations which go to make up the life of society. He has insisted on its complexity and richness and vitality – its transcendence of what any one individual can conceive or express. This, he declares, in all its elaborateness and multifariousness *is* the community. It is no less than that. That is the standard of legislation and what we ordinarily call state action. The business of politics is to take this elaborate complex of individuals and institutions for granted, try to understand the principles and fundamental ideas which inspire

Viewpoint: Bosanquet's social theory

it, diagnose the evils from which it is suffering; and then by state action seek to remove the disharmonies which are threatening its life and checking its vitality. (1943: 244)

This is not unlike Durkheim's view of the role of the State.⁷ He stressed the importance of special groups, notably vocational ones with their professional codes. He opposed the Syndicalist view of society as functioning through a relation between such groups, but he had an almost Corporatist view of a constitution in which such groups would be intermediaries between the State and the general body of citizens. The State was in ultimate control of them on behalf of society and should also organize its public morality through the characteristic civic virtue of justice. The State, as upholder of rights, could on occasions liberate individuals from the pressure of special groups. He was less clear that such groups might at times protect them against pressures from the State. But he was perhaps more realistic than Bosanquet in seeing both that a community needed such groups and that they could be a threat.

Not that Bosanquet thought their mutual support could be taken for granted. He was saying that the State had a role as adjusting and facilitating the contributions to the common social life which can be made by a multiplicity of institutions each with its own proper purpose. He called the State 'the operative criticism of institutions', where to criticize is defined as 'to adjust a part to its due and harmonious relations with a whole' (1895: 12). The State is said to be the 'hinderer of hindrances to the best life'. This means it should remove obstacles to what are nowadays called 'life chances', so that people should have the opportunity to 'make the best of themselves'. These obstacles might be lack or curtailment of *rights*, and Bosanquet (like Green) spoke of the paramount function of the State as to uphold rights. Other obstacles might be the grinding-down effects of material consequences; here Bosanquet, as we have seen, was chary about direct State intervention. The phrase 'the hinderer of hindrances' can sound negative, and in any case it is difficult to interpret or apply it with any precision. I think a more useful notion is '*the enabling State*'.⁸ I do not think that Bosanquet was worried about who should provide the infrastructure for such a State; he was not faced with a controversy over privatisation.

Nevertheless, although he did not give the State an extensive role in directing and controlling, and still less in owning, the resources of the community, Bosanquet most certainly had a high

view of its function, and this leads to ambiguities about its claims which have laid him open to criticism. The State, he rightly saw, is the sole legitimate repository of organized force, and is entitled to use this force to carry out its stabilizing and harmonizing function. But he combined the view that the State can at times legitimately use force to carry out an indispensable function, with the view that this is the *highest* function in the community; and that it commands the highest loyalty. There is of course a Hegelian note in this, and it was castigated by L.T. Hobhouse (1918). Hobhouse recognizes there is a value in the way in which Hegel and Bosanquet set the role of the State in the wider context of the life of a civic community, within which it plays a unique part. But uniqueness is not the same as final moral supremacy. The latter is a matter of judgement in circumstances, and is also affected by the kind of State one is confronted with.

The trouble is that in talking about 'The State' (with capital S), it is often unclear as to whether Bosanquet (or of course Hegel) is talking about the State in its ideal function, or about what might be the acts of some particular government. Bosanquet was perfectly prepared to criticize existing state actions (he could hardly have been a Liberal if he had not been) but the philosophy by which he saw things as developing their ideal natures meant that he continually talked in ways which could only hold of states as they should be, and he did not envisage a really evil state. He did, however, write (1917: 290) 'I admit that recent events have done something to show that the responsibility of a community for single wicked actions of men may be more intimate than I had thought possible'. This is a partial answer to what was to be Hobhouse's attack. Hobhouse also criticized the Hegelians for speaking as though the *nation state* was the natural form of the political economy. This was a dated view. We are now manifestly faced by the question of the adequacy and finality of the sovereign nation state. Even if a world government is not a realistic prospect, we are moving into a period of various kinds of interdependences (EEC, Nato, Warsaw Pact, IMF, etc.) which limit the absolute sovereignty of the nation state. At the same time there are internal moves to lessen its centralized power through devolution or regionalisation. Bosanquet could probably have taken the latter on board, since the central state would still have the control of force (county constabularies are under the law, if not directly under the Home Office), and in an emergency devolved powers can be recalled. But he would have had a problem over the

legitimacy of international groupings vis-à-vis the nation state. He could not envisage that intermediary groupings between the nation state and 'humanity' could guide states in making 'world choices' (see 1917: 287 ff) and he could not see how 'humanity' could form an organized moral community with sufficient tacit consensus to function as a political unit. He did however give qualified approval to the League of Nations which was coming on the scene. Like most Liberals, following Sir Edward Grey, he supported the 1914–18 War, but wrote in the preface to the 3rd edition (1920) of *The Philosophical Theory of the State*

Our natural instincts and innate patriotisms will by themselves mislead us. They need some inspiration and some discipline to make the world safe for humanity. It is not the State, nor sovereignty, nor merely the Germans, nor the Kaiser, who made the war. It is all of us, pursuing our mingled aims which take no account of others, which, apart from due subordination of means to ends, must lead to collision.

He was surely right about the difficulty of seeing humanity as a super-State operating through a moral consensus. My own view is that we cannot presuppose this, but should rather look at factors making for 'one world' in certain spheres – some of them common dangers across frontiers, such as terrorism, pollution, especially nuclear pollution, and the need to control drug traffic. Also there is a moral readiness of people in one part of the world to respond to disasters in another. Yet externally there is the problem of the lack of a sufficiently shared moral outlook to make an international political community viable, and at the same time there is also an internal problem in our increasingly pluralistic communities. I do not think our contemporary 'communitarian' political philosophers, mostly of the Right, who stress the need for shared moral traditions, face this latter problem squarely enough. Moreover the problem of moral pluralism is not only a racial one. There is the breakdown of an assumed (broadly Christian) morality, the bitterness of confrontational politics; and the growth of the 'underclass' – people without any real stake in the community.

Bosanquet was surely right in seeing that the State needs to be able to carry out its special function in the context of a community in which there are (to use expressions of Ralf Dahrendorf's) 'life chances' or 'options' and also 'ligatures'. Shirley Williams in *Politics is for People* (1984: 45) refers to Dahrendorf's *Life*

Chances (1979) in words which might have been written by Bosanquet:

Dahrendorf pointed to the sense in which the quality of life, as distinct from the quantity of production, is related to these ligatures or linkages, to the relationships which people have with their community, with their family, with the history of their particular neighbourhood, with their ability to find around them familiar things. It is these things, not only opportunities or choices, that spell out our identity and give meaning to our lives.

Bosanquet could take all this for granted, partly because sociologically he was living in a stable community, partly because his Idealist approach led to a way of thinking in which what should be, was already there, if you could see it properly. We know now that these 'ligatures' are in jeopardy. We also know that there are deep-seated conflicts whose harmonious reconciliation cannot be assumed, we may have to learn to live with them and to try to contain them.

This brings me to the metaphysical and religious background of Bosanquet's philosophical Idealism. It was an Absolute Idealism where Reality is a single systematic whole. The Absolute is *perfect*, 'perfect' meaning both complete, and also embodying a value beyond which there can be no higher. Fastening on the former sense, Bosanquet calls it 'The Whole'; on the latter, he calls it an infinite spiritual being, which transforms and incorporates all that is partial and 'finite', so that each part contributes to the ultimate perfection. Finite beings are 'appearances' – that is to say, the way in which they are seen under the conditions of temporal existence is not their real nature. But under these conditions they can develop their real nature in which they will be transformed into constituents within the Absolute. There is of course a difficulty here over the word 'develop'. If there is a real development, something is happening which adds to what was there before. As far as finite existence goes, Bosanquet allows that this is how it will appear. There is a struggle between good and evil in a life fraught with what he calls 'the hazards and hardships of finite selfhood'. But from the (non-temporal) viewpoint of the Absolute, there is no real struggle in Time because there is no Time. Conflicts of good and evil are ingredients in the perfect spiritual whole, which is a complete coherent system. So in the end in the words of Julian of Norwich 'all shall be well, and all manner of things shall be well'.

In my view, Bosanquet's most successful book is his *Three Lectures on Aesthetics* (1915). He sees a work of art as an imaginative composition, which expresses feeling in a material embodiment. He considers what he calls 'difficult beauty', where we have to overcome an initial revulsion against apparent dissonance and learn to appreciate the total expression. His view is consonant with abstract as well as representative art, seeing the latter as imaginative composition. In his aesthetics a work of art is in effect what he wants reality to be in his metaphysics, where material conditions are transformed into a unity with spiritual significance. The work of art can absorb tensions in a unity (some people can indeed look on art as the one thing that can redeem the tensions and conflicts of actual life in the world). It can be beyond good and evil, though not beyond beauty and ugliness, 'ugliness' being defined by Bosanquet as incoherence, where a work claims to be an expressive composition but fails, and is thus a counterfeit. Such ugliness is quite distinct from 'difficult beauty'. The work of art forms a unity in itself. But life in the world is not like a work of art, or if a particular life is spoken of as a work of art, this is a metaphor. Helen Bosanquet indeed wrote in *The Charity Organization Review* in 1900 that 'there is always something of the artist about the true philanthropist, and the harmony of life which he aims at creating is hardly less important than that of the painter, the poet, etc.' (Vincent and Plant, 1984: 115). But a work of art is an artifact, in that it has a bounded unity. In real life, problems at one stage may be resolved only to produce others at another stage, and so on in an open-ended way.

Few people nowadays may want to defend the Idealist Absolute, as 'the Whole' in its timeless perfection. Nor does the notion of an 'Absolute' in any sense play much of a role in contemporary political and social philosophy. Yet some form of transcendental reference in a political and social philosophy may serve to set it in proportion, and help correct the limitations of a purely social view of human life and morality. I think we can see this happening in Bosanquet, and we can perhaps appreciate the fertilizing effect of this perspective without accepting its extreme metaphysical claims. This comes out, I think, in how he sees social and personal morality. Life in society shows what he calls 'the hardships and hazards of finite selfhood'; under its conditions there will be conflicts and incoherences which it is the function of the State to try to reconcile. But in public life, reconciliation is incomplete, because this is a setting in which people are treated under laws as

'units at arms length', in what Bosanquet calls 'the world of claims and counter-claims' (1913: Lecture V, especially p. 153). The morality of this public sphere is indeed a morality, it must weigh claims and counter-claims, and its characteristic virtue is justice. The morality of justice is essential because the principle of spiritual membership in the Absolute 'cannot be used and abused at the discretion of finite societies' (1913: 151). But the relationship between people which justice is concerned to safeguard is not the last word in their relationship. Indeed, it is not the first word either, since mind in man, Bosanquet held, is a 'social characteristic, and lives in the medium of recognition' (1913: 84).

In the public sphere people are seen as 'units at arms length', as related by claims and counter-claims. The final relationship is one in which they are 'members of one another' in what Bosanquet holds to be the organic unity of the Absolute. We may feel chary about 'organic unity' as a description of human fellowship. Yet Bosanquet is surely right to say that people can be bound up in ways whereby they bear one another's burdens and share one another's joys, and that this is an inter-relationship which morality cannot prescribe. In such a disposition, he holds, one passes beyond morality to religion. He remarks significantly (1913: 147) that

When critical ideas directed against current orthodox Christianity first made an impression on my mind, it was more than anything else the doctrine of vicarious atonement, literally construed, that seemed shocking and unjust. And it was with some interest, and not without surprise, that, taking stock of one's convictions after a long development, one found that what was obviously the intention of the doctrine in question, so far from remaining the great stumbling-block in Christianity, had become pretty nearly its sole attractive feature. One had passed, I suppose, from an individualistic rationalism to an appreciation of the world of spiritual membership.

The world of spiritual membership is one in which people bear one another's burdens. The spirit of this kind of relationship at least prevents anyone who has it from resting within the prescribed morality of the world of claims and counter-claims. That this public morality is in the sphere of the State shows that, however much Bosanquet may be accused of making State loyalty the highest loyalty, his transcendental reference prevents this from

being in fact his final word, either about human relationships or about a person's ultimate spiritual membership. There is a similar corrective in Bradley. His famous chapter 'My Station and its Duties' in *Ethical Studies* (a chapter for which Bosanquet had a high regard) has been taken as epitomizing social conformity. Its readers do not always go on to the next chapter 'Ideal Morality'. Here we are told that there is no visible community in which we can realize 'the ideal self'. No visible community is ever a complete harmonious system, and, even if it were, 'the ideal does not always bring peace in its train'. In the morality of 'my station and its duties' there is no fully satisfying community, and even in ideal morality the man who realizes himself as an artist need not be a good man (Bradley 1927: 236, cf. 214, 232, 236). Bradley was more sceptical than Bosanquet about their being a final harmonious system – indeed, his Absolute goes beyond the notion of 'system'.

Bosanquet believed in a final harmony; he had a religious dedication to the system of the Absolute, which he calls 'the Whole'. My own sense of the matter, for what it is worth, is that, while I might be able to feel mystically about 'the Whole', I should find it very difficult to feel mystically towards 'Tutto', as it was called by another Idealist philosopher, Gentile, or even towards 'The Entirety', as it was called by Bosanquet's friend, the philosopher and statesman, Lord Haldane. But I respect the fact that reference to the Absolute prevented them from resting content with the adequacy of social morality. This is a note which I miss in the writings of contemporary secular communitarians (such as MacIntyre 1981 and Sandel 1982) where virtues and moral practices are pinned to the customs and traditions of an actual society.⁹

A transcendental reference in a social philosophy, if not in a sociology, can remove any complacency about these (not that MacIntyre is complacent, since he laments that we have ceased to have such traditions). Beyond customs and traditions, there can be reference to what I should like to call a regulative ideal of goodness. This can prevent us from putting absolute value on our own practices, still less our political ideologies, giving us an orientation from which they can be criticized. Criticism is possible because though we cannot fully comprehend such goodness, we can be turned towards it, and learn to distinguish 'better' and 'worse' in our own imperfect dealings. How we can do this would, however, be another story.

I have been describing how Bosanquet tried to do it in his

particular philosophy, one which set a high value on individuals, while setting them firmly within a common life in which the State had a crucial role, as 'hinderer of hindrances' to their realising their spiritual capacities. This was fine; nevertheless when we read Bosanquet and his fellow Idealists today, we may feel that, for all their moral earnestness, there was a certain moral blindness. It was a blindness to the way in which collectives, including the State (and dare we say, the COS?) are never as disinterested as their members would like to believe, especially where they have power over people's lives. It is true, as I have said, that their reference to the Absolute prevented these Idealists from taking social morality as finally satisfactory. Its judgements were partial because they were made within a limited perspective. They did not see that they were also likely to be partial in the other sense, of being slanted, however unconsciously, to the interests of particular groups. Marxists say that collective self-interestedness will always have the last word, except in a Communist Utopia. We need not be Marxists to think that, though this may not be the last word, it is very often the first word, and one not to be disregarded. Such partiality can affect the way we see the 'common good', as well as bolster our cruder personal advantage. Their failure to be sufficiently aware of this is one criticism which can be made of the Idealists. Another, perhaps allied to it, would be that they underestimated the intransigence of conflicts. They saw conflicts as ministering to a final harmony: indeed, when rightly seen, this harmony already existed. This could take away from the seriousness of 'the hazards and hardships of finite selfhood'. On some religious views, this might be said to be a good thing. On others the reality of conflict might be taken more seriously. We may indeed seek reconciliations, but we may have to see ourselves as living in a world in which there can be situations for which there is no satisfactory solution. We have to learn to live with them and to realize that others are in the same predicament. Moreover, the Idealists' optimism about a final metaphysical harmonious perfection could feed (not perhaps very consistently) a secular belief in progress. We are not so sure.

Yet I would not want to end on a note of criticism. I have nothing but admiration for the way in which the Idealist political philosophers gave themselves to thinking seriously about the concrete character of civic life. Bosanquet in particular gave himself not only to thinking but to working for a community, as he saw it, where individuals would give each other mutual support in

trying to achieve the best they were capable of, and where the necessary conditions for this would be protected by an enabling State

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Notes

- 1 Of the two most influential recent books on Political Theory, Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York and Oxford, Blackwell, 1974) and John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard and Oxford, 1971), Nozick is insistently individualistic, and Rawls is advocating a form of social contract which bypasses the fact that any contract presupposes an already existing community
- 2 Quoted by Helen Bosanquet from a leaflet issued to the Ethical Society in 1887 (1924-45)
- 3 Like her husband, Helen Bosanquet was interested in the theories behind social policies, and wrote about them in a number of books and articles. A collection of her papers is deposited in the library of the University of Newcastle. This collection includes a number of letters to Bernard Bosanquet. Some of these which bore on his philosophy were published by J. H. Muirhead in *Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends* (1935)
- 4 The abolition of the Guardians had to wait until the Poor Law itself was abolished by Neville Chamberlain's Act of 1929. The cases for the Majority and Minority Reports were put by Bosanquet and Sidney Webb in *The Sociological Review* II, 2 (1909)
- 5 J. S. Mill thought that there should be compulsory public examinations for all children, but that their education should be by private provision (*On Liberty*, Chapter V). Bosanquet thought that this got it the wrong way round (1899: 67). Is our present Secretary of State for Education 1988 going back to Mill?
- 6 This was originally given in a lecture course on 'Montesquieu et Rousseau' in Bourdeaux, probably before 1901. It was published under this title by Georges Davy (Paris, 1953)
- 7 See 'Etat, patrie et société civile' in *Revue Philosophique* 148 (1958). This was a hitherto unpublished fragment, printed to mark the centenary of Durkheim's birth, and probably dates from 1900-5. There is a fuller treatment in *Professional Ethics and Civil Morals*, London 1957, a translation of *Leçons de sociologie physique des mœurs et du droit* (Istanbul and Paris, 1950)
- 8 I was first introduced to this phrase by Dr Nick Bosanquet, a contemporary member of the family. I do not know where it originated, and nor does he. He

used the phrase to express a view in which the State is concerned to see that people should have access to e.g. health care, disablement care, education, free at the point of consumption, not necessarily supplied by public services but commissioned through e.g. franchises, grants, competitive tender. Nick Bosanquet gave these as examples of measures which could be argued for under the rubric of 'the enabling State'

- 9 Sandel speaks of a 'constitutive sense of community, a framework of self-understanding distinguishable from what are just the dispositions of individuals' (1982: 174). This would certainly have been congenial to Bosanquet.

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Review article: Sentiment and social change

Bill Williamson

The Social Construction of Emotions

Rom Harré (ed.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, £25, vii + 316 pp.

Education and the Working Class

Brian Jackson and Dennis Marsden, Ark Paperbacks, London, 1986, £4.95, 296 pp.

War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War

Harold L. Smith (ed.), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986, £27.50, xi + 271 pp.

Inside British Society: Continuity, Challenge and Change

Gordon A. Causer (ed.), Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1987, paper £8.95, xii + 250 pp.

Everyday Life

Agnes Heller, Routledge, London, 1986, £6 95, xii + 276 pp.

The books upon which this essay is based do not at first sight sit well together. They span very different subjects and have no obvious common theme. What brings them together in this review is the contribution they can be shown to make to the broader enterprise of understanding the course of social change in Britain during the period since the end of the Second World War.

Only one of the books under review has that as its distinctive aim. What the others offer, in very different ways, are analytical resources which broaden out the range of questions that can be asked about social change. It is for this reason that it is fitting to discuss these books together. What stands out is a theme that is

important for but neglected by both social scientists and historians: the way in which social change brings in its train changes in how people experience themselves and their society. It is the theme of change in the social contours of subjectivity. The books under review, each in their different ways, have something to offer us here

People act, think and feel. The processes involved in achieving this have been at the heart of the study of social psychology and have long been understood to be interdependent and essentially social in character. Thus there is no action without thought, no thought without feeling and some forms of action, as Max Weber well knew, are primarily affective in character. How thoughts, feelings and actions are related is a matter for research and is something which ought to be approached both historically and comparatively; for 'structures of feeling', as Raymond Williams once described the phenomena I am referring to, both change through time and vary from one type of society to another (Williams, 1977).

In this sense, both thought and feeling, as the warp and weft of experience, have to be seen simultaneously as facets of the experience of particular human beings and as features of the organisation of society as a whole which changes through time. E.P. Thompson put this well when he noted:

people do not only experience their own experience as ideas, within thought and its procedures. . . . They also experience their own experience as *feeling*, and they handle their feelings within their culture, as norms, familial and kinship obligations and reciprocities, as values or (through more elaborated forms) within art or religious beliefs. (1978: 363)

Within the social sciences, however, there has been much more emphasis placed on the study of thought and action than on feeling. As a result, what Raymond Williams has referred to as 'the affective elements of consciousness' (1977: 132) is a realm of experience which has been largely neglected by social scientists. The actions of people in society are carefully traced in social statistics and people leave traces of themselves in the records of the courts, in the mass media, in elections and in the records of commercial enterprise. Their thoughts are researched in opinion polls and studies of ideology. Their beliefs show up in accounts of religious practice or in the way they vote for their politicians.

Their feelings, though, have been neglected. The fact that people are alternately happy and sad, full of optimism or disappointed, envious, jealous, ambitious, despairing, proud, self righteous, angry or composed hardly seems to matter. That they fall in love, suffer loss or indignity or become depressed and sometimes elated and that coping with their feelings is something which taxes their abilities to the limit, is something which, by and large, social scientists, historians included, have tended to ignore. The people whose lives are charted in the annals of social science are incapable of hate or of sympathy for their fellow men. *Homo sociologicus* neither laughs nor cries

It is odd that this should be the case. A reluctance to enter the territory of the psychologist explains part of it. An unwillingness to rest an argument on anything but the hardest evidence is another problem; both in history and sociology the search for reliable evidence, often, as is the case with historians, of a documentary kind or, as with social scientists of a controlled statistical kind, cautions great care in describing something as intangible and conceptually imprecise as emotions and feelings. And there is the additional difficulty that in the predominant varieties of social theory, what E. P. Thompson calls 'the vocabularies of the human project – compassion, greed, love, pride, self-sacrifice, loyalty, treason, calumny' are all too easily reduced to the logic of social arrangements (1978: 359). It is a charge he makes particularly against some strains of modern marxism but his comments apply with equal force to several other traditions of social theory. The outcome remains the same, whatever the conceptual scheme; feelings and sentiment are either ignored or regarded as inaccessible to serious social – as opposed to strictly psychological – research

The point should not be overstated and it is not one which has been completely ignored. Within academic sociology, in the work, for instance, of Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1970) all the way through to Berger and Luckmann (1966) there is an acknowledgment of the importance of the subjectivity of social action. And in historical studies the work of Burckhardt (1951) Huizinga (1979), Namier (1955), Febvre (1973) and, perhaps above all, Elias (1982) stands out in the way they attend to the whole question of the emotional temper of different periods of history

Nor is the situation static; both in historical studies e.g. in the work of Richard Sennett (1978) and in sociology in the work of Bellah and his colleagues on 'habits of the heart' (1985) or Joe Bailey on pessimism (1988) there is evidence of a growing

awareness and of an increased interest in exploring change in the social and psychological contours of subjectivity in modern society.

Such work faces considerable difficulties. Some are essentially conceptual and concern the ways in which feelings and emotion can be described and interpreted. Closely related are, of course, the strictly methodological problems of conducting research into these issues and of finding operational indexes of change in feelings and sentiment. And then, though not exhaustively, there are the straightforwardly historical questions of how change has taken place in a particular society over a given period of time.

The historian or the psychologist who might yet doubt that such change does take place could profitably read the chapter on melancholia by Harré and Finlay-Jones in *The Social Construction of Emotions*. What they demonstrate in this account of a particular emotional state is that emotions are inseparable from their social and cultural setting and from the linguistic resources people can draw upon to make sense of their experience. Since these resources change through time and vary between societies it becomes clear that some sorts of emotional experience are confined to earlier periods of history or to only some societies. Melancholia, it can be shown, is an 'obsolete mood'.

While it might be conceded that such a demonstration is possible if long time scales are involved it might not be so easily acknowledged that significant changes in 'structures of feeling' can take place in the shorter term. In fact, the books under review contain many suggestions that the emotional resonances of British society have changed significantly over the past forty years and provide ample clues about how this might be researched.

Onwards from the war

The Second World War is rightly perceived in this society as a turning point in British and, indeed, in world history. In the case of Britain it is commonly thought of as having ushered in a new era of planning and of welfare in which a new form of society and social relations could be built guided by the principles of justice and fairness and of widened opportunities for all. Such imagery has become part of popular historical consciousness and evokes a powerful sense of a society held together through war by a common perception of an enemy and of the sort of values which

would govern the future once that enemy had been defeated.

The image of an organic community pulling together – the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ was one later evocation of it – which lay behind the building of a welfare state, is a potent element of this particular structure of feeling. By 1945, after Belsen and Auschwitz, British people could think of themselves as champions of decent, humane and democratic values with a responsibility to help reconstruct a corrupted world. Though austere, people in Britain lived in a society in which there was hope for a better future for all irrespective of their class background and a prevailing determination to secure it. Regret that the war had to be fought at all, sadness at its results, uncertainty about the future were all combined with a pride in the country’s achievements and a determination to root those gains in the strong institutions of a welfare state at home and a democratic world order overseas.

Standard though these observations are there is no doubt they touch upon and highlight widespread and powerful feelings which were both part of the experience of individual men and women and of British society as a whole at that time. How such feelings were focused and interpreted is both an historical and conceptual matter. Conceptually it is a question of tracing through patterns of everyday life the ways in which different groups of people experienced their world.

And it is at this point that the work of Agnes Heller in *Everyday Life* becomes helpful. Written in 1968 Heller’s book, drawing liberally on both phenomenological and marxist traditions, bears many similarities to the work of Berger and Luckmann and their ideas on how everyday life is constructed. The language may be grotesquely Hegelian but the insights are worth the effort of their discovery.

What she underlines is that people experience the reality of their lives in the here and now of their everyday conduct. Within the constraints of everyday life people develop their distinctive identities and understanding of their world and become aware, too, of the possibilities for change within it. Everyday life, then, is not just given; it is achieved. It is a sphere of ‘objectivation’ which can be changed and, she insists, ‘change in human attitudes is co-constitutive of every change’ (p. x).

The world of the everyday is not confined to the sidelines of history as false consciousness; it is part of history itself and must be taken seriously. This is, of course, sociological old hat. But it was not so when this book was first published and certainly not the case

in the East European strains of marxist thought with which Heller grew up. And for my purposes what is particularly valuable is the way she injected into her account of everyday life an affective dimension foreign to much marxist theorising, insisting that there is an 'indissoluble unity' to perception, feeling and thinking (p. 195).

The unity she writes about is not something achieved by individuals. It relates, too, to where people are placed in society and it changes through time and varies from one society to another. From one point of view it is the underlying 'feeling of certainty' which lends credibility to what people come to believe about their world. 'Belief' she writes, 'the feeling of certainty – can multiply our capabilities, give us wings, imbue our activities with new and greater energy' (p. 207). But it can bring disaster, too, when feelings replace thought as guides to action and the feeling of certainty can become manifest not just as trust in something but blind faith. It is not only to the unfortunate history of the continent of Europe in the twentieth century that these words apply

Her account of social interaction is built up from these observations and she demonstrates that all encounters have an affective dimension ranging from 'feelings of affirmation' like love or sympathy, through to 'feelings of negation' like antipathy or hate. In between there is a zone of indifference and it is the character of the feelings involved which give shape to how people perceive the others around them and construe their obligations towards them. In this way questions about feelings and perception lead inexorably to questions of morality and onwards to questions about the character and quality of a whole way of life and of the social order which sustains it. To have demonstrated that is a major achievement.

But back to the war; how have changes in the structures of everyday life taken place since that time and with what consequences for the affective character of interpersonal relations? Have feelings of affirmation about the sort of social relationships many sought to achieve through the post war policies on welfare and employment and health been realised in how people typically conduct their lives and make their moral judgements? Or have they been replaced by an attitude of indifference or by 'feelings of negation'?

Post-war social change; reality and myth

If the answers to such questions were straightforward then the questions themselves would hardly be worth the asking. One problem, for instance, is that the initial premise might be overstated i.e. that the war had brought significant social changes as a basis for the building of a new kind of society. There is clearly little doubt among the contributors to Harold Smith's book, *War and Social Change* that the idea that the Second World War was a watershed of change is grossly overstated. Thus it is argued that a policy of full employment was thought to be feasible without root and branch change to the economy. The educational reforms are evaluated as creating little that was new. Penny Summerfield in her essay on the 'levelling of class' shows that the war increased division and heterogeneity among working people.

And so on; each essay in the book modifies the myth. In Harris's chapter on welfare there is the striking argument that the values of social solidarity created by the war were 'artificial' (p. 256) and that the welfare state was born with no coherent conception of what it should be and no coherent theory of the state itself. The 'visionary patriotism' of reconstruction concealed behind the rhetoric of an organic community a great diversity of values and goals. The demand for welfare continued to increase after the war but the absence of a coherent vision of what the welfare state could be left it vulnerable to attack and to doubt that it could ever be fully realised.

Smith's volume as a whole is a significant contribution to a growing number of studies which seek to make sense of the impact of the Second World War on British society. What it does not explain is why the myth persists and why, in popular memory, the war was such a turning point and why the memory of it and what it symbolised still has the power to evoke powerful feelings of pride in the country's achievements and, more than forty years on, a feeling of regret that despite the affluence which followed the war, society as a whole has lost a sense of a common moral purpose.

What lies behind the book's failure to explain this is not so much that the contributions are flawed. It is rather that in seeking to check perceptions against fact most of the contributors neglect the potent influence of feeling in shaping how people in wartime Britain, and for a long time afterwards, though, perhaps, no longer, construed their world and lived their lives.

It is, of course, not a criticism of the book to point this out: it is rather a comment on what can and cannot be done by adopting a particular historical method and approach which makes much of the contrast between belief and actuality and disconnects what people think from what they feel. And it is an approach to historical actuality which conceives of what was significant in the past in terms only of the structures and processes of public life without tracing the manifold ways which these are part of and arise from the logic of the everyday lives of millions of people in society.

That everyday life with its rich textures of feeling is at the heart of another of the books under review, *Education and the Working Class* by Jackson and Marsden. The re-issue of this sociological classic is timely. At a time when sociological research of a sensitive humanistic kind struggles to retain its credibility in higher education, this book stands as a model of what can be achieved. Harry Ree in his introduction to the book describes it as a slice of history, a life-like evocation of working class life and education in the early 1960s.

But it was always more than that. It charted aspects of the social landscape of this society which were almost unknown. And it did so in a way which pointed directly to practical conclusions for educational policy and the organisation of schools. In film and literature of the period there was a parallel search for a clear account of what kind of society had developed in Britain. Certainly, the society which seeps through the pages of Jackson and Marsden in many ways was the embodiment of the high hopes of 1945. What they showed was how far yet it still had to change to realise a fuller life for the working class people on whose efforts the whole edifice of affluence rested.

All this was achieved in a book which set out directly to explore the economic conditions but also the delight, snobbery, frustration and love which were part of working class life and community. There was no carefully engineered research design. Jackson and Marsden even admit that they did not really know why they wrote the book until they had finished it. It was a very personal enterprise, an exploration of their own experience in Huddersfield as grammar school boys made good. Here, of course, is its strength. The unashamed interest in the personal, on how people feel as much as how they think, their refusal to draw a sharp line between themselves as researchers and the people they were researching are precisely the qualities of the book which explain its analytical force and historical objectivity.

the economic alchemy of the Thatcher years will in the end produce the gold of sustained economic growth.

In several of the essays there is a sense that in the dark undertow of change the quality of social and community relations in the society will inevitably decline. The residualisation of public housing and worrying signs of backlash against welfare services for the disadvantaged are just two indications of these trends. Joan Higgins's chapter on the health service notes the cohesive role it has played – she follows Klein in calling it a 'symbol of social reassurance' – but that its capacity to continue in that role is under great threat, despite it being an institution with which the vast majority of the people of this society are well content.

Reviewers have a right to grumble; the book has little to say about race relations, gender divisions and the differences which divide the generations. It is a book about structures rather than processes, about policies rather than attitudes, and about institutions rather than social relationships. Because of this it cannot illuminate, for instance, what it was that made Thatcher possible. It is not enough to point to economic decline or the failure of the Left or the rise of the service class. All matter; but so, too, do the less obvious, more subtle changes in the tone and texture of social relations, in attitude and value, of fellow-feeling and historical perception. These are features of how people feel about both themselves and others and what we need to know, and urgently, are how such feelings guide the moral choices people make and what values govern their actions.

Privatism, individualism, indifference to the needs of others, resentment of the disadvantaged, fear of strangers appear in this book as a kind of latent undercurrent, a consequence of structural changes over time in the society. That they are part of the changes of structure, key features of what has made them possible is hardly countenanced in these essays and the reason is simple. Too many varieties of social theory have remained silent about the ways in which people actually experience the world, value it and make sense of it. It is only when we have understood that we would be in a better position to assess the feasibility of alternative visions of the future and understand the real constraints on their realisation.

Emotions, language and society

It is not, though, simply an empirical question, a matter of asking people what they feel about the poor or the welfare state or the

bomb or even what they feel about themselves. Such questions raise horrendous empirical difficulties. It is actually much more a conceptual problem of knowing how feelings can be understood. Here, of course, is the importance of the Harré book, *The Social Construction of Emotions*. It is a collection of essays by philosophers and anthropologists held together by Harré's description of this 'social constructionist viewpoint' which he sets against the 'intellectually anorexic' accounts of emotion offered in recent academic psychology (p. 9).

The essence of Harré's position is this. we need to study emotions to understand and explain human behaviour. But emotions are not generic. The personal experience of emotion is something shaped by language and by the moral order of the society. It follows, therefore, that there are culturally diverse emotions and that what it is to experience a particular emotion e.g. love, pride, sadness, will change through time and differ between societies. He rejects the 'ontological illusion' that emotions are somehow there: what is really there, he insists 'is the ordering, selecting and interpreting work upon which our acts of management of fragments of life depend' (p. 4). Thus instead of asking 'what is anger?' we should ask, 'how is the word "anger" used in a given cultural context?'

Subsequent chapters explore further aspects and implications of this constructionist position and there are specific chapters on particular emotions e.g. anger, envy and loneliness – this latter chapter is particularly useful to sociologists – and the whole question of how emotions vary between different societies. It is, on the whole, a most useful and challenging book with major implications for all work being done on the boundaries of sociology and social psychology and philosophy. But it has direct implications for historical work, too.

If emotions do not exist apart from the vocabularies which give expression to them and the social conventions to render them legitimate, then this points to interesting questions about change in society. Again, the period since the end of the Second World War can illustrate the point. The rhetorics of caring interdependence, even of pride in sacrifice for collective goals which were so much part of the vocabulary of emotion during and shortly after the Second World War, sustained a particular range of emotional response. They were, of course, closely entwined with national pride and the imagery it evoked but there was, too, a 'structure of feeling' which laid emphasis on the community pulling together.

on fairness and on helping one another and of feeling that although people existed as individuals they did so as part of something larger and more important than themselves.

This sense of being part of a larger community should not be belittled. Men died for it, high taxation and austerity and rationing were accepted by most people as part of the necessary conditions for victory and reconstruction. And the building of a decent and fair society after the war with welfare for everyone as its main goal was something rooted in what Heller would call 'feelings of affirmation'. She mentions sympathy, inclination and love; we could add fellow-feeling, concern, a willingness to care for the needs of strangers. In some of the books under review caution is urged that we do not overinterpret the myth about the Second World War. There was perhaps less support for the welfare state than I have implied and a careful review of all the evidence would point to many people and groups who had deep reservations about the kind of society Britain had become. Evelyn Waugh, for instance, wrote *Brideshead Revisited* because he thought the values of the way of life he described were seriously under threat and would have no place in the new world. For him, no doubt as for many reactionary old conservatives, regret was a potent mood at the time.

But if the general point is accepted about the prevailing structure of feeling of the society at that time, can the argument be pushed further to suggest that, like 'melancholia' some of these feelings are now obsolete? Has the growth of a materialist affluence and an ethic of individualism transformed the values and norms of the society and sanctioned vocabularies of feeling radically at odds with those of the earlier period? Have they been replaced, in Heller's terms, by 'feelings of negation', of antipathy, resentment and even, perhaps of hate?

What are the predominant structures of feeling of our society? What kind of social policies could they sustain? What is the balance now in our society between contentment and satisfaction with existing social arrangements of the sort displayed by Mr Chapman in *Education and the Working Class* and regret that something worthwhile has been lost in our society, a sense which Jeremy Seabrook detected in many of the older people he spoke to for his book, *What Went Wrong?* (1978). How do people perceive the needs of strangers and how strongly do they sense, if, indeed, at all, that they have an obligation to contribute to meeting those needs? To what underlying feelings and moral commitments can

politicians make the most successful appeals? With what feeling of hope do people construe the future both for themselves and for their society? In what kind of sentiments are the institutions of modern Britain now anchored?

These are empirical questions and answers to them will only emerge from the most careful and sensitive interpretation of how people act, think and feel. Without answers to them our understanding of the political and economic orders of society and of change within them is flawed and incomplete. To answer them well demands a sophisticated understanding of how emotion and feeling are organised, enough historical wit to realise that this is something which changes through time and sufficient literary skill to evoke for others the complexity of it all. The books under review provide hints on how all this might be achieved.

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Enter the Sociologist: Reflections on the Practice of Sociology
N P McKeganey and S Cunningham-Burley (eds), Avebury,
Aldershot, 1987, £19.50, xi + 203 pp

In the words of its editors, this volume is part of a 'growing literature which attempts to convey the experiential aspect of doing sociological work' (p. 3). This tradition begins with Hammond's *Sociologists at Work* (1964) and includes Bell and Newby's *Doing Sociological Work* (1977). Neil McKeganey and Sarah Cunningham-Burley's objective is to extend this *genre*, previously focused only on the research process, by examining in a broader way 'what being a sociologist' involves. They seek to include here the way in which the activities and everyday life of the sociologist as an ordinary person both impinge on and are in turn impinged upon by the formal role of the sociologist.

The idea of the book is a valid one. Unfortunately the contributions mainly disappoint. They mostly fail to rise above the anecdotal, are rather self-consciously literary or journalistic in style, and in general lack sociological incisiveness. They fail to build on the availability of a far more systematic sociological literature on the social embeddedness and reflexivity of sociological knowledge which already exists, for example, in the work of Goffman, Schutz and the ethnomethodologists, or C. Wright Mills. The editors themselves report an uncertainty even amongst their own authors as to whether what they had to say 'had a relevance over and beyond' their own individual experience (p. 4). I am afraid that I concur with the contributors' scepticism. My verdict on the collection is that on the whole it is neither good journalism nor particularly good sociology. Furthermore, whereas the Hammond or Bell and Newby volumes possessed the merit of

presenting the low-down on well-known research, the present volume reports on research which is less well-known or on experiences which are merely personal.

If we follow the editors' own gloss, the first three chapters examine the process of communicating sociological ideas. Only one of these pieces, Mike Hepworth's reflections on 'Becoming a Sociologist' and on 25 years in the subject, succeeds in turning a personal view into a topic of more general interest. The other two are pedestrian pieces – on the individual experience of submitting articles to sociological journals (Neil McKeganey), and a comparison of the annual conferences of the BSA and the ASA (Albert Mills). Little new light is shed by these 'personal views'.

The next three chapters follow more closely in the footsteps of Hammond and Bell and Newby examine aspects of the research process, giving particular attention to how the researcher is viewed by the researched. To this end, but again without much verve or general interest, Steve Bruce recounts at length how he was hoaxed by a respondent (frankly, I wasn't surprised). Juliet du Boulay and Rory Williams offer a competent juxtaposition, but no extended comparison, of the different treatment of the researcher in a Greek mountain village and a Scottish city. And Oddette Parry describes her fairly obvious social vulnerability as a participant observer in a naturist club.

The interpretation of the professional practice of the sociologist and the life of the sociologist as an ordinary person is the central topic in chapters by Sarah Cunningham-Burley and Rosaline Barbour. Cunningham-Burley points to a number of implications of sociologists 'doing sociology in everyday life', including the tendency for her own everyday social encounters to take on some of the character of research observations and research interviews. Barbour's chapter examines the overlap between the personal and the professional in the sociologist's work from the point of view of her own friends and acquaintances, some of whom resented being the subject of informal sociological analysis. Unfortunately in neither of these chapters is the analysis carried very far. On her own admission, Cunningham-Burley approaches her topic in a 'relatively unsophisticated and unsystematic fashion' (p. 100). Part of the inspiration for their chapter derives from P. M. Strong's remark that 'To treat one's entire life as data is to . . . dedicate oneself entirely to the discipline' (p. 99). But her examination of the implications of sociologists doing sociology in everyday life contains none of the methodological awareness or the precision in

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deriving general conclusions to be found in Strong's own work, which involves a careful use of Goffman's insights and systematic recourse to methodological procedures such as 'analytical induction' and 'constant comparison'. The problem in both Cunningham-Burley's and Barbour's chapters, and to an extent the volume as a whole, seems to be an assumption that anyone can do analytical ethnographic work and that this is easy work, when in reality it is difficult and specialist work, requiring much flair and an attention to methodological procedures to bring it off well.

The three final chapters underline this point. All three arise from the sociological researcher formally off-duty in a medical setting, but keeping a 'sociological' diary of their personal experiences. None of these chapters is sufficiently focused to achieve any really telling new angle on the role of the sociologist. Sara Delamont's chapter is a plausible account of conceptions of 'pollution' in a gynaecological ward which happens also to raise questions about the ethics of using data gathered as a participant rather than a researcher. John Benyon simply reports on eight days as a patient in a South Wales hospital. Since he admits that his chapter 'is intended as a journalistic piece rather than an attempt at serious research or theory formulation' (p. 172) it is difficult to see just what was the point of its inclusion. For Paul Atkinson the topic is his own social incompetence – despite being a sociologist – in the face of medical bureaucracy. We are told that the theme of this chapter is the sociologist as 'anti-hero' able to compete in fieldwork-induced adversity with the anthropologist. But it is not clear to me that any important new insight hangs on this view. Indeed something like this must be the verdict on the volume as a whole.

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David Jary

Max Weber and His Contemporaries

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel (eds), Allen & Unwin, London, 1987, £30.00, xiv + 591 pp.

In this volume the editors have brought together thirty-five papers from a conference convened in London in 1984, and have appended to them Dieter Henrich's important reflection on the meaning of Weber for Karl Jaspers. The purpose of this conference was to situate Max Weber's thought and action with

respect to a diverse group of contemporaries scattered across Europe and located in the universities, in politics, in the world of letters, or in various religious and cultural associations and movements. The centrality of Weber's position in European thought is assumed in these papers; the authors then aim to relate his work and activity to that of various social scientists, theologians, historians, politicians, philosophers and other representatives of modern culture.

Using an expansive definition of its field of inquiry, the collection seems to contain a bit of everything, following the form 'Weber and . . .'. Included are people Weber knew personally (Alfred Weber, Simmel, Sombart, Schmoller, Troeltsch, Michels) and people he did not know at all (Freud, Sorel, Pareto, Mosca), those he admired (Naumann) and those he despised (Spengler); thinkers he pondered seriously (Nietzsche) and men he ignored (Durkheim). One reads about associations to which Weber belonged (the Evangelical-Social Congress, the Association for Social Policy) and movements he questioned and repudiated (Social Democracy, Anarchism), or about modes of thought that were formative for his thinking (the German Historical School) and philosophical schools that were not (utilitarian liberalism). The enormous range and variety in these figures, issues and materials is ambitious, if it is anything.

Yet the major difficulty with such eclecticism is that it fails to make distinctions and to acknowledge judgements of significance. Who qualifies as a 'contemporary' of Weber? According to what criteria can the reader decide who or what is important or marginal? It is not clear how the volume proposes to answer these questions, with the result that the editorial principle of selection can appear to depend less on explicit claims about Weber's *fin-de-siècle* world (not to mention Weber's own ideas about it) than on the availability of today's scholarly talent. By default, as it were, this collection opts for generosity: the authors are free to be inventive, and nearly everything and everyone can be included. There are a few omissions. Marx, surprisingly, and the Feminists, less surprisingly, do not receive individual treatment. But otherwise the 'contemporaries' range from J. S. Mill, born more than half a century before Weber, to Gramsci, born nearly three decades after him, and neither of whom were essential points of orientation for Weber's horizons. The effect of treating Mill, Gramsci and everything in between as 'contemporary,' or of considering charlatans like Lamprecht on the same plane with

...to do
judgements of proximity, rank and worth would have he
contribution and place in perspective the true bearing of
themes discussed in these papers with respect to Weber
contributions in science and politics

However, a consistent point of view and level of discussion cannot be expected from a book with such variety. A very few essays qualify as major new contributions: for example, those by Wilhelm Hennis on the 'Historical School' (also available in his book on Weber), and by Henrich. A second and by far the largest group are content merely to try to fill in minor gaps in our knowledge. Those that are most successful at this level (such as the contributions by Aldenhoff-Hubinger on the *Evangelisch-sozialer Kongress*, Dahmann on Ernst Toller, or Schwentker on the Otto Gross Circle) reveal an impressive disparity between writers like themselves who have access to major parts of Weber's original corpus, by means either of language or of participation in the editorial work of the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*, and other scholars who lack such access. In this latter respect the essays show interpreters compelled to rely on the portions of Weber served up in the public domain (especially the English language version) at a distinct disadvantage, a situation that is unlikely to improve soon. At a third level are several admirably ambitious comparisons. Yet in most of these (Robert Eden's discussion of Nietzsche excepted) the authors find they must preface their efforts with questions about appropriate 'grounds of comparison' (Tracy Strong concerning Freud, p. 469), with apologies for the 'intellectual awkwardness' of a strained contrast (Alan Ryan on Mill, p. 170), the provisional quality of 'attempts at a comparison' (Jurgen Kocka on the truly minor figure of Hintze, p. 284), or the 'lack of any direct connection' between Weber and the subject at hand (David Beetham writing about Mosca and Pareto, p. 139). Even in these instances once a domain for inquiry is justified, contributors typically voice a frustrated awareness that it cannot be adequately explored given the few pages at their disposal or considering the present state of the available historical and textual evidence.

These reminders, combined with the tentative and sprawling character of the project, inevitably leave the impression of a collection, as a whole, whose strength lies in preliminary observations and brief speculations rather than in precise, detailed, thorough and notable results that are historically and conceptually

compelling. It is undoubtedly with this deficit in mind that Ralf Dahrendorf calls in the concluding essay for a new life and work of Weber in his own times that will give some of the 'magic' back to 'the barren landscape of modern social science' (p. 580). Unfortunately, at its best *Max Weber and His Contemporaries* can contribute only marginally to that urgent need.

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The Chicago School: A Liberal Critique of Capitalism

D. Smith, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £30.00, paper £8.95, x + 245 pp

There is a growing number of articles and books appearing which assess the role of the Chicago School in the development of sociology in general and the development of American sociology in particular. Recent contributions include, for example, *The Myths of the Chicago School*, Lee Harvey (1988), 'Early American Sociology and the *Polish Peasant*', Norbert Wiley, *Sociological Theory*, 1986, 4, 20-40; and 'Connections: W. I. Thomas, European Social Thought and American Sociology', P. Lodge, in *Structures of Knowing*, Richard C. Monk (ed.), AUP, 1987. Dennis Smith's book makes a valuable contribution to this growing body of recent literature about the Chicago School.

Smith's book represents an alternative to the radical critiques of the Chicago School which span the decades beginning with Thorstein Veblen and continue with the works of C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner and finally H. and J.R. Schwendinger. Simply put, each of these asserts in a more or less extreme manner

that the concepts and theories developed by sociologists in Chicago, as elsewhere in America, were structured in ways which served the interests of modern corporate capitalism. Furthermore, it is asserted, the ideological glasses through which these sociologists saw the world prevented them from recognising how they were being used (p. 6).

In challenging this position, Smith argues that Chicago sociology represents a set of responses from within the tradition of *American liberalism* to what he calls 'the practical and moral challenges of contemporary American capitalism' (p. 7). Smith makes his case

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first by exploring the differences between old-world and new-world liberalism and the relationships between the dominant political ideology and ruling-class interests in each of these social contexts. The nineteenth-century American liberalism Smith writes of was not linked, as was the European variety, to a moribund aristocracy; neither was it critical in nature. American liberalism was a celebration of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Thus when Smith refers to the Chicagoans as liberals he means

no more or less than that they believed American democracy, properly functioning, should enable men and women to achieve the satisfactions embodied in what has become known as the American Dream. They took seriously the obligation to work for the enactment of goals such as social justice and individual happiness as embodied in contemporary interpretations of the American Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution. (p. 6)

The central challenges of the Chicago sociologists, according to Smith, revolved around the reconciliation of three dilemmas. First, criticism of capitalism from within the ideological framework which justified it; secondly, individual liberty, justice, and communal harmony; and thirdly, happiness and efficiency or rationality.

The Chicago sociologists' liberal critique of American capitalism is selectively traced through four generations in the works of, from the first generation, Albion Small and W.I. Thomas; Park from the second; Louis Wirth and William F. Ogburn from the third, and, from the fourth generation, Morris Janowitz. Noticeably missing from the above fourth generation are symbolic interactionists who locate their heritage in the work of George Herbert Mead. Instead of claiming Mead as philosophical underwriter to the Chicago School, Smith draws on the work of John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen, and it is the latter two who fulfil this role. In all but ignoring Mead, Smith deftly avoids entanglement in the controversy regarding the extent of Mead's influence in Chicago sociology. Unfortunately his section on Veblen (and the associated comparison between Veblen and Simmel) is probably the least productive part of the book.

The main fault in this book, and I hasten to add that it is difficult to avoid in a book of this nature, is that Smith probably overstates his case. Certainly, I think that it is accurate to think of the

Chicago sociologists as liberals. Collectively they had confidence in the integrity of 'the system'. Social problems were not considered to be evidence of a fundamentally corrupt system but of a pathological aberration within a basically good system. However, the work of Chicago sociologists was not, by any means, exclusively geared toward a criticism of capitalism.

A great deal of the work of the Chicagoans was not placed within the context of corporate capitalism, nor did it constitute criticism of capitalism *per se*. The social disorganization and social pathology which was of interest to many Chicago sociologists was typically placed in the context of social change. For Thomas, for example, the quintessential instance of this modern crisis is the transplanting of people from one cultural milieu to another when 'social evolution' becomes too rapid for existing beliefs, traditions, and rules of behaviour to sustain. The problems of crime, social and psychological maladjustment, and the characteristics of hotel life or religious sects, and so on were much more likely to be associated with rapid social change, mass immigration, or industrialization, than with capitalism.

Smith provides a generally convincing corrective to the 'lackeys-of-the-capitalist-class' account of the Chicago school. In addition he usefully catalogues the work of the characters who represent the four generations of Chicago sociology and casts their work in a new light. In short, this is a worthwhile book for upper level undergraduates, graduate students in sociology, and a handy addition to one's personal library.

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Peter Lodge

Anomie. History and Meanings

M. Orrù, Allen & Unwin, Hemel Hempstead, London, 1987. £25.00, xii + 210 pp.

This book is a welcome addition to sociological literature for it is a scholarly treatise on an important sociological concept, a concept frequently used but less often with precision of thought and understanding. Dr Orrù is fortunate to be able to go to original sources in Latin and Greek as well as French ones. He would not claim it to be a comprehensive discussion of *anomie*, but it certainly goes a long way to unravelling its many meanings. Of course, etymologically it is easy to define as the absence of laws or

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norms, but its use has been various. He rightly asks if it refers to positive laws or the lack of shared beliefs and customs, or to the inconsistency of laws or norms. To clarify his own mind he has patiently examined various usages in various periods of the history of thought – Ancient Greek, Biblical Literature, the English Renaissance of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well, of course, as the ethical discussions in nineteenth century France and the contemporary literature on the subject.

The author's excursions into fifth-century Greek thought immediately reveal two different attitudes to anomie; a transcendental perspective which conceives it as the essence of evil and so the root of social disorder, and an immanentist perspective which sees it as the contextual problem of a changing society. These two may be also traced in more recent sociological thought. The contrast between Durkheim and R.K. Merton in their uses of the term are pertinent to the discussion. He goes on to say that few sociologists would imagine that Biblical literature has anything to offer of interest but he demonstrates not only that anomie is a key concept in this literature, but that its use has a striking resemblance to the sociological use of the concept. Anomie is the product of evil forces and has a pejorative connotation. At this point and elsewhere in the book Durkheim's ethical, and indeed his quasi-religious outlook is relevant to consideration of the term. His discussion of English writers, and especially of John Locke, traces the bridge between the religious usage and its subsequent secularisation as an ethical concept whilst at the same time the old dualisms of philosophical mood remain.

French use of *anomie* did not begin with Durkheim as is popularly thought, but with J M Guyau, who much influenced Durkheim at first, although subsequently Durkheim's notions departed radically from Guyau's. In each case the concept was fundamental for their several moral philosophies. Dr Orrù makes a plea for a re-examination of Guyau's use of the term as an alternative to that of Durkheim, for to the latter's social realism Guyau had presented a moral philosophy emphasising individuality and one which opposed positivism and rationalism. Guyau believed that intellectual elevation is always accompanied by moral elevation, and in his book *Education et hérédité* (1889) he explained why education must play a paramount role in modern society. This is because instead of being a means towards moral conformity, which to be sure Durkheim considered it to be, education should be regarded as an end in itself; thus providing the

individual with a means to be autonomous, choosing for himself what is morally desirable, despite its running occasionally counter to convention. Education, therefore, is a means of inducing moral anomie.

Inevitably, the discussion must come to consider in some depth R K. Merton's famous essay on the subject and it is here we see the author's own predilections, which are not Durkheimian. In referring to Merton's sociological analysis he also makes a comparison with L. Srole's psychological analysis all of which leads to a consideration of value-relativism for this is implicit in the work of both writers. The American contribution to this appraisal had the effect of eliminating the moral overtones that obviously occur in Durkheim's work, or at least there was a strong endeavour to reduce them. This was accomplished by examining the dysfunctional effects on persons and on society of the disparity between means and ends, where the ends are culturally induced goals and the means are unavailable. By raising the possibility that *anomie* might not be primarily a moral concept the way became open to perceive it as possibly morally desirable. In short, the question is posed: does not modern society, urban and industrial, require a degree of anomie in order to be creative and adaptable?

Orrù argues that the development of the concept of anomie represents a move away from a theoretically-oriented concept to a more empirically-oriented one, and that if this had not happened the evaluative nature of the concept would have meant it was less useful to sociology. Its less evaluative nature makes it more acceptable but at the expense of theoretical clarity (p. 140). Still, the concept is not entirely value-free and this leaves room for plenty of further work on the subject. Indeed, the author initiates it in his closing remarks about value-freedom and value-relativism and the concept of anomie. His summary conclusion brings out the necessity for sociologists to have a good grounding in philosophy, such depth puts a concept like *anomie* in an historical context and enables him to assess its significance and utility. This book is a valuable contribution to sociological studies; now we could do with a similar one treating the concept of *alienation*.

Exeter

Duncan Mitchell

...and Hyper Aesthetics
London 1996 (2)
...of the better America
...the first thoroughly working
...the authors, the Canadians, Arthur Kroker and
David Cook, however, do not make this claim. What they claim
at least implicitly, is that their book is perhaps the first exercise in
postmodernist sociology. In Kroker's postmodernist sociology
theoretical reflection is a privileged artistic act' and sociological
reasoning takes the form of what he calls 'panic writing', 'panic
noise', 'panic politics' and 'panic questions'. What all this panic of
postmodern sociology does preclude is good, solid substantiated
argument. And it is for this reason that *The Postmodern Scene*
must ultimately fail as the first proper sociology of postmodernism.

Yet it is an original, even brilliant book. Though the authors
might deny it, the book does have a well defined central thesis.
This thesis, which animates so much of Jean Baudrillard's work, is
that in today's 'postmodern' societies the cultural is slowly but
surely sucking the life out of the social. Paradigmatic for what is
understood as the cultural here are advertisements, computers and
consumer electronics, rock music and especially television. Much
of British cultural studies, for example the analysts associated with
Screen and the Glasgow media group have proffered 'structuralist'
explanations of culture in which audiences are affected, or
positioned, by cultural forms. Baudrillard and Kroker would agree
with these analysts. The difference is that whereas the just-
mentioned British writers would argue that it is culture which
functions to reproduce capitalist social formations, the post-
modernists argue instead that it is the *social* which has become
epiphenomenal and exists for the sole reason of reproducing the
cultural.

I have argued elsewhere that if modernization is a process of
(following Weber and Habermas) cultural differentiation, then
postmodernization is a process of cultural 'de-differentiation'. I
had always understood Baudrillard's notion of 'implosion' in terms
of such de-differentiation. But Kroker and Baudrillard, one learns
from this book, are arguing something entirely other and perhaps
more radical than this. It is that 'implosion' is not the increasing
problematization of what is the cultural and what is the social, nor
the problematization of what is image and what is reality. What

arguing is that the cultural, the image, the spectacle has become so pervasive and so powerful that it has, so to speak, like a vacuum cleaner sucked the very life out of the social. Thus the real merges into the image and the social into the cultural. Kroker serves up postmodernism with a peculiarly Canadian twist. What he presents us with is not just Baudrillardian explosion, but a corollary notion of 'explosion', grounded in the work of national cult figures, Marshal McLuhan and film-maker David Cronenberg. 'Explosion' here is simply the McLuhanesque 'externalization' of our nervous systems, of our psyches, into information and communication networks. Its paradigmatic film is Cronenberg's classic *Videodrome*, in which the man-made simulacra, recorded and packaged on the video cassette, comes to assume literal powers of destruction over human minds and bodies. If the Frankenstein monster, as Moretti argued, was emblematic of the bourgeois-created proletariat of industrial capitalist society, then Cronenberg's video-technology based image and spectacle are the Frankenstein of contemporary information society and postmodern culture.

The book's main claim ultimately hinges on the theory of power it puts forth. This theory is grounded in Baudrillard's critique of Foucault. Kroker argues that Foucault, like Talcott Parsons, offers a theory of *modernist* power, based on institutions, normative expectations and the idea that power is some sort of circulating medium. Kroker's explication of this power notion takes up a great portion of the book, but it is so entangled in his rhetoric and 'panic writing' that its thrust is almost impossible to sort out. Postmodern power, he seems to be arguing, is not a question of social norms or social normalization, because in contemporary times the social has ceased to exist. Postmodern power is instead 'dead power'. Dead power much in the sense that Marx's means of production in (modern) capitalism contain dead labour but exercise power over individuals. The difference is that postmodern power is exercised by dead *images*. Even a more important difference is that whereas modern, capitalist power came from the elite class of capitalists, postmodern power, argue Baudrillard and Kroker, comes from the masses themselves and in this sense is 'fascist'. That is, power comes from the externalization of the subjectivity of the masses, which is then simulated in the 'mediascape'. This mediascape then controls these same 'silent' masses by means, not of coercion (as does modern power), but through 'seduction'.

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This book then puts forward a powerful central thesis with I think a sufficient amount of truth value to keep media research units busy for decades. Let me list its shortcomings:

- 1) Much of the book consists of relentless, repetitive, overbearing hype. This will put off readers over the age of 35, who will be enraged that their students are so taken with the book.
- 2) The ongoing modern/postmodern debates are really two debates. One is basically philosophical, and articulated in Habermas's arguments that Lyotard's refusal of the *grands récits* is irrationalist. The second debate is taking place in the world of the arts and art criticism and involves the postmodern 'transgression' of boundaries between high and popular culture, between the real and the image, between the social and the cultural. Kroker engages both of these debates. He engages the first via his own Christian background and his thesis that Augustine was the first postmodernist, in the latter's challenge to the rationalist assumptions of Classical Greek Antiquity. He engages the second via his Baudrillardian analyses in the sociology of culture. For Kroker, Baudrillard is today's Augustine, the return of the (anti-Platonic, Christian) repressed. But none of this treatment recognizes the difference between what I have just spoken of in terms of 'philosophic' versus 'aesthetic' postmodernism, nor does it sufficiently make connections between the two.
- 3) The book never examines empirically the question of whether communication networks really do exert such control over us as individuals.
- 4) Kroker seems to unconditionally approve of, indeed positively revel in, postmodernism. What kind of weird politics can a man have who celebrates a form of power which *he* calls 'fascist' and whose radical structuralism precludes any type of resistance through collective or individual action?

It is likely that in 'real life' Kroker has views on gender, inequality, etc. that are not dissimilar to those of *The Sociological Review's* readers. His is also a first rate mind. No question about that. In this book Kroker has delivered the ultimate 'strong programme' on the information society. For most of us the information society is still a class society in which the capitalists still hold most of the cards. For Daniel Bell, information is seen, not as constraining, but as enabling, as class domination recedes and educational credentialism (rather than material means of production) yields unprecedented rates of growth. For Kroker and Baudrillard, the information society is instead a set of diabolically

powered structures. These structures destroy what the post-modernists call the 'great referents' of class politics. They suck dry individuals of their subjectivities and capacities for action and struggle. They even reduce the body (again like in Cronenberg's *Videodrome*) to what the authors call 'dead bodies' or 'designer bodies'.

This is heady stuff with probably a lot more validity than most of us will want to grant it. But is it good *sociology*? The verdict here has to be in the negative. Kroker is far more interested in being a *notorious* sociologist, and this could be counted to his credit, than in being a good sociologist. Nothing wrong with this sort of abiding and driving ambition to *épater le bourgeois*. Having said this, however, the first solid, coherent, reasonably argued and halfway comprehensive sociological account of postmodernism remains to be written.

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Scott Lash

States, War and Capitalism Studies in Political Sociology

Michael Mann, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, £25 00, xiii + 240 pp.

This volume contains eight essays written over the last decade. 'The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results' contains the seminal distinction between the infra-structural and despotic faces of state power within a larger argument that state autonomy results from increasing territorialisation and centralisation. 'States, Ancient and Modern' is less polished and finished, but, perhaps ironically, even more thought provoking. Some conclusions of this essay have been modified in the first volume of Mann's *Sources of Social Power* (1986), but the sustained refutation of the *structuraliste* Marxism of Hindess and Hirst raises key sociological points about class that deserve continued attention. The classic exercise in fiscal sociology, 'State and Society, 1130–1815: an Analysis of English State Finances', certainly proves the point that the rationale of the state in history has owed more to geopolitics than to class concerns, but the arguments contained in this essay are now best put in the first volume of Mann's major work, making its reprinting here unnecessary. This cannot be said of the remaining essays, all of which concern the industrial world; these are in effect working

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essays for Mann's second volume, and they will attract immediate attention on that account alone

'Capitalism and Militarism' commonsensically stresses the view of classical realism that wars are often caused by the asocial nature of multipolar state systems, thereby refuting any easy equation of capitalism and militarism. 'War and Social Theory' into Battle with Classes, Nations and States' fundamentally repeats this argument but with important qualifications, notably the insistence that the character of 'the state' can be much influenced at key moments by pressure from particular groups of domestic capitalists – which is to imply that an analytic history, rather than a general theory, of the relations of nations, classes and war is all that we can and should hope to produce. 'The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism' applies the insights that the author has gained in an attempt to think through our best options in the nuclear age. Mann's hope is that the United States might learn to 'take class out of geopolitics' – a suggestive notion that would have been made still more powerful by an analysis of precisely which American domestic interests have to be convinced of the virtue of this approach. The justification for including 'Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship' is the simple, powerful and convincing one that class relations have changed more as the result of geopolitical settlements than on account of the unfolding of a logic inherent to class itself. This point is driven home even more insistently in the magnificent demonstration that political class consciousness amongst workers was caused by political exclusion rather than by the workings of more obvious socio-economic variables. The final essay, 'The Decline of Great Britain', is the only one that has not appeared before. It offers a general theory of decline stressing geopolitical competition, the diffusion of capitalist practices and the rigidity of social institutions that results from the obvious tendency to formalise one's moment of success. This is very striking, if as yet incomplete, and it allows Mann to argue, I think correctly, that British decline resulted far more from elite 'mistakes', especially its obsession with sterling, than it did from any restriction of state autonomy by a militant working class.

This is a very rich collection which no sociologist should miss. It takes us beyond the assertion that geopolitics matters to the beginnings of an achieved account of the very complex interactions between state and class. Equally importantly, the most attractive features of Mann's approach to sociology – its interest in subjecting large scale theories to the historical record in order to

allow us to advance our subject – are well to the fore. The level of scholarship is very high, as in the analysis of the precise ways in which European state building helped nascent capitalism – an account that goes beyond Weber's to become the best now available. The reader is forced to think by the originality, fertility and openness of explanations attempted. This is especially true of the realisation that classes became loyal to their nations for the banal but potent reason that struggles at this level proved to be successful – the awkward side effect of which has been a notable lack of interest in controlling traditional elite geopolitical practices.

Five critical comments spring to mind. First, the account of the origins of the state perhaps underplays the role of religious change; differently put, Mann's greatest strength is in analysing collective power and this makes him 'musically deaf' to the 'fear and trembling' behind much religious change. Second, his assertion of a perpetual dialectic between state centralisation and the diffusion of power throughout larger, multi-power actor systems may, despite its enormous suggestiveness, be open to question at one point. Some evolutionary breakthroughs, most notably the emergence of capitalism, were probably only possible in the absence of centralised control. Third, Mann's definition of militarism (seeing war and the preparation for it as normal) is surely mistaken. Is not the lesson of the interwar years that the refusal to think about war aids and abets disaster? Was not Clausewitz right to stress that the military arm, aware of the cost of battle, sometimes encourages restraint, notably in the light of ideological passion? Fourth, Mann's general belief that working class action does not push forward any general process of social evolution makes him, in my view, dismiss too easily the idea that there may be other sources of social evolution. It can still be argued, for instance, that the more involved are newly industrialising countries in the world economy, the more likely it is that they will liberalise their political systems. Finally, I think that Mann is wrong not to stress that a greater problem for British foreign policy makers before the First World War than sectoral demands of capitalists was domestic liberal opinion. It is very much to be hoped that Mann's second volume takes care to disentangle not just state from capital, but the occasionally powerful effects of liberal regimes as well. One hopes too that the third volume, which promises to address a full range of theoretical problems, directly confronts this difficult problem: will better geopolitical behaviour result from more rational action on the part of state

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leaders or from subjecting such leaders much more firmly beneath popular control?

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John A. Hall

The Concept of an Islamic State an analysis of the ideological controversies in Pakistan

Ishtiaq Ahmed, Frances Pinter, London, 1987, £22.50, 235 pp.

The ideological foundation of Pakistan contains a central ambiguity: a state for Muslims or an Islamic state? At the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, Jinnah, as 'founding father', declared it to be a modern democratic state for the Muslims of India. They formed a separate nation (from other Indians) on the basis of Muslim culture. In the years that followed, the first constitution of Pakistan was written amidst conflicts and debates between the different positions on Islam, and the result was a constitution which reaffirmed the modern state, but with a nominal commitment to general Islamic principles. This symbolic gesture towards Islam is common in the constitutions of many of the modern states in Islamic countries. Only a few (Saudi Arabia, some Gulf states, and more recently Iran and Pakistan itself) are committed to the full rigours of Islamic law, variously interpreted. The subsequent history of Pakistan was marked by further conflicts and debates over the place of Islam in the state and society. The dynamics of Pakistani politics were seldom moved by these conflicts as such, but by conflicts and fissures arising from class, regional and ethnic factors. However, whenever the legitimacy of a ruling regime is challenged, then Islam enters the picture in one form or another.

The call for the implementation of the Islamic *Sharia* (law) has been the regular battle cry of the *Ulama* (clergy), adopted by some political parties, most notably the Jama'at-i-Islami, as a tool in popular agitations. Until the accession of General Zia through a military coup in 1977, successive leaders, both elected and military, had made various gestures to Islam to preempt agitations against them and buttress their Islamic legitimacy, but overall they maintained the basically secular forms and operations of the state. Islamic law, like in many other Islamic countries, was confined to the sphere of personal status. What is remarkable in this history is that the Islamic platform, whenever submitted to a popular vote,

did not fare very well. Bhutto, for instance, was electorally popular (on most occasions when this was put to the test), but only made the usual symbolic gestures to Islam, while his clerical and fundamentalist opponents did not get many votes. The one factor which seems to effectively mobilise popular sentiments is the agitation against non-Muslims, especially the Ahmadiyya sect, within or outside the country. Islam as a communal 'marker', in Pakistan as elsewhere, seems to be a much more potent weapon in popular agitation than the Islamic religion as such.

The book under review surveys this political background and the central ambiguity in the ideology of Pakistan. Its main effort is then directed at analytical accounts of the different theoretico-ideological positions on the question of the place of Islam in the state and the law: the conservative *Ulama* seeking to combat modernity; the radical fundamentalists, exemplified by the influential Maududi, undermining the traditional model of the state in favour of 'pure' Islam; the Islamic modernists, like Muhammad Asad, seeking a modern state with Islamic law, other forms of Islamic modernism, and finally outright secularism with Islam as cultural and ethical inspiration. The analysis examines the political, social and economic models implied or advocated in each of the theoretical strands. The author underlines the fact that the Islamic canonical sources have little to say about politics, economics or the state, which allows modern theoreticians wide scope in formulating their ideal models, even when they claim that the original sources are comprehensive in their coverage of all aspects of life. This would also explain why the prohibition on alcohol and the payment of interest on loans, the restrictions on women, and the introduction of Quranic penal prescriptions, have become the hallmarks of Islamisation in the modern world: because they are the only clear specifications of law in the original sources. The book concludes with an attempt to situate the case of Pakistan in the modern social science literature on development and modernisation, and then to draw some political conclusions. The major part of the book, however, is on political theory rather than politics.

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Samī Zubaida

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Cults, New Religions and Religious Creativity

Geoffrey K Nelson, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1987, £27 50, vii + 245 pp

Since the Second World War, Geoffrey Nelson declares, there has been 'an unprecedented burst of religious creativity on a world scale' (p. 1). It has taken many forms: authoritarian sects; religious movements drawing inspiration from Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, reformist pressure groups within mainstream Christian churches, occult movements, revivals of witchcraft and paganism; cargo cults and other religions of the oppressed.

Religious ferment is a sign that world history is moving from what Sorokin called a 'sensate' phase, where truth resides supremely in the evidence supplied by our senses, to an 'idealistic' age, where the sensory, the rational and the supernatural are all affirmed as real. Sensate societies are inherently unstable 'because they attempt to deny the reality of an important form of human experience' (pp. 156-7). Secularization has peaked, and the West is passing to a period of sacralization.

Nelson emphasizes the rich variety of new religious movements and their varying social consequences. He rejects the facile functionalist view that every minority movement has latent integrative consequences for society. Some movements he sees as harmful, particularly so if they are authoritarian. He also rejects the argument that religious movements survive only in the interstices between social institutions, catering for temporarily dislocated clienteles and lacking the capacity to transform the wider society. For Nelson, the growth of new religious movements marks 'a rising tide of spirituality that is producing a re-enchantment of the world' (p. 2). Among the new religious movements there may be one destined to become the faith for all human kind. The author warns us that 'the survival of the human species may depend upon the ability of humans to create a religion that can act as the ideological base for a world society, a religion that can unite humanity and integrate a planetary civilization' (p. 185).

Nelson's aim is to develop a theoretical synthesis through which 'the causes and consequences of this unparalleled period of religious creativity' (p. 2) may be understood. Contemporary sociology, he argues, is totally unfitted to the task. Sociology is trapped within the monistic materialist paradigm that dominates Western science. Confronted with an object of study that is by

definition predicated on the reality of a supernatural transcendent realm, sociological analysis has inevitably been reductionist.

Reductionism fails because it denies assured evidence of the supernatural. Here Nelson places his faith in the findings of parapsychology. Using the methods of positivist science, parapsychologists have supposedly established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of non-material entities. Communication with discarnate spirits through mediums, materialization of spirits, psychic photography, automatic writing, spirit healing, reincarnation, telepathy, telekinesis, precognition 'the cumulative evidence is vast and clearly supports the hypothesis that human personality survives the death of the physical body' (p. 33). Instead of perversely denying these scientifically confirmed features of the universe, we should incorporate them into our theorizing. Sociological reductionism always was an imperialistic fantasy, parapsychology has exposed it as a busted flush.

The paradigm-shift that Nelson announces will require a dualistic theory of human nature. A robust conception of the 'self' is necessary 'for the assumptions of action theory, for the universal experience that men (*sic*) have of "free choice" and for a sociology that rejects deterministic explanations of a behavioural type' (p. 37). This dualistic anthropology is to be embedded in a mystical, spiritualist cosmology. We are spirit beings incarnate in a universe 'that exists as a unified whole, and is conscious and purposeful' (p. 46). Humans are one vessel through which the universe becomes self-conscious, and charismatic religious leaders are a channel for the forces of history (pp. 102-3).

At the heart of the book are three crucial assertions: that the sociological study of religion has been reductionist, that the evidence of parapsychology is clearly on the side of the spirits, and that a mystical, spiritualist cosmology is imperative.

In characterizing sociology as reductionist, Nelson dwells on the Marxian and Durkheimian streams. He says little about Weber, who has had a far greater impact on the sociological study of religion and whose work could not be called reductionist without grotesque misrepresentation. For Nelson, sociology has been not a liberating discipline but the major ideological prop of a dehumanizing determinism, and sociologists have become bureaucratic servants of power opposing the forces of religious creativity (p. 43). This is a strange accusation to make against sociologists, who have been leading and unpopular defenders of the civil liberties of minority religious movements.

The evidence of parapsychology, on which Nelson's thesis turns, is treated very briefly. Quashing all dissent, he asserts that the case is now conclusive. From this he leaps to cosmology. Reliance is placed on the opaque deliverances of the discredited mystic, George Gurdjieff, while the profound dialectics of twentieth-century physics are dealt with in three sentences (pp. 44–5). This balance could give the gap between the two cultures a bad name.

Nelson's grand thesis may well prompt readers to reflect on the fundamentals of their own sociological praxis. In that respect the book is stimulating. The illogic of the argument is nevertheless wild, and the substance of the thesis unpersuasive.

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Alan Aldridge

Class Analysis and Social Research

Guglielmo Carchedi, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, £29.50, xi + 289 pp.

Guglielmo Carchedi states in the Foreword to *Class Analysis and Social Research* that class analysis has 'largely been ignored by sociologists, political scientists and economists, and almost totally ignored by philosophers (whether of science or of knowledge)'. For this statement to be true, the term 'class analysis' has to be used in a very idiosyncratic fashion. In this book, the author, who is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, is re-examining the theoretical relations between structures, the individual and social change in the light of dialectics, and not, as other writers have often done, seeking to interpret historical instances in the light of Marxist theory. This method, often termed 'dialectical class analysis', both explains the initial statement and makes the book as a whole decidedly esoteric (in the later chapters even the instances are imaginary).

The book begins with a lengthy historical account of the rise of dialectics. The purpose of this is to argue that dialectics was not sufficiently applied to workers' organizations and that this was why dialectics was abandoned as a tool of social research. Dialectics, regarded by Marx himself as the foundation of his entire system of ideas, has of course been integrated into the structure of education in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but in recent years there has been a striking awareness there of the need in social research to go beyond it. This is the opposite of the path recommended by

Dr Carchedi. Dialectics he sees as the key to understanding class struggle. 'An analysis in terms of class and class struggle is essential, but not sufficient, for a theory aiming at the replacement of capitalism by a socialist society,' he concludes 'It is the fusion of dialectics and class analysis which gives its specific characteristics to both Marxist dialectics and Marxist class analysis' (p. 89). Only through this, he argues, can we distinguish between the 'inner forces which push classes in their struggle towards either the reproduction or the supersession of the system' (*loc cit.*)

Yet the problem of the dialectical mode of reasoning in social life has always been twofold. the difficulty in the complex nature of society of identifying thesis and antithesis and the consequence that statement of thesis and antithesis does not of itself reliably indicate the mode by which these related opposites will be subsumed in the synthesis. As Marx himself notes, the class struggle may result in the transformation of capitalist society towards socialism. But it may also, in other circumstances, result in other scenarios: the intensification of opposites, Bonapartism, the common ruin of the contending forces. If Marx is right, it is the strength, not the weakness of capitalism that will in time generate the conditions for its supersession. Dr Carchedi argues that all the potential for transformation in a situation is already present, the problem of differentiating which of these potentialities will be realized can, he believes, be overcome by identifying how the determining instance stamps the determining instance with its own class character.

There follows what is literally a lengthy review of E O Wright's *Classes*, in which he criticises what he terms 'extremely serious internal difficulties' in Wright's work. Wright, unlike Carchedi, has undertaken the useful task of actually applying theory to real life. Dr Carchedi accepts that this is a valid exercise, but demolishes the exercise as actually performed on account of what he sees as serious divergences from Marxism in the direction of individualism. In the latter part of the book Dr Carchedi then proceeds to apply his concept of dialectical class analysis in turn to knowledge, labour and value, before returning to his main theme in the conclusion: the irrelevance, if not danger, of virtually every development in modern social research. Since much of his argument is so contortuliloquent as to be virtually unintelligible, one example will have to suffice. The use of questionnaires, he argues, is acceptable because they do not force us to reconceptualise our notions of structure and consciousness. (This statement in

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itself is highly contentious, but let that pass) Tests of statistical significance, he then argues, are *not* acceptable 'because these tests force us to reconceptualise these notions in a static and individualistic way' (p. 130). Computers are singled out for special attack they are, it seems, capitalistic in their reasoning process and their use in socialist society will have to be severely restricted. Organizations are not just 'some sort of crystallization of political forces' (p. 243) so organization theory is only relevant in capitalist societies, and workers' organizations are infected with bureaucracy because of their capitalist heritage and the influence of 'bourgeois social scientists' (*sic.* p. 246). Would that social scientists had so much influence! The natural assumption that this discussion will in due course lead to opening up possibilities which will inform and expand the horizons of social research is not fulfilled and given the introspective nature of the work it is hard to see how it could have been

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Women and Social Class

Pamela Abbott and Roger Sapsford, Tavistock Publications, London and New York, 1987, £20 00, paper £8 95, viii + 211 pp

Societies may well be messier than sociologists' theories about them (as Michael Mann has suggested) However, where social class is concerned, theories, taken collectively, seem to be just as messy as societies The interlinked tasks of class analysis have involved devising measures or categories of class (operationalising it), using the categories to describe a class structure, and charting how the class structure, or individuals' mobility within it, have changed over time. If these tasks are not difficult enough, add in people's popular or subjective opinions about the nature of class, and the complexity grows. People, just like sociologists, vary in their opinions about what class is Abbott and Sapsford show us that women are no different from men in this respect and some of them are unsure about their own class, women were reported as saying, 'I think of myself as middle-class, really, but my husband's a bricklayer, so I suppose we'd count as working-class' (p. 189) Finally, add a gender dimension, when the categories available were devised with men only in mind, and the task almost gets out of control. The difficulties are such that it has been far easier to

complain about the neglect of women by traditional class analysis than it has been to provide a satisfactory integration or alternative.

Seemingly unperturbed by the enormity of the task, Abbott and Sapsford launch fully into the minefield of women's place in social class analysis. They first review the debates about gender's place in class analysis and then attempt to replicate some of the empirical studies on men's classes using a survey constructed from Open University students' honours degree course in research methods over a number of years; students interviewed individuals about class using a common questionnaire, according to a quota sampling design, and 2,630 women's replies are analysed. The authors are well aware of the limitations of such data.

Their literature review covers the usual issues about which units are the most appropriate for class analysis, (household or individual), whether women are a class in themselves and patriarchy (not class) the main force for inequality in society, the limitations of conventional class categories (the Registrar General's in particular) for assigning women to classes, and the pros and cons of multidimensional scaling. As the outcome of this review, Abbott and Sapsford adopt the established critic's position, that traditional class analysis, 'the malestream' (p. 7) as they call it, is unacceptable mainly because it gives married women a derived class position from their husband, and assumes that 'men's social class and social imagery' are 'not in the slightest influenced by the women with whom they live' (p. 34). In replicating men's social class studies, they provide data on women's intergenerational marriage mobility (father's to husband's class), intergenerational occupational mobility (father's to woman's occupation), women's subjective own class classification and its comparison with objective classifications of the woman and her husband, and general perceptions on the nature of class and on images of society. Some of these relationships are examined for the first time in this volume. Correlations between variables are also examined, although the presentation is not heavily statistical since most of the details are omitted and the conclusions only included.

Their test on women's data of the social closure and buffer-zone hypotheses and the view that intergenerational mobility is no longer of any significance concludes that all three hypotheses are partly true for women, unlike men; they find 'a strong association between father's and daughter's job-level, . . . women are nevertheless effectively kept out of high status occupations (gender closure)'; and routine non-manual work 'is attainable by

women from manual working-class backgrounds' (p. 178). Part of the problem with the latter conclusion is that it assumes that the manual/non-manual distinction is a meaningful one to women. This is debateable. Indeed since Abbott and Sapsford's analysis of women's social mobility rests on the social class categories devised for men, their findings need to be interpreted with caution. The classification of low level clerical work and shop assistants, for example, as non-manual and thus ranked above skilled manual jobs like policewomen is a longstanding problem in the analysis of women's social class which can lead to spurious mobility calculations. Also, some of their analyses, could benefit from more multivariate analysis before firm conclusions can be drawn.

The book is a valiant attempt to tackle a very difficult topic with only poor instruments available for use. The book makes a significant contribution to the sparse literature on the class analysis of women. At the very least, researchers in the future will not be able to justify excluding women from class analysis on the basis of there being no sources of comparison in previous research, as they have done in the past (pp 159-60)

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Shirley Dex

Employment and Opportunity

G Payne, Macmillan, London, 1987, £9.50 paper, xxii + 215 pp

Employment and Opportunity reports some of the major findings from the Scottish Mobility Survey. As such it is a contribution to the core of British sociology, the study of equality, as well as to some of its decidedly peripheral elements, the study of regional development and Scottish society. The book is a kind of companion volume to the more general and theoretical book by Payne, *Mobility and Change in Modern Society*, published also in 1986, by Macmillan. It opens with a brief overview of developments in Scotland – especially in its economic and industrial base. But the bulk of it is a reasonably conventional account of the results of a mobility study, concentrating on the extent of mobility, changes in its rate over time, and the importance of education and the changing nature of the economy.

The author's emphasis is on occupational mobility and not directly class mobility. Payne thus rightly avoids some of the more tortuous issues of the debates about stratification and proletarian-

isation. He also opens up a picture of more mobility than previous studies have tended to present or that theories have asserted, often as the author implies with little or no supporting evidence. Payne places great emphasis on the changing nature of occupations in this, and attempts to downgrade the importance of education. There is, however, little support for the crude post-industrial societies argument as he stresses, for example, the continuation and possible increasing importance of class, and the juxtaposition of the relative openness of the middle classes with the closedness of the elite, and the increasing self-recruitment of manual workers. Career mobility and sectoral shifts are nevertheless sufficiently important to refute any crude Braverman-type downgrading thesis.

The immobile view of Britain which Payne treats as having a dominant position in sociology (which may by now not be the case) is rooted in the studies at L S E in the 1950s and 1960s of Glass, Floud, Halsey, Little and Westergaard. The starting point – Payne calls it Fabian optimism – was that mobility could be achieved by more equal access to education. Having started here, the emphasis was on studying education, and the classic study of Little and Westergaard, whilst the ‘death-knell of the early Fabian optimism’, was central to the evolution of British class analysis. Although refuting the reduction of inequalities in educational opportunities, the ‘L.S E approach’ continued to posit education as the crucial variable: credentials rather than work experience were becoming increasingly important in selection, and a new ‘educated’ middle class would secure access to middle class jobs and choke off any chances working-class children might have of getting such jobs. This would happen despite a reduction in the level of unqualified working people. Payne attacks this perspective for its over-concentration on changes in the job content (all jobs were in effect rising in skill level) at the expense of the expansion in the number of non-manual jobs. Moreover, Little and Westergaard were especially guilty of asserting and not substantiating much of their thesis. Payne’s own analysis does not support their theory, education has become more important in selection, but it does not mean other criteria are unimportant or that it is a sufficient condition of mobility. Moreover, the entrants to the new ‘lieutenant’ position which Little and Westergaard assumed would, through privileged access to education, become self-recruiting were not as uniformly educated as they implied.

Less convincing is Payne’s treatment of Scotland. As the

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reporting of the mobility study gets underway (chapter three onwards), the distinctive feature of Scotland gets lost in the data analysis and discussion of general literature (British or otherwise). At one stage he actually writes 'Britain (strictly speaking Scotland)'. Scotland has a distinctive educational system and proportionately fewer non-manual occupations than Britain and Wales, but neither factor is treated as very significant or as explaining, for example, why credentialism is more limited than 'usually believed' (p. 190). Payne sees his arguments as of general relevance and whilst referring to the importance of historically specific analysis, he does not demonstrate how the peculiarities of Scotland are that crucial for the patterns of mobility observed in this case. This would probably require a more systematic comparative analysis than is offered here. The book is very much about class and mobility and not specifically a contribution to the much neglected sociology of Scotland.

Employment and Opportunity is a very useful input to debate on social mobility and as such can be recommended for use in general sociological courses. Notwithstanding my earlier reservations, it will be important for students of Scotland, and it should, in my judgement, be of use in courses on work and education, as well as provide important background material for students of industrial relations and the labour process debate. I would also recommend it to teachers of research methods and supervisors of PhD students to use as a model of good technical analysis and well-argued and clear writing.

London School of Economics and Political Science Stephen Wood

The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour
Robin Cohen, Avebury, Aldershot, 1987, £27.50, xiii + 290 pp.

This book is intended specifically as a contribution to the political economy of migration, but its broad-ranging theoretical scope means that it has a relevance to the wider debate about the nature and development of the capitalist mode of production. It is an important and welcome addition to the literature.

Cohen's theoretical starting-point is Wallerstein's world-systems theory, and although this is not uncritically accepted, he adheres to Wallerstein's characterisation of capitalism as necessarily entailing the co-existence of free and unfree labour. As Cohen

acknowledges, this involves breaking with Marx's conception of capitalism as a mode of production. And he departs from Wallerstein's position insofar as he rejects the latter's view that forms of unfree labour are confined to the periphery of the world capitalist system.

Three central analytical themes arise from this position and run through the book. First, Cohen argues that the international combination of forms of free and unfree labour are better analysed in the context of a regional, rather than a world, political economy. Second, he argues that capitalism subordinates and encapsulates pre-capitalist modes of production, in the course of which agricultural production is commodified and labourers are released from the land in order to be incorporated as unfree labourers in either the core or the periphery of the world system. Third, he argues that the state plays a key role in recruiting labour, and in structuring and legitimating the international division of labour. These arguments constitute the matrix within which he advances a theory of international labour migration which is derived in part from Marx's analysis of the creation of relative surplus populations, which treats the 'sending' and 'receiving' nation states as bound together economically and politically, and which regards the demands of capital as a superordinate (but not the only) determinant.

These themes are combined with additional theoretical issues, including the significance of domestic labour within the capitalist mode of production, and the so-called new international division of labour, about which Cohen expresses significant reservations. Further, they are sustained by reference to three examples of twentieth-century migration: from the Caribbean region to the United States, within Southern Africa, and from ex-colonies and the Mediterranean region to north-west Europe.

My major theoretical reservation concerns Cohen's conception of capitalism. If the essence of capitalism is considered to lay in the combination of forms of free and unfree labour, it becomes difficult to distinguish capitalism from any other mode of production or epoch exhibiting distinct forms of labour exploitation because, in historical periods prior to the seventeenth century, wage labour also coexisted with a variety of forms of slavery, serfdom and servitude. If such coexistence is not historically novel, it cannot serve to distinguish capitalism from, for example, feudalism. Significantly, Cohen seems unable to periodise temporally the four historical phases of capitalist development he identifies, for to do

so would require him to specify the point of transition from feudalism to capitalism. Moreover, this emphasis upon the co-existence of different relations of exploitation diminishes the analytical significance of the historical emergence of wage labour which, by granting the proletariat the right to dispose of his/her labour power within the market, also granted the proletariat a degree of individual and collective autonomy which is always denied under production relations created and reproduced by direct domination

I have some more specific reservations. First, there is a significant disjunction between the theoretical scope of the book and the empirical case-studies. With the exception of a brief, schematic overview of different forms of unfree labour associated with migration from the seventeenth century, all the empirical material refers to the past one hundred years. Hence, formally, the wider validity of his argument requires further support. Second, given its scale and international significance in relation to twentieth-century capitalist development, it is unfortunate that Cohen fails to consider seriously the labour migration to the Middle East since 1945. There is a growing literature on this topic from which both the researcher and the undergraduate student could have gained benefit if it had been surveyed and analysed.

Third, Cohen displaces the discontinuities in the determinants and consequences of migration into and within Western Europe since 1945 in favour of highlighting the continuities. Consequently, significant errors result, as when he claims that Britain has been a major importer of labour alongside Germany, France and Switzerland. Both relatively and absolutely, labour migration into Britain has been on a much smaller scale than in the case of the other three countries; indeed, relatively speaking, labour migration into Luxembourg has been on a much larger scale than into Britain. Moreover, his undefined concept of 'migrant worker' diminishes the very widespread variations in legal status of migrants who have entered and (although this is far from being the universal experience) settled in Western Europe since 1945. This arises, in part, from the limited overview of the literature on the Western European situation.

Yet, Cohen has added significantly to the growing British literature which either implicitly or explicitly challenges the still-dominant 'race relations' paradigm in Britain which has successfully denied the conceptual space since the 1950s for the development of a political economy of migration which can adequately

contextualise, both analytically and empirically, post-1945 migration to Britain, and place it in the wider context of the interrelationship between migration and capitalist development. The book deserves to be widely read, as well as much argued about

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Introducing Police Work

Mike Brogden, Tony Jefferson and Sandra Walklate, Unwin Hyman, London, £25.00, paper £9 95, 1988, 224 pp

The organisation and operation of the British police has come under increasing public, media, and government scrutiny. It has also been the focus of a rapidly expanding sociological literature which now presents the student, academic and interested observer with a daunting range of texts covering: police history, decisions to arrest, the policing of public order, police discretion and so on. This broad range of 'police topics' is matched by an equally broad range of approaches: psychological, microsociological, structural and polemical. The authors of *Introducing Police Work*, themselves well known contributors to the literature mentioned above, have set out to provide a 'route map' (p. ix) for those wishing to find research evidence to inform debate on contemporary policing issues (e.g. the miners' strike of 1984-5). The authors have also tried, with success, to avoid a pedestrian bibliographical approach by, firstly, structuring existing literature into loose theoretical categories (evolutionist, conservative, structural, radical etc.), secondly, by putting forward their own analysis at the end of each section, and, finally, by suggesting certain contemporary events where police work has been brought into public view as test cases for their argument.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the scope of the book is to follow the authors' suggestion and take one of their well known police stories. In August 1983 five schoolboys (two of whom were black) were attacked by police in London's Holloway Road. Four years later five police officers were gaoled for their part in the attack. This four year long story illustrates a number of important issues. The officers in this case had acted with a high level of aggression towards a group of youths walking home after a night out. In chapter two the literature is assessed to see whether there is

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any evidence to support the argument that the police have (and select) a more aggressive and authoritarian personality type. Perhaps the Holloway Road officers were 'rogues' who could be weeded out by better selection procedures and training (Scarman Report)? The conclusion is that the police are in fact very ordinary and the imprisoned officers were not extraordinary in comparison to their colleagues. The police recruit from the respectable, white, and mostly male working class and carry with them the attitudes of this section of the population. What is more important than any essential personality type is the learning process whereby a raw recruit becomes a 'practical copper' (chapter three). Many of the early ethnographies highlight the importance of 'cop culture', a set of norms, expectations, and behaviours learned on the job. This culture includes stereotypes of the people to be policed, notions of how they are to be policed, and certain occupational values. One fundamental value is that of loyalty – the delay in bringing the officers to account was caused by the reluctance of other officers to enforce the law against colleagues.

The story is illustrative of another important set of questions. This police-public encounter, like numerous others taking place in Britain's cities daily, involved young males, some of them black, at leisure (or alternatively unemployed) and on the street. By re-evaluating some of the standard histories of the police the authors demonstrate how, historically, the police developed a mandate to control specific groups of people in specific locations. This mandate was not, and is not, a constitutional one but flows from both the form of the criminal law (which prioritises the crimes of the powerless) and a generated common sense professional knowledge of which group poses a threat to social and political order. Since the formation of the modern police force during the first half of the nineteenth century this group has been progressively refined from the dangerous classes, to the rough working class, to the young male working class, and finally, in some areas, to the young black male working class. By their externally identifiable structural position within the society the youths in Holloway Road were a potential problem for the police to sort out (see chapters four and five, and for a review of the way in which variables of age, gender, race and class affect police practice, see chapter six). This focusing of police attention is part of the vicious circle which has led to, not only disrespect for the police, but also open and violent resistance from sections of the population trying to cope with the discriminatory effects of recession.

The final section of the book deals with the complex issue of accountability which has preoccupied much of the recent literature. Accountability can be seen as a problem at a number of levels. A large proportion of police work is low visibility in that it is done by junior officers with a considerable degree of discretion and often away from direct supervision. For example managerial initiatives (policing by objectives, anti-racist or community relations policies) can be forestalled by the interpretation of the policeman's and police woman's (see pp 101-9) job by those on the spot i.e. junior officers. Similarly, but for different reasons, it is very difficult for members of the public, especially if they belong to already discredited/powerless groups, to call the police to account for their practice. Finally there is an issue of accountability at the most senior level i.e. the role of the Chief Constable. Here the authors argue that attempts to call Chief Constables to account for both overall policy and operational decisions are fraught with difficulties in a situation where both the formal rules governing the police are permissive *and* where the 'cop culture' has such a power to shape the reality of policing on the streets (chapters seven and eight).

The book works very well as an introduction to the major issues and the extensive literature. For those already familiar with the sociology of the police the authors' own analysis and their review of established texts will hold no surprises. But it is a well written, imaginatively structured, and widely referenced discussion which can be used as an introductory text for students and as 'briefing' material for all those trying to make sense of the politics of policing.

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Mike Collison

Sociology and Teaching: A New Challenge for the Sociology of Education

Peter Woods and Andrew Pollard (eds), Croom Helm, London, 1988, £25 00, 239 pp

Some sociologists of education seem especially constrained to try to help the work of their research subjects (teachers). The search for practical value has in recent years led to various attempts to specify how sociologists can contribute to the improvement of practice. In some quarters that search has been allied to a commitment to collaboration between researchers and teachers.

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Following the inspiration of Stenhouse and others, some contributors to the field have endorsed a 'democratic' ethos, seeking to dissolve sharp distinctions between the academic expert and the practising teacher. The idea of the 'teacher-researcher' has gained in popularity and in recent years Donald Schon's model of the 'reflective practitioner' has been invoked. The role of the social scientist, seen from this perspective, is to 'empower' teachers, helping them to reflect upon their everyday practices in a disciplined and well-informed way

The theme of this volume reflects that tendency. It is argued that sociologists have an important part to play in informing and guiding professional development. The argument is coloured by a marked ambivalence. On the one hand there is a tone of optimism, characteristic of authors who bring new methods and new insights in a spirit of missionary zeal. On the other hand there is a recurrent air of defensiveness. According to several of these authors, the sociology of education is currently a discipline in search of an application. These authors seem unduly concerned to justify sociology's existence by promoting this particular approach.

The editorial introduction establishes the book's general attitude, arguing that the discipline is 'at a critical point in its development'. For all its achievements, they argue, educators often find sociology's message either unduly arcane or excessively banal. Such complaints, sometimes coupled with accusations of ideological pollution, are not confined to education. As we all know, they are encountered on all sides. But there is nothing new in this. Sociologists of education, together with colleagues in other fields, have been declaring states of crisis on and off for decades. Indeed, it is not at all clear just what the current 'crisis' is meant to be, or how it is manifested. The editors of this volume and several of their contributors are conspicuous by their success – in publishing, attracting research funds, supervising students and promoting their own sociological perspectives. It is hard to see Peter Woods, Andrew Pollard, Robert Burgess, Colin Lacey, David Reynolds and John Furlong – all contributors – as languishing in a twilight of neglect. Likewise, when introductory volumes like the Methuen *Sociology of the School* series, or the various Falmer series, sell in considerable numbers, it is hard to agree to the proposition that there is no market for sociological work on schools and classrooms. The editorial rhetoric is – like many such appeals to crisis and paradigm shifts – over-stated.

There is some truth in the view that sociologist's contributions

can less easily be transmitted through a purely disciplinary approach. As Margaret Wilkin's chapter documents there are various institutional pressures that have squeezed the basic disciplines while promoting school-based 'professional' training. She argues therefore that sociologists need to involve themselves more directly as 'consultants in the classroom'. Pollard provides a parallel discussion of the role of the sociologist as conceptual midwife, encouraging the development of 'reflective' teaching. From this perspective, what the social scientist has to offer is methodological expertise, and the ability to develop abstract thought from concrete experience. The special contribution is therefore the inculcation of an attitude of mind, rather than the transmission of sociological 'findings' and recipes for action.

The theme of the 'sociologist as consultant' is explored by David Reynolds, with special reference to the 'school effectiveness movement'. Reynolds recapitulates the view that sociology and school teachers have not enjoyed fruitful relations. But he does so only by invoking the two most extreme caricatures of sociology – 'correspondence' theory and the 'new' sociology of education. Arguably, the majority of sociologists in Britain have been equally unmoved by the extreme versions of these two positions. The vast majority of empirical research in Britain is excluded from Reynolds's analysis: hardly surprisingly, plenty of room is left for Reynolds's preferred model to supervene.

Hilary Burgess and Robert Burgess each provide a useful and illuminating chapter. They are less concerned with prescription and proselytizing. Hilary Burgess reports on work with teachers of primary mathematics. Her essay is especially useful in showing how difficult it can be for teachers to treat their own practices as 'strange' or problematic. Robert Burgess writes about the value of diaries and diary-interviews in work with teachers. Both chapters will be read with profit by anyone interested in qualitative methods, whatever their views on collaborative research. Quicke also develops a well known research technique – the life-history – as an aid in teaching sociology to teachers. He is right to suggest that when linked with disciplinary rigour, such firsthand experience of qualitative work can engage teachers in serious sociological work.

The theme of teacher education is carried through in the chapters by Miles and Furlong, and Jordan and Lacey. The former suggest that the new emphases on school-based training in the Postgraduate Certificate of Education give sociologists greater

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opportunities for influence and involvement. They describe several different approaches derived from a close integration of the sociology teaching with the students' school-based experience. In a similar vein, Jordan and Lacey advocate the use of 'restricted case study' in establishing issues of theoretical and practical significance for practising teachers and students. The authors claim that their 'case-studies' should inform education and debate. They also point out that there are many 'case-studies' (i.e. ethnographic monographs) already in existence, but claim they have had no impact on debate about education. It is not at all clear from their chapter why the 'case-studies' *they* advocate should be any more significant from all the others they selectively – and rather dismissively – refer to.

In general, the essays collected here will be useful for anyone involved in teacher-training and the supervision of research undertaken by teachers. Whether or not the work is as innovative as the authors imply is doubtful. Indeed many of us supervising MEd dissertations have been advocating and teaching these approaches to 'teacher-research' for many years without making *quite* such a song and dance about it.

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Paul Atkinson

Nearing retirement A study of late working lives

Phil Lyon, Avebury, Aldershot, 1987, £18.50, xix + 196 pp.

Relatively little is known about late working life and even less about its subsequent impact upon the experience of retirement. What are the stresses, strains and anxieties of this period and how do these influence feelings about prospects after the cessation of paid employment? These questions are particularly important in the present period of high unemployment when older workers are often expected to 'volunteer' for redundancy and early retirement.

Lyon sets out to answer some of these questions through two case studies in the Aberdeen area of Scotland. At Stoneywood Mill, seventeen older workers and thirty-six retirees, of whom twenty-four had retired before the state pensionable age, were interviewed. At the Building and Works Department of Aberdeen District Council, Lyon carried out interviews with sixteen older workers and thirty-six retirees, of whom twenty-four had taken early retirement. The age of interviewees varied from 54 to 75 and

the interviews were carried out between October 1981 and October 1983

These interviews provide material for the fascinating middle chapters of the book when the men are able to talk about their experiences of late working life. Both case studies were going through changes, not untypical of the period. The paternalistic ethos of the mill was under strain from the need to automate and shed labour. In the past, older workers in poor health were offered sheltered employment until 65. Now, an early retirement policy was being introduced as a mechanism for disguising the need for redundancies. In this way, an attempt was being made to maintain a belief that the mill offered a job for life. However, older workers now felt far more insecure than before, knowing that a decline in health would lead to early retirement and little chance of further employment. The Building and Works Department had traditionally been used by older craftsmen, who were willing to accept lower pay in return for escaping the cut and thrust of work in the private sector. However, competitive tendering was beginning to be introduced into their work with a much greater emphasis upon time allowances for specific repair jobs.

Lyon claims his case studies support two main propositions. First, 'the organisational context of late working life has a bearing on the way that older workers view themselves and their chances of continued employment' (p. 161). At the Building and Works Department, older workers expected to maintain their skill ability, alternative job opportunities existed and they expected to work until 65. At the mill, retirees had experienced a regime that offered job transfer for those no longer able to cope with more demanding work. The present cohort of older workers faced a less certain future and were less likely than their predecessors to expect to be working until reaching pensionable age. Older Council employees were less likely than mill workers to see themselves as different from or inferior to younger workers.

The second proposition is that 'late working life circumstances, and, indeed, labour market history have a bearing on feelings about retirement' (p. 176). Retirees at the mill remembered themselves to have been quite negative about retirement but the present cohort of older workers expected to be offered early retirement and several were impressed by the pension money on offer. Council workers and retirees were ambivalent about retirement, because low service levels meant limited pension rights.

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All this is a useful addition to the limited literature on late working life. But the book does suffer from three weaknesses. First, there are methodological problems since the author is always struggling with a sample where most respondents are trying to remember their experience of late working life. There is a preponderance of retirees over actual older workers. Second, the book is not about nearing retirement but about nearing retirement for white males in certain types of manual occupation. This would matter less if the author recognised and discussed the limitations of this in the early chapters. What does later working life mean for white collar occupations? Or for black workers? Or for women, whether involved in paid employment or unpaid domestic labour? Lyon cannot be expected to answer all these questions but he should have made a better attempt to situate his case studies within the overall issue of nearing retirement. This is made to jar even more by the fact that the domestic lives of his workers are totally ignored, presumably on the grounds that they have no salience for the world of 'real work'. Third, and related to this, the opening theoretical chapter is weak. It is poorly edited and long on extensive quotations. Only passing reference is made to any of the recent literature on political economy perspectives on ageing and even less mention is made of any of the post-1979 labour market research.

These are important limitations. And yet the attempts of these men to express their feeling about work and retirement are powerful. Lyon is thus right to conclude that his book 'is but a contribution to our understanding of retirement as a changing social phenomenon' (p. 178).

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Retirement in Industrialized Societies

K. S. Markides and C. L. Cooper (eds), J. Wiley, Chichester, 1987, £36.50, ix + 331 pp.

Controlling Social Welfare

C. Cousins, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1987, £22.50, paper £8.95, viii + 219 pp.

Warfare and Welfare

J. Tinbergen and D. Fischer, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1987, £38.50, xiv + 189 pp.

Modern Welfare States

R R. Friedmann, N. Gilbert and M. Sherer (eds), Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1987, £29.95, xiii + 305 pp.

The Welfare State in Transition

N Johnson, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1987, £25 00, paper £8.95, x + 243 pp.

Ideologies of Welfare

J Clarke, A. Cochrane and C. Smart, Hutchinson, London, 1987, £7 95, 206 pp.

The sharp decline in the annual rate of growth in social expenditure in the OECD countries from 1975 represents the historic transformation of the welfare-state which had its origin in the development of social security legislation in Bismarck's Germany in the 1880s. This important collection of books, in various ways, describes the rise and fall of welfare expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product. We may suitably refer to this historical process as 'The Welfare Wave'. While these studies are all concerned from a variety of perspectives with this transformation of modern industrial societies, Johnson's study of the welfare-state in transition and the rise of welfare pluralism provides a particularly lucid and detailed analysis of the institutional transformation of various sectors of the welfare-state. The ideological battle which surrounds the growth of Fabianism, the Beveridge Revolution and the growth of Thatcherism is ably and cogently discussed by Clarke, Cochrane and Smart who provide invaluable selections and documentation from original sources of the legitimization of welfare programmes.

The welfare wave of the western democracies may be divided broadly into four sections. The welfare wave rises slowly in the last two decades of the nineteenth century under the conditions of competitive capitalism; to some extent this insurance legislation for the working class represented a response of the ruling class to trade-union pressure for various forms of industrial protection against unemployment, accident and sickness. The welfare state was an aspect of mass democracy stemming from an expansion of social citizenship in the form of working-class claims for social rights to welfare services and economic security. Liberalism as the ideology of competitive capitalism gave way to Fabianism and socialism as legitimations of state intervention to protect citizens

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from the unmitigated impact of competitive capitalist relations. The second section of the welfare wave occupies the period from approximately 1914 to 1942, in this period Keynesian economic policies came to be the predominant framework within which the welfare policies were pursued and the welfare state was both a consequence and a response to the social devastation of mass warfare. The third section of the welfare wave was constituted by the Beveridge Revolution of 1942–8 which provided the context for massive state intervention and the rise of corporatism as the principal political structure of the industrial democracies. The size and character of that increased social expenditure are examined comparatively in an important collection of essays (edited by Friedmann, Gilbert and Sherer) which analyses the complex nature of welfare programmes in nine different societies. For example, in Austria social welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 16 per cent to 27 per cent between 1955 and 1984. In the United States, social expenditure rose by five fold in the period 1962–80, and in Britain the welfare-state increased its expenditure between 1960 and 1980 by 170 per cent. While various theories of welfare-state expansion are considered in *Modern Welfare States*, three factors appear to be particularly important: high rates of economic growth, increased social taxation and a reduction of military expenditure.

In explaining the increase in social welfare expenditure, these volumes generally follow Wagner's Law that increases in public expenditure are a consequence of economic growth and urban development. This is the logic-of-industrialism thesis. In this respect they are probably deficient in failing to give adequate weight to the consequences of popular political struggles for welfare programmes under the institutional structure of expanding social citizenship; we might suitably call this set of endogenous factors Marshall's Law. However, it is also the case that we cannot understand the welfare-state programmes of nation-states when considered in isolation as autonomous units within a world system, and therefore we need to examine exogenous factors which promote or constrain the welfare wave. Thus the importance of Tinbergen and Fischer's study of *Warfare and Welfare* is that their explanation clearly identifies the global constraints, both political and economic, on the welfare programmes of nation-states. They argue that 'it is characteristic of today's international anarchy that an almost unrestricted sovereignty exists and is even advocated by political leaders. This means the virtual absence of

restrictions and the existence of an enormous over-armament, since sovereign nations think that more armaments make for security. In actual fact our security has declined and so has our welfare' (pp 13-14). Tinbergen and Fischer correctly argue that the protection and expansion of an optimal system of social welfare is dependent upon the development of an optimal international condition of peace, secured by international treaties and a hierarchical world government. However, as Richard Titmuss recognized long ago in his classic essays on the welfare-state, the unintended consequences of mass warfare in the twentieth century created the conditions whereby the working class and other popular forces were able to secure an expansion of social citizenship.

The Beveridge Revolution brought about an ironic agreement between both left-wing and right-wing critics of the welfare-state. *Ideologies of Welfare* usefully shows how from the perspective of radical socialism the welfare-state functioned to maintain the continuity of capitalist domination by reducing the costs of labour and by disguising the general character of capitalist rule. This was the capital-logic theory of welfare. By contrast the New Right saw the welfare-state as the cause of economic decline and as the basis of unwarranted state regulation of the individual. In response the New Right argued the case for a new type of individualism, for family responsibility and for the support of voluntary associations within the welfare-state.

The long-term inflationary effects of the Vietnam war, the oil crisis of 1973 and the elections of Thatcher and Reagan inaugurated the fourth stage of the welfare wave. Whereas in Britain between 1960 and 1975 the annual growth rate of social expenditure was in the order of 6 per cent, between 1975 and 1981 this had been reduced to under 2 per cent per annum. The problems of the welfare-state in a period of economic crisis have produced a number of new responses which we may broadly refer to as welfare pluralism which involves 'substantially more participation and a greater reliance on self-help, mutual aid, voluntary and informal help with social workers fulfilling a community rather than a casework role' (Johnson, p. 56).

In Britain the transition of the welfare state has also involved experiments in the commercialization and privatization of welfare services including through the Griffiths Report the introduction of private-sector business practices in the delivery of health-care services. These changes in the management of the British welfare

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state along with the implications of these changes for professional social work and the de-skilling of health-care occupations are systematically discussed by Cousins in *Controlling Social Welfare*. The gist of her argument is that while Sainsbury's managerial methods may be appropriate for selling cornflakes they are not entirely suited to the needs of a health-care system and the consequence of supply-side economics in the welfare-state has been to undermine morale and commitment to these public institutions.

While these volumes deal generally with the problems of welfare decline, they also point to the constraints on any policy aimed at 'rolling back the state'. The constraints on privatization and on the reduction in absolute terms of state expenditure are discussed by Johnson. First there is little evidence that public support for welfare, particularly the health programme, has declined and there is considerable middle-class opposition to reductions in education and health services. Secondly, rising levels of unemployment have increased unemployment insurance and schemes for income-support maintenance payments. Thirdly, demographic changes in the western democracies, namely the ageing of the population has increased demand upon the social services. Finally the reduction in the welfare bill has been compensated by increased expenditure on defence, penal institutions and the police force. Apart from Johnson's book, these studies of the welfare-state may be criticised for their failure to connect the decline of the welfare-state with the growth of a more oppressive system of social control. The current transition of the welfare-state involves a major re-allocation of resources. For example, in Britain the decline in social expenditure in housing as an aspect of the welfare budget has occurred in a context, where more expenditure is redirected towards the care of the elderly.

Because the demographic structure of the industrialized societies may prove to be the key issue behind the politics of welfare at the end of the century, the question of retirement becomes a crucial aspect of the modern debate over welfare policies. *Retirement in Industrialized Societies* provides a systematic overview of retirement problems and policies in ten societies. It is possible to argue cynically that the development of compulsory retirement in the postwar period was used as a strategy to contain, and if possible reduce, unemployment levels in younger age groups. For the trade-union movement retirement was an essential plank within industrial democracy and by 1970 retirement for men before the

age of 65 had become the norm in the majority of industrial societies. However, with the steady decline of fertility rates, some industrial societies such as West Germany now face complex demographic problems because their endogenous workforce is not being replaced. They are thus forced to depend increasingly on guest-workers to maintain their workforce. Furthermore, compulsory retirement is often seen to be discriminatory and in America, where activism is an important value, there is strong popular pressure for a more flexible policy on retirement. For example the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967) increased the age of forced retirement to 70 years. Throughout the industrial world, the economic burden of pension insurance schemes is widely recognized, but there are no easy solutions. In the context of government overload and fiscal crisis, the conditions for political conflict between different interest groups (including the sick, the poor, the aged and the disabled) are greatly increased, resulting in what we might call a new politics of resentment over the diminishing welfare cake. These volumes are a useful contribution to the explanation and description of the erosion of the welfare state as a collective ideal and as a form of institutionalized altruism; in particular they provide a powerful insight into the banality of the times in which we live

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Bryan S. Turner

British Social Policy 1914-1939

Anne Crowther, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £3 95, 87 pp

To the present generation of undergraduates the period 1914-39 is as remote as the late Victorian period is to most of their lecturers. Whatever their age, most sociologists are likely to have but a sketchy knowledge of its history and almost total ignorance of its social policies. Even specialists in social policy, when they launch into history beyond 1945 tend to orbit around the pre-1914 Liberal reforms before zooming off into the outer space of Benthamites and the Elizabethan Poor Law.

As we peer at the twinkling twenties and thirties what sort of telescope is provided by this slim volume, the latest in a long-established series of *Studies in Economic and Social History*? At first glance it would appear to offer just what the back-cover blurb claims, 'an ideal introductory tool for students approaching this

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important topic for the first time' However, one has only to read a few pages of the middle chapters to think twice about recommending it to junior undergraduates in sociology or even social policy unless they have some prior knowledge of the politics and socio-economic features of the period Newcomers to the period should first consult John Stevenson's *British Society 1914-45* (a volume in the Pelican Social History of Britain) which includes excellent chapters on social policy, unemployment, housing, health, education, etc. Alternatively, they might start with coverage of this period in one of the longer narrative histories of social policy¹ or public policy.²

Crowther's book is more suitable for the student specializing in history or the non-specialist needing to move deeper into the study of this period It provides a stimulating critique of the received wisdom in the light of fresh research by social and economic historians It raises fundamental doubts about our image of the twenties and thirties, questioning, for example, the idea that unemployment was worse than in previous decades (the smart view now, apparently, is that we have insufficient data to confirm or deny the charge) Some of the reassessments of the period are, of course, influenced by the recent recurrence of some of its major problems: massive unemployment, means-tests, the North-South divide, the growing power of central over local government, a divided opposition and the belief that market forces are unalterable From this side of the post-war consensus, the inter-war years look different and it is harder to condemn the politicians of the slump when our present representatives appear to be treading in their footsteps

The format of this series enforces severe limitations on the author who, within about sixty pages of text, has to review over a hundred sources listed in a separate bibliography. The bibliography itself is worth the purchase price, listing many articles and books that sociologists would otherwise not discover and providing neat one-line summaries of their contents and approaches. The critical review might have been easier on the reader if it had devoted one chapter each to the main social policy problems (unemployment, social security, health, housing, etc.) rather than switching constantly from one to another within chapters which cover sub-periods (chapter three, The First World War; chapter four, the twenties; chapter five, the thirties). But whichever way it was organised such a review could never hope to do more than skim the surface of complex debates between historians who are

steeped in the detail of legislative and administrative changes, subtle shifts in welfare benefit regulations, and new theories of economic, social and political change. The author does well to convey the excitement of the debates and lure the reader towards the original sources. She also relieves the tension of academic debate by occasional shafts of ironic wit, as when she concludes a discussion about the impact of changes in dole regulations on the numbers registering as unemployed with a plea on behalf of 'the man on the Jarrow omnibus who persists in blaming interwar unemployment on shortage of work rather than generosity of benefits' (p. 46).

The general theme of her account is that by the end of the period government expenditure on the care of its citizens had vastly increased yet 'those areas most in need of social services were least likely to get them' (p. 58). Although great changes in social policy were achieved 'few of them had been planned. Interwar governments did not often ponder the fundamental aims of social policy, but were more concerned with mopping up after each emergency' (p. 73). The reasons behind this incoherence are well explained in the most interesting chapter for sociologists, chapter two, which explores the impact of various pressure groups, including the Labour movement, on the shaping of social policy. The bureaucracy may have cooked up the legislation but usually only in response to the workers kicking up a rumpus, or threatening to do so!

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Dave Mallion

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Violence, self-discipline and modernity: beyond the 'civilizing process'

Robert van Krieken

Abstract

Norbert Elias's writings on the development of self-constraint and its relationship to state formation are examined in the light of anthropological and historical critiques of his arguments and data. It is argued that state formation should not be seen as essential to self-discipline, that Elias's view of the development of self-constraint rests on a limited reading of the historical evidence on medieval personality and behaviour, and that many other aspects of the history of European society apart from 'lengthening chains of interdependency', such as bureaucracy and individuality, should be examined in order to explain modern self-discipline.

Although Norbert Elias's two books on the history of manners and state formation (1982a, 1982b) have already received considerable attention, the rapidly growing Elias literature does not make it very clear what is and is not worth pursuing in his historical sociology of personality. Some commentators accept Elias's arguments with few questions asked (Abrams, 1982; Bogner, 1986; Coser, 1980; Kuzmics, 1984; Turner, 1987). Others complain about empirical inaccuracies and theoretical flaws, but are still willing to accept the overall thrust (Aya, 1978; Sampson, 1984), and a few are more critical of his entire enterprise (Lasch, 1985; Robinson, 1987; Wehowsky, 1978). Most of the discussion is sociological in disciplinary orientation, perhaps simply because Elias has worked and identifies himself as a sociologist, while few social historians or anthropologists pay him more than passing attention. In addition to the debates on how well his ideas work as sociology (for example, the recent double issue of *Theory, Culture and Society*

devoted to Elias and 'figurational sociology'), it is worth identifying more precisely the accuracy of his contribution to our understanding of European social history, as well as specifying the impact any attempt to make cross-cultural sense of the 'civilizing process' has on Elias's explanation of the development of Western personality structure

Elias pursues a number of arguments in his work, but the ones I will be focusing on are, greatly simplified, these: first, personality has a history, more precisely, the balance between external, social control and self-control has gradually shifted towards the latter. Whereas a medieval person would have been constrained by primarily social, often violent, external constraints, and when not subjected to those constraints would have given relatively free rein to their drives, impulses and passions, nowadays one has self-discipline built into one's personality structure, so that social constraint becomes self-constraint. Second, this development of self-discipline can be explained with reference to the 'lengthening chains' of social interdependency which accompanied the increasing monopolisation of physical force, which was in turn part of the formation of centralised nation-states. There are other aspects of Elias's work which deserve attention, such as his methodological arguments, his emphasis on the unintentional character of social change, or the concept of 'figuration', but my primary concern here is with the question of self-discipline and the historical relationship between personality structure and social structure

The attraction of Elias's work is that the concept of the civilizing process seems to offer a link between Weber and Freud, explaining more precisely how the Protestant ethic originated and how the super-ego developed historically. Arthur Mitzman has described the changes in emotional management that Elias analyses as the social-psychological corollary to what Weber saw as the rationalisation of public and private life, and suggests that 'it is arguable that this process is the major historical tendency of the past 500 years' (Mitzman, 1987: 664). The civilizing process promises to be the detailed historical connection between the public and the private, linking personality to state formation, as well as being a more historically precise conceptual alternative to Foucault's (1977) work and the notion of the 'disciplinary society' (O'Neill, 1986). On closer inspection Elias's formulations do display a number of problems, some empirical and some theoretical. However the aim of my discussion will not be to either praise or criticise Elias, although it is difficult to avoid doing both; rather it

will be to use an examination of Elias's arguments to draw out their more general implications for the historical sociology of personality and state formation

State formation and self-discipline

Elias argues on the basis of his material on aggression and manners that in the course of European history people gradually experienced a 'civilizing process', in the sense of internalising social constraint, becoming more self-disciplined, and managing their feelings and emotions in a more stable way. He also reminds us that nation-states only gradually emerged from the fragmented political landscape of the early Middle Ages, and that their emergence can be described as a process of the monopolisation of violence and the centralisation of authority. The really decisive theoretical contribution Elias makes is then to link the two – to say that the longer chains of social *interdependency* associated with the process of state formation had the effect of making people internalise social constraint to an increasing degree, and encouraging them to become increasingly self-disciplined.

Historical accounts of this sort, in which one development explains another, have to be probed and tested fairly vigorously, for fear that we have simply observed two contemporaneous developments. The explanatory connection between state formation and a particular civilized personality structure is weakened if it is possible for civilized self-discipline to emerge without a nation-state and a centralised monopoly of violence. H. U. E. van Velzen has highlighted this problem in Elias's work, in his study of the Djuka or Aucaners in Surinam, who have no central authority of any significance: the tribal chief has prestige but no power, the influence of Dutch colonial authorities has always been limited, and it is essentially a quite egalitarian society (van Velzen, 1982). At the same time, self-restraint is seen as a virtue, all adults, particularly older men, 'are expected to behave with a high degree of restraint in social relationships. Aggressive or irascible behaviour is strongly censured' (van Velzen, 1984: 88). The examples he gives parallel Elias's examples of European manners: the emphasis on relatively content-less courtesy as a social lubricant, regulation of eating habits, shame surrounding bodily functions, and so on. The Aucaners themselves are convinced of the sophistication of their own civilization, regarding *Bakaa* (Whites, but really all

outsiders) as generally barbaric: 'rude, childish, subject to bouts of passion' They refer to 'the Bakaa's indiscretion, but also their inability to suppress emotions and the inept way in which they conduct human relationships' (1982: 247) In Djuka society one regulates and manages feelings and emotions in a quite stable and precise manner, and for van Velzen the absence of a central state means that Elias's explanatory relationship between state formation and civility cannot be sustained. However there are limitations to the cross-cultural comparison and van Velzen's alternative explanation of the Aucaner's self-control and civility dilutes the critical impact of his evidence.

The strong version of Elias's argument about the connection between state formation and personality change should certainly be modified in the light of van Velzen's evidence. Elias states unequivocally:

The peculiar stability of the apparatus of mental self-restraint which emerges as a decisive trait built into the habits of every 'civilized' human being, *stands in the closest relationship* to the monopolization of physical force and the growing stability of the central organs of society. *Only* with the formation of this kind of relatively stable monopolies do societies acquire those characteristics as a result of which the individuals forming them get attuned, from infancy, to a highly regulated and differentiated pattern of self-restraint; *only* in conjunction with these monopolies does this kind of self-restraint acquire a higher degree of automaticity, does it become, as it were, 'second nature' (1982b: 235, my emphasis)

The Djuka example indicates that this is clearly not *universally* true. I have mentioned only van Velzen's material because he relates it explicitly to Elias's arguments, but others have made the same point (e.g., Smith, 1984) It is a comparative sensibility which leads Anthony Giddens to reject Elias's linking of social complexity with self-control: the evidence on oral cultures, by most definitions less socially differentiated than European culture, 'simply does not support the proposition that such cultures are universally associated with spontaneity of emotional expression' (Giddens, 1984: 242). However there may be sufficient support for a weaker version of the argument, one which applied specifically to European history. Although it is not *necessarily* state formation and increasing social differentiation which underlies civilized

behaviour, it *could* be, given the existence of other characteristics in European history and culture not present among the Aucas. The problem would then be to specify what those 'other characteristics' might be.

The explanation offered by van Velzen for Djuka diplomacy rests on the uxori-local character of marriage relations, the fact that women usually remain in their home village and it is most often the man who moves. A man will spend most of a year in his wife's village, but will also pay regular visits to his village of origin (in turn usually his mother's village) as well as cultivating links with his father's village. Polygynous marriage then complicates this arrangement even further (van Velzen, 1984: 90). Economic arrangements between husband and wife or wives are not clearly defined, so that men are engaged in a process of constant negotiation with their wives and their home villages.

In this vaguely defined situation the husband travels continuously back and forth, under conditions which call for the utmost tact. This situation places great demands on his powers of diplomacy. It appeals to his insight into character, his sense of social relationships and his caution. Guile, calculation and self-control are rewarded (van Velzen, 1984: 91).

Like Elias, van Velzen argues for the centrality of social interdependency, which generates a tight web of social expectations that are in turn internalised and become part of Djuka personality.

Instead of a monopoly of authority, it is the character of Djuka marriage relations which produces this complex social interdependency. The implication of this for Elias's arguments is that while state formation and the monopolisation of physical force may have played a role in the long-term transformation of European personality structures, changes in marriage and family life could have had the same effect. The paucity of discussion of the social history of family life (Elias, 1982a: 137; 1982b: 295) is what George Mosse complains about in Elias's work, saying that the transition of the family from a secondary position in the Middle Ages to the forefront in the early modern period may be as important as the monopolisation of violence. Elias examines (Mosse, 1978: 181). One could argue with Mosse about whether the changes were as he describes them, but the point remains that if one is speaking of networks of mutual obligation, reciprocal dependency and so on, it is important to examine what is probably

the primary arena of interpersonal obligation, family life, and the ways in which it mediated wider social changes. It is surprising that later commentators on Elias have not elaborated on this point, as well as disappointing that historians of the family have not discussed the implications of Elias's work in more depth.

More importantly, the self-restraint Elias speaks of develops in the course of every individual's lifetime, particularly their early childhood, making family life and child-rearing precisely the arena in which the linkage between social conditions and personality structure takes place. As he puts it, each individual is 'constrained from an early age on to take account of the effects of his own or other people's action' (Elias, 1982b, 236, my emphasis). While one could say that the early modern period marked an increasing awareness of childhood socialisation and education, and perhaps changes in child-rearing practices, the debate on why that change took place is a complex one. C. John Sommerville, for example, believes it had a lot to do with a strategy of effecting social change on the part of religious reformers (Sommerville, 1978, 1982). Developing one's own version of self-discipline, programming the rising generation, as it were, was potentially the most effective means of implementing particular social changes. What this renders problematic and in need of explanation is the whole idea of social change in European culture – that it does and should happen and that it can be mastered and directed through human thought and action – and one has to go much further afield to explain that. To begin with the early Middle Ages deserve much closer examination, some writers argue that a growing interest in educating children can be traced to the period between the sixth and eighth centuries, and there was certainly a heightened sense of a need to educate children by the twelfth century (Herlihy, 1978: 118–21).

Elias also touches on other aspects of European historical development which make up a more complex picture than the one we find in the passages where he emphasises the centralisation of authority and the monopolisation of violence, such as the formation of towns and a specifically urban culture and division of labour, with the differentiation and specialisation (and the requirement to educate and train children) that implies, which can be said to have been equally responsible for tightening the webs of social interdependency, as could population growth itself (Elias, 1982b: 13–56). Goudsblom's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding (Goudsblom, 1986), students of the plague's social effects

are often persuasive in their arguments for its decisive impact on social relationships, particularly in terms of making people more aware of the possible long-term consequences of other people's behaviour, what they did with their bodies, and how individual human bodies relate to each other (Gottfried, 1983; White, 1974)

While one might appreciate the ingenuity of Elias's untangling of the unintended effects of social action, the problem is that some groups of people did consciously and deliberately set out to civilize social life, at all levels (Duby, 1983), and the people we usually see as the object of 'the civilizing offensive' (Kruithoff, 1980; Mitzman, 1987), the lower orders, occasionally went about civilizing themselves and each other. One would have to put the *intended* consequences of their actions alongside that of the unintended consequences of other actions that Elias identifies (Fulbrook, 1985: 135). Interwoven with the history of state formation and a tightening web of social interdependency is a history of urban and social reform, a Christian Church ever intent on determining the behaviour of its members, (Borkeneau, 1939: 452, Delumeau, 1977, Mosse, 1978: 180, Muchembled, 1985), of education and factory discipline (Simon, 1960, Thompson, 1967). If we insist too much on the unplanned character of social change, on its 'relative autonomy' (Elias, 1982b: 355), if we over-emphasise the 'blindness' of human agency, we run the risk of eliminating it as an effective historical force altogether, despite protestations to the contrary, reducing it to a kind of energy operating behind the stage while being subject to some other abstract 'process' which gives the actual course of history its particular form.

There are also problems with Elias's treatment of the question of historical necessity. An explanation which takes the form that things *necessarily* (Elias, 1982b: 236) had to develop the way they did should be approached with caution, if not outright dismay, as McCullagh argues, 'it seems unlikely that historians can explain why any historical events were necessary, that is show why they could not possibly have been otherwise. The most they can show is that they were probable, to some degree' (McCullagh, 1984: 205). This is an argument which works in both directions: it applies both to the idea that one historical event or process necessarily *followed* another, which is the version of historical necessity which Elias rejects, and also to the idea which Elias in fact espouses, that one historical event or process can be said to have been necessarily *preceded* by another (Elias, 1978: 161).

The development of self-discipline

Whatever its causes and origins, the change in personality structure which Elias argues for is an increase in self-discipline, or as he puts it, self-constraint

the more complex and stable control of conduct is increasingly instilled in the individual from his earliest years as an automatism, a self-compulsion that he cannot resist even if he consciously wishes to. The web of actions grows so complex and extensive, the effort required to behave 'correctly' within it becomes so great, that beside the individual's conscious self-control an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established. (Elias, 1982b: 232–3)

What Freud called the super-ego, the unconscious internalisation of social constraint, is seen by Elias as being the product of specific social conditions and as having developed over time. Whatever particular differences there might be between different societies, the overall direction of the change is the same, towards 'a more or less automatic self-control, to the subordination of short-term impulses to the commands of an ingrained long-term view, and to the formation of a more complex and secure "super-ego agency"' (Elias, 1982b: 248).

In order to 'obtain a clearer picture of how the behaviour and affective life of Western peoples slowly changed after the Middle Ages' (Elias, 1982a: xii), Elias turns to historical evidence consisting primarily of the view etiquette books give us of everyday habits and manners, and material on the aggressive behaviour of knights and their subsequent incorporation within court society (Elias, 1983). He found that as time went on the standards applied to sexual behaviour, eating habits and table manners became gradually more sophisticated, with an increasing threshold of shame, embarrassment and repugnance. A number of comments can be made on Elias's treatment of these issues which in turn illuminate the general question of the relationship between social change and personality.

Elias describes medieval society as being characterised by an aggression which dominated everyday life and was rarely subject to much social or self-control. The documents 'suggest unimaginable emotional outbursts in which – with rare exceptions – everyone

who is able abandons himself to the extreme pleasures of ferocity, murder, torture, destruction, and sadism' (Fontaine, 1978: 248). There was great pleasure in killing and torturing, and 'it was a social permitted pleasure' He gives the example of a knight, Bernard de Cazenac, who spent his days plundering churches, attacking pilgrims, oppressing widows and orphans and taking pleasure in 'mutilating the innocent', and this is meant to be typical of the behaviour of medieval knights. His wife was no better, she had women's 'breasts hacked off or their nails torn off' (Elias, 1982a: 194) It was this uninhibited violence that was domesticated in the course of the civilizing process, with its gradual monopolisation and containment within the process of state formation. Only with the development of self-discipline could people learn to use their knives to slice their food instead of each other

While the general observation is valid enough, few would argue that the Middle Ages were not a cruel and violent time, there are also arguments for a slightly modified portrayal. There is a subtle but important difference between saying that violence was socially accepted to saying that it was a social permitted *pleasure*. In one critique, Benjo Maso (1982) has pointed out that Elias relied heavily on a long chapter in Achille Luchaire's *La Societe francaise au temps de Philippe-Auguste* (Luchaire, 1909), and that this reliance reproduces the weakness in Luchaire's account. The problem which Maso focuses on is that the French historian's description rests on an interpretation of medieval literature – epics, songs and chronicles – without asking very many questions about the relationship between that literature and the social life it was referring to.

If we return for a moment to Bernard, our murderous knight, Maso points out that the original text gives no indication of any pleasure that he might have had in his violent activity, nor that he spent all of his life engaging in them. More important is the origin of the quotation: it is the *Historia Albigensis*, which Maso argues was a 'propaganda piece, with which the writer, Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, attempted to rouse the North of France to take up arms and do battle with the Southern heretics' (Maso, 1982: 229). In any case the writer makes it plain that these atrocities were just that, excesses, and not acceptable knightly behaviour. He writes of 'unheard-of cruelties' ('crudelitas inaudita'), calls Bernard 'the cruellest and worst of all' ('homo crudelissimus et omnium pessimus'), and his wife 'the worst of all bad women' ('omnium malarum pessima') (Maso, 1982: 299).

Elias also makes use of the writings of Bertran de Born to support his picture of medieval blood-thirstiness, but again this source should be approached with more caution. His work is not necessarily representative of medieval poetry: according to Maso's reading of the thirteenth century sources, they regarded Bertran as one of the most war-hungry men of his time, for whom Dante reserved a place in the eighth circle of Hell, and there is also an argument for seeing an element of parody in his work (Maso, 1982: 300). Bertran was violent, but the violence did take place within the pursuit of his interests rather than merely for its own sake. Mosse also makes the point that 'chivalry did not leave free reign to aggression' (Mosse, 1978: 180), and Robinson argues that violence 'may have been common, but it was *normal* only in the pursuit of legitimate goals, themselves defined within a clearly understood social system' (Robinson, 1987: 3).

There are limits to this kind of criticism: placing violence within the pursuit of legitimate goals and a social system does not lessen its cruelty and painfulness. Michel Rouche's portrayal of the early Middle Ages, for example, agrees with Elias's in most respects. He also says that violence was more common in the Middle Ages, and 'the weary indifference found in the writings of Gregory of Tours and the cries of horror that can be heard in the poetry and sermons of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans, and Hircmar, bishop of Reims, suggest that violence was an everyday affair' (Rouche, 1987: 498). Aggression was 'routine', and involved a wide array of techniques, such as cutting off hands and feet, bludgeoning, picking out eyes and tongues, burning, and so on. The Franks had the 'curious' custom of putting thieves to death and fining murderers, partly because murder was seen as an expression of manly virility (Rouche, 1987: 499), but probably also, as the English evidence suggests, simply because property was valued more highly than human life (Hanawalt, 1976). The point one can make is that the social framework all this ferocity took place within was mainly that of vengeance, feud, and the settlement of disputes. The violence which was progressively monopolised by the state was not simply, perhaps not even largely, that of knights, but more of the ordinary populace (Spierenburg, 1984: 1-10). Ironically it might have been knights who were the *most* self-disciplined in the expression of their aggression, in comparison with the rest of the population.

The 'weariness' and 'cries of horror' in the historical record also indicates that not everyone in the Middle Ages considered murder and torture to be acceptable forms of behaviour. The abbot and

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monks of the Abbey of Lobbes, for example, saw violent conflict as the work of the Devil, and Mayke de Jong has discussed the hagiographical account of a voyage a party of monks took to Flanders bearing the holy relics of St Ursmer, which were intended both to raise money and constrain Flemish knights from their feuding (de Jong, 1982). In the tale the monks spend most of their time trying to effect some sort of reconciliation in each of the many feuds they came across in their journey, revealing the holy relics when all negotiation had failed, to reduce everyone to a state of religious shock and confusion; as another commentator has remarked, 'the monks were masters at creating situations in which it was impossible not to swear peace and embrace one's enemy' (Koziol, 1987: 536). No matter what the relationship of the account to reality, at the very least it indicates an abhorrence of violence and a desire to eradicate it among these as-yet uncivilized monks, and their attitude was part of a broader-based rejection of knightly violence, in particular the Church's attempts from the late tenth century onwards to protect both its own property and 'non-combatants such as women, merchants, pilgrims and priests' (Callahan, 1987: 445) through the establishment of the 'Peace of God' (Cowdrey, 1970)

Philippe Contamine also refers to the 'large scale' of medieval pacifism, which proposed 'not simply the repression of pillage which disturbed daily life, but a struggle which was also metaphysical and cosmological against all elements of disorder and violence within the body and soul of the individual and society' (Contamine, 1984: 270). Elias does argue that such evidence of opposition to violence fits within his framework, in the sense that fluctuations from one extreme to the other were also a product of the lack of self-constraint. However it is a grudging concession. Elias spends very little time on the issue (Elias, 1982a: 195, 1982b: 240) and is not entirely convincing, as it remains to be explained how and why the fluctuations took place, as well as why some social groups displayed more self-constraint and abhorrence of violence than others.

Maso goes on to argue that aggressiveness among knights actually increased with state-formation and the initial stages of the monopolisation of violence (Maso, 1982: 306). Courage has been described by Duby as a twelfth-century invention (Duby, 1973: 27), and before then the primary sources appear to indicate more respect for those who temper their courage with foresight and planning (Maso, 1982: 307). But with the spread of a money

economy, mercenaries were increasingly being used in the conduct of war, and this seriously threatened the position of knights. In the ensuing conflicts the knights were aided by the Church, which threatened mercenaries and those who employed them with excommunication, and this in turn gave knights even more excuse to kill any they came into conflict with. As Maso puts it:

The impulsiveness which medieval knights appear to display to our eyes did not derive in general from a lack of self-discipline, but was a carefully cultivated characteristic with which aristocratic warriors tried to distinguish themselves from the lower classes they saw as threatening them. What Elias calls a *desire* for aggression could with equal justification be called a *pressure towards aggression* (Maso, 1982: 322).

Knightly violence was thus not simply an expression of 'spontaneity' or a lack of 'affect-control' or self-constraint, but was itself a product of a specific *set of social conditions*. Elias does say as much himself when he remarks that 'violence was inscribed in the structure of society itself' (Fontaine, 1978: 248), and that 'to a certain extent, the social structure even pushed its members in this direction, making it seem necessary and practically advantageous to behave in this way' (Elias, 1982a: 194). However this undermines the whole idea of a fundamentally different medieval personality structure, and it is therefore misleading to portray medieval personality as being characterised by a positive desire for violent cruelty awaiting domestication through state formation and the monopolisation of physical force, because violence is a product of specific social conditions, and state formation itself can and does encourage the controlled expression of sadism, cruelty and aggression.

Among the Aucas, self-constraint was consistently so well-developed, the expression of violence was so well subjected to social control, internalised social control, that it makes no sense to speak of its monopolisation. It is possible for a culture to have established a stable pattern of social and self-control very early in its history, preventing the appearance of the kind of violence and emotionality we seem to observe in medieval European societies, and thus the possibility of its monopolisation. What this means for the study of Western culture is that it is precisely this early medieval period of relative political instability and turmoil, in which violent conflict and the waging of war was a constitutive

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aspect of political and economic relations, which needs *explaining*, rather than seeing it as the departure point of European history. It is important to examine in considerable detail how, when and why violence occurs in order to get even a vague sense of how people felt about it. As Barbara Hanawalt has argued, literary sources tend to tell us primarily that stories of violence and murder have always fascinated and titillated people, but they do not reveal much more than that about people's psychological responses. Hanawalt's evidence suggests a tolerance of violence as a means of settling disputes, and explains this by suggesting, among other things, that human life had little value in medieval society (Hanawalt, 1976: 316). Certainly one would have to have a particular emotional make-up in order to see other human beings in this way, and in that sense Elias's examination of the question has been important, but this is still very different from describing violence as a socially permitted 'pleasure'

Elias also draws on his evidence about the development of manners to support his argument on the transformation of emotional life since the Middle Ages. The advice given in etiquette books shows a gradual lowering of tolerance for various forms of behaviour, such as spitting and nose-blowing, an ever more sophisticated regulation of sexual behaviour and greater embarrassment about the naked body and sleeping arrangements. Despite his rejection of the idea of 'the individual' being distinct from 'society', the general impression Elias gives is of medieval spontaneity, of a somehow less controlled lifestyle in which one did more or less as one liked, without feeling the kind of restraint we now experience as disgust or repugnance, and it is a view shared by other medievalists, when the question is addressed at all. Marc Bloch, for example, writes of 'the emotionalism of a civilization in which moral or social convention did not yet require well-bred people to repress their tears and their raptures', of 'the despairs, the rages, the impulsive acts, the sudden revulsions of feeling' (Bloch, 1961: 73). Elias gives one example from Erasmus's *Diversoria* which captures the essentials of the picture he draws of medieval social relations. Erasmus describes the interior of a German inn:

some eighty or ninety people are sitting together, and it is stressed that they are not only common people but also rich men and nobles, men, women, and children, all mixed together. . . One washes his clothes and hangs the soaking articles on

the stove Another washes his hands But the bowl is so clean, says the speaker, that one needs a second one to cleanse oneself of the water. Garlic smells and other bad odors rise People spit everywhere. Someone is cleaning his boots on the table. Then the meal is brought in. Everyone dips his bread into the general dish, bites the bread, and dips it in again. The place is dirty, the wine bad . . . The room is overheated; everyone is sweating and steaming and wiping himself. There are doubtless many among them who have some hidden disease. (Elias, 1982a. 72)

The interpretation Elias gives of this source is that it indicates a spontaneity, a lack of the affect-control and freedom from the self-discipline which would now make us feel disgusted at the squalor and filth of this sort of scene. He argues that people were in fact subjected to a different lack of freedom, the individual was a prisoner of his drives and passions, 'hurled back and forth by his own feelings as by the forces of nature' (Elias, 1982b. 241) However we should question whether this is a fair interpretation of the evidence, and whether it could not be seen in a different light

Elias's work has been compared with that of Philippe Ariès (Hutton, 1981: 248; Lasch, 1985: 706–8), and it is helpful to recall some of the difficulties his arguments on the history of childhood have encountered. Ariès also posited a fundamental difference in outlook and mentality, in particular an essentially different attitude to children in the Middle Ages, and a number of historians of the family have followed him in this respect (Shorter, 1977; Stone, 1979). However his work has been heavily criticised for over-interpreting his evidence and for neglecting other sources that give a different view Linda Pollock concludes that the whole area of childhood history 'bears the hallmark of sloppiness not only are there problems inherent in the sources used rarely considered, but some of the data used and conclusions arrived at are factually inaccurate' (Pollock, 1983: 263), and Ashplant and Wilson also argue that Ariès's 'discovery of childhood' was 'in fact an optical illusion, based in the main upon a naive reading of the iconographic material' (Ashplant and Wilson, 1988: 255). According to Pollock parents were much more responsive to children's emotional needs than many seem to think. Instead of emphasising the differences, 'historians would do well to ponder why parental care is a variable so curiously resistant to change' (Pollock, 1983: 271). Pollock concentrates on the period after 1500, but much of

the work done on medieval childhood comes to similar conclusions (Attreed, 1983; Boswell, 1984; Hanawalt, 1977; Herlihy, 1978; Kroll, 1977; Wilson, 1980). Revisionist history of this sort has been written in a variety of areas, such as individuality and mental illness (MacFarlane, 1978; Neugebauer, 1978), making it increasingly difficult to hold to a view of medieval mentality as fundamentally and radically different from us moderns (Goody, 1986: 181-2, rejects the idea altogether), and demanding a more sophisticated explanation of what was really different about medieval personality and culture.

There is a persistent methodological problem in this area to do with the sources and how one interprets them. It is quite an impressive analytical leap from the texts on etiquette to the everyday life of 'Western peoples', in fact into their very psyches, but it sometimes bears the marks of a leap of faith. Erasmus's writings, for example, should be seen to have an element of polemic in them, as do most denunciations of bad manners, and as we know from more recent histories of the attitudes of moral critics, that polemical element, not to mention sheer misunderstanding, can lead one quite some distance from reality (Johnson, 1970: 110; Kitteringham, 1975: 128). It is equally plausible that everyone in Erasmus's inn was almost as disgusted by the squalor as we might be, but had developed a pragmatic, world weary acceptance of it all because they were not yet capable of seeing any other way of doing things, or because of 'mere sensuous indifference' (Murray, 1974: 324). Too great a commitment to the very idea of profound social and psychological change blinds us to the possibility that differences in behaviour can be explained much more parsimoniously, as direct responses to a particular social environment, instead of in terms of a significantly different personality structure, one 'incomparably more ready and accustomed to leap with undiminished intensity from one extreme to the other' (Elias, 1982b: 238).

A different kind of example to illustrate this point, from a discussion of individuality, often it is argued that because artists did not portray their subjects as distinct individuals, this means that people at the time did not have a sense of individuality like our own. However, as John F. Benton argues, 'artists could produce "portraits" as instantly recognizable as those of a modern cartoonist when they saw a reason to do so, and their preference for the conventional and symbolic representation of living individuals was a matter of choice' (Benton, 1982: 277). When Elias interprets

the drawings in *The Medieval Housebook* as being 'expressions of a society in which people gave way to drives and feelings incomparably more easily, quickly, spontaneously, and openly than today' (Elias, 1982a: 214), the obvious objection is that they indicate nothing of the sort. They say something about how medieval life was *represented*, but very little indeed about medieval personality structure. Medieval literature was rarely written to be read literally (Maso, 1982: 299–300), and the self-confessed inclination of writers like Guibert of Nogent to embellish the truth in order to make a point is not atypical (Benton, 1970: 28–32). A far more subtle understanding of medieval literary and artistic conventions is necessary to make *any* inferences from Elias's material at all; failing that, this kind of literary material should at the very least be approached with greater care, and treated as suggestive clues rather than as definitive and easily accessible evidence requiring little questioning.

Individuality, self-discipline and state formation revisited

Despite these difficulties, most social historians would accept the rough outline of what Elias has argued. a gradual intensification of self discipline, a shift from social control based on public humiliation, neighbourhood surveillance, priestly condemnation, fear and violence, to internalised norms and values, a quite demanding socialisation process, what many would call 'ideology' It is quite plausible to suggest that our attitudes to our bodies are hedged in by different, perhaps even more restrictions than they have been in the past (Darnton, 1984: 69–72), that expressions of emotion are confined within a different set of legitimate boundaries, even if positively encouraged, in fact insisted upon, within those boundaries, as Marcuse and Foucault have remarked (Foucault, 1981; Marcuse, 1969). It is an important point to make, and any attempt at clarification of the history of this change deserves attention, but at the same time the limitations of Elias's particular formulations need to be overcome before we can come to an adequate understanding of the topic.

A central characteristic of Elias's work is his heavy explanatory reliance on the monopolisation of violence and lengthening 'chains of social interdependency'. While one might agree that these developments played a crucial role in the history of self-discipline, there are other aspects of European social history which should be

treated with greater weight than one finds in Elias himself. For example, there is one particular feature of state formation which deserves much closer attention in terms of its effect on personality structure: bureaucracy. The monopolisation of violence took place within the framework of the development of nation-states as collectivities of individual citizens governed by the rule of law and a corresponding bureaucratic form of organisation. Societies characterised by a bureaucratic form of social organisation, argues La Fontaine, have a very specific concept of the person: the distinction between an office and its incumbent narrows the sense of self within one's individuality, so that 'person and individual are virtually indistinguishable' (La Fontaine, 1985). A bureaucratic social order is defined by relationships between a more or less centralised authority, and individual citizens, instead of relationships between, say, kinship groups or descendants of ancestors. The bureaucratic form of organisation has built into it a specific logic which defines us more clearly than other social forms as distinct and separate individuals with rights, duties, obligations, responsibilities, all of which are pre-existing characteristics of both the office and our identity as citizens, and which ones self, psyche and personality simply has to adapt to.

Every society and culture has the kind of conflict between reality and desire which Freud saw as the dynamic underlying the formation of a super-ego, but bureaucracy fixes the rules of the 'reality principle' more firmly than any other social form. Jack Goody's comments on the implications of literacy are pertinent here – writing, the basis of all bureaucracy, permanently and cumulatively fixes the rules of social order so that every successive generation has much less discretion than in an oral culture to remake and reconstruct society (Goody, 1986: 24–5), and this in turn demands a gradually increasing degree of self-restraint. The changes in personality structure which Elias calls the 'civilizing process' could thus with equal justification be called the 'bureaucratization of the world' (Jacoby, 1973), and the major historiographical problem then becomes to translate the comparative understandings of the question found in writers such as La Fontaine into a historical analysis of the impact of bureaucratization on Western personality structures.

Part of the solution to this problem can be found in the activities of the bureaucrats themselves and their overall impact on popular attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. In his work on the 'well-ordered police state' Marc Raeff has highlighted how the aim of the

numerous and diverse police ordinances issued by both local and central authorities from the sixteenth century onwards was precisely to 'civilize' the lower orders, to instil a rational and disciplined approach to work and life, and to wean them away from a 'traditional' lifestyle based on irrational beliefs and customs and a pre-industrial sense of time (c f also Le Goff, 1980 and Thompson, 1967) The ordinances dealt with, *inter alia*, the size of crowds at regular events such as betrothals, weddings, funerals and christenings, as well as their location and timing, with the aim of restricting the wasteful consumption of resources and otherwise productive labour time, and to restrict the display of emotion and feeling to as small and private a sphere as possible, thereby freeing the public sphere for productive and instrumentally rational work (see also Greenfield, 1918, Tribe, 1984, Oestreich, 1982). As Raeff puts it:

While it is true that many ordinances were not actually implemented and many regulations more often breached than obeyed, they do, nonetheless, provide evidence of the efforts made by rulers and administrators to move their societies in specific ways and directions, to shape their population, economies, and cultural life according to set standards and norms. In the long run, in spite of resistance and failures, there did emerge an active, productive, efficient, and rationalistic style of economic and cultural behaviour, and in this development the constant prodding and structuring by administrative action played a significant, or rather an essential and seminal role. (Raeff, 1983: 44)

One can make too much of this argument. R W Scribner, for example, has pointed out that what might appear to be a 'well-ordered police state' seen from above and from the outside often turns out to be much less ordered and rational once one examines its day-to-day operation and observes its reliance on consent often withheld as well as the sheer ineffectiveness of much of the absolutist state's interventions (Scribner, 1987) None the less the kind of control of affect that Elias ascribes to the lengthening chains of interdependency and the monopolisation of violence was also the explicit and intended object of much state intervention, in the interests of securing a stable, productive and 'modern' workforce, and if one holds that personality and behaviour did in fact change so that 'passions' and 'impulses' were more controlled,

that active intervention has to become part of one's explanatory schema.

An especially thorny problem which even the most ferocious of Elias's critics have not addressed is precisely the question of *whether* medieval personality and behaviour should be contrasted so sharply with its modern counterpart at all, with a developmental process then inserted between the two extremes. The methodological difficulty is that almost all the sources for our view of medieval peasants and townsfolk are precisely those historical characters who were concerned to improve the self-discipline and self-control of the lower orders, which should lead us to suspect that they may have overstated their case. The criticism that Jean Wirth levels at French historians of popular culture such as Robert Muchembled (1985), Robert Mandrou (1975) and Jean Delumeau (1977) does not apply to Elias, because unlike them he does not argue for the 'acculturation' of one group by another, and in fact his sense of the civilizing process corresponds quite closely to Wirth's conception of the social change at issue being much more broadly-based (see also Verrips, 1987). However another point made by Wirth does home in on Elias as well, he writes that ultimately the acculturation thesis 'is based on the hypothesis that these primitive beings actually existed', and the civilizing thesis also assumes that medieval people were essentially primitive – less self-controlled, less disciplined, less emotionally stable, and so on. 'I do not see', writes Wirth, 'what gives anyone the right systematically to presuppose the existence of a greater presence of religion, magic, the sacred and irrationality, from which it subsequently became possible to detach oneself' (Wirth, 1974: 77).

The problem here is one of present-centredness, as Ashplant and Wilson (1988) have termed it: the constraint in all history of having to approach an understanding of the past with the categories of the present. How can one really speak of spontaneity, passion, self-constraint and even violence in relation to the Middle Ages, when the concepts, if they existed at all, would have meant such very different things, and the emotions and behaviour they refer to would have been understood and experienced in such a very different way? As Ashplant and Wilson put it,

Armed with the categories of the present (questions to be asked, objects of inquiry to be found), the historian goes to the sources looking for them. That is, the historian treats the sources as if they could answer those initial questions, in a direct and

unmediated way. But that would be possible only if those sources were constructed within the same category-system and had been created for the same purposes, as those of the historian. Since the relics of the past are not like this, all that can happen is for the historian to mis-take items within the sources as answers to the initial questions, mis-recognize the objects of enquiry as present or absent. (Ashplant and Wilson, 1988: 267)

The only way to deal with this issue is to approach the historical evidence in a completely different way, to investigate 'the process by which the historical source was generated' (Ashplant and Wilson, 1988: 268), rather than treating them as source of 'truth' requiring no interrogation. To paraphrase and adapt E.P. Thompson, we know a lot about the delicate tissues of social norms and mutual relationships which regulate the lives of Trobriand Islanders, and the intricacies of their psychic make-up, but the infinitely-complex creatures which appear in anthropology seem to turn, in medieval history, into Hobbesian brutes enslaved by their passions and at the mercy of their unrestrained drives and impulses (Thompson, 1971: 78). I can offer no solution to this problem, except to argue: that it should be kept firmly in mind, that the image of undisciplined, impulsive medieval personality structure smells just a little, reminiscent of how many used to view 'primitive' culture, and that we should test out our Boschian image of medieval everyday life with all the scepticism we can muster. At the very least it is important to see what medieval impulsiveness and passion there might have been as a response to some very specific social conditions: dramatic social and cultural change, constant and frequent contact with death, war and famine (White, 1974).

Elias's particular perspective could also be usefully complemented by different, sometimes better ways of conceptualising the problem: John F. Benton, for example, argues that one can describe the change in consciousness as a transition from a 'shame' culture to a 'guilt' culture (Benton, 1982: 271), and in many ways this parallels Elias's notion of the civilizing process, or as Pieter Spierenburg prefers to translate it, 'conscience-formation' (Spierenburg, 1984: ix). Benton counsels caution in the use of such an explanation, as in any culture individuals are motivated by both shame and guilt, but he none the less argues that in the twelfth century 'guilt and its expiation became increasingly dominant themes, and the values and judgement of European society were never again to be as simple as they had been in

the shame-conditioned world of Gregory of Tours' (Benton, 1982: 272). This increased awareness of individual responsibility was partly made possible by an increasing self-examination and a concern with the inner life of oneself and others. At the same time some other characteristics of the medieval sense of self constituted a barrier between their experience of guilt and the later development of self-control and self-discipline.

In medieval thought, Benton emphasises, the *persona* (there was no other word for 'personality') was not something inside oneself, but outside it, a mask between oneself and the outside world, and 'looking behind the individualized mask eventually brought one closer to the uniqueness, not of self, but of God' (Benton, 1982: 285). This was the more orthodox, Christian version, but people also held to a belief in Fate, which could be discovered through magic and pagan rituals, a belief 'that individual selves have no meaning in a world where neither choice nor chance exists' (Benton, 1982: 287). The notion of conscience and self-discipline depends on a concept of individual autonomy and responsibility, and this in turn rests on a view of how the world works and the role of human agency within it. In a world governed either by God and the Devil or some other supernatural forces, human beings are merely swept along in the tide, and a strong sense of human independence from those forces contributes to a sense of individual responsibility, and therefore conscience and self-discipline, coming to play a part in people's psychic life. The concept of individual responsibility and guilt was an integral part of Christian thought, as evidenced by practices such as the confessional, in which one dealt with God and one's conscience in private, although mediated by the priest, the idea that 'the ear of the priest is the ear of God' was established by the sixth century (White, 1978: 55). But this was still somewhat removed from the kind of self-discipline which emerged later, in which guilt was so well established in one's psyche that it did not even require the mediation of the priest.

The essential point here is that changes in conscience and self-discipline were intimately related to changes in Western culture's sense of self and individuality in itself – in psychoanalytic terms, the history of the super-ego goes hand in hand with, and in some senses is preceded by, the history of the ego. For example, the question of violence and people's response to it: if people tolerated violence it was not simply because they were not controlling their own aggressive impulses, but also because of the

low value placed on human life. That valuation changed, argues Spierenburg, because people increasingly came to *identify* with the other human beings who were the object of violent and cruel punishment (Spierenburg, 1984: 184–9). The transformation in consciousness is not just the increased control of violent impulses, but also a changing sense of self, in which another human being's fate is felt to be related to one's own, although Elias's analysis of how lengthening chains of social interdependency contributed to this change takes us a good deal of the way towards explaining it, in addition to that it was the increasing sense of individuality itself which formed the foundation for the change in sensibility. Where Elias does discuss the increased sense of a separation between self and other, he does so primarily to argue against the idea of individuality somehow 'outside' society, and explains it as a consequence of greater self-constraint rather than the other way around (Elias, 1982a: 221–63).

The historical sociology of personality is difficult territory, because it is a complicated enough task to ascertain what people did in everyday life, let alone what they thought and felt, but it is none the less an enterprise crucial to our understanding of social history. A particular anthropology, a specific set of assumptions about people's thoughts and feelings, their sense of self and of their relationship to the social world around them, the very structure of their psyches, is built into any historical and/or sociological account, and especially those of belief, culture and mentalities. The weaknesses of Elias's work arise from the conceptual limits he operates within, his lack of engagement with the very real methodological problems of historical evidence and interpretation, and some major contradictions within his own writings, such as that between his rejection of the notion of human 'nature' and his continued reliance on concepts like 'spontaneity', 'drives', 'instinct', 'impulse', and 'passion', but the strength of his general orientation remains the very idea of connecting the social history of personality and mentality with the larger processes of state formation and increasingly extensive social differentiation, and this alone makes a critical engagement with the questions raised by Elias essential to an adequate understanding of both the historical sociology of personality and the psychology of modernity.

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Factory women, redundancy and the search for work: toward a reconceptualisation of employment and unemployment

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Abstract

A number of social scientists (see for example, Allen *et al* , 1986, Brown, 1984, Purcell, 1985, Purcell *et al* , 1986; Roberts *et al* , 1985) have drawn attention to the way in which patterns of working have changed radically in recent years suggesting that we need to rethink and reconceptualise with regard to work, employment and unemployment.

This paper examines these issues in Sweden where recession in the early eighties and economic restructuring, similar to the experience in other Western countries, have affected individuals' relation to the labour market. It is our view that the effects of these developments (have) affect(ed) women and immigrants differently. It is furthermore our contention that welfare state policies related to the functioning of the labour market (inadvertently) play a role in the maintenance of inequality.

Two inter-related processes are involved in economic re-structuring. Jobs disappear (one process), shuffling the ex-job holders into unemployment and the search for new work (another process). In this paper, we examine these processes in relation to large-scale redundancies that were implemented at a Swedish food processing factory in the first part of the eighties. While others have explained the economic, technological and political forces and dynamics lying behind redundancies and close-downs in the present historical period (see for example, Bluestone, 1984, Purcell and Wood, 1986), we focus attention on the *people* affected and analyse why *particular* groups of workers at the factory in question were hit by the lay offs. Once thrown into the search for new jobs, we examine the fate of these workers, given that the relations of employment-unemployment are changing. Put simply, how easy is it to re-find

paid work when faced not only with a contracting labour market, but with employers who place different demands on the type of labour power they require? And just what does work mean in terms of a labour contract, working hours and other criteria?

The second part of this paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework which would help understand the changing face of employment and unemployment and expand dual labour market theories¹ and the place of women and immigrants therein. Today in Sweden, unemployment is very low and the media are full of reports stating how certain industries and occupations are in dire need of labour power. This would suggest that redundancy and unemployment are no longer social problems which require our attention as social scientists – at least in Sweden. By focusing on *unemployment per se*, an important point is being missed, namely that the relations of employment have been and are changing. This fact has serious implications for some sections of the workforce. We show in the second part of this paper that for certain groups the risk exists of not acquiring *permanent* work having once become unemployed. Remaining outside the area of permanent employment for longer periods of time (even if one is not permanently unemployed as such) is a particularly pertinent issue since it deprives an individual of many of her/his legal rights or possibilities. For example, when in temporary work, an individual with young children may not be able to work a legally entitled six-hour work day or have a job to return to after parental leave. It is difficult to complain about working conditions when temporarily employed or be assimilated into the 'work collective'. It also affects social insurance, such as old age pension, sick pay, unemployment benefit, etc. Thus Freeman and Perez's (1988) words are of relevance, it would seem, also to Sweden: 'the social danger remains of a dual economy in which a low skill, part-time low wage labour force works under different conditions from those prevailing in the more technically advanced areas' (p. 57)

I The redundancies

A decision to rationalise and invest in new machinery coupled with decreasing sales led the factory in our study to make a quarter of its workers redundant in 1982. Most companies attempt to keep the type of labour power that is most valuable to them, when reductions in staff are introduced.² Different groups of employees

are therefore affected depending on the needs of the company and whether changes result from investment and implementation of new technology or are due to processes of rationalisation.³ Two groups were disproportionately hit in our study. One was a group of older workers, close to retirement, who 'voluntarily' agreed to go.⁴ The other comprised a younger group of mainly women. It is this latter group on which we focus attention in this paper. However, not only did we find that women were disproportionately made redundant, but that particular groups of women, namely *immigrant women* and *women with young children*, were affected.

Most studies carried out on women and redundancy (as in the case with redundancy studies as a whole) have either looked at *total* close-downs or have solely involved voluntary redundancies (i.e. the workers themselves have decided who is to go) (See for example Coyle, 1984; Martin and Wallace, 1984, Wood, 1981). Exceptions are Walby's and Callender's studies (see Walby 1985, Callender, 1987).⁵ In this respect our study is valuable in being able to examine *which* workers were affected and to look at the social relations of gender and ethnicity which would help explain the selection of workers to lose their jobs.

Before examining in closer detail the principles that were used to decide who was to be made redundant, we will present a brief portrait of the company and the working conditions there. This portrait is necessary so as to provide the back-cloth against which we can understand the divisions amongst the workers that emerged as well as other conditions of work organisation that directly or indirectly were responsible for the selection process of those workers who were to stay and those to go.⁶

The factory

The factory, which was involved in the production and distribution of food-stuffs, was situated in a large southern Swedish town. At the time of the start of our study in 1982, this town and its surrounding county were amongst those areas in Sweden that were reporting the highest rates of unemployment. The company, founded at the close of the previous century, had remained a family business until the mid seventies when it was merged into a multi-national concern. With this shift in management, a distant and more technocratic leadership – with an interest in increased rationalisation and automation – replaced an earlier more paternalistic one. Management style and decisions were also

influenced by changes in local and international labour markets and in particular by increased competition during the late seventies and early eighties.

The factory was of middle size, employing, prior to the redundancies, 288 blue collar workers, 93 white collar workers and 64 salesmen. Work on the shop floor was labour intensive and mainly carried out by women, men constituted only 27 per cent of the workers. A fifth of the blue collar workers were immigrants, half of whom originated from southern Europe and nearly a quarter from other Scandinavian countries. The median age for the workers, both men and women, was 42.

Similar to the documentation in a wealth of recent studies, jobs in this factory as a whole, as well as on the shop floor, were closely linked to a gender division of labour.⁷ Jobs if not officially, at least in practice, were gender-marked. While men worked with men or on their own and women worked mainly with women, women worked also *under* men. Men in general planned and decided over their work, and had the jobs that required more skill and training. The content of the work differed for male and female workers as well, as did the total setting within which they found themselves.

The women primarily worked with jobs on the line (such as packaging, feeding the machines, etc.) as well as with cleaning and work in the store rooms. The male workers, however, were to be found in more or less all the jobs in the production process. They were employed as electricians, carpenters, maintenance men, mechanics; they were in charge of the larger machines and in the mixing and processing of the raw materials; they drove the trucks and other transport machines. They did not however work on the line with jobs demanding speed and 'nimble fingers'. The men's jobs were defined as skilled and the men were not as dependent on each other's presence and speed as the women who worked on the line were. The men enjoyed in addition, more freedom of movement. They could more easily leave their particular job stations for short breaks, talk to other workers, etc.

Most of the women's jobs, on the other hand, were assigned to the least qualified category and were crowded into the lowest pay-scale. Since the work they carried out was defined as work that required no skill, they were assumed to be more easily interchangeable, meaning that they could and should fill in for each other, whenever this was seen as necessary by foremen and management.⁸ Working on the line required continuous attention and they were often tied to a particular job station or machine

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And since much of the work was done on a group piece rate, the women were dependent on the smooth functioning of this team and its individual members. The combination of group piece rate and letting the women fill in for each other was – as we are to see below – one of the factors that produced tensions amongst – and even divided – the women workers.

While some of the immigrant women who had been with the company for longer periods of time were placed in better jobs, in general the immigrant women – and in particular those from southern European countries – were at the bottom of the hierarchy amongst the women workers. They carried out the most difficult and dirty cleaning and worked at the least desirable job stations. The immigrant women themselves maintained a certain amount of distance from the Swedish women and men, they often kept to themselves in the breaks and tried to get jobs together with other women from a similar ethnic background. A high proportion of the immigrant women worked in the evenings.

Work in the factory was carried out in two shifts: day and evening shift. People working the day shift usually worked full-time, while the evening shift consisted 0.7 of full-time and was the most usual form of part-time work in the factory.⁹ Many of the women who joined the factory's work force started working evenings as it fitted in better with their responsibilities at home, but continued to do so because of the 'women's atmosphere' they themselves helped create. Whereas the work organisation during the day shift made it difficult for the women to create such a 'shop-floor culture' (Pollert, 1981), during the evening the women were left to themselves. With the exception of an occasional repairman or manager, those who worked evenings were almost exclusively women. Left to themselves, they created a more pleasant work situation, with less competition and a lessened division between the different groups of immigrant and Swedish women. The workers' output during the evening shift was higher than during the daytime.

The creation of a pool of 'extra' workers

During 1979/80, as part of long term planning for the 1980s, a decision was made to invest in a number of new machines. It was assumed that this would influence the work process and job composition in the work place, i.e. that fewer workers would be needed in the factory. The assumption was made by management

that workers leaving the factory through *natural wastage* in combination with a stop on hiring new workers, would see to it that the work-force re-established itself at the (lower) level needed. In the meantime – and until this was the case – a pool of workers was established that was to serve as a labour power reserve. Pool workers were to replace workers who were absent and had to take any kind of work available at a particular time. They were usually given a station in the morning but it was possible that they had to move around several times during the day. The pool also served as a warning to the work-force, that is to say it suggested that certain workers were more valuable than others, and interestingly absenteeism decreased after the introduction of the pool. The creation of the pool was to have, as we shall see, important implications. It was a source of further divisions among the workers and affected everyone's working conditions. It was an important element in the processes leading up to the redundancies.

The pool, which comprised approximately 18 per cent of the workforce on the shop-floor – the vast majority being women and immigrants – came primarily to include those who had joined the work-force last, those with higher than median absenteeism and also workers who could be expected to be away from work for longer periods in the near future: for example, pregnant women. Not all the workers with a high degree of absenteeism, and who joined the firm last were included in the pool; exceptions were made with regards to skill. Gender and ethnicity then, played an important, although never actually stated as such, role in the decision of who was to be included. Mainly women, and in particular women with young children and immigrant women, were affected by the decision. Most of those affected, although shocked and surprised, passively accepted the decision. A few of the workers protested, but their protests were squashed.

During these years then, a number of changes affected the workers' situation. Increased rationalisation and automation were introduced, where new, larger machines replaced older machines and earlier work done by hand became mechanized. The pace of work was speeded up and many of the new machines were run continuously, thus making it impossible for the workers to take breaks together. The higher noise level made it more difficult for the women to talk to each other while working together at a machine. The decision to create a pool of workers affected, however, not only the pool workers themselves but the entire

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work-force. Pool workers became continual newcomers and experienced its negative sides on a day-to-day basis. But the workers who continued working with their 'own machines' were affected by this decision as well. For one thing, their work atmosphere and contact with work-mates changed and the continuity that they had experienced earlier was lost. For another, as it affected their group piece rate, earlier feelings of solidarity and collectivity were broken down.¹⁰ The women workers reported that everyone – regardless of whether they were in the pool or not – experienced their work and work situation as more stressful. A divided and stressed work-force made management's task of lay-offs easier.

Redundancies

In the middle of 1981, it became apparent to the management that it would have to make a large number of workers redundant. A worsening of the general economic climate coupled with tougher competition in this particular branch led to lesser sales. At the same time few people left on their own accord to find jobs elsewhere. In the late summer of the same year, at the first round of negotiations, the union works committee was presented with a list of just over eighty names of workers whom management wished to lay off. Approximately half of these were older workers (over 58 years and 3 months of age) who after a period of unemployment could be granted 'early retirement on labour market grounds'. At the same meeting, management stressed that they were interested in keeping what they considered to be the best labour power. By this was meant skilled workers and those workers who had little absenteeism, as well as those who carried out their work 'satisfactorily' and worked well with others. Absenteeism, in particular, was emphasized by management as a prime motive in directing their choice of workers (who did not belong to the older category) who were to be laid off. 'It was primarily those who were hardly ever at work who were forced to go. The main emphasis lay there. This was a clear declaration on our part from the start...' (personnel manager)

Although negotiations between management and the union were to continue for a period of four months, the union did little to fight the lay-offs and appears to have agreed more or less with the management's assessment of the situation. Given current compe-

tion, the union was afraid that the factory might have to close down all together in the future and in order to make the subsidiary a well-functioning and profit-making unit, the union shared the management's view of keeping what they both defined as the 'best labour'

Large-scale redundancies are often precipitated by a period of heightened stress for the work-force. This was also found in our study in the way the workers described the period of four months of negotiations. Since all the workers knew that a decision about redundancies was in the making but since the grounds for deciding who was to go were not openly discussed and since little concrete or specified information was released during this period, it created a large amount of unrest in the work-force. If the creation of the pool had broken down community and solidarity and furthered divisions between the workers, the negotiations about the soon-to-be implemented redundancies created even greater divisions and mistrusts among the workers.¹¹ During this period, differing rumours about which principles were to be used leaked to the workers. But while neither the union representatives nor management countered these rumours, they did offer to let some workers change machines, change from working part-time to full-time or switch from working evenings to working days. Agreeing to this request didn't necessarily mean that he/she was allowed to stay, but it gave the worker concerned some hope that this might be the case. To the other workers it was another indication that they might have to go.

Who lost their jobs?

According to the Employment Protection Act in Sweden, 1974, 1982 (LAS), an employer may not freely choose whom he wishes to make redundant when there is not sufficient work. Rather, he is obliged to follow the principle of seniority so that those workers who have joined the work place last should be the first to lose their jobs. However, this principle may be by-passed if a collective agreement is made at the local level permitting a different ranking concerning whom is to be laid off.

This latter clause was utilised at the factory in our study. Management and union agreed first on the group of older workers (a total of thirty-four) – which by necessity meant by-passing the rule of 'last in-first out' as most had worked at the factory for many

years – and then negotiated over the other group of workers (that finally resulted in a figure of forty). We have indicated above that various considerations influenced management's and union's final choice of this latter group. Below we develop these considerations or 'principles' in more detail and in so doing we will show that gender and ethnicity were closely 'baked into' these principles – even if this was not an explicit intention

LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT

Even if 'last in-first out' was put aside, length of employment was frequently used in the decision of who was to be made redundant but almost exclusively *in combination* with the other principles to be discussed below (i.e. if a worker had been with the company for a short time, but had a high degree of absenteeism – for whatever reason – then s/he was more likely to be laid off than a worker who had been there for the same amount of time but had very little absenteeism)

In one sense, the principle of 'last in-first out' seems to be fair, as it guarantees older workers and workers who have worked longer at a particular work place continued employment opportunities. The principle however works against those who do not have a continuous work history at the same work place, something which is particularly true for certain groups of workers: women and immigrants. In their careful weighing of family and work, women switch jobs, work place and/or working hours to fit in with the needs of their families and thereby are more likely to be among the last to join the work-force at a particular work place (although their work history *per se* may be quite extensive). In particular when children are young, women may try to find part-time work and/or evening work. Some of the women we interviewed, who joined the factory's work-force during the late 1970s, did so because they could work evenings there or because the factory was close-by. Thus they had left previous factory jobs and had only worked at the factory for a short time at the time of the redundancies. This switching between jobs is also true for immigrants whose anchorage in the labour market in the beginning is not particularly secure and they tend to move to other or 'better' jobs the longer they have been in Sweden and know more about the workings of Swedish society and what jobs are available. The variegated local labour market in the town where we carried out our study made this feasible earlier when the economic crisis had not yet been felt.

SKILL LEVEL OF THE WORK

Workers whose jobs entailed certain skills were not included among those laid off. Their skills were seen as essential for the smooth running of production, and management had no wish to teach new workers these skills when they were satisfied with the present job occupiers. Since the skilled jobs were mainly held by Swedish men, this partly accounts for why women and immigrants were disproportionately affected by the redundancies.

ABSENTEEISM

Degree of absenteeism was, as we explained earlier, a prime motive used in ranking the workers for redundancy. In the following we discuss different types of absenteeism, whether it was long-term or short-term, and what it was due to. In addition, we show that even this criterion was gender-related.

Long-term absenteeism

Study leave

The majority of the workers in the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs had little education, many had not even completed secondary schooling. The educational level of the immigrant workers was particularly low. But while the men who showed skill and aptitude were given further training or education leading to better jobs in the company, the women workers in non-skilled jobs who wanted to acquire more education or get a better job, were required to do so on their own initiative by taking study leave. Those workers who were on the latter type of study leave at the time of negotiations lost their jobs.

Parental leave

The majority of the women workers at the factory who gave birth took out the full amount of parental leave¹² – rather than it being shared with their husbands. Thus they were absent for a long period of time, usually nine months or a year but sometimes up to one and a half years as allowed by law. Pregnancy and ensuing parental leave ensured that the woman in question landed in the pool since the company argued that they couldn't be sure that the woman would return to the factory and they were not prepared to guarantee her old station upon return. Women who had recently been on parental leave and who had only worked at the factory for a short time were amongst those chosen for redundancy.

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Long-term sickness

Like parental leave, long-term sickness also meant placement in the pool.¹³ Long-term sickness in turn influenced the decision of whether or not they were included in the group of workers to be made redundant. Often it was used together with how long a worker had been employed in the factory.

Short-term absenteeism

One's own sickness and children's sickness

In the statistics kept by the company on absenteeism there was no indication of whether this was due to own sick leave or leave for care of sick children. The women with younger children had a higher level of absenteeism than the average for the workers. Some of this higher level of absenteeism may have been due to looking after sick children, since women (at least in these types of jobs) more often than men stay home when their children are ill. None of these women however had a higher level of absenteeism than would have been allowed by law – namely 60 days (per child) per year.

If the firm's statistics did not give clear evidence as to just how much absenteeism was due to care of sick children, the following excerpt from an interview with the personnel manager states the firm's standing on the situation of women with young children

/There are those who say that it is problematic to employ women with young children. What do you think about such a statement?/

'From the management's point of view and even the other workers, it is not good if a woman needs to stay at home to look after a sick child.'

/Do you ask prospective workers about their family situation?/

'I ask the women if they are married, have a family and the ages of their children. There are quite a few around 25 who have small children, and then it is problematic to employ them, I feel. If they want to work in the evenings, then it is easier, because then they really want to work and it's less of a problem if their children are sick.'

/Do you think there's a lot of absenteeism due to children being sick?/

'Yes, I would say so.'

Poolworkers

It was suggested above that the creation of the pool warned workers who landed in the pool that they were seen as superfluous labour and would most likely lose their jobs when redundancies were enforced. As it turned out, management and union decided to examine all the workers during the negotiations and so the pool workers did not automatically lose their jobs. For example, the evening workers had been placed in the pool as this shift was to disappear with the reorganisation. At the same time, the evening workers were considered 'good workers' and management was not keen to lose them.

In reality, though, the pool workers were disproportionately made redundant but this was due to the other principles utilised. A high degree of absenteeism placed one in the pool. Conversely, the working conditions associated with the pool elicited absenteeism. Those who had been relegated to the pool because of absence due to illness, mentioned the pressures they experienced at work when they returned and that this in turn contributed to higher absenteeism. Other workers who had no history of illness prior to landing in the pool now found themselves also getting sick as a result of the dislikeable conditions that they were forced to work under, or alternatively they stayed away from work, because they just couldn't face being there. This high absenteeism then influenced their being chosen for redundancy.

HOW ONE GETS ALONG WITH THE OTHER WORKERS AND BEING A 'GOOD' WORKER

In contrast to the principles used above, these mentioned here are of a more subjective nature. Even the principle related to absenteeism, though, involves a subjective element, namely the belief that a good worker is someone who is at work every day and who prioritizes work over family. A principle however that is clearly at odds with what it means to be a good mother, which entails for example taking care of one's sick child.¹⁴

Pool workers and immigrant women were in particular affected by the usage of the criterion of how one gets along with the other workers. As we mentioned above, it was a difficult task, once placed in the pool, to live up to the demands of working as a team. The structure and day to day functioning of the pool placed them in an impossible work situation of moving around, adjusting to an already existing pace of work, meeting new work-mates, etc. The women were never at a certain job station long enough to become

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a real work-mate and they were often seen negatively in the other workers' eyes, as they lowered their chances of making a good piece rate and income.

The immigrant women, and especially those from southern Europe, were not seen in a particularly positive light by either the other workers, foremen or management. According to the Swedish women, it was more difficult to work with and get close to the southern European women. They felt they kept to themselves and excluded others by speaking their own language. The immigrant women on the other hand felt unaccepted by the Swedish women. Various negative views, even prejudices, about the immigrants came out in the interviews as well. There were complaints that the immigrants extended their summer holidays by taking sick leave and then produced 'bought' doctor's certificates, that they left their children with child-minders and at day-care even when the children had a temperature since they wanted to earn as much as possible and that they then had to rush off from the factory when the child-minder or day-care called, and so on.

The immigrant workers were ironically both visible and invisible, both of which worked against their chances of keeping their jobs. They were visible as a *group* and thereby attributed certain negative features as individuals that were assumed to characterise certain immigrants as a whole. On the other hand, they were invisible as *individuals*. From the interviews with both the personnel manager and the chairman of the trade union works committee, it was apparent that they knew few of the immigrant women personally.¹⁵

Since every individual was discussed during the negotiations, lack of acquaintance with the individual may well have been the deciding factor – this was true for the Swedish women as well, but especially, we believe, for the immigrant women. To quote the chairman of the trade union works committee

The most difficult thing that I experienced in connection with the redundancies was that not everyone on the union committee knew all the members, where they worked in the company and who they were. For example, they could sit there and discuss Kristina Petersson, and yet not everyone in the committee knew who she was, where she worked, etc. Some of them hadn't had any contact with the person you were talking about. At the same time, you didn't know enough about her so that you could go in and fight for the girl, so that she could keep her job

Some concluding remarks

In addition to the 'older workers', forty workers were chosen for dismissal. Of these, 85 per cent were women, 70 per cent immigrants and 75 per cent were born between 1945 and 1959. We have tried to show above that the work organisation coupled in particular with the changes that were implemented at the factory during the last years elicited new divisions among the workers and enhanced old ones. Divisions that separated pool workers from non-pool workers, Swedes from immigrants, new workers from old, skilled workers from non-skilled and men from women. These divisions and resulting conditions lay behind the complicated web of principles that were used and which led to the dismissal of a rather homogeneous group of younger, unskilled workers. Nearly all were women, they were in childbearing and childrearing years (and most of these with younger children), and mainly immigrants. They had joined the factory work-force during the mid and late seventies. These divisions also prevented any resistance against the redundancies. With a divided work-force, collective action was difficult. Furthermore, the union's defensive stand in the matter counteracted such an action. Had more of the union's male members been affected, would the union have braced its muscles?¹⁶

II Unemployment and movement in the labour market

In our study, not only did we examine the processes leading up to redundancy and its implementation but we also followed closely for a period of nearly three years the family and work histories of a number of women workers who lost their jobs.¹⁷ Following these women's lives was part of a larger study we carried out on women and unemployment where a greater number of women's unemployment careers were documented. In our larger study – as was borne out in the sub-group of factory women – we found that the majority of women were unsuccessful in refinding *permanent employment*. This did not mean however that they were unemployed for the period of three years, rather redundancy/unemployment was followed by a complex patchwork of short periods of temporary work, relief work, labour market training programmes, intermittent unemployment and so on. A few eventually left the labour market altogether.¹⁸

Recent analysis of the results from the Swedish STOP project

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(Gonäs, 1988) suggests that this pattern, or 'permanent temporariness' as Gonäs calls it, is more characteristic of women's unemployment lives than men's. The 'unemployment careers' of 3,375 individuals made redundant from seventeen firms, which either closed down or laid off a number of workers, were studied. Gonäs found that men more quickly and in larger numbers found their way back to permanent work.

In making more explicit this complex patchwork following redundancy, we provide below a theoretical discussion on the relation between employment and unemployment. Following this, we show, with the help of the experience of one of the women made redundant, the importance of gender and ethnicity in analysing women's position in a segmented labour market.

Toward a reconceptualisation of employment/unemployment

Despite the fact that many Western social scientists have in recent years remarked upon the way in which employment/unemployment patterns are changing, many studies on redundancies (as well as the general debate in the media) have tended to look at unemployment *vis-à-vis* employment.¹⁹ Put in another way, a simple dichotomy is presented where individuals are seen as either being in work or out of work. In addition to this dichotomous way of thinking, the content and type of employment (i.e. type of contract, full-time/part-time) are not problematised. In many studies of shut-downs and redundancies, individuals are asked after a period of time whether they have re-found employment or not, but it is not specified if the work that has been found is temporary in nature or otherwise, or whether it is the number of hours they want. Such studies cover up how widespread less permanent types of employment, as well as part-time employment, may be.²⁰ But more importantly, by not problematising the nature of employment, the studies miss a possible *movement*²¹ in the labour market that may follow redundancy and that if work is temporary or unsuitable in other terms, then renewed unemployment is likely to ensue.

Furthermore, 'unemployment' is often seen as an absolute category. If an individual does not have work, it is assumed that she/he is enrolled at the labour exchange and collecting unemployment benefit. The categories of employment and unemployment then, are used as limited concepts and their array of meaning and content is not explored.

Another problem is that a *static* analysis is frequently given, even if a study is longitudinal in nature. Individuals are reported as being 'employed' or 'unemployed' or in an 'other' category at different points in time over time. But the individuals are, so to say, locked in the categories. The processes lying behind this movement between different categories and an eventual position in the labour market are left aside.

The categories of employment and unemployment may have fitted earlier (for example in the classic Marienthal study) when the industrialized countries had not become welfare states, but they are problematic today when we have an extensive insurance system, state intervention in the labour market and a flora of different types of employment contracts and forms of employment.

In Sweden, for example, to prevent an increase in registered unemployment, labour market policy programmes were expanded during the late 1970s/early 1980s. While unemployment levels rose during this period, they remained at a relatively low level compared to other Western industrialized nations like Britain.²² During the same period, adults in government sponsored programmes of relief work, temporary jobs and vocational training more than doubled and more than equalled official statistics of unemployment.²³ Thus while one can conclude that these policies have been successful in keeping their promise of 'activating the working population', one side-effect would appear to be that they may have furthered an increase in more insecure, short-term employment and movement in the labour market.

In addition to policies that are aimed at bringing down unemployment levels, there are a number of other labour and family policies that affect participation in the workforce and which are of relevance to the discussion here. Liberal policies in Sweden allow the individual various leaves of absence from one's *permanent* job. This includes parental leave for up to one and a half years after child birth, study leave for longer periods of time, leave to take another job (which is better but only a temporary position – allowing one thus to keep and to return to one's permanent old position if need be). Furthermore, parents with children under eight years of age are entitled to go down to six hours from their full-time position (and to be able to return to full-time when desired). These leaves create job vacancies but only those which are obviously temporary in nature. Thus this liberal legislation creates better working conditions for those who belong to the 'core workforce' but also provides the soil for an elaborate system of

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temporary work for more marginal workers – from which at the present time it is difficult to extricate oneself.

Other labour legislation has also affected this question of temporary jobs. The Swedish Employment Protection Acts (1974, 1982) have ensured that workers who have a firm footing in the labour market cannot be easily manoeuvred out. Inadvertently, this act has probably meant, by contrast, that those who have a more marginal position in the labour market (such as women, immigrants, youth, handicapped) are prevented from joining the labour market on equal terms. Since it is difficult to fire an employee who has been employed for more than twelve months, employers have become more careful about whom they hire. Employment for a trial period is frequently used and when hiring a new worker, temporary employment has become, it would appear, common practice. Ann Henning (1984) has shown that almost half (48%) – and in some industries even more – of vacant jobs which are required by law to be reported to the National Labour Market Board were in the year 1979 temporary vacancies.²⁴


All of this makes problematic a traditional, dichotomous way of looking at unemployment and employment and suggests the need for a broader perspective where a larger role is given to non-permanent employment when the effects of structural change on individual workers is discussed. Figure 1 presented below is a step in the direction of such a reconceptualisation of the labour market where non-permanent employment, government programmes, etc are given a place together with full-time permanent employment and unemployment.

Interpreting the diagram

In between permanent employment²⁵ and 'absolute unemployment' is a diffuse and large area which we have named the 'grey area'. The line dividing permanent employment from the grey area and unemployment is presented (Fig. 1) as a thick, unbroken line, which represents the area of permanent employment as being distinctly separate and difficult to enter. The line between the grey area and absolute unemployment is, on the other hand, thin and broken, showing that the two areas tend to merge into each other and that individuals easily 'wander' between the two.

On losing employment, individuals move over time from 'absolute unemployment' – defined as being registered at the employment exchange and collecting unemployment benefit²⁶ – to

Figure 1: The 'grey area' in relation to 'absolute unemployment' and permanent employment



Note Arrows refer to movement between the 'grey area' and 'absolute unemployment' and within the 'grey area'
* refers to periods when unemployed or holding temporary work (but not permanent work)

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a position in the 'grey area'. They may then move to another position in the 'grey area' or back to 'absolute unemployment'. If they are fortunate, they may leap across the barrier into the realm of permanent work.

In the upper part of the 'grey area', we have presented various forms of temporary employment. Those which are closer to permanent work and which carry with them somewhat more security and benefits are placed to the left side and near the area of 'permanent employment'. Those which are for very short periods of time and are most likely to resort in renewed unemployment, or which are coupled with unemployment (such as odd hours here and there) are placed on the right. Working part-time (permanently) but wanting full-time (i.e. partial unemployment) is placed in the centre.

In the lower part of the 'grey area', we have presented various 'states' (such as parental leave, training) which relieve an individual, who does not have permanent work, *temporarily* from having to seek employment or to return to temporary employment. An individual may be in one of these states while being concurrently unemployed. Thus one can be in two categories at the same time.

In the category 'outside the labour market', an individual is either permanently relieved from having to seek employment or is not anchored in any of the insurance benefit schemes – which are in turn related to labour market participation. It also includes the 'informal economy', such as 'working on the side', 'self-provisioning', work done for others that is not paid, and 'scavenging' (Wallace and Pahl, 1986). Of course it is possible to be both in permanent employment and the informal economy or in the 'grey area' and the informal economy at the same time.

On becoming unemployed, an individual may not in fact start off as 'absolute unemployed' but rather in the grey area. For example, of the factory women made redundant many were not 'absolutely unemployed' on the first day after finishing at the factory. Some were on sick-leave prior to redundancy and this 'state' continued for a period after they were laid off. On their 'first unemployment day' then, they collected sickness benefit rather than unemployment benefit. Some were on study leave²⁷ at the time of the redundancies and were living on study grants. They became registered as unemployed temporarily during the course holidays and on completing their education. One woman was, for example, eight months pregnant and was collecting pregnancy

leave money²⁸ on her 'first day of unemployment'. Furthermore, another woman who was 'absolutely unemployed' had not been at the factory for a year and a half prior to the redundancies. She had been on parental leave and should have returned before the lay-offs. However, difficulties in obtaining local government child-care had delayed her return – by which time the redundancies had been implemented. We see then, how reality clashes with the picture we may have in our minds of a group of workers being at work on one day – to be at the labour exchange the next. On another level though, all the women described above were unemployed as they had lost their *permanent* jobs at the factory.

The point we have been making above is then, that the unemployment process is particularly complex and that the 'real' dividing line is between permanent employment on the one hand and a variety of other conditions and 'states' on the other. Furthermore, we suggest that being excluded from obtaining permanent employment is a particular problem for women and immigrants (and of course other weak groups such as the young, old and disabled).

Gender, class and ethnicity in a changing labour market

Below we will illustrate the *movement* we are emphasising by taking the case of one of the women made redundant from the food-processing factory. To begin with a very brief outline of her working and family life and 'unemployment career' will be given before relations of gender and ethnicity are discussed.

Nevia moved to Sweden from southern Europe with her family when she was ten. She left school before the official leaving age and at fifteen she started work in a clothing factory. A few years later, the factory shut down and she became unemployed. Shortly afterwards she gave birth to her first child. After a year's parental leave she started looking for work. This was in 1978 and she had no difficulty finding work. While several factory jobs were available, she chose to start at the food processing factory, since it allowed her to work evenings and this solved her child-care problems. She was in her early twenties when she was laid off from the food processing factory.

Following redundancy from the food processing factory Nevia spent the first months going to the employment exchange and unsuccessfully looking for work. After nearly half a year's unemployment she was re-employed – but now on a temporary

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basis – at the food processing factory (from which she had earlier been laid off). The company needed temporary workers since the installation of some new machinery had been delayed. Prior to being offered temporary work there she had become pregnant and at the end of a three month working period she was not offered new work. This contrasted with the situation for other workers taken on at the same time as she was who were subsequently offered different temporary jobs over a long period of time.²⁹ Nevia returned to 'absolute unemployment' until her second child was born and she took parental leave.³⁰

Towards the end of her parental leave and with the threat of renewed unemployment on the horizon, Nevia contacted a number of clothing factories but was unsuccessful in finding a job. A renewed search for work during a short period of unemployment landed a *temporary* job. This job was made possible within a labour market scheme set up to help the unemployed find employment. For a period of time (six months) a large part of her wage would be paid by the labour market authorities. (After this period it was hoped that she would be employed on a regular basis.) Her basic hourly wage at the clothing factory was lower than at the food processing factory, which was to affect the level of her unemployment benefit later.

At first the job went well, indeed Nevia had remarked on several occasions her wish to work in a clothing factory again (she had much preferred her first job to the job at the food processing factory). But after a while she was given 'ticking offs' about her work, being told that it was not up to standard. After further 'warnings' she was psychologically unable to continue working, she didn't manage to sew anything at all.

We wondered why this job was difficult since she had sewing experience


Earlier when I sewed, I only did one little detail and did several hundreds, maybe thousands. It was just the pocket. I didn't do any seams. But here it was seams and the work had to be *perfect*. Just half a centimetre out and that wasn't OK. All the seams had to fit, both sides had to be equally long. That's very difficult and no markings on the whole garment. You have to have a good eye and have technical know-how in sewing. But you can't get that in six months. One of the other women told me not to give it a damn. She said it's piece-work and piece-work can't look better and that the company should think about

that before they put pressure on the workers to do so and so many And it was terribly badly paid. It was set low for everyone so that you had to get your rate up. And everywhere else they get far more money.

Nevia asked to be given another job at the factory but management answered that there were no openings. She therefore felt forced to leave the job. Nevia thus returned to the employment exchange and 'absolute unemployment' ³¹ At the end of our study she was contemplating becoming a child minder but had not as yet contacted the local authorities about possible employment.

Thus during the three years, Nevia moved back and forward between 'absolute unemployment' and the 'grey area'. It can be concisely illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 2: *Nevia's movement in the labour market following redundancy*



Nevia's experience is in part pivoted upon the way in which gender, class and ethnicity have influenced her past choices in terms of education, training and jobs. As is well documented, in the sex segregated labour market women are pushed into a small number of crowded occupations. Not surprisingly, Nevia chose both the clothing industry and the food processing industry where unskilled female labour is heavily depended upon but where economic restructuring has unfortunately left its mark. Loss of her first job was due to the nigh eradication of the textile and clothing industry in Sweden due to structural change. Loss of her job at the food processing factory was also due to the effects of structural

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change but that just *she* was selected for redundancy was dependent on a complicated web of reasons.

She had been amongst the last employed. But she also mentioned that she had been on sick leave both for herself and for her child – not that it had been particularly high – but she felt it was a contributory factor. And lastly she was an immigrant. After working for a while at the factory, she had asked to change work duties, feeling unaccepted and 'mobbed' by the other workers on the line (cf. Cavendish, 1982). She asked to be transferred to the cleaning section when an opening came up where she could work alongside other women from her home country. While she was pleased with this move, it also ensured her 'invisibility' in an immigrant group. When the redundancies were enforced, her cleaning job was not rationalised away but she was replaced by a Swedish woman who had been at the factory for a shorter period than she had but whose 'contact with all the foremen was very good and they saw to it that she stayed', as she put it.

In her movement in the labour market later, we see again how gender and ethnicity were crucial. The food processing factory's need for flexible labour power meant that she was rehired again on a temporary basis but her pregnancy ensured that she was undesirable labour power in the long run. The clothing factory later was willing to hire her temporarily thanks to a government scheme. This scheme provided the company in effect with a cheap, flexible and easily disposable labour power. The firm was not however prepared to offer working conditions that Nevja deemed suitable.

In the periods of 'absolute unemployment', considerable effort was made by Nevja to find work. Two factors made her unattractive labour power at a time when employers were more 'choosy' about whom they employed. On the one hand, she had two young children now. Liberal legislation as regards care of sick children makes employees wary of employing women from this group. On the other hand, she – as well as other women in our study – gave several examples where employers had made it clear that they were uninterested in employing immigrants. A quotation from the personnel manager at the food processing factory, who was re-interviewed three years after the redundancies and just after they had done extensive re-hiring, will illustrate this particular company's view of the matter:

of those applicants I give a job to, I make the demand that they can speak and make themselves understood in Swedish

relatively well . . . for their own sakes. Otherwise, they only get giped or are called things. Those who we've taken on now fit in perfectly in the work-groups, and not just here, but in Sweden as a whole. They've adapted themselves to the Swedish culture.

The first requirement that a worker should speak Swedish relatively well is perhaps justified, although it is interesting if one puts it in a historical perspective and notes that this was unimportant in the seventies when there was a shortage of labour. The conclusion seems to be justified that such language requirement is used in the present economic setting to keep out certain workers. The second requirement is more subtle. It is not language *per se* but the acceptance of certain cultural values that influences one's chance of finding work. To be hired, a worker has to fit the expectations of other, namely Swedish, workers, and accept Swedish culture.

While Nevia's experience of unemployment and moving in the 'grey area' is of course specific to her situation, the pattern that emerged with its underlying causes were to be found again among other working class women in our study on women and unemployment. For all the women made redundant from the factory, low level of education and formal training, lack of language sufficiency for some of the immigrant women, and a continued looking for work in a very limited area of the labour market made it difficult to find work. The type of jobs they had held during the 1970s were no longer available in the early 1980s. Traditional working class jobs in manufacturing industry were disappearing in the local labour market at the same time that few jobs were opening up in the care sector during the years 1982-4. The jobs offered were often not permanent or did not provide the sufficient number of hours required. During this same period the number of people looking for work within traditional women's jobs rose drastically. Similar developments characterised the national labour market. In this type of labour market minority/immigrant women experienced in particular difficulties in finding work. In 1982 for example, unemployment levels amongst this group of women were more than two and a half times as high as that of Swedish women in the county where we carried out our study. Finally, what is especially interesting to note is how making use of a well-intentioned and comprehensive legislation designed to help families (such as long parental leave, leave to look after sick children, working a six hour day if you have small children) in fact jeopardizes women's

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position in the labour market and contributes to their belonging to groups in the labour market's periphery.

General discussion and implications

We have discussed here job loss for a particular group of factory workers and their subsequent movement in the grey area (and between unemployment and the grey area) of the Swedish labour market.

While we have looked at redundancy and labour market movement in a country where its welfare legislation has played an important role in the specific content of what we have been arguing, there are a number of current trends visible in Sweden, but also in other Western countries, which would suggest that the 'grey area' is likely to expand in the future and which has particular implications for those workers (such as women and immigrants) who are found in the secondary sector of the segmented labour market. We will briefly remark upon some of these in what follows.

We have earlier emphasised the question of temporary work – both in terms of 'ordinary' jobs and government created schemes. Its prevalence is not restricted to Sweden. A study from Sussex University (*Temporary Work in Britain*, 1985) suggests that temporary work is on the increase, especially in such jobs as catering, cleaning, manual occupations and office work, the types of jobs that are most frequently filled by women. Traditionally, temporary workers have been used to cover holidays, sickness and seasonal occupations but it would appear that their use is expanding in order to decrease employers' costs and help provide them with increased flexibility. Above we mentioned that a few of the women made redundant in the early part of 1982 were re-employed again later during the same year. Whereas they had been permanently employed before, they were now employed on a temporary basis. A few of them continued to work on a temporary basis in the years that followed. A year and half later after the cutbacks were implemented, the factory was in further need of new workers. This time a large group of workers were employed, all on a temporary basis.³²

Another change in the labour market is a move toward 'privatisation' – work that earlier belonged to the public or state sector is sub-contracted out to private firms. A well-known attempt at privatisation in Britain is the NHS's putting of hospital

cleaning, catering and laundry services out to tender. (See Coyle, 1985) The reasons for such trends as privatisation is linked to the ability of small specialist groups in the service sector to 'run themselves more tightly', as Colin Gill (1988) has pointed out. 'Unlike the manufacturing sector, economies of scale in services peter out very quickly because the bureaucratic burden becomes too great too soon' (Gill, 1988, p. 7) While privatisation may not necessarily result in 'movement' in the labour market as we have defined it, it opens up questions about one's position in the labour market. A recent example in Sweden is the civil aviation authority's suggestion to let their cleaning be taken over by a private firm. If the suggestion had been implemented, then both pay and working conditions for the women workers would have deteriorated and the women would have lost many of the benefits associated with being a state employee.

A further international trend, linked to the above, is the 'casualisation' of labour. With this is meant making certain types of labour casual so that they lose a moderate degree of security in income and employment. This may involve sub-contracting out as in the examples above but it takes place in the private sector as well as in the public. Deborah Bernstein (1986) has looked at the transition to sub-contracting in the case of cleaning work as it took place in Israel. For employers, it cut costs and was a way to find new sources of labour. For the women, it meant intensification of labour and affected their wages and benefits.

Lastly, another trend we wish to comment upon is the professionalisation of jobs and occupations. While there has been considerable debate over the questions of reskilling and deskilling, little attention has been paid to women's 'ordinary jobs'. One example will be given to illustrate what we mean from the care sector in Sweden. The job of 'nursing auxiliary' is about to disappear and the lowest position in the hospital hierarchy will be that of staff nurse (*underskoterska*). This latter profession requires a two year training while the former position required only a twenty week course and often jobs could be found in this field without any training at all. This development has important implications for the types of workers who we have been describing in this paper, i.e. those who are low educated and looking for unskilled work. In our study we found considerable resistance among the women interviewed towards education and training especially if it was long-term. Thus while these auxiliary jobs in the care sector earlier absorbed some of the women made redundant

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from the manufacturing industry, changing the educational demands for these jobs will in effect exclude certain workers and reduce their choice of work areas – which is already limited by the sex segregated labour market.

It is questionable then, whether factory women made redundant in the present day can find a permanent footing in the labour market in the future. If the trend is to a growth in temporary work, coupled with increased professionalisation, it is reasonable to assume that women – like the ones reported in this paper – who have little formal education and vocational training will continue to move within and between the 'grey area' and unemployment in tomorrow's labour market. It is also reasonable to assume that similar patterns of movement will apply to other groups with a more marginal position in the labour market.

Some concluding remarks

Our discussion and analysis in this paper augment, we feel, dual labour market theories. These theories – applicable not only to the US but also to European countries (see for example Gill 1988) – contain a number of shortcomings in that they tend to insufficiently differentiate workers in the secondary sector of the labour market. Women, in particular, are grouped together as if they form a homogeneous mass (see Beechey, 1978, and Dex, 1985, for a critique.) In this paper we have tried, however, to explicate one of these groups in the periphery. But we have also shown how present patterns of segmentation are taking form. This has been possible by our emphasis on 'movement' and by an approach which is methodologically dynamic.

The paper has also emphasized the many forms of employment prevalent today, thus exemplifying that permanent full-time employment 'can no longer be seen as a universal human experience' (Purcell, 1985: 153). Since welfare state benefits are closely tied to permanent, full-time employment, those workers who do not have access to this type of employment cannot enjoy many rights and privileges. Thus we suggest that it is time to remove 'permanent full-time employment' from its pedestal and no longer use it as the norm against which all sections of the population are judged.

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Notes

- 1 See for example, Edwards *et al* (1975), Gordon *et al* (1982), Piore (1975)
- 2 This assumption suggests that the rule of 'last in - first out' will be by-passed if possible. This was in fact the case at the factory in question as we shall see
- 3 See for example D. Massey and R. Meegan (1982) for a further discussion of how groups of workers are affected differently due to different types of structural changes. We are not arguing then that it may always be women who are most seriously hit. In Gunilla Furst's study (1985) it is apparent why the women kept their jobs but why certain groups of men were made redundant when new production technology was introduced
- 4 The firm asked those workers who were over 58 years and 3 months of age if they would voluntarily leave the factory. They would register as seeking work for 450 days (although they were given to understand that work would not be offered) after which they would be granted early retirement on labour market grounds. They were also offered severance pay. This has been called 'black' early retirement and has been used more and more in the last few years in Sweden as a way of coping with the need to cut back staff. It has also been criticised as a misuse of the law. While this group is of interest to discuss in itself, we have decided to place emphasis in this paper on those workers who were forced to look for new work following redundancy. For a further discussion of the older workers see Davies and Esseveld (1988) and Salomonsson (1983)
- 5 Callender's article was only read by us when revising this paper. Any similarity over the presentation of the redundancy process is thus coincidental
- 6 This research was based on a number of visits to the factory as well as interviews with union representatives, personnel managers, unemployment officers and most importantly the workers themselves (thirty-five in-depth interviews in all). In addition, Karin Widerberg and her co-workers (see Calleman *et al*, 1984) carried out a qualitative study about family insurance at the same factory before and during the period when the decisions about the redundancies were being made. We are very grateful to Karin Widerberg, Catharina Calleman, Lena

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Lagercrantz and Ann Petersson for making their material available to us. A more thorough discussion of many of the issues raised in this paper (in both section 1 and section 2) is to be found in our book *Att hoppa hage i den svenska arbetsmarknaden. En studie av arbetslösa fabrikskvinnor*, (Playing Hopscotch in the Swedish Labour Market. A Study of Unemployed Factory Women), Stockholm, Rabén & Sjögren, 1988.

- 7 See for example Pollert (1982), Cavendish (1982), *Rapport om jämställdhet i sju livsmedelsföretag* (1981), Westwood (1984).
- 8 The women workers themselves felt that it took considerable effort to learn to work at a new machine. This wasn't as much due to the type of work itself, but more to the speed at which the work was carried out and the expectations to try and find the level at which the others worked. An obvious bias in what is considered skilled versus non-skilled work became apparent in the women's descriptions as well. Workers were placed in higher pay grades partly on the basis of the strength required to do the job. Continuous strenuous movements which were required for some of the 'women's jobs' were not included here. For a further discussion see Davies and Esseveld (1988), as well as Phillips and Taylor (1980), Pollert (1981), Baude (1985).
- 9 A few of the workers worked part-time during the day (such as women with small children who were allowed by Swedish law to work a 6 hour day) but a decision to work part-time during the day nearly always affected the worker's work conditions as it was felt that part-time work in the day time upset the normal work routine which was based on a nine hour work day. These workers lost their 'own' machines and often had to work wherever extra labour power was needed.
- 10 See for example Lazarus (1971) for a discussion of the relation between loss of social support in the workplace and heightened stress.
- 11 Our discussion differs from Angelow's (1988) of the situation at the Swedish Öresund shipyard during the period before the decision about closure was made. We mainly attribute this difference to the fact that at the ship-yard *all* workers were to be made redundant whereas in 'our' factory only a quarter of the workforce was laid off.
- 12 Parental leave entitles leave of up to one and a half years. During the first six months one receives approximately 90 per cent of one's prior income. A further six months can be taken out following these first six months or up to the child's eighth birthday. Full benefit (see above) is paid for the first three months and a 'basic sum' for the other three months (37 S Kr per day at the time of our study). Of the one and a half years then, no benefit can be paid out during the last six months. Either parent may make use of this leave, (although both cannot do so at the same time) but few men utilise their right – at least for longer periods. Since men generally earn more, loss of income is greater when they take leave since the benefit is individually tied.
- 13 It is important to point out here that many of the workers in this category, who had been with the firm for a very long time, were long-term sick as a result of occupational injuries and damage to their health brought about by their work duties at the factory and in earlier jobs.
- 14 While Swedish law addresses the parent and not the mother, we refer here to values and practices about differentiated gender roles shared in the working class.
- 15 These women were even less visible for another reason having to do with the

way relations between men and women are established at the workplace. Some of the women interviewed indicated that Swedish women kept their jobs or got their jobs back because of 'good contacts'. A number of studies have shown that sexual attraction and games play an important part in male/female interaction at the workplace (See for example, Enarsson, 1983, Pollert, 1982). Foremen, managers and union officials were almost exclusively Swedish men. Joking with a foreman or establishing a relationship that has a – often not discussed – sexual undertone, would be much less allowable for women of the Islamic religion. In fact, some of these women indicated the need to speak to a foreman only in the company of another woman.

- 16 Ressler (1985) and Pollert (1981) suggest that a lack of 'open' protest in general can be attributed to women workers' low status. In their view it is unusual for those at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy to actively protest, instead they form more passive cultures of resistance. Women and immigrants were little involved in union politics at this factory and thus scarcely influenced the questions that the union took up or influenced the way it worked. Equally, the male permeated union showed little interest in women's issues which might have enticed the women to greater participation.
- 17 Thirteen women (eight younger and five older) were interviewed intensively on a number of occasions about their experience of unemployment. More superficial contact and information with a much larger number was in addition gained from telephone calls and visits to the factory. As we point out in the text shortly, these thirteen women were part of a larger study where we followed the 'unemployment careers' of 45 women who had worked in different types of jobs earlier (and not just in manufacturing industry). The empirical data was collected 1981–4.
- 18 Of the 45, 6 found permanent work, 7 moved outside the labour market. The rest moved between absolute unemployment and what we call the 'grey area'. See below.
- 19 This is true of earlier studies – from the thirties onwards – which looked at the individual consequences of unemployment. These studies, with their conceptual apparatus, have influenced more recent work. While in Britain attempts have been made to rethink the relations of employment-unemployment, most recent studies in Sweden appear to be guilty of the criticisms we give below. The use of a qualitative method, which made it possible for us to chart the women's lives in minute detail, was fundamental in allowing us to question categories prevalently used and to construct our conceptual diagram. It is unlikely that this could have been achieved with large scale, quantitative studies. For a further discussion of our qualitative method, see Davies and Esseveld, 1987.
- 20 For a recent example, see Angelow (1988).
- 21 Piore (1975) makes a distinction between upper and subordinate jobs in the primary sector. The former category is characterised by higher mobility and turnover patterns than the latter. This mobility, which is positive and linked to good working conditions and higher wages, should not be confused with the *movement* that we are talking about in relation to these working class women. Here the movement is for the most part negative and may result in further or eventual marginalisation.
- 22 Unemployment rates in Sweden were, for example, 3.5 per cent of the total workforce in 1983. For the whole of the seventies and eighties, however, official unemployment rates have been higher for women than men. For an overview of

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unemployment rates in Sweden and a discussion of problems with official figures, see (Davies and Easveld, 1982)

- 23 In 1983, 3.8 per cent of the labour force were enrolled in labour market policy programs (0.9 per cent in labour market training programs, 1.3 per cent in relief work and 1.6 per cent in programs for the disabled). See Jungenas (1985)
- 24 These figures are deflated. As Ann Henning writes 'A number of circumstances indicate that the proportions of temporary employment in the job supply is in fact higher still. Implications to that effect can be seen in the following factors: employment with a maximum duration of ten days is not included in the material, employment for a trial period is submerged in the 'permanent positions' category, rolling employment for a certain period is not included, and the cultural-worker and teacher groups are only scantily represented. Nor do temporary relief jobs and other types of practical training schemes arranged in cooperation with labour market authorities form part of the investigation material' (Henning, 1984, p. 547)
- 25 Permanent employment (*tillsvidareanställning*) is associated with elaborate employment protection devices. 'The employer must possess a just cause for giving an employee notice. The Labour Court may determine whether a just cause has been presented, if the parties disagree, the employment lasts while the matter is in dispute. The employment does not cease until after the expiration of a certain period of notice, lasting from one to six months. During this period, the employee is guaranteed a full salary. If shortage of work is the reason for the dismissal, the employer is obliged to observe certain priority rights when giving notice to his/her employees, and they leave with a right to re-employment' (Henning, 1984, pp. 534-5)
- 26 To be entitled to unemployment benefit in Sweden, you have to belong to an unemployment fund, each union operating its own fund. Furthermore you have to have been a member for at least 12 months before becoming unemployed and to have worked at least five of the last 12 months prior to unemployment. Two of these five months may be substituted by military service, government training course or parental leave. Benefit is paid out for at the most five days a week for a total of 300 days, 450 days if you are over 55. Benefit is approx. 90 per cent of one's earlier earnings (but with a ceiling of 300 S Kr at the time of our study). One has to be enrolled at the labour exchange as looking for work to be entitled to benefit.

In addition to the 'regular unemployment benefit', there is 'labour market support' (KAS) which is paid out to those who are not members of a union unemployment fund or who have been members too short a period. To be entitled to KAS, one has to have worked for five of the last 12 months before becoming unemployed. KAS is lower than unemployment benefit (500 S Kr per week at the time of our study was the ceiling). It is paid out for 150 days, 300 days for those over 55 and 450 days for those over 60.

Union membership in Sweden is particularly high compared with other countries. In December 1986, 86 per cent of the workforce were union members.

Spouses or other family members having work, or not, does not affect unemployment benefit or KAS. This would however be the case when on social welfare. Cf. McKee and Bell (1985)

- 27 These women were studying full-time at an adult education centre to complete their lower secondary school education and then their upper secondary school

education. They were legally entitled to be absent from their jobs for these studies and had the right to return to these jobs later on after the completion of their studies

- 28 If a woman has a heavy job and cannot be given lighter duties she is entitled to pregnancy leave with pay (*havandeskapspenning*) for a certain period before the expected birth
- 29 For example, Marica, another woman who had also been made redundant from the factory earlier, continued to work there on a temporary basis, accepting whatever work came up for a period of approximately two years. This meant that she was ensured work only for shorter periods of time, e.g. two or three months at a time and that during these two years, she constantly switched jobs. She switched between day-times and evenings, between working in the factory itself and the warehouse on the edge of the town, between working full-time and part-time, between working on the line and doing cleaning. In other words, she showed a tremendous amount of flexibility and accommodation during this period in the hope of acquiring renewed work
- 30 It is interesting to note that it is called *parental leave*, regardless of one's situation, i.e. what is one on leave from? In this case it was leave from unemployment and thus it becomes clear how wage labour is the defining parameter. All individuals in Sweden are covered by social insurance included under which are sickness benefit and parental benefit. These benefits are based on one's income and provide approx. 90 per cent of lost income. Parental benefit during the first nine months is the same as sickness benefit. The benefits are paid out by the state and although based on income from current or last gainful employment, they are not tied to *specific jobs*. This means that while unemployed and collecting unemployment benefit (also based on income earned during last working year) one is entitled to sickness or parental benefit. When unemployment benefit runs out, you are however no longer entitled to sickness or parental benefit. (A small sum may be claimed per day, but its size is negligible.) For more information about unemployment benefit, see note 26
- 31 As Nevja was now unemployed of 'her own free will', she was not entitled to unemployment benefit for the first 4 weeks
- 32 It is interesting to note that redundancies earlier and the re-employing of mainly new workers later on a temporary basis provided the company with 1) a flexible workforce, 2) a workforce of what the company saw as 'good' workers

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Marriage and the housing careers of naval wives

Joan Chandler

Abstract

The analysis of female biography is problematic, straddling as it does the public world of work and the private domain of home. In recent years the development of life course analysis has encouraged a greater awareness of the variability and complexity of most women's lives. Within this context discussions of the home have centred on domestic relationships, on marriage and parenting. Less discussed have been the implications of tenure and accommodation for domestic responsibility and domestic labour. The home is an arena for family life. Housing is the basis of home-making and many of the responsibilities of housework and maintenance devolve on women as home-makers. The inter-relationship between housing and the domestic relationships of women was explored in a research project concerned with the wives of Royal Navy personnel. The marriage patterns and housing careers of these women revealed a biographical pattern that was distinctive and largely uniform. This pattern was the product of an occupationally-related structure of housing options and the wider pressures towards home-ownership. This pattern shaped the domestic responsibilities of the naval wives and their relationships with husbands and children and had implications for their patterns of employment and family formation.

Cycles, courses and housing careers

Classically the processes of ageing and familial change have been explored through the concept of the family life cycle, a sequence of stages through which each individual typically passed (Duvall, 1977). These stages were built around what were considered the main 'tasks' of family life, of getting married, having children, of bringing those children up and launching them into the wider

community. The stages were child-centred and not well-suited to discussions where other aspects of family life, such as marriage or people's relationship to their homes, were the point of study. It was a model for everyone, but had particularly familistic implications for the lives of women and made normative assumptions about 'typical' biographies and 'typical' families (Nock, 1979; Murphy and Sullivan, 1986). The life cycle approach was also ahistorical and deterministic; individuals were caught in a fixed cycle of procreation which appeared devoid of human volition or decision-making. It offered a natural history view of humanity and had developed a matching vocabulary, based on an avian metaphor; newly married and older couples occupied 'unused' and 'empty nests', from which fledging children had flown or been launched, the new category of the 'crowded nest' has latterly emerged with the domestic pressures of youth unemployment. As it was devoid of decision-making, it was also devoid of social setting and the influence of non-familial factors.

In recent sociological analysis the framework of life cycle categories has given way in popularity to life course analysis (Elder, 1978; Hareven 1982; Cohen, 1987). Here biographies appear more dynamic and diverse. The new emphasis is on the plurality of pathways in peoples' lives, the variable timings of transitions and 'more flexible biographical patterns within a continually changing social system' (Cohen, 1987: 1). Within the life course perspective it is possible to draw out the differing threads of individual lives and examine the ways in which these threads combine. It is also a more satisfactory approach for researchers who wish to retain the intersubjectivity of their data; life course information is more easily built around the views and preoccupations of the individuals researched and grounded in the narrative of life history accounts (Bertaux, 1981). As such, categories which derive from life course analysis seem more emergent and less imposed upon biographical data and whilst this is a great analytic advantage, it also has the weakness of portraying individuals as masters and mistresses of their own destinies.

As the cycle is the metaphor of familistic models, the journey is the metaphor of the life course, a journey 'punctuated by stages, with boarding and embarkation points' (Cohen, 1987: 3). As the life course is more preoccupied with the individual it is also more voluntaristic in theoretical leaning. As individuals age within historical context, the pathways of their lives may appear idiosyncratic and the extent to which people are navigating their

journeys may be exaggerated. Life course analysis also captures the tenor of the times, being evocative of a greater uncertainty and insecurity as well as flexibility in individual lives.

However, the feminist perspective contains a curb on the voluntarism of life cycle models. In its development, it has emphasised the timeless qualities of being a woman, wife, mother and the unchanging nature of patriarchy and domestic labour in female biography (Oakley, 1982). It has explored the ways in which married women arrange their lives around those of their husbands' job (Finch, 1983, Callan and Ardener, 1984). Marriage and gender limit the choices and direct the options for women. Within this frame, housing is a vital social setting and the acquisition of a home, be this rented or purchased, constitutes a significant transition in women's lives. Wallace has described how women postpone marriage, but not necessarily cohabitation or motherhood, until they can have 'a real wedding and the accoutrements of a real home – and perhaps their own house' (1987: 120), and these are tied to the regular employment of their partners. Becoming a home-maker is a vital transition for women on their route to adult status. However, for many women the shape and nature of this route is tied to their husband's job and bounded by the wider ideology of a proper family home and desirable housing. These factors limit ostensible decision-making by women as they journey on their housing careers; it shapes their domestic lives and influences other decisions.

The influence of housing factors on age at marriage and patterns of child-bearing have been noted elsewhere (Ineichen, 1979; Madge and Brown, 1981; Murphy and Sullivan, 1987). The housing circumstances of naval wives are relevant to this debate, being deeply influential on the fabric of their domestic lives and intertwined both with their fertility and their employment prospects. The centrality of housing in the biographies of naval wives relates to a number of factors: their access to both service accommodation and private housing is closely connected to their husbands' careers; extensive and regular husband absence increases their domestic responsibilities; the unusual life style of service families renders the relationship of women to their homes more visible.

The navy wife and housing

The significance of housing within female biography emerged during a research project concerned with the familial experiences of women married to Royal Navy personnel. In 1984–5 data were collected through a questionnaire survey of 1,100 navy wives and 30 in-depth interviews. As a group these women had a distinctive marriage pattern derived from the exigencies of their husbands' occupation. The draft system of manning ships and shore establishments meant that naval servicemen could change their place of work every two and a half to three years and sea service frequently entailed their long absence from home. I was concerned to describe similarities in their biographies, ways in which their husbands' occupation impinged upon their daily life over time. In recounting their life histories since marriage, housing had a particularly prominent place.

For all women housing creates a context for family life but, for women married to naval servicemen, it also encapsulates key dilemmas in their lives. They often have to choose between being with their husband, moving when he moves, and having a settled home, established friends and a stable local and educational environment for their children. The choice in family styles underlay their decision to remain in married quarters on naval estates or to become home-owners in the civilian community. The choice was between the convenience and lesser responsibility of the married quarter and the investment potential, the greater control and privacy gained through private housing. It was also clear that for naval wives these choices were ever-present, permanent options in their life course, not a particular decision or stage in their career. Each new draft rekindled these issues and called for new compromises. Conflicting aspirations and irreconcilable loyalties were constant in the marriage careers of naval wives as domestic togetherness often meant frequent moves and a settled home meant family separation. Life in married quarters or home purchase were housing options that never seemed entirely satisfactory.

However, having chosen where to live, the consequences were legion. The housing situation of naval wives influenced other pathways in their life course particularly patterns of employment and childbearing. Married quarters and home-ownership entailed differences in tenure and different rules of housing access: neighbourhoods differed, as did the scope for home-making and

the chores of home-maintenance; the cost and ease of moving varied; these options altered the married relationship and incidence of weekday absence; housing entailed different responsibilities for women in married quarters and for those who were privately-housed.

Past studies of 'tenure pathways' (Payne and Payne, 1979; Madge and Brown, 1981), have suggested that there are two main routes within civilian housing. These routes lead either to council housing or to private ownership and traffic on them moves only one-way. Within the Navy, two pathways could be identified, but one predominated. On the major track the early and mobile years of marriage were spent in married quarters, adjacent to the husband's port or duty station and the later years in private housing, where couples commonly remained, fixed in tenure and in area. Very much a minority pathway was trodden by those who remained in service accommodation until the husband had left the Navy, when they moved into council housing. The desire to own privately dominated, only 12 per cent of naval personnel did not intend to buy their own homes (MOD, 1984a); home-purchase was actively encouraged by naval authorities and their loan schemes were linked to long-term service commitment, houses were bought by naval personnel, unlike other servicemen, for owner-occupation not as investment properties. Therefore the issue for officers and ratings was not *if* they are going to buy their own homes, but *when* they were going to buy them.

Getting married and first homes

Marriage for almost all naval wives meant leaving their home town. Of the women interviewed, few were living in their areas of origin. Most women had met their husband when he was home on leave and staying with parents or relatives, although some had met them at college or while in the WRNS. Where the women came from made little difference to their attitudes and their experiences. All told the same story. Marriage to a sailor had created a major break in their lives and almost invariably involved moving into different accommodation and to a completely new area.

Holme (1985) has argued that it is the aim of each newly-formed couple to set up an independent household. Service accommodation permitted the early and smooth transition to household independence. As naval regulations stipulate that legal matrimony

is essential in access to service accommodation, so early marriage is encouraged. Over 60 per cent of naval wives who were in their first marriage were 21 years old or less at the time of that marriage. If only ratings' wives are considered, the figure rose to over 70 per cent.

In the interviews it was clear that housing constituted an important institutional pressure towards marriage rather than cohabitation; four of the women interviewed said that they had lived with their husband prior to marriage, but these living arrangements had been short-lived, the commonest reason being that they did not make financial sense.

In a bed-sit it was, sharing a house with some students, and that was alright but the rents were high, so that was another reason for wanting to get married quickly as well. You were just wasting money on living together in such a high-priced flat. It was ridiculous really.

However, beyond the key to one's own front door, marriage for service wives frequently entailed a move to a new district. For some women marriage offered the possibility of adventure away from the parochialism of their home towns, an escape from an unhappy home or from the poor opportunities of a declining area. A few women remained with their parents on marriage, but this was described as a temporary arrangement usually pending the availability of service accommodation. These arrangements were not only seen as temporary but also as largely unsatisfactory.

I was about six months with my mum, so I didn't feel married, although I was married.

This first move could be daunting but exciting.

It was my first move. Although I'd been to London for the day, I'd never really gone outside Wales. It was a big thing for me to give up my job and make this move, somewhere I had never been before. I never knew what it looked like. I'd been down here for the day when he was in the Gulf. I did not know what it was like.

It could be cosy,

I loved it. It was our first home together. He was working on land so he was home every day.

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It could also be a disappointing, or even a frightening, experience especially if it coincided with a husband's sea draft,

When I went to live with him we went off to Scotland. Within five days he went off for five weeks patrol. He was a submariner which meant that after five days of me going into Scotland, where I'd never been before, settling into a new house and he was away for five weeks and you can't write to them. So dead silence for five weeks. It was pretty awful.

It came as a shock. . . . He was there for a weekend and then he went off to sea, so really it was an absolutely devastating shock. It was terrible being left not knowing a soul in a strange town, having been in a big community in Portsmouth where I knew everybody. . . . I suppose, when I think about it, I don't know why I went up there. I should have stayed with my mum until he came back.

But she did not. She moved to Scotland instead, moving as most brides did, to be with their husbands symbolically if not physically. It is an irony that the draft to the distant port so frequently prompted the marriage and was so often accompanied by service separation.

Married quarters

Although the popularity of married quarters is declining, they are the first-stop accommodation for almost all newly-wedded naval wives, irrespective of whether they were marrying officers or ratings. All but one of those interviewed had lived in married quarters at one time, however briefly. Although such accommodation meshed easily with a mobile life style and was a cheaper housing option, it was regarded as second-best and was increasingly out of step with popular aspirations towards owner-occupation. The day to day practical benefits of service accommodation are diminished where home-ownership is an investment, a basis for social prestige and an avenue into the civilian community.

When discussing married quarters, most respondents mentioned their convenience in mobility, when moving could be a frequent experience. Many women catalogued these moves during the interview.

We came here (Plymouth) to married quarters for nearly nine months, between six and nine months, then we moved to Portsmouth for six months, married quarters again. Then we moved up to Blackheath Village, while he was at Greenwich, for six months, in a rented house. Then we moved up to Faslane, where we started off in married quarters, for I think less than six months, but that sort of time, while we found ourselves a house, which we bought and we stayed there for two and a half years.

One woman recalled a time when she had three houses in eight months; another claimed to have had thirteen addresses during her sixteen years of marriage; and another described how every two years she and her family had moved between Portsmouth and Plymouth, in alternating drafts, since all her husband's sea drafts were in Plymouth and shore duties in Portsmouth. Such mobility would not be possible with other types of tenure. As Courgeau concluded in his French survey.

If . . . (people) become tenants, their mobility increases. It increases further if they are accommodated by their employer. However, when they succeed in becoming the owner of a residence, their migration propensity will decrease to one seventh of the mobility of a tenant. (1985)

If their convenience was their biggest plus, their biggest minus was the lack of control they afforded occupants over their domestic environment and their lack of scope for creative home-making. The decor was never quite right and repairs were a constant source of irritation. Married quarters were hard to personalise; they had no cultivated gardens and little scope for the DIY enthusiast, now common in civilian society; there was always the thought of the out-muster, where damages had to be paid for and your improvements or attempts at stylish decoration could be included in those damages. The out-muster was a sore point with many wives,

We do like to have our own decorations and not grey walls, but you get told off if you put blue tack up, and one of the things that really gets to me is pompous men with egg down their ties and cigarette burns and dandruff coming into your house and telling you if you've got it clean enough to go out.

The bureaucratic supervision of their housecraft could be humiliating, 'Its not just a house, it's your home'. Also many women echoed the sentiment that these homes were never really theirs and they were then loath to spend the time or the money in making quarters more homely,

Its little things that really make your home, but you can't do them because you are always thinking that's going to cost me. Why should I invest in something that's not going to be mine at the end of the day And I think this has gone a long way to us moving out and getting our own little place so that we can do what we like.

Having recounted these views, it must also be said that, however grey and flowerless married quarters looked on the outside, the inside of the flats and the houses were no different from those visited in private housing. Almost all bristled with new furnishings, electrical goods, new carpets, pictures and plants. Holme (1985) notes a similar phenomenon in her comparisons of council housing accommodation in Bethnal Green and the privately-owned suburbia of Woodford. All suggest how high are the standards of amenity, comfort and aesthetics expected by many women of their homes today. One could argue that it is not merely the cleanliness or tidiness of a house that reflects on a woman's housecraft, but its entire look. When many adorn their homes with new, fashionable furnishings the pressures within the tight-knit community of the married patch become immense. Contemporary brides carried an idealised image of their home which service accommodation was unable to match. One young woman recalled how,

When I moved in I had this fantastic picture of everything and it was going to be really great

but instead she found

The underfelt was all torn and the cooker was burnt. There was new mattresses, but they all had their polythene on them; the headboards were all stained. Actually the bed did break and we then brought my bed from home down. The chairs were very uncomfortable, very square, horrible green, cigarette burns all over them; a good unit, solid, but it didn't do a lot for me. The firegrate stood out a bit and I didn't quite like that.

Many described how they had grown up in comfortable private homes and how service accommodation could never match this. Attitudes to housing did depend on previous experience and the quality of the housing itself. Smaller naval developments were described as more neighbourly and the houses on them often praised for their quality and roominess. The greater ease with which they merged into the surrounding civilian housing and population was also valued.

The large estates of service accommodation were singled out for special criticism, as people described their ugliness, their relative unfriendliness and their poor local reputations. Here service accommodation does not stand alone, but is part of a wider social valuation of housing. Hamnett (1983) and Murphy and Sullivan (1987) describe the polarisation of British housing into inner city public housing and suburban owner-occupation. Council accommodation, so often now in the form of flats, offers fewer amenities and has increasingly become occupied by poorer residents. Owner-occupation has spread to more highly paid and skilled manual workers, is more likely to be in the form of houses, to constitute 'nice areas', and to be subject to the more or less constant processes of house-improvement. Along with this trend has come the falling status of public housing and the concept of 'sink estates'. The position of married quarters may not be central to this trend, but attitudes towards them are inevitably touched by these processes. As housing it is fitted into an overall hierarchy of residential status.

In a 'property-owning democracy', not to own becomes increasingly stigmatised, allied with council housing and, in the mind of the public and many of the occupants, regarded as a place from which the successful move. Also the stigma of location and tenure rubs off to stigmatise the occupant. In the 'ideology of tenures' (Harloe, 1985), those not in private housing are picked out as socially deficient. The Naval estate is associated with public housing.

People seem to have this set ideal of what naval wives are. They think you are not supposed to have any intelligence and, when you lived on a large naval estate, they class that as being horrible with dirty quarters, loud-mouthed women and wife-swapping parties.

More minor issues concerning married quarters were also mentioned. Some ratings' wives were over-conscious of their

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husbands' rank and 'rank-pulling' was a source of some annoyance, although many others claimed not to have encountered this particular form of status-consciousness. Also mentioned was the intrusive aspect of living cheek by jowl with the Navy

All the time you see uniforms coming by all the while, and naval cars and that sort of thing. When we were in Torpoint, I never really felt totally relaxed.

Different tenures put women in different relationships to their homes and located women in particular neighbourhoods and communities. Officers' wives were more positive about their neighbours in service accommodation than were the wives of ratings. Whatever the other drawbacks, married quarters meant the greater possibility of company and this company was often highly valued, especially when husbands were away and wives had small children to care for and to entertain. The more marginal the naval community, the more important the social side of married quarters became, as one naval wife described in her move into quarters in Scotland,

It is out on a limb and, when you move into married quarters, you do tend to get to know people, even if they are not living in the same bit as you are. You probably get to know other people who work with your husband, because they try quite hard there, harder than anywhere else, in fact I think, probably because of the lack of contact that you have with your husband while he is away. It's a much more wives-get-together sort of place than anywhere else I've lived.

Ratings' wives also valued the greater guarantee of friendship on the naval estate, with the gearing of so many estate activities to lone wives and their children, but their comments also revealed a more equivocal side. They described the social claustrophobia and cliquishness of married quarters, the other side of close-knit communities, a view not expressed by the wives of officers. Also ratings' wives had encountered more variable social standards on these estates. They disliked the greater opportunities the naval estate ostensibly offered for infidelity amongst wives and they reported more caution in their relationships with neighbours.

A lot of them are very rough, especially the women and the language; it's disgusting.

There's a lot of goings on in married quarters. When husbands' away, there's a lot of messing around, which I don't agree with, but you see a lot of that.

They also disliked how the reputation for philandering amongst wives stigmatised the other residents,

It was the reputation that the women had got up there. You all get tarred with the same brush, if they can do it, because of the comings and going up there. I don't know if its still the same, and that I don't like.

Life in naval quarters was associated with mobility. Occasionally wives mentioned the excitement of frequent moving, but such enthusiasm was rare and most were more concerned with the problematic side of moving. For instance, it was not uncommon for wives to do the packing and moving whilst their husbands were away at sea. Others described the unsatisfactory nature of transient and situational friendships and described the strain of always having to start again in the building of a social circle. Nevertheless the capacity quickly to make local friends was an essential part of being a naval wife,

The navy wives, I think, are a special breed in that, because they move around so much, they have to be sociable and I don't mean that they have to go knocking on everyone's door and saying, come and have coffee with me and talk in a loud voice. But they have to be adaptable and prepared to make friends they can confide in fairly soon and the fact that you are a navy wife is a sort of passport to being able to be on the same terms.

This passport has much easier currency within quarters accommodation than within private housing. Furthermore the concurrence of biographies meant that naval estates contained exceptionally young and transient populations and this both fostered and undermined the informal support networks of naval wives.

Whatever their feelings and attitudes about moving, most emphasised the importance of being with their husband and this feeling was unsurprisingly strongest at the outset of their marriages. Although some women spent long and regular holidays with parents and relatives while their husbands were away, few gave up quarters and returned to live with a parent or to their home towns.

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However, within the life course, frames of decision-making change. As the marriages of naval wives lengthened and children were born, and the call of home-ownership became stronger, so their housing careers entered a new phase.

The decision to purchase

Service accommodation facilitated mobility amongst naval families. House purchase meant settlement and amongst the older couples in quarters there had been a clear recognition of this consequence and a rejection of this housing option.

He wants to buy a house, but I won't because, if I buy a house, I'm settled, I married him to be with him. I know his job takes him away, but the way I look at it is that, whilst I'm in quarters, we can be with him, and his ship can be out, but he can come in for one day and we'll be here.

The choices for women married to naval personnel seemed quite clear-cut.

If you want to move all the time, then you don't buy your house. And, if you buy your house, you just can't afford to move.

Nevertheless with time other issues came to dominate and constant moving began to pall. The settlement of their children and their schooling, especially their secondary schooling, took priority over being with husbands. These factors weighted any decision in favour of staying put and coincided with other pressures towards house purchase.

When those interviewed were asked about why they had decided to buy a property, undoubtedly the commonest answer was that, however cheap and convenient quarters were, they were still a financial drain and a waste of money, since they could never be considered an investment. Apart from the issue of investment, the question of why they decided to purchase was often greeted with a certain blankness, which is often the response to questioning 'normal' behaviour. In discussing their decision to purchase there was a substantial swell of opinion that was beyond rationality. For many there was a naturalness and inevitability that surrounded

home purchase, especially when the couple had themselves been brought up in private housing. All comments voiced their desire for what they saw as the security, privacy and the comfort of their own home.

We wanted a house of our own, with our own belongings and our own bits and pieces

We didn't always want to stay in quarters. We wanted a home of our own. I think when you start having children, you feel you have to start having roots

I was brought up living in my own house and I've always wanted to live in my own house.

For those who had been brought up in council housing, the chance to buy their own home was seen as a step up in the world and one not to be turned down lightly.

The decision to buy a house was also a career decision. Married ratings who re-engaged for 22 years and married officers who took a 16 year commission were eligible for the Long Service Advance of Pay for House Purchase, provided that they were married. This loan was recalled should they decide to leave the Navy early. Hence house loans were the means by which the Navy secured the long-term commitment of servicemen. Here strands of the life course for naval wives came together, setting the pattern for successive years. They were simultaneously entering the private house market, accepting a shadow career commitment to the Navy and tacitly accepting more extensive service separations from their husbands. Furthermore house purchase would alter their relationship to their home, their level of domestic responsibility and their involvement in the community.

With the administrative encouragement of house purchase, 65 per cent of married sailors and marines owned their own homes, (MOD, 1984a) a figure considerably higher than that for other forces; for the army it was 24 per cent and for the RAF 42 per cent. However, class differences were visible in the varying rates of home-ownership and different attitudes towards house-purchase: nearly 10 per cent of officers intended to buy their own homes while 75 per cent of ratings had this ambition; only 46 per cent of junior ratings owned their own home, compared with 83 per cent of senior ratings and 87 per cent of officers. Officers were much more likely to be both married and homeowners at the outset of their

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careers, whereas ratings became home-owners later in life, if at all. While women remained in married quarters they were especially vulnerable if their marriages dissolved. If this occurred they had no rights to their home and whatever the quality of the tied accommodation they fell to the bottom of the housing market as they awaited eviction and re-housing in council accommodation.

The bulk of naval families decided to buy houses adjacent to naval centres. Some had considered buying a distant and home-town property, but this was usually dismissed with wives claiming that they were the ones who had been against the idea. One woman's comments sum the feeling of all on this.

He wants me to buy a house at home (North Wales). But I said no, the children have got no father; its bad enough that he's away with his job anyway. I say its bad enough, but its not; that's his job and when I married him I knew that that was his job but I don't want to be in North Wales and him down here

Nevertheless, there was a minority who had chosen to live far away from any establishment, largely because their husbands spent so much time at sea. The areas were picked because of their central position and good communications, proximity to parents and because of the financial benefits of separation allowance, paid to servicemen living a substantial distance from their duty station.

Home-ownership

Home-ownership involved the naval family and, more particularly, the naval wife in a different life style. It may have brought her desired comforts and privacy, but home-ownership was not an unmixed blessing. It also brought her a greater weight of responsibility, where the creativity of home-making could easily become the burden of home-maintenance.

As Goldthorpe *et al* (1969) noted so long ago, the privacy of one's own hearth is a major ingredient of a privatised existence within a suburban landscape. Forrest added another dimension by describing house purchase as part of the 'process of debt-encumbered privatised consumption' (1983: 210), that characterises contemporary society. McDowell (1983) linked the growth of home-ownership and increased female involvement in conspicuous consumption to entrenched patriarchal assumptions that infuse

planning policy, neighbourhood structure and the conceptualisation and marketing of the suburban idyll. For McDowell, home-ownership is a key battalion in the reinforcement of sexual divisions, as it has gendered implications for the life styles of men and women.

Within the interviews women linked their attitudes towards house purchase to a concept of maturity; it was part of growing up and spending their money more wisely.

We lived there (married quarters) for about four and half years, but for about two years we did not bother to buy any furniture or anything, because they provide it all and it makes you lazy. We just went to discos and pubs and spent our money that way. That's a disadvantage. It makes you lazy and you get in a rut.

Not all families who moved to private housing were fully prepared for the ensuing extra financial costs. Rent was not a simple equivalent of mortgage; there were rates, insurances and running repairs to be faced. Some women saw this financial burden as considerable.

Every time the postman comes you think, please don't let it be another bill, because it is a lot more financially . . . takes up an awful lot more money than living on a naval estate. Our mortgage alone is almost twice what the naval wives would pay for their own house and that's just your mortgage. I mean what they would run their house on, bills, rent and everything would be just about my mortgage. So, yes, its a lot more stressful and sometimes, if I'd have known what the situation would have been like, I'm not sure I would have agreed to moving.

Nevertheless, for this woman, once having 'moved up', whatever the difficulties, she could not return to married quarters. Her sense of pride would not allow it.

The spread of home-ownership to increasing sections of the population has coincided with the growing fashion for DIY improvements and self-provisioning. Pahl (1984) has described how this is more than home-centred hobbies for today's married man, but a strategy of personal capital accumulation in a housing career of 'doing up' and 'trading up' properties. Even without this intent, time, effort and informal skills play a vital part in keeping down the costs of routine maintenance. Within the civilian family a

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substantial part of house maintenance might be done or organised by the husband. But their regular absence within the naval home has meant that these extra responsibilities devolve more completely onto wives. Consequently, private ownership put these women into a different relationship to their homes and often transformed their relationship with their husband.

House-ownership meant more chores and more house maintenance for naval wives. One woman described a tense stage in their marriage when they had bought an old property in need of renovation. She spent months in chaos and each leave was absorbed in frantic repair-work. She now looked back on the era as disastrous. Many of the women described their skills in painting and decorating, but this often lessened with time.

You don't realise when you buy a house how much work there is involved. See, it's still not decorated or anything, because he's been away so much. I used to do all the decorating, but I don't now, can't be bothered.

Apart from the extra cost and the potential for extra work, home-ownership brought a greater range of decision-making to many wives and was often described as necessitating her greater control over finances and household management. Wives gained more domestic power, a greater measure of control, but this was not always experienced as a freedom but as a burden, an extra pressure.

There was more to organise and only you could sort it out when things went wrong. You never know what bill is going to turn up, you know your roof might fall in or something stupid like that, you have to be prepared for those sorts of things. And we felt, to do that, I needed to be the one that took all the money responsibility. There are times when I can't stand it here and I hate it. I hate the pressure that it puts on you being a naval wife as well, having to be the one that knows where the money is, how much money there is and trying to juggle the books and everything while they are away, sometimes it puts an awful lot more strain on you than you really need.

However, while most women acknowledged the problem, they considered it outweighed by the long-term financial gains and sense of security that they felt they derived from home-ownership.

The move into civilian housing changed the community involvements of naval wives. Some liked their remoteness from the Navy and the advantage of your neighbour always being there rather than away at sea or returned to parents. Others were less enthusiastic about the heterogeneity of this civilian community, often without a huge pool of mothers and young children for company, where neighbours were more diverse and where being a lone wife was something of an oddity.

Married quarters are more friendly . . . Everything is geared to you, Clubs for you. But here it is nice if I speak to my neighbours once every three months. Its not that we don't get on. Its just that they are very very private, with their own life and, to be perfectly honest, if you live in your own house, the less you see of your neighbours.

'Do you miss anything about naval quarters?'

Yes, I miss my friends. I never see anyone out here, because I'm on the older end of the estate here, so I'm surrounded by, or seem to be surrounded by, a lot of old people.

Once money had been spent on house improvements, friends established in the area and children become content in local schools, families were loath to move, especially if this move was to a new area. Compared to other service wives, women married to naval personnel were more likely to live in owner-occupied accommodation and less likely to accompany their husbands drafts (MOD, 1984b). During the interviews, most wives described themselves as settled and established. They viewed moving as too much of an upheaval, too much of an expense and too damaging for the children's education.

House-ownership entailed additional service separation because, in addition to deployment at sea, a husband drafted to a distant shore establishment was absent from home during the working week. Hence women were involved in weekend marriages and described their marital relationship as one of 'week-ending'. In part the pattern was similar to that outside service life, given the significance of the civilian weekend, but there were other problems and irritations for wives in this arrangement. Time and time again they noted its disturbing influence, here referring not only to household routines and responsibilities, but also to themselves. The weekend marriage was sometimes experienced as an emotional rollercoaster, whereby the week and the weekend

entailed rapid mood change, which the women found wearing. Changes in routine were short-run and the weekends became cluttered as women found they had more work to do in tending to their returning husbands and their washing. Women tried to cram the weekends with shopping and odd jobs around the house and there was also the desire to keep the weekends free so they could 'be together' with their husbands, since his weekday absence made the weekend a special time. It threw the weekend into sharp relief and seemed to be a time when women made extra efforts in a number of directions.

The foregoing discussion has illustrated the close interaction between housing careers and other elements in the biographies of naval wives. Rules of housing access encouraged their early marriage and housing careers shaped their patterns of marriage, domestic responsibilities and neighbourhood relations. Further life course consequences can be traced, especially in the early mobile years of marriage. Here patterns of employment and the timing of child-bearing also related to housing factors.

Housing career, employment and child-bearing

As marriage to a sailor usually entailed a move to a new area, so it entailed job loss for naval wives.

'Did you consider staying in Portsmouth?'

Yes, momentarily. But that just wasn't on because I had married my husband to be with him. There was no good reason, apart from the job, to stay there and that wasn't a sufficiently good reason for me.

And this was despite the fact that her previous job was described as a well-paid one in personnel management. In addition, the consequences of such moves were more than temporary unemployment and interrupted careers; they could herald a complete exit from the job market as naval wives were unable to find suitable or any paid work.

There was a close connection between marriage, husbands' postings and ceasing employment; of the women surveyed, 23 per cent claimed to have ceased employment on marriage and 21.5 per cent identified their husband's job change as the main reason for their exit from the labour market. The interviews went on to

elaborate the connection. Women whose jobs were organised in career structures noted the disrupting effect of any move other than one which was career-related. Ratings' wives with addresses on the large naval estates suffered an additional handicap as time and time again they described their inability to find paid employment, the prejudices of local employers who discriminated against and were at times hostile towards wives living on 'the married patch' who applied for jobs.

I tried to get a job, but I couldn't because there was a drive on getting youngsters, school leavers into work and as soon as you mentioned where you lived, they looked at you and said 'navy wife', 'yes', 'not interested', because you were liable to be on the move.

I stopped working as a WRN and I haven't worked since, there are no jobs in Scotland . . . I went up there probably to try and get a job . . . I was told it was a small place and they have no jobs. All the wives wanted jobs.

These factors combined to ensure that marriage and its contingencies in mobility and housing tenure marked a sharper break in the occupational careers of naval wives than those of women married to civilians. Such findings would appear to contradict a common interpretation of empirical findings about women and work. The Martin and Roberts' study of women's employment typifies the approach in arguing for the irrelevance of marriage as a variable in women's occupational involvement. Contemporary women are described as ceasing full-time employment typically on childbirth and re-entering the job market later on a part-time basis; marriage in itself appears to be without consequence. Their survey found 'no difference between the standardised proportions of married women and unmarried women working' (1984: 14). Once the 'different age distribution and the presence of children and the age of younger or youngest child' had been eliminated as factors, 'married women are just as likely to be working as non-married women' (1984: 14). For naval wives, marriage and its housing consequences were deeply influential on their capacity to find paid work and their pursuit of a career. The wives of ratings frequently said that the employment opportunities were easier once they had moved into private housing and were settled in an area. The figures quoted in the Armed Forces Accommodation Report (MOD, 1984a) supported

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these statements. The report found that the wives of house-owners were much more likely to be in paid work than the wives of non-house-owners; the figures were 50 per cent and 30 per cent respectively and the trend was consistent across all ranks. This relationship could be interpreted in a number of ways and the interpretations probably work in combination. Women found it easier to engage in outside work from a settled home and female wages facilitated home-purchase.

Unemployment was frequently then the lot of the wife on the naval housing estate and another disconcerting factor to be added to the new home, strange place and husband at sea. The most commonly reported response to this loneliness and joblessness was to have a baby. After her move to Scotland, one woman described how

The following year I had a baby. The main reason why I had a baby was because I had nothing else to do.

Another commenting on her employment problems, added

I suppose I was bored and he said why don't we have a baby and that was it, we did.

Again this raises problems with the generality of the findings of the Martin and Roberts' study and with their conclusion that

the presence of children and the age of the youngest child are by far the most important *determinants* (my emphasis) of whether or not women work (ibid.: 15)

Such statements contain misleading implications for the complexity of motivation behind female fertility and raise issues on the sequencing of events and the motivational background to change. Unemployment may propel women into early motherhood, as much as motherhood leads women to leave the labour market. In her follow-up studies of women made redundant Coyle noted the 'striking . . . number of younger women who had babies after redundancy'. (1983: 82). For a number of the women interviewed children filled an occupational hollow, absorbed time, eased loneliness and were an entry into a day-time social life which was female and child-centred. The social life of naval housing revolved around the day-time activities of women and children and the

passport into this society was a baby. The childless, whether they were employed or unemployed, were unable to enter these circles of sociability. The pressures towards child-bearing were manifold. They hung round a positive attraction,

On the estate I used to see lots of women pushing prams about,
and I used to think, that looks nice

Or came from feelings of exclusion

They were all talking about their families and their kids, what they got up to, and so-and-so sent them flowers and again I start to feel sorry for myself. So, really, rather than being a help to me, they make me feel worse. I go home and think, I haven't got kids to go home to

Furthermore, in the close-knit world of the naval housing estate child-bearing could be well-orchestrated,

There was seven of us at the same time; the boat came home, and we all fell and I was the last one to fall. All the others had had boys so we were convinced that we were going to have a boy and I had the only girl.

But whether they were planned or not, children meant that you were 'in'. It meant that you were available in the day, that you could participate in the many mother and children activities. These activities were the hub of naval community centres and the basis of informal friendships. Motherhood enlarged the area of common ground among wives

As soon as I had the baby and left work, my whole life was just completely different altogether. I didn't know anybody from the estate at all and within a few days practically, I knew hundreds of people.

Morris has noted how young unemployed women may withdraw 'into a domestic role, and notably motherhood, as providing the most secure base for identity' (1986: 16). Motherhood had social advantages over unemployment and for naval wives it partially resolved the paradox of being a married woman whilst often living as a de facto single person.

Conclusion

In tracing the biographies of naval wives, housing formed an important strand and there was great uniformity in its patterning. Access to service accommodation and private housing was tied to their husband's occupation and their housing careers were a major influence on marital relationships, family formation, employment prospects, domestic responsibilities and neighbourhood involvements. Housing careers were similar for all naval wives, but those married to ratings married younger, lived on poorer quality estates, took longer to tread the path towards private home ownership and were more vulnerable to homelessness if their marriages failed.

The early years of marriage were typically associated with mobility, married quarters accommodation, problems in finding paid employment and separations that related solely to sea deployment. However, with the passage of family time and the assistance of cheap home loans, most naval families were able to realise almost universally held ambitions for home-ownership. As naval wives moved into private housing, their domestic duties increased and local roots were established, and they were likely to see their husbands only at weekends, to be in weekend marriages. The analysis of the housing careers of naval wives is one illustration of the intersection of housing and gender. Type of accommodation and its tenure is a product of other elements in the life course of women and influential in shaping their experiences of both home and work.

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The sexuality of men and the sociology of gender

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Abstract

In recent years writers in the field of the sociology of gender have turned to psychoanalysis for insights into the psychological dimensions of female sexuality. The same insights are now being applied to the analysis of masculinity. This paper argues that the full advantages of this are undermined by the adoption of an object-relations perspective which restores the social determinism from which many such writers seek to escape. This argument is pursued through a detailed analysis of one recent text in the field – *The Sexuality of Men* (eds) A. Metcalf and M. Humphries (1985) – but is applied more widely to the treatment of sexuality in the sociology of gender.

Introduction

The literature on the sexuality of men is still fairly sparse and of inconsistent quality. The main sources of information continue to be the large-scale classic studies of sexual behaviour conducted by Kinsey (1948), Masters and Johnson (1966) and Hite (1978). The first two concentrated on patterns of sexual behaviour and on psychological responses and were influential in undermining the conventional strict separation of normal from abnormal sexuality.

They established without doubt that, regardless of belief or morality, data on sexual *behaviour* indicated that it is much more accurate to talk of a continuum between normal and abnormal sexual phenomena. Hite's work differs from the others in its focus on the *meaning* of sexual behaviour for the participants. Her aim was to allow men to speak anonymously and spontaneously about 'what it is like to grow up in our male society. . . . about how they

define masculinity and what it means to be a man . . . about how they see women – and what sex itself means to men' (Hite, 1978: XVII). There is also a difference in orientation between Hite and her predecessors in that while Kinsey and Masters and Johnson retain certain normative assumptions about heterosexuality and marital relationships, the methodology adopted in the Hite research militates against a judgemental stance. This ethnographic approach to investigating male sexuality, of course, predates Hite's work. It had been adopted in America by men's consciousness-raising groups which had emerged as part of the radicalism of the early 1970s. Inspired by feminist redefinitions of political behaviour, the objective of these men's groups was to provide a supportive environment in which men could explore the truth of feminist accusations of male chauvinism and patriarchal will to power. In the intimacy of this setting, men revealed those aspects of their personalities generally denied expression by the demands of masculinity, the repression of which engendered internal anxiety and inhibited their capacity to relate to others, men and women. Traditional gender roles, it was argued, oppressed men as well as women: men needed liberating too. The aims of the consciousness-raising groups were both to develop anti-sexist practices in relation to women, thus supporting the women's movement, and to provide a therapeutic context to repair some of the damage. Such was the manifesto of men's collectives, like the Berkeley Men's centre in San Francisco and proselytised in periodicals like *Brother. a Forum for Men Against Sexism*. Several books provided accounts of the experience of men's groups and how they fed into developing theories of masculinity (Pleck and Sawyer, 1974, Tolson, 1977).

The importance of the Hite Report was that it showed that the contradiction between outer machismo and inner insecurity, emotional deprivation and identity anxiety revealed by the participants of men's groups could not be discounted as a peculiarity of neurotic, intellectually over-developed, self-indulgent, middle class professional and academic men, but was generalisable to a broad cross-section of American males. The problem was no longer to prove that such a contradiction lay at the heart of masculinity, but how to explain it.

Following the trend in the sociology of gender, accounts of male sexuality tended to rely on variants of role theory and analysed the consequences of disruption of the traditional gender role structure brought about by post-war social and economic change. This

approach has acquired a considerable amount of public credibility encouraged, no doubt, by a series of popular television documentaries such as Channel 4's *About Men* (1983) and BBC's Continuing Education Series, *Men. . . .* (1984). The view that 'it's all conditioning' has emerged to co-exist with the older, 'it's human nature' in the explanatory vocabulary of common-sense.

However, just as a number of feminist writers became dissatisfied with this approach (see Coward, 1982 and 1983), so too have analysts of masculinity for the same general reasons: that it can explain neither the mass 'deviancy' from established gender roles and behaviours revealed by the mass surveys, nor the psychodynamics which make such deviation possible. In trying to understand the limits and possibilities of human sexuality, such dissenters have turned to psychoanalysis.

While this is a most promising development, the full advantages appear to be threatened by a tendency to sociologise the insights gained. It will be argued in the following pages that this is a consequence of the political subtext of the project. the Freudian appropriations are underwritten by objectives other than understanding sexuality, i.e. those of changing society more generally. Thus, the psychoanalytic borrowings tend to be selected primarily for their capacity to provide more sophisticated mechanisms whereby the individual relates and reacts to the social scripts provided by social structure, than are offered by classic socialisation theory. This results in the reintroduction of the kind of social reductionism from which many writers in the field genuinely wish to escape.

This argument will be pursued through an analysis of a recent collection of essays edited by Metcalf and Humphries and published as *The Sexuality of Men* (1985) because it exemplifies many of the problems endemic to recent discussions of sexuality and gender which have been informed by psychoanalysis.

The sexuality of men

The starting point for the editors of this collection of essays is the apparent contradiction between the dominant representation of male sexuality as machismo, and the inner insecurity and sometimes pathetic anxiety revealed by many of the respondents of Hite's and other studies. Most of the contributors address this

contradiction in one way or another, whether by explaining the emergence of macho styles in the gay community or exploring the ambivalent responses of many men to pregnancy. It is addressed in the context of what Andy Metcalf identifies in the Introduction as the two broad themes of the book: 'One is that much of male sexuality can be understood only if the family constellation around the infant is brought into the picture, and psychoanalytic approaches discussed. The other theme concerns the changes which have occurred over the last thirty years in women's place in the world' (p. 8). However, it is also clear from the Introduction that while the predominance of one or other of these themes may vary from essay to essay, it is the relationship between the two which is thought to be the key to understanding contemporary male sexuality. Metcalf provides an embryonic account of how these themes are linked, and, drawing where possible on some of the other contributions, it is possible to construct the following thesis about the impact of social change on male sexuality.

In infancy, the male child acquires his sense of identity through the structuring of sexual difference in which he has to reject all that stands for feminine and identify himself with all that stands for masculine. This requirement applies not only to his relations to his parents but also modes of feeling, behaving and thinking, interests, capacities and abilities. A secure sense of identity for men, therefore, depends upon a clear sexual division of human capacities and attributes in the family. This, however, is always fragile because they continue to retain a residue of primary identification with feminine attributes because of the initial attachment to their mother. Nevertheless, their sense of self is highly dependent on what it is to be male and this is reaffirmed by its difference from what it is to be female. There is a strong sense in the book that male identity has no positive referents of its own but only negative referents, i.e. that which is not female. The fragility of male identity accounts for the ambivalence which many men have towards women. On the one hand, a man in a relationship with a woman can relive the intimacy, closeness and dependence of his infancy; on the other, that very surrender is profoundly threatening to the autonomy and invulnerability which marks him out as a man. It is also held to account for the 'driven quality' of male sexuality, for sex provides men with the 'only entry back into the subjective' once they have rejected emotion, tenderness and dependence as feminine. Yet even there, many men feel the threat of being engulfed, of losing control. This fragile

identity is stored up, therefore, by the cultural representation of male sexuality as 'macho' and that of women as supine.

This inherent fragility is underlined by changes in women's position in the post-war period because they have led to 'an unfreezing of fixed relations in the family' (p. 9). Amongst these changes can be listed the increased control women have over their fertility, their greater participation in the labour force, and their increased legal capacity to pursue their own interests; for example, at work, in divorce and, through welfare provision, in housing and income supplement. All these factors have lessened women's economic dependence on men and have increased their presence in the public sphere, a world previously the preserve of men. The exchange of services on which traditional family life depended and which provided a cornerstone for the sexual division of labour elsewhere, can no longer be guaranteed. Gender roles have become less distinct and this threatens both male power and male identity. A defensive reaction to this threat is the reassertion of male power and the display of the most flagrant symbols of their masculinity. Thus, the thesis concludes, contemporary male violence towards women (real and symbolic), pornography, the macho image in popular culture, even the political appeal of the Iron Lady, can be understood as a male collective reaction formation to the threat posed by the intersection of the material reality of the changing position of women in society and the psychic reality of the never-quite-resolved Oedipus complex.

What, then, can be made of this thesis? The first thing that must be said is that in the form just enunciated, it does not appear consistently in the book. It is not clear whether its aim is to put forward the above thesis about the nature of contemporary male sexuality or simply offer vignettes of how it is experienced by nine contemporary writers. The thesis of how changes in women's position in society key into the psychic structure of masculine identity is largely lost. Many of the articles simply ignore the two broad themes identified in the Introduction and do their own thing; the changing position of women is explored by Andy Moe and Tony Eardley who argue respectively that pornography and violence towards women are male responses to the increasing unwillingness of women to collude in shoring up the structure of traditional male dominance; but this is far outweighed by the interest of many of the contributors in the other theme – the psychodynamics of infantile sexuality and its consequences for adult male identity.

The seriousness with which the psychical domain is treated is probably the greatest strength of the book. The authors recognise the inadequacy of approaches which ascribe some essential character to male sexuality and consequently to male behaviour, whether they make appeal to 'the selfish gene' or to some ahistorical, innate 'will to power'. They are less sure of dismissing approaches which derive male sexuality from the material structures of capitalism. Generally, these are held to be inadequate in themselves, but they do tend to be reintroduced by locating the psychodynamic relationships involved in the construction of the psyche in the patriarchal family structures of capitalist society. This is in part an effect of the view that only 'a framework which retains a materialist stance and focuses on the relationship of social change to internal and unconscious motivations can grasp the contradictions and paradoxes of human sexuality' (p. 11) and of the commitment to socialist politics. This is not to say that these are not worthwhile commitments in themselves but the concern to integrate all of these enterprises tends to leave them all underdeveloped. A major problem it poses for the analysis of the psychic dimension is that this often slides over into and becomes confused with theories of socialisation. In this the writers of *The Sexuality of Men* are not alone. It is a recurrent tendency in the field of the sociology of gender and one which is difficult to avoid. It is this issue to which the rest of this paper is devoted.

Socialisation theory

Most socialisation theories assume the existence of predetermined roles and values in society which individuals internalise through the process of role-play in social interaction, initially with immediate members of the family and later with significant people in the social environment. This positive role-modelling is reinforced by a system of sanctions for deviant behaviour. Most research on gender socialisation is of this kind and focuses on the effects of the models of masculinity and femininity presented by parents, teachers, television, books, films, advertisements and other forms of behavioural and symbolic representation. These are then assumed to be the 'cause' of gender differences of the stereotypical sort. *Just Like a Girl: How Girls Learn to be Women* (Sharpe, 1976) is an example of this kind of explanation and it continues to

be the most popular despite the criticisms that have increasingly been levelled at it. These include:

- that it assumes an 'oversocialised conception of man' (Wrong, 1961) (and, of course, woman!), i.e. that there is no adequate conceptualisation of consciousness other than as the passive embodiment of social forces. Like behaviourism it assumes that behaviour is a conditioned response to external stimuli;
- that it fails to account for the *extent* of non-conforming behaviour which actually exists beneath apparent conformity to normative standards of morality;
- that it is based on a circularity of argument, in that the processes which are supposed to produce the role structure in society are themselves products of that role-structure;
- that subscribers to this position who are committed to radical perspectives and sexual politics, cannot account for their own activities except by recourse to notions like undersocialisation. (For a recent account and critique, see Connell (1987))

These criticisms have also been made of Marxist attempts to explain the persistence of the sexual division of labour and conventional definitions of sexuality, despite the changes in the material structures and social relations which underpin them. Such explanations have had to explain not only the continued dominance of men but also women's complicity in their own subordination. The orthodox answer has been first to point to the capitalist economy and, by way of the reserve army of labour concept and the domestic labour theory, to show how women's increased participation in the labour market does not undermine the patriarchy of production but actually is functionally necessary for it. Secondly, women's collusion has been explained by the thesis of false consciousness. (For resumé and critique, see Kuhn and Wolpe, 1978; Somerville, 1982) This often rests on a crude conditioning model and is often indistinguishable in practice from non-Marxist social learning theories.

In addition to general dissatisfaction with the inherent functionalism of both positions, it was for some, the impact of French Marxism, and for others the existential realisation of the imperviousness of deep inner psychic structures to changes in sexual/domestic arrangements, that led to a renewal of interest in psychoanalysis, with Juliet Mitchell's seminal work, *Psychoanalysis*

and *Feminism* (1974) breaking ground in the hostile camp of feminism. The reappraisal of Freud's revolutionary assertion of infantile bisexuality and polymorphous perversity, and Mitchell's displacement of Freud's more biologicistic elements of the Oedipus Complex by the notion of a cultural imperative derived from a Lacanian reading of Freud, promised a non-essentialist account of the construction of sexual identity. Since then, the appropriation of psychoanalytic insights by feminists in the attempt to explain the construction of femininity is almost commonplace. It was only a question of time until the same insights would be applied to the analysis of masculinity. *The Sexuality of Men* is one such attempt.

However, the appropriation is a very hesitant and tenuous one, partly because of a continuing suspicion about Freud's misogyny and partly because interest in psychoanalysis is often tangential to another project – that of developing a materialist account of the relationship between the private and the public sphere as the theoretical base for a socialist gender politics. One consequence of this is that processes which, for Freud, mostly operate at the level of the unconscious and are inaccessible to consciousness except through the mechanism of transference in analysis, are thought of as conscious, interactional ones and are sometimes described as actions involving rational calculation and intentionality.

The following quotes (emphases added) from *The Sexuality of Men* illustrate this slippage between psychoanalytic accounts and those of socialisation theory:

This rejection of the mother. . . is in itself a violent and dehumanising process because it involves an internal rejection and suppression of the son's own potential qualities of nurturing, in favour of the coercive but compensatory attributes *held out to him as a reward for achieving malehood*. Part of this process is the devaluation in the son's eyes of the gender to whom these rejected qualities are assigned. *Big boys don't cry' will be drummed into him through his early years* as a constant reminder of his earlier struggles. (pp. 103–4)

In the process of this identification, the boy sides with the father and rejects the mother with whom he has had an intense and sensuous relationship. In siding with the father, *the boy is also conscious, at least emotionally*, that he is duelling with his father for his mother's attention. (p. 147)

When I give attention to the notion of sexual development, I find myself thinking of Freud's account of a boy's Oedipal

resolution since this was an attempt to theorise an experience *that is often hidden* . . . within Freud's account, we can begin to think how we are left feeling that our sexual feelings towards our mothers are wrong. *We are made aware of the threat of our fathers as rivals and we are forced to repress our sexual feelings even though they are deeply embedded.* (pp. 164–5)

The significance of this manner of theorising is that the referents are clearly the child and its *real* parents as given external objects, while for psychoanalysis what is crucial are the psychical structures and processes which develop in interaction with the parents and others, and these are not necessarily formed through a simple correspondence with external objects or events. Even before Freud abandoned the theory that hysterical neurosis was caused by sexual abuse in childhood, he was clear that what is crucially important is not so much the 'real event' itself but the significance of the event in *unconscious memories*. It is not what is real and remembered which produces neuroses (though such memories may be very distressing) but what is repressed and not remembered, for it is in the psychical mechanisms of repression and defence that neurotic symptoms are created and reproduced. (On this point see Skues, 1987.) It is to these psychological processes that the early Freud looked for the answer to the question of why similar experiences in childhood lead to neurosis in some individuals but not in others. When he subsequently discovered the significance of the child's *active* sexual desires and developed his theory of the Oedipus complex, this emphasis on the (often unconscious) dynamics of the psyche rather than on the socialising effects of the family environment became even more crucial.

The difference between socialisation theories and psychoanalytic accounts lies in this; in the former, the child is a product of how the parents behave to her/him, thus the father *is* a rival, the mother *actually* rejects the child, the parents *really* punish the child for behaviour inappropriate to her/his gender, the male child *is* denied the opportunity to nurture. In the latter the parents may or *may not* behave in this way. What is important is the child's active though unconscious desires in relation to the parents and siblings and the ways in which the psychical structure and 'economy' develops through such processes as defence, repression and sublimation. While there is an important link between this psychic work and the actual interpersonal interaction in the family, no direct one-to-one relation can be assumed.

Psychoanalysis

There is a certain amount of muddled thinking on this issue in the literature on the sociology of gender which attempts to appropriate psychoanalytical insights. Again, *The Sexuality of Men* is indicative of this muddle, caused by a rather uneven knowledge of Freud and psychoanalysis. For example:

In the *construction* of the Oedipus complex – in which a boy at an early age, *tackles the differences* between mother and father and finds a place for himself in the relationship with them – the boy begins to identify physically with the father. They both have penises which are different from what the boy has observed about the mother. (p. 147, emphases added)

This passage is simply misleading. The Oedipus complex for Freud is not primarily about tackling the fact of sexual difference or about the beginnings of identification of a kind with the father. Freud is not concerned with this phase of development as a kind of cognitive coming to terms with the world. Identification of a kind with the father precedes the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1925; 1977: 333) and even when the more significant identifications come into being this is during the phase of dissolution of the Oedipus complex which is initiated by the fear of castration (Freud, 1924; 1977: 319). What Freud is describing, rightly or wrongly, is not a stage of cognitive development of a gradual insertion into a social network but the implications of an 'organised body of hostile and loving wishes which the child experiences towards its parents' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1980: 282) and which typically come into play at a certain stage in the child's sexual development.

In the same account the author writes:

In rejecting the mother, the boy is also rejected by her. The process is both mutual and messy. Rejection on both sides creates an unresolved lack in the boy which at one level, produces an unfulfillable yearning or desire for some reinstatement of the mother's position in the boy's life; and at another level the mother's rejection of the boy becomes imprinted in the memory of his early relationship and lasts throughout the boy's life. (p. 147)

No references are given to support this account and it is not one derived from Freud. Of course there are mothers who reject their child, sometimes in response to hurt caused by the child's hostility. On the other hand, there is plenty of clinical evidence that the rejecting mother is the projection of the child's own hostility on to the mother. This is not treated as simply illusory in analysis since the projected behaviour constitutes psychic reality for the child and has effects on her/his behaviour. (This point underlines again the difference between psychoanalysis and socialisation theory.) However, a general thesis of actual and necessary maternal rejection does not feature in the Oedipus complex or its dissolution as outlined by Freud. Yet again, it is misleading to describe the child's rejection of the mother as 'in itself a violent and *dehumanising* process' (p. 103) since for Freud it is a profoundly humanising one inasmuch as abandonment of the mother and identification with the father is an essential step in establishing the autonomy necessary for adult life. The anxiety aroused by the (phantasised) threat of castration is painful as is the resolution – the relinquishing of the desire for the mother – but it is an inevitable part of human development, according to Freud.

Another aspect of the conceptual confusion in the book (with the exception of Tom Ryan's essay) is the lack of acknowledgement of *different* theories and positions *within* psychoanalysis. This is particularly surprising, given that the divisions, antagonisms, rivalries, repudiations and counter-repudiations in psychoanalysis are rivalled only by those within Marxism. Yet, these writers in their descriptive accounts of the development of masculinity slip easily from Freud to Klein to Chodorow without registering that there is considerable dispute about the validity of such an enterprise. For example, those authors who directly confront the 'roots' of masculinity, as opposed to examining its various products in social behaviour or cultural artefacts, focus on the Oedipus complex as the critical moment in the construction of male sexuality. Yet, often in the descriptions of this moment, the authors seem to be actually referring to the pre-Oedipal relationship with the mother and the process of *separation* from the mother which is more the concern of Kleinian psychoanalysis and the object relations school rather than that of Freud.

Given that it is Klein who is frequently called up as the authenticating figure in much of the psychoanalytically – orientated sociology of gender, and it is Klein around whom the psychoanalytic movement in Britain critically divided, divisions still reflected in

the institutional structures and training policies of the British School of Psychoanalysis (see Kohon, 1986 esp. Intro.), a brief if cursory outline of Klein's main propositions is perhaps worthwhile at this juncture

Melanie Klein

Melanie Klein's clinical work with very young children led her to give more prominence to the pre-genital phases in the development of ego and superego than had Freud (Klein, 1932, 1945, 1959. See also Segal, 1979). She proposed that through the oral and anal stages, the infant gradually acquires an awareness of an external world outside itself. Thus, the infant builds up a picture of its first love-object by introjecting images of part-objects (initially, typically the breast) and their symbolic equivalents. These part-objects are endowed in phantasy with human traits and reflect both the real relationship of the child to the part-object and the projection on to the part-object of the child's feelings. For Klein, this relationship from birth is necessarily ambivalent; suffused with desire since the mother's body is the source of pleasure and gratification, and with hate since it can never satisfy the infant's desire given that, by virtue of its being a psychical construct, it is insatiable. As early as the first few months of life, the infant's hostility and aggressive impulses cause the child great anxiety which is met by a number of defence mechanisms. An important one in the early period is 'splitting' of the part-object into the ideal and the persecutory; for example into the ideal breast – the object of the infant's desire, and the persecutory breast – on to which the child's own hostile feelings have been projected. Indeed, Klein came to believe that persecutory anxiety – the fear of attack by parents (in effect, the child's projected aggressive impulses) was the generic form of anxiety of which castration anxiety was only one manifestation. The phantasy of the castrating father has predecessors in the devouring mother, and Klein believes this to be evidence of the formation of the ego and the superego prior to the Oedipal stage. It is here worth pointing to the recurrence of such images in religious symbolism and in folklore as well as in the clinical evidence of adults of both sexes and in respondents' answers in the surveys of sexologists.

Klein goes on to identify other mechanisms which evolve for dealing with this anxiety at later stages: phantasies of restitution

and reparation to the mother's body; the displacement of interest from the source of anxiety to other objects – to the father's body in the genital phase; and finally to the world outside. Thus, it is clear that, while painful, 'normal' anxiety is essential to the child's development in Klein's scenario.

This summary is the view of Klein rehearsed by contemporary theorists of sexuality and, as can be seen, it is one which emphasises the *relationship* between the external environment and the internal life, between the mother and the child. Yet a closer examination of the debates around Klein proves interesting.

From a strictly orthodox point of view, the work of Klein has been rejected as a deviation from Freud's foundations such that it falls outside what can be accurately categorised as psychoanalysis (Glover, 1945). Others have argued that Klein retains all the elements of classic Freudian theory and merely develops insights and observations which Freud, in his later works had already provided (Riviere, 1952). Others still have argued that Klein's deviation from Freud 'consists, in fact, of the radical development of Freud's own greatest deviation from himself' (Guntrip, 1961, 207). While much of the debate revolves around technical details, the key principles in dispute are the status of Freud's theory of instincts and the role of the external environment in the development of the psyche. It is in relation to these 'two ends of the chain' to borrow an Althusserian metaphor from another context, that one's status as a true Freudian is often judged by the initiated.

In the case of Klein, there are some unexpected twists in the argument which are particularly pertinent for the wholesale adoption of Klein by sociological adventurers. The latter rarely mention for example, that Klein was profoundly committed to a biologically-based instinct theory, the main postulate of which is a conflict between the life-instincts and death instincts, a conflict so one sided in Klein's accounts as to provoke criticism that she had replaced sexuality – the libidinal drives on which Freud's theoretical edifice was premised – with aggression as the motive force of psychical development (Glover, *op. cit.*).

Of more relevance to the current discussion is the fact that one of the main objections to Klein's propositions was that she *neglected environmental factors*, including the nature and quality of care and the psychology of the carers, and that these doubts were voiced mainly by the more orthodox members of the psychoanalytic community (see the account of the 1935 discussions of the British Psychoanalytic Society in Glover, 1945). While Klein

is clear that 'it is the combined action of the child's early instinctual life . . . and the pressure of reality . . . (that) shapes the course of its mental development' (Klein, 1932; 1980: 221), such statements are often followed by more ambiguous ones regarding the relative role of each. For example,

reality and real objects affect the child's anxiety-situations . . . in the sense that it regards them as so many proofs or refutations of its anxiety-situation which it has displaced into the outer world. (*op. cit.*)

and again,

the way in which each child will receive the impressions of reality is already largely determined by his or her early anxiety-situations. (*op. cit.* p. 222)

This comes close to saying that external reality can be experienced by the child only as a world generated by the play of endopsychic forces.

The point here is not to make a judgement on Klein's position in these matters, but to argue that it does raise problems with the representation of Klein in much contemporary psychoanalytically-interested sociology. It is difficult to see how a theory with such an insistent psychobiology and an analytic focus which marginalises the external environment, could provide the theoretical foundation of a school of psychoanalysis noted for its focus on the relational properties of familial dynamics and, perhaps more surprising, could come to be a major source of validation for a late twentieth-century sociology of gender.

One response to the first paradox is nicely put by Guntrip (*op. cit.*): Klein remains a true Freudian because she develops a deviation already begun by Freud himself, but neither of them recognise it. The deviation consists in the claim that Freud's later theory of the superego superceded his own instinct theory, in that it is accounted for theoretically, entirely in terms of psychodynamic processes of the structuring of the ego and does not rely on the biological. Guntrip argues that Klein's theory of the internal objects world is simply a development of this aspect of Freud's work, to which instinct theory is merely 'a kind of biological mysticism. . . . a guarantee of Freudian orthodoxy that obscures the importance of new ways of thinking' (Guntrip, *op. cit.*, p. 208).

So while Freud's neglect of external environment is admitted, Guntrip argues that these new ways of thinking, i.e. Klein's theory of endopsychic structure in terms of internal objects, opened the way to others who did take the infant's interpersonal context fully into account and developed a 'true theory of personality', unencumbered by psychobiology.

These others to whom Guntrip refers are associated with what became known as the British School of Psychoanalysis, of whom the best known are probably W.R.D. Fairbairn and D.W. Winnicott; their approach is that generally referred to as 'Object-Relations Theory'.

Fairbairn and Winnicott

There is some dispute about whether this subsuming of Klein into the same grouping as the object relations school is valid. On the question of the role of innate instincts, there is little doubt that they are poles apart. Fairbairn is clear that 'from the standpoint of dynamic structure, 'instinct' is *not the stimulus* to psychic activity but itself consists in characteristic activity *on the part of* a psychical structure' (1952: 150, emphases added) and he is well known for this view of the predominance of environmental factors, in particular the quality of maternal care in psychic development.

This is crucially related to the shift in thinking about psychic motivation. For Fairbairn the pleasure principle, i.e. that psychical activity aimed at avoiding unpleasurable tension (see Laplanche and Pontalis, *op. cit.* for a useful clarification of the common confusion with hedonism) is replaced by the claim that psychical activity is aimed at *seeking objects*. Thus, as Fairbairn himself concludes, 'It follows that behaviour must be oriented towards outer reality and thus *determined* by a reality-principle from the first' (*op. cit.*, p. 289, emphasis added)

This shift to outer reality as the determinant of inner reality is even more pronounced in the work of Winnicott, despite the differences between the two men. Winnicott, because of his influence as a paediatrician in post-war child welfare circles has been much criticised, along with Bowlby, for contributing to the idealisation of motherhood, so central to the familialist ideology which pressured women to return to the home after their war-effort. Fairbairn and Winnicott did, of course, recognise that no

mother could provide the perfect care which would guarantee only 'good' objects in the child's environment.

No one ever becomes completely emancipated from the state of infantile dependence . . . and there is no one who has completely escaped the necessity of incorporating his early objects. It may consequently be inferred that there is present in every one either an underlying schizoid or an underlying depressive tendency. (Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, p. 56)

Nevertheless, for a mature, well-balanced personality a particular pattern of infant care is required, what Winnicott described as 'good enough' mothering (Winnicott, 1965: 15–20); see also Davis and Wallbridge, 1981) Such a mother is one who has had a good enough mothering in her infancy and whose pregnancy, therefore, positively correlates with the experience of good internal objects. As a consequence of this identification this mother is, post-partum, psychically merged with her baby, that is, in a state of 'primary maternal preoccupation. . . almost an illness' (Winnicott, 1958: 302) and therefore can anticipate her infant's needs so it can experience a 'continuity of being'. This continuity is a necessary 'illusion' created and sustained by the mother (*op. cit.*, pp 152–4), since for Winnicott, unlike Fairbairn and the early Klein, the primary state of the psyche is one of 'unintegration' (*op. cit.*, p. 149) and requires the management of its environment to be such as to enable the integration of the ego. Only gradually does the mother introduce the external world 'in small doses' by providing 'real' gratification by 'real' objects in response to the baby's presenting needs (Winnicott, 1964; 1970: 69–74).

Clearly for Fairbairn and Winnicott, the child's psychic life is to a large extent a product of the type of mothering it receives. It is this that marks the difference between Klein and the derivative work of the object-relations approach, a difference acknowledged even by Guntrip (*op. cit.*, p. 397). Crucially for Klein the inner world of objects consists of unconscious symbolic constructions initiated by desire and the repression of desire; it does not necessarily reflect the external reality of the child's family life. There is no necessary relation between the *real* parents and the *introjected* parents which are a product of the child's fantasies. Yet they are no less 'real' for that. They are genuine reflections of the child's ambivalent feelings and the unconscious mechanisms for working through them which are a necessary part of every child's

painful emergence into an autonomous human being. In this respect, Klein follows Freud in establishing that psychic reality is distinct from social reality. This is not to say that there is no relation between them but to say that the relation cannot be prejudged.

Some, of course, will argue that such differences are a matter of degree, are outweighed by the coincidence of agreement on the importance of the early years of infancy and of 'internal objects' and are of only minor academic interest. Theoretically, it has to be admitted that the point where quantitative change is said to become qualitative is always rather arbitrary and decided by fiat. However, in the case of the differences discussed above, the recent controversies around child sexual abuse have revealed that they are of rather more than mere academic significance and that views about the nature of phantasy and reality in relation to infantile sexuality have considerable consequences for the children, their families and the welfare professionals involved. Similarly, the implications for a wide range of policies are fairly stark depending on whether or not one believes that continual care by the mother is required throughout early childhood as a condition for mental health.

The point being made here is that these differences go unrecognised by the authors of *The Sexuality of Men* and this leads to both conceptual confusion and a conflating of different processes which need to be addressed separately if a better understanding of sexuality – male and female – is to be achieved. This is not an argument for purism. Eclecticism is a perfectly legitimate practice in relation to specific ends. It is important, however, to be clear precisely what different theorists claim and what the implications are for strategies for change. This is what is missing from most of the relevant essays in *The Sexuality of Men* and it accounts for the slippage to which I have referred earlier. In particular, what is presented in this and many other sociological accounts of sexuality is an exposition of Freud that is often much closer to the object relations school and its sociological popularisers, of whom the most quoted is probably Nancy Chodorow. Indeed, in the last essay of *The Sexuality of Men* all but one of the references to Freud are found on examination to be taken from Chodorow's highly influential book, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978)

Nancy Chodorow

Chodorow's work is a great improvement on the social learning accounts so prevalent in the field of gender. Chodorow herself is critical of those sociological and psychoanalytic accounts which entail 'a model of direct transmission of social reality to psychic reality and total isomorphism between these' (Chodorow, 1978: 47). She is insistent that while the outside world affects the inside, 'this influence is mediated through fantasy, introjection and projection, ambivalence. . . .' (ibid.). However, the substance of her analysis departs from this declaration and is much closer to the statement later in the book that: 'The sexual and familial division of labour in which women mother *creates* a sexual division of psychic organisation and orientation. It *produces* socially gendered women and men who enter into asymmetrical heterosexual relationships' (p. 209, emphases added). In saying this Chodorow comes much closer to a social determinist position than to that of Freud and Klein.

In essence, Chodorow claims that sexual difference is initiated by the *mother* in that she relates to her children in different ways depending on their biological sex, and that this is a consequence of the structure of the family roles and the relationships in contemporary society.

Because women are psychically and socially structured by the dominant gender ideologies in society, as mothers, they 'experience their sons as a male opposite. . . . sons tend to be experienced as differentiated from their mothers. . . . maternal behaviour. . . tends to propel sons into a sexualised, genitally toned relationship which in turn draws the son into triangular conflicts' (p. 110).

In contrast, the period of primary identification is prolonged for female infants because 'mothers of daughters tend not to experience these infant daughters as separate from them. . . . cathexis of daughters is more likely to retain and emphasise narcissistic elements, that is, to be based on experiencing a daughter as an extension or double of a mother herself, with cathexis of the daughter as a sexual other usually remaining a weaker, less significant theme' (p. 109).

This differential treatment of sons and daughters by mothers is carried into the Oedipal period.

The boy has already been primed to a genital attachment to the mother. The rapid abandonment of the mother which follows castration anxiety is aided by the early process of differentiation

initiated by the mother's reaction to his biological sex. The boy, then, is able to identify fully with his mother and retain in the unconscious a woman as both a sexual object choice and a source of emotional gratification. This heterosexual orientation emerges after the latency period.

In the case of a girl, Chodorow claims, 'her relationship of dependence attachment and symbiosis to her mother continues, and her Oedipal (triangular, sexualised) attachments to her mother and then her father are simply added' (p. 129). The Oedipal situation for girls, then, is a 'bi-sexual oscillation between father and mother' (ibid). This is resolved by the splitting of sexualised love in such a way that genital object choice settles on the father, but the emotional attachment associated with sexual involvement remains with the mother. It is, therefore, relatively easy for girls to shift their sexual object from the father to other males. On this view, girls never entirely 'resolve' their Oedipus complex to the same extent as boys; they never 'give up' the mother so completely nor the pre-occupation with pre-Oedipal issues of merging, attachment, continuity between the inner object world and external object relations. Consequently, girls need to express affective needs; boys repress them

This difference has important repercussions for the personality differences between men and women, in particular, for the differential capacity to operate in relational and non-relational spheres. 'The main importance of the Oedipus complex, I argue, is not primarily in the development of gender identity and socially appropriate heterosexual genitality, but in the contribution of different forms of "relational potential" in people of different genders' (p. 166)

This quote is critical for understanding Chodorow's project and her influence on work in the sociology of gender. It reveals that her main interest in psychoanalysis is in terms of the light it may throw on the acquisition of gender personality and gender characteristics. It might be argued that this is perfectly legitimate given Chodorow's aim to explain why it is that women are primarily and often exclusively responsible for childcare. Her answer is that it is not just as a result of tradition or social pressure or male domination, but because the capacity and desire to nurture is highly developed in women as a consequence of the particular female psyche brought about by the fact that they themselves are mothered by women. Given the status division in contemporary society between the private and the public spheres.

this nurturing ability then locks women into ideologically and materially subordinate positions relative to men. Chodorow's book, after all, is entitled *The Reproduction of Mothering*.

However, in spite of Chodorow's attempt to avoid a simple isomorphism between social and psychic reality (p. 47) she ultimately reinstates such a structure as the following quotation reveals: 'The structure of production and reproduction requires and presupposes those specific relational modes, between husband and wife, and mother and children, which form the centre of the family in contemporary society' (p. 190). Chodorow is ultimately guilty of the functionalism from which she set out to escape.

It is no coincidence that Chodorow frequently refers to Talcott Parsons, for what she provides is a psychodynamic mechanism whereby the Parsonian dichotomous pattern variable – expressivity: instrumentality – so essential in his view for the functioning of modern industrial society, is produced and reproduced via the pattern of social roles in the family. In Chodorow's account, the acquisition of heterosexuality and gender characteristics is initiated by heterosexual parents in a family structure in which women mother and fathers are largely absent. The Oedipus complex becomes simply a transmitter of the personality traits functional to a sexually unequal society. Further, it even guarantees biological reproduction since it creates an asymmetry of needs in the heterosexual relationship. Men seek to recreate the early bond with their mother in an exclusive relationship with women. However because of their early differentiation from their mother and their repression of the pre-Oedipal identification with female qualities, men's capacities to engage relationally are limited and they, therefore, fail to meet the emotional needs of women which are highly developed by their prolonged pre-Oedipal attachment to their mothers. 'Thus, women's heterosexuality is triangular and requires a third person – a child – for its structural and emotional completion. For men, by contrast. . . . a child interrupts it' (p. 207). The desire for children too, then, is said to result from the structure of the family.

Unlike Parsons, however, Chodorow is not happy with the state of affairs because what he calls 'role differentiation', she argues, is predicated on sexual inequality and the denial of potential capacities and interests of both men and women. She also believes that exclusive female childcare in the increasingly small, insular family of the industrialised West, is likely to lead to psychological problems in all family members. In other words, because of

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demographic, occupational and urban changes in contemporary society, the sexual and familial division of labour is becoming dysfunctional.

Chodorow's solution of equal sharing of primary parenting between men and women is revealing of the social determinism that she has in common with the object relations school. With two parents of different sexes rearing children,

primary identification would not be created in the first place. . . . Children could establish an individuated sense of self in relation to both, . . . masculinity would not become tied to denial of dependence and devaluation of women. . . . (It) would reduce men's needs to guard their masculinity and their control of social and cultural spheres. . . . and would help women to develop the autonomy which too much embeddedness in relationship has often taken from them. . . . Personal connection to and identification with both parents would enable a person to choose those activities she or he desired, without feeling that such choices jeopardised their gender identity. (p. 218)

Leaving aside the social, economic and cultural revolution that would be required to make equal parenting a reality for the average family, the claim that it could so fundamentally change the nature of sexuality and gender identity can be sustained theoretically only if psychic reality is held to be determined, in the last instance, by social reality.

Sexual orientation and the pleasure of the erotic

It is this type of account, then, which underlies *The Sexuality of Men* and which limits the range of issues that might otherwise have been explored. Discussion of male sexuality in the book is dominated by the way in which the structure of the modern family suppresses the 'relational potential' of boys and leads to emotional illiteracy and deprivation in men. It is not surprising that, like Chodorow, the authors place so much faith on shared parenting as the main strategy for overcoming this deficiency in men. In the words of Tom Ryan: 'The active presence and participation of fathers in the early nurturing of their children may provide a less

defensive, softer model of masculinity' (Metcalf and Humphries, 1985: 27).

There can be little doubt of the positive effects that shared parenting would have on the emotional lives of men, not to mention the benefits it would bring to children in general, to the relationships between men and women, men and men, and to the employment and other public aspirations of women. One should be warned, however, not to regard such a change in child-rearing as a panacea. First, it would not be an easy change to bring about at the macro or the micro level (see Ehrensaft, 1981). Secondly, it may well bring other problems with it, such as the emotional repercussions for the child and the legal question of custody should the parents wish to separate. However, the view that the resultant blurring of the familial division of labour would have a positive impact on gender models, gender stereotyping and related gender characteristics is not here disputed.

The problem is that by concentrating so overwhelmingly on this issue, the authors come close to defining sexuality solely in terms of gender characteristics. In a book entitled *The Sexuality of Men* and one which includes articles relating to male heterosexual and homosexual erotic desire, symbolism and imagery, one might have expected two other equally important aspects of sexuality to be explored in more depth. *the acquisition and experience of heterosexual-homosexual adult genitality; the pleasure of the erotic.*

In relation to the first aspect, adult sexual orientation is treated as a function of the process of separation from the mother, within a family structure in which primary childcare is exclusively undertaken by women. I will return to the theoretical underpinnings of this approach to sexual difference below. For the present let us consider the impact on this process of a family structure in which both parents mothered.

Chodorow believes that 'primary identification would not be created in the first place' (Chodorow, 1978: 218). The authors of *The Sexuality of Men* are more cautious: 'Primary identification with the mother would still continue but rather than being feared and denied it would come to be accepted and appreciated' (Metcalf and Humphries, 1985: 27). Chodorow's position is the logical conclusion to arrive at and Tom Ryan gives no reason for his caution. Is it too cynical to conclude that perhaps he is more aware than Chodorow of the minefield into which this particular reasoning is likely to lead? Does not it suggest that without primary

identification there would be no need for repression, no castration complex, no Oedipus complex, no unconscious? Presumably, therefore, there would be no need for the whole psychoanalytic enterprise the insights of which the authors regard as fundamental to an understanding of sexuality. Would children simply continue their original 'polymorphous perversity' or 'bisexual disposition' (Freud, 1905; 1977, 1938; 1987) into adulthood or would they 'choose' their genitality? Would the current social approbation of heterosexuality be replaced by an ideology of sexual pluralism, and if not, what mechanisms of reproducing the dominance of heterosexuality would or could replace the present familially-produced psychical ones? Or is there a silent assumption of an innate biological tendency to heterosexuality at work here?

In relation to the second aspect, the pleasure of sex for men appears to derive from 'a whole bundle of emotions which seem to have little to do with the erotic' (Metcalf and Humphries, 1985: 5). It is said that men's emotional needs for affection, tenderness, dependence, are largely unrecognised and often denied. Men shun direct emotional interaction because they do not have the language with which to communicate. Sexual activity is the only legitimate channel through which these needs can be met. Men, it is said, seek sex because 'it is our only entry back into the subjective' (p. 4). The root of this displaced activity is traced once again to the structure of the modern family. It is because women mother exclusively and male infants so completely identify with them, that the adoption of male gender identity requires such a complete abandonment and rejection of all traits, feelings and characteristics associated with that early relationship. It is assumed that with shared parenting, other channels of emotional gratification would become available and the 'driven quality' of male sexuality would dissipate.

This sounds all very plausible but there is something rather odd about the argument, particularly when put in its crudest form by Vic Seidler: 'We go for sexual contact as a way of fulfilling our needs for dependency. . . Often we end up attempting to fulfil a whole range of separate, even contradictory needs in our sexual contact' (p. 161). It appears that the authors regard this as a regrettable state of affairs which could be considerably improved were other means of emotional interaction possible for men. This assumes either that sex could be divested of its psychical baggage and returned to some pure erotic, dare one say, biological state, or that sex will be satisfying only when men are able to differentiate

clearly their needs and recognise which ones are demanding satisfaction. Neither of these assumptions are at all in keeping with the insights of psychoanalysis from which the book derives its motivation.

What is even odder, however, is the assumption that this phenomenon is an exclusively male affair. Research evidence on the meaning of sexual contact for women suggests that it consists of the same confusion of desires, demands and needs also often unsatisfied. If this is the case, it can hardly be said to be caused by emotional ignorance and illiteracy since it is claimed that the 'relational potential' is so much more highly developed in women.

One would not wish to deny the importance both to men and to their partners of improving emotional literacy and increasing their willingness to acknowledge the importance of emotional forces and inter-personal dynamics in human affairs, including those ostensibly 'zweckrational' in character. However, what is missing from this analysis of male sexual drive is an account of the erotic pleasure involved. The impression one gets from *The Sexuality of Men* is that underneath the surface posturing, sex for men is (or should be) a very 'worthy' activity, earnestly pursued, albeit for the most part unknowingly, for a more profound gratification than sheer pleasure. Discussion of the erotic is limited to relating certain cultural products e.g. images of women in pornography, to certain socio-economic structures, e.g. women's position in society, while sensual enjoyment of the erotic itself is neglected. Indeed it could be suggested that *The Sexuality of Men* itself is an ironic reflection of Andy Moe's description of pornography as 'alienation from pleasure' (p. 58).

It is in the treatment of the erotic that the text smacks particularly of a hair-shirt penitence, as though in the post-permissive era, it is inadmissible that pleasure should be pursued for its own sake. To those women who view with interest the development of an autonomous consciousness-raising movement among men, the neglect of an honest discussion of male pleasure seems like another formal genuflection in the direction of feminism while evasive action take place. Credibility is even more stretched when we are asked to believe the following:

We (men) so exhaust ourselves at work that we have little left for our emotional and sexual relationships. We are drained and empty. We are oblivious to the economies of our energies. But because we are so exhausted it is difficult to listen to demands

when we get home. The truth is we have wasted ourselves at work. (p. 159)

This description hardly coincides with many women workers' experience of their male colleagues' work commitment, but most peculiar of all, given female employment participation rates, is the assumption of the little woman at home waiting for her man to return to assail him with emotional demands.

The patience of the most sympathetic reader is even more sorely tried when this kind of piety is coupled with intellectual pretentiousness as in the final chapter, 'Fear and Intimacy'. The book's attempt to get *beneath* the cliché that men have trouble communicating emotionally, is here undermined by a mixture of the obvious, the vacuous and the inconsequential, exemplified by the following:

Freud showed that men's behaviour is not guided by the light of impersonal reason. He made us aware that we are vulnerable creatures who can be deeply hurt in our personal relations, though we do everything to flee this knowledge of ourselves. (p. 154)

While the statement is not untrue, we needed no Freud to tell us this. Indeed it is almost a universal proposition about human nature, any number of names could have been substituted. But, in any case, in the form presented above, it is so self-evident as to be banal. In an attempt to give commonplace observation an intellectual heritage and standing, the piece is peppered with allusions to Marx, Gramsci, Freud, Reich, Laing, Foucault, Lacan and several other unnamed structuralists. However, since these allusions are never systematically developed or related to each other, one is left with an impression of pompous name-dropping.

This is particularly galling, since the author spends a great deal of space in the essay taking all and sundry to task for intellectualism. The message of this sermon is that intellectualising is just another male defence to avoid confronting emotional experience and it is to this raw material that men must turn to get to the truth about themselves. Unfortunately, Vic Seidler does not practice what he preaches.

The sad thing is that none of this is at all necessary. Developing an understanding of male sexuality at the theoretical level, in therapy or in the practice of everyday life is a perfectly justifiable project and one long overdue.

Conclusion

The general problems raised in this article have been illustrated by but are not confined to the pages of *The Sexuality of Men*. These kinds of questions reveal the general inadequacy of the sociology of gender for understanding those aspects of sexuality which cannot be reduced to a function of the contemporary family structure. Despite the recent interest in psychoanalysis by writers in this field, its insights tend to have been appropriated in such a way as to convert them into mere psychic mechanisms through which socially appropriate gender characteristics are transmitted. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the neglect of such issues as sexual orientation and sexual pleasure. This is a consequence of the inability or the unwillingness to confront the psychical dimension in its own terms and not as a product of the social. This is partly an effect of the adoption of a type of object-relations perspective which equates the level of psychical life of the infant with the level of reality at which maternal care is delivered.

The key issue with regard to sexual difference is the distinction between need and desire. Freud argues that the first sexual pleasures are experienced in relation to the vital processes of the body, such as feeding and defecation. However, these pleasures are soon pursued in their own right independently of the needs which are satisfied by the vital functions. The child evokes the remembered pleasure in a phantasised image of the means of satisfaction. In Freud's words, 'The first wishing seems to have been a hallucinatory cathecting of the memory of satisfaction' (Freud, 1900; 1976: 757–8). As such it is the prototype for the operation of desire and the first instance of erotic representation. Phantasy – conscious, subliminal and unconscious – is therefore the mechanism by which such 'wishes' are expressed and fulfilled.

It should be clear from the above that for Freud, desire is not the same as need. Needs are directly related to their somatic referents and are satisfied by fixed objects. Desire is only indirectly derived from somatic function and its objects are diffuse. The relationship between desire and any 'real' object is never direct but mediated and transmuted by phantasy. When we say, 'I don't know what she can possibly see in him', we are reflecting on the impossibility of understanding desire as the relation between a subject and an external love-object, unmediated by the play of the unconscious.

As recent writers have pointed out (Adams, 1983; Sayers, 1986) the object relations school replaces the concept of desire with that of need, and substitutes the relationship to the real mother for the relation to the phantasised mother. This is a function of their overriding concern with issues of dependence/independence. Their starting point is the socially required outcome of all child rearing, i.e. an autonomous, self-confident individual conscious of her/himself as a coherent integrated subject distinct from others. The task of supporting the development of the differentiated ego from a state of absolute dependence is ascribed to the mother (either on biological grounds or on grounds of social convenience). The child's needs *can* be satisfied if the real mother 'manages' the child adequately. The child *can* be weaned away from the dependence on the mother and brought to recognise its difference from her with the minimum of anxiety or ambivalence, if its emotional environment is managed carefully, a process that 'can be done well by only one person. . . the ordinary devoted mother' (Winnicott, 1964: 24).

This is the view of good child care and the role of the mother that has become part of the conventional wisdom of modern paediatric practice and from which the normative criteria of childcare organisations are derived and intervention justified. Inasmuch as many of its derived practices are beneficial to the welfare of children, they are not to be dismissed or easily replaced. However, while such practices may well satisfy the infant's *needs*, they cannot satisfy the infant's *desires* as Freud conceived them, for control over the child's phantasies is not within the mother's power, nor, indeed, are the mother's own unconscious wishes. Inasmuch as the type of care the child receives and the quality of the relationship with the family are important factors in the construction of the psyche, such pedagogic advice may ease the anxieties attached to the processes of psychical development, but it cannot abolish them precisely because the psychical life is more than a simple reflection of real family life. Desire and the representation of desire construct a phantasy relationship to the mother and father which is constantly at play with the relationship to the real mother and father. It is this dimension that has been lost in *The Sexuality of Men* and nowhere more clearly than in the treatment of sexual difference.

Starting with dependence/independence as the organising principle, sexual difference is seen as the outcome of the child's growing awareness of gender *role* differences and the association

of these with anatomical differences. Thus, 'people with penises behave like x; people without them behave like y'. Ergo, in the case of boys: 'I have a penis, therefore I must *not* behave like y'. Masculine gender is thus acquired by the boy's denial of his pre-Oedipal experience of oneness with his mother. This reduction of sexual difference to gender difference is further betrayed by the language used to describe this process:

At the same time the child is learning to differentiate between others and itself, it is also 'modelling' itself on the mother, i.e. identifying with the mother. The various fundamental tasks such as walking, talking and holding objects are learned, in fact, through *imitation* of the primary caring person, the mother. . . . Thus, identification with the mother is the beginning of identity and the basis from which later identifications are formed. What is important to our understanding of male gender identity is that in order for a boy to develop masculinity he must give up his identification with his mother and identify with his father. (Metcalf and Humphries 1985: 20, emphasis added)

This last sentence is entirely in keeping with a Freudian account of the acquisition of heterosexuality but it is directed on to sociological terrain by the subverting usage of the term 'identification' earlier in the paragraph. There it is equated with its everyday usage – imitation – and reduced to a psychological mechanism of role learning. For Freud, identification with a part-object, a characteristic of a person or a whole person, is always an outcome of the psychical processes involved in desire/wish fulfilment. It is never a simple process of modelling on one person. Thus, male gender identity is not just about the acquisition of socially appropriate gender behaviour. It is not just about boys imitating their mother's behaviour and then switching to imitate their father's. It is also about sexual desire and its object choice and the erotic phantasies to which it gives rise and on which it feeds. Research findings overwhelmingly suggest that this dimension of sexuality is not acquired by copying, nor, I would argue, is it best understood by this type of Freudianised social learning theory. Some recognition of this problem can be found in the chapter, 'Gay Machismo', but unfortunately it is not pursued theoretically either by its author or by other contributors. A serious consequence of this inadequacy is that it vacates the terrain to those who, while accepting the cultural relativism of *gender*-related behaviour would assert the

innateness of sexual difference. It thereby undermines the radical challenge to conventional views of sexuality which Freud launched some eighty years ago.

This, of course, is not the intention of the authors of *The Sexuality of Men*, nor indeed of many others working in the general field of sexuality. In fact, as has already been acknowledged, the strength of the book lies in its insistence on the importance of psychoanalytic insights for understanding the construction of masculinity and femininity. That it ultimately fails in this respect is because the insights gained are redefined within a pre-given hierarchy of commitments. The commitment to 'a materialist stance' and to socialist politics ultimately over-rides the intellectual commitment to a non-reductionist theory of male sexuality. The exploration of the boundaries of social relations and the psychical domain, the identification of points of intersection, of mutual conditions of existence are displaced by the imperative of finding strategies for changing institutions in ways that will liberate men and women from the social and emotional straitjackets deriving from the current sexual division of labour.

Important though this is, it does tend to lead to a temptation to condense a number of different problems into one and to pin one's faith on a hopeful synthesis of plausible theories. It may just be that the best we can do is to be prepared to live with a certain level of inconsistency and contradiction in the theories we hold about different aspects of human life and to recognise that whatever strategies for change we develop, they will incur costs. *The Sexuality of Men* illustrates the difficulty of relinquishing the desire for a coherent universe. However, elusive, a general theory which integrates the psychical and the social is eternally seductive

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Colonial science and dependent development: the case of the Irish experience

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Abstract

This paper draws on recent studies of colonial science and of the social function of science in the underdeveloped world to analyse the social development of science in Ireland and, subsequently, the Irish Republic. It is suggested that after the Act of Union scientific activity in Ireland became prized as a cultural practice, largely isolated from its local context and potential local applications. Because of government priorities in the new state and because of the Anglo-Irish character of much of the scientific culture, this isolation persisted after Partition. The recent history of science in the Irish Republic is interpreted in terms of this isolation or marginality.

Introduction¹

In the past fifteen years dependency and world-system interpretations of social change have wrought a great alteration in our perception of the economy, polity and culture of the 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' world (see for example Frank, 1967, Wallerstein, 1974). Although they now face increasing opposition (Berger, 1987: 115-39, see also the essays in Seers, 1981) these interpretations have, among other achievements, encouraged the critical study of the role of science and technology in underdeveloped regions. Contrary to the benign assumptions of earlier, diffusionist models of the spread of Western culture and modernity, recent studies have often characterised the scientific estate in underdeveloped areas as 'alienated' (Clark, 1980: 78; Cooper, 1973: 5-6; Vessuri, 1986: 25-31). On this view scientific workers in the underdeveloped world typically find that their training, their scientific communication and their institutions direct them towards an

agenda set in the West. Their work frequently has very limited local relevance and there is little resonance with other aspects of local culture (Herrera, 1973: 22-9; Goonatilake, 1984: 91-119, Choudhuri, 1985). Those who attempt to integrate their science with local concerns receive little scientific recognition. Under these circumstances, in Cooper's words, 'science in underdeveloped countries is largely a consumption item, whereas in industrialised countries it is an investment item' (Cooper, 1973: 5-6).

The interest of these authors is largely concentrated on the search for structural reasons for the continued alienation of science and on evaluating proposals for science policy in underdeveloped countries. In most cases their aim is to assess the post-colonial position rather than to examine the history of the scientific enterprise in their region (but see Goonatilake, 1984: 1-21). However, their interest dovetails with a growing body of historical literature on colonial science. Here again recent work has rejected the diffusionist assumptions of early models of the growth of science outside the European centre (see Basalla, 1967; Jarrell, 1987). Analysts have begun to draw distinctions which reflect the ways in which the growth of science is influenced by details of the colonial context. For example, Inkster has drawn attention to one crucial distinction which he illustrates by reference to Japan and Australia: in the former case the spread of science requires 'the penetration of indigenous science and culture by Western science, culture and technique' whereas, for Australia, 'the spread of science is the Western scientific community' (Inkster, 1985: 686). In areas whose settlement resembles the Australian case, the influences on the shape of the scientific community would be intimately related to the factors such as geographical remoteness, the rapidity and nature of settlement, the scientific 'celebrity' of the natural environment (for an outstanding case see Dugan, 1987), and eventually to struggles over political supremacy and dominion status. In other cases, however, one would anticipate that scientific culture and scientific institutions would have been embroiled in more or less open political struggles from an earlier stage. Such a distinction between, effectively, the setting up of a European country overseas and the control of a large, settled indigenous population by a small number of European colonialists is also recognised by Jarrell (1987: 327).

Diffusionist assumptions have been countered in other ways also. MacLeod, in a synthesising account of colonial scientific relations in the British Empire has emphasised how scientific

developments mirrored economic and strategic demands: 'The politics of science were embedded in the politics of the wider Empire' (MacLeod, 1987: 233). The growth of scientific institutions in the colonies and the gradual devolution of scientific authority were dictated not so much by the diffusion of scientific knowledge and skill per se as by the growing need for the local management of the complex resources of empire. As the rhetoric of empire became more federal so did the recognition of the worth of the colonies' science increase.

As historians study further the conditioning effects of imperial development on the scientific institutions of the colonies, their work draws very near to the interests of the analysts of dependent science. However, for a variety of reasons (including the authors' own geographical location) most published historical work has dealt with cases of settler societies such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the early-independent American States (but see Jarrell, 1983a; MacLeod, 1974). These countries have not, clearly, been the ones selected by dependency theorists (although a case could be made for regarding, for example, New Zealand in this light and Canadian/US relations also). In this paper the focus will be on a society in which the settlers formed a minority of the population and for which at least some recent economic and social analysts have embraced a dependency model: Ireland and, subsequently, the Irish Republic (Wickham, 1986; O'Dowd, 1986).

Science and the colonial interest

Dependency theorists' interpretations of colonial relations differ most radically from diffusionist views in regarding economic behaviour towards the colony as primarily exploitative. Where Basalla chooses to emphasise the early scientific significance of the exploration of botany, geology and zoology in the colonies, this portfolio of sciences also has a clear economic rationale (Basalla, 1967: 611; MacLeod, 1987: 222, 231). This point is too obvious to require further discussion. But colonies could also serve further practical but non-economic ends, for example, in the testing of social and legislative policies (Lee, 1977: 20-7; MacLeod, 1987: 227). And science too could be harnessed for other than directly economic objectives. As Basalla notes, 'Anthropology, ethnology, and archeology' often number among the scientific

pursuits to be followed from an early stage. Such a development, he asserts, is to be viewed as 'a product of a scientific culture that values the systematic exploration of nature' (Basalla, 1967: 611). That these values were effectively foremost in the case of ethnologies of the colonial period may readily be doubted. For this is a topic which, in the Irish case at least, has lately excited much interest. Attention has centred on the extent to which the practices, results and objectives of ethnology served to provide a legitimation for colonial control and a justification for the low social positions to which most Irish people were restricted.

Clearly the scientific study of race could not escape from presuppositions about the racial groups to be recognised in the first place. A widespread division between 'Saxons' and 'Celts' or 'Gaels' was recognised even by those who wanted to argue for the distinctive but equal virtues of the Irish. For others, such as Daniel Mackintosh (FGS), the divide was less symmetrical. The ethnic types he identified were founded on details of physical appearance. Thus the Gaels, being characterised by such features as 'nose short, upturned, frequently concave, with yawning nostrils', contrasted with the Saxon: 'Nose straight and neither long nor short' (Mackintosh, 1866: 15, 17; see also Curtis, 1971: 16-22; 1968: 36-48). The author also identified associated mental traits indicating, for instance, that Saxons were 'persevering in pursuits admitting of variety, but unadapted to purely mechanical or monotonous occupations', while Gaels he found 'deficient in application to deep study, but possessed of great concentration in monotonous or purely mechanical occupations, such as hop-picking, reaping, weaving etc.' (Mackintosh, 1866: 16-17)

Such qualitative conclusions could even be injected with some arithmetic rigour as with John Beddoe's 'Index of Nigrescence' which was intended to allow comparison of the colours of people from different localities. It was derived by subtracting the total number of fair and red-headed persons from the sum of dark and twice the black-haired persons. Coupled with the assumption that racial affinities were best preserved in hair, eye and skin colour, this index permitted Beddoe to demonstrate that as one travelled from east to west in the British Isles the population became increasingly melanous and to suggest that in all probability the most western Celts were descended from Africans. He chose the term 'Africanoid' to refer to these westernmost peoples (Beddoe, 1885, Curtis, 1971: 19-20).

These scientific assessments of the characteristics and affiliations

of the Celtic populations of the British Isles became fused with contemporaries' historical and political commentaries. Such analyses purported to show such things as the inevitability of British triumph, the ill-adaptedness of Celts and other races for independent government and the need for British control over economic and business matters (Williams, 1966: 37-58). In this manner therefore the content of colonial science can be seen to have a connection to the aims and requirements of colonial control. In a manner which has become familiar through studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge, we can see how the shape of colonial science was influenced by the social problems and preconceptions of the colonial period. This is not of course to say that these views were generated *in order* to justify colonial administrations; rather the interest which guided research and the setting up of categories was dominated by the colonial context.

The purpose of introducing this example is not to imply that such intimate connections between scientific views and colonial needs represented the typical state of affairs. It is rather to illustrate how scientific developments can be seen to have reflected colonial relationships and colonists' objectives in ways additional to straightforward economic exploitation.

Colonialism and the history of science in Ireland:

(a) *Cognitive colonialism*

The example just introduced leads one to anticipate as one likely scientific expression of the colonial relationship that there would exist strong connections between the content of Irish science and the economic or political basis of colonial control. In other words, one would expect to find a relationship at the level explored by the sociology of knowledge. According to a recent study by Bennett (1985) this is not however the case.² Using scientific biographies and contemporary dictionaries, he undertook a survey of nineteenth-century scientists native to or settled in Ireland and reported no apparent connection between the substantive content of the theories supported or claims put forward and the political or religious affiliations of the scientists. The fact which helps make sense of this finding is that the scientists of this period were overwhelmingly Protestant and, within that, mostly Church of Ireland. Irish science was at this time firmly Anglo-Irish: Bennett

records only 10½ per cent Roman Catholics in his sample and between 62 per cent and 79 per cent Church of Ireland. This impression is confirmed in a celebratory article on the importance of Irish contributions to scientific knowledge where Herries Davies finds at most only seven out of the fifty scientists surveyed to have been from the majority Roman Catholic population (1985: 305). Accordingly, the basic social and political divides which have commonly been found to accompany marked divergences of scientific opinion were largely absent from the scientific community in Ireland. It is noteworthy in this regard that the instances of 'scientific' racial assessments presented in Curtis' reviews (1971) derive overwhelmingly from commentators based in mainland Britain; they are generally not the products of Irish scientists.

One can also cite earlier evidence which supports Bennett's and Davies' findings. Hoppen reports that the Dublin Philosophical Society founded in 1684 had but one Roman Catholic member and 'he took little part in its proceedings' (1970: 25). Trinity College, although somewhat equivocal in its attitude to the new philosophy (Hoppen, 1970: 63-4), provided many of the new society's members. And its exclusion of Roman Catholics (as students until 1794 and as full Fellows to 1873) could only have contributed to this imbalance, even if religious tests were not always rigorously imposed (Dowling, 1971: 164; McDowell and Webb, 1982: 213 and 256). To some extent the Protestantism of Trinity was to its scientific advantage but this influence on its intellectual shape was not decisive. Thus, under Cromwellian influence, Miles Sumner was appointed to the newly-established Professorship of Mathematics in 1652 to train students, including soldiers, in the techniques of surveying but his salary lapsed at the Restoration (McDowell and Webb, 1982: 19-20; Hoppen, 1970: 62). In the eighteenth century Trinity's cautious Whiggism was neither a strong encouragement nor an obstacle to science and 'In 1736 the undergraduate course in Science was clearly still modelled on the course prescribed by Laud a century before' (McDowell and Webb, 1982: 46).

The generally unfavourable scientific situation of Roman Catholic sector of the population was however magnified by developments having little to do with the Protestant classes. In seeking an alternative to the Queen's Colleges – which had been set up (very slowly) on a national level in the 1840s – the Roman Catholic Hierarchy decided to establish a Catholic University in Dublin but left the organisation to the English Catholic intellectual John Henry Newman (Dowling, 1971: 165-7). His plans turned out to

be too exalted for the level of demand with which they were met (Jarrell 1981: 150–1). Thus while there appears to be a Protestant hegemony in science it is not clear that it is one consistently contrived by the Protestants and it is far from clear that the hegemony was used to develop cognitive structures with a decisive colonial stamp. As 'West Brits' – to put it anachronistically – Anglo-Irish scientists were engaging in intellectual exercises and disputes familiar to England and their cognitive resources were being applied to issues of a fundamentally similar kind.

(b) Internal colonialism

An alternative interpretation of the changing pattern of scientific organisations can be presented in relation to the notions of dependency and underdevelopment. During the eighteenth century Ireland enjoyed considerable prosperity. Associated with this was a desire to match the economic achievements of England and a reasonable expectation that this could be achieved. The pre-conditions would seem to have been met: Dublin was the second city of the empire and Ireland had both a large population and a high population density. At the same time there were outstanding institutional scientific innovations including the Dublin Society for Improving Husbandry, Manufactures and other useful Arts and Sciences (1731) and the Physico-Historical Society of Ireland (1744). The ambitions of the first of these was well expressed in its title (it later became the Royal Dublin Society) while the latter organisation was committed to undertaking county surveys (although only four were completed). The goals of these societies, particularly the Dublin Society, have been regarded as well tailored to a national economic spirit, a spirit which was subverted by the Act of Union. According to Johnston, who subscribes to this view, there persisted into the early nineteenth century 'in Ireland a strong, optimistic and, in a sense, patriotic, scientific culture, which had originated in the pre-Union "belle époque"' (1983: 58). But this culture was soon to disappear in the new economic and political context.

The general argument here is that, under the relatively independent eighteenth-century parliament, Irish science had been encouraged in a way fitted to the country's situation. The Dublin Society did have activities of apparent utility: thus there was the Society's garden at Summerhill which functioned as a form of experimental agricultural plot; there was a programme of

afforestation with financial inducements to plant trees; detailed advice was published on the cultivation of flax and the production of linen; and by 1795 a programme of public lectures on scientific topics had begun (Meenan and Clarke, 1981: 12–13 and 23; Kelham, 1967: 298). Various commentators have seen elements of decline in this scientific profile as the Irish economy, polity and institutions came under increased British domination after the Act of Union. This decline is associated with the British underdevelopment of Ireland which is held to have set in anew at this point. On this interpretation, the long-developing growth of English strategic and economic control over the other areas of the British Isles finally resulted in the outright imposition of English control over Irish affairs; the treatment of Ireland as an (internal) colony became explicit (Hechter, 1975: 68–73; Jarrell, 1987: 336–41).

Certainly, economic aspects of underdevelopment or of a colonial relationship became pronounced. The Irish economy was opened up (albeit gradually) as free trade with Britain was gradually imposed and British taxation was introduced to recover from the expenses of the Napoleonic wars. Central economic institutions such as the banks were also influenced by English practice rather than by local needs. As Lee has noted, Irish banks modelled themselves on their English counterparts rather than the continental European style of investment banks (Lee, 1977: 19–20, Daly, 1981: 80–2). With no settled brief to encourage or invest in local enterprises the banks were free to export huge amounts of capital and to contribute to Irish investments in English manufacturing. At the same time, although debates over the proper role of state intervention in the national economy and levels of investment were enormously popular in England, the Westminster parliament was chronically reluctant to interfere with the market forces which were doing much to damage Irish economic performance.

Certain developments at the level of scientific institutions appear to be explicable in the light of this tendency. Both the Dublin Society and the late eighteenth-century Royal Irish Academy found that as recipients of state support they became the object of unwelcome attention. As early as 1815 members of the Academy's council were blaming the Act of Union for their downturn in fortunes (McDowell, 1985: 23). It was not simply a question of the British administration's want of enthusiasm for this type of learned society. In the case of the Dublin Society which offered public education and performed quasi-state duties it was felt that such matters should not properly be left in the hands of

private individuals (Kelham, 1967: 298–300). From 1853 the great bulk of Irish scientific activity was concentrated under the control of one English-based ministry: the Department of Science and Art. Under its control consistency was introduced into the Irish institutions and in many cases they came increasingly to be modelled on English exemplars (Jarrell 1983a).

Jarrell illustrates this relationship through three examples: the Royal Dublin Society; the Museum of Irish Industry and the Geological Survey of Ireland. In the first case he records how the Society was obliged to give way to the changes demanded by the British administration. This was most commonly over small matters such as the Sunday opening of the Botanical Garden at Glasnevin (1983a: 336) – a dispute which symbolised the differences between a private garden collection and a public one such as that at Kew. It also concerned plans to merge the Society with the Academy to form a Royal Society of Ireland which would also entail the Society surrendering many of its educational and exhibitionary functions (McDowell, 185: 54–67; Meenan and Clarke, 1981: 36–8).

Jarrell's second example is the museum originally founded by Sir Robert Kane as a museum of economic geology and broadened in the following year, 1846, into an institution for the promotion of Irish industry. The foundation of the museum was accomplished under the first British department concerned with scientific areas, the Office of Woods and Forests. The initial response of the Department of Arts and Sciences on taking over in 1853 was favourable, increasing salaries to the equivalent of the comparable London institution. However, London took a continued interest in the amount of work being undertaken by museum staff and harboured serious misgivings about Kane having an appointment in Cork as well as in Dublin and at his associate, William K. Sullivan, having a post at the Catholic University as well. The London-based administration was now dealing with museums in Dublin and South Kensington and Jarrell records how much less generous they were to the former than to the latter (1983a: 341).

The last example Jarrell gives, the Geological Survey, differs from the other organisations in being under metropolitan control from the outset. Even its operation was compromised by London's requirements though. Thus, when its buildings were required for London's planned new college of science the survey was moved but was forced to leave behind its collection of rocks and minerals for use in the new college.

Jarrell has certainly disclosed ways in which the metropolitan control was progressively exerted and of the ways in which it clashed with the desires and organisational arrangements currently prevailing. The implicit argument that, by this control, the London administration underdeveloped or exerted a malign colonial influence is less clear. He appears to acknowledge this uncertainty himself when he states (1983a: 347):

The act of union seemed to have cut off any possibility of a more general unification of Irish science under Irish control during the nineteenth century. Whether a local parliament would have organised scientific institutions in a different or better way is moot.

If we look at instances which do fit the strong colonial model we find two good examples supplied by Jarrell. One relates to the geological survey. By 1900 the principal survey of England and Wales was completed and the geologists had been put to work on a drift survey; such a development was not planned for Ireland. We are told that in response to this the *Freeman's Journal* complained of unfairness 'because the drift survey was for agricultural and economic purposes and, therefore, Ireland required one too' (1983a: 344). This does appear to offer a good case of English requirements dictating a course of affairs which is out of step with the colony's need. One could well imagine that Ireland, being proportionately more dependent on agriculture, would find the drift survey even more important than would the English and Welsh. Yet the decision was made the other way round. The second good example concerns local reaction to the downgrading of the role of the Museum of Irish Industry. Jarrell reports that this proposal 'touched off a quasi-nationalist controversy in Dublin towards the end of 1867' and that 'the activities of the Department of Science and Art [were] likened to the pillage of Ireland by English soldiery' (1983a: 337).

In these two cases we find evidence both that developments in scientific organisations may have operated counter to the economic interest of the Irish island and that local people regarded them in this light. Most of the other developments and administrative alterations are not however shown to have these features and are in fact attributed to struggles between different administrative systems. Moreover, there is certainly evidence that Irish people did not themselves agree about the direction in which scientific

developments should go' for example Jarrell notes that Kane was opposed to the direction taken by the Catholic University in Dublin (1983a: 340) There is even some evidence from Jarrell that the London administration was taking account of local needs. He cites Department minutes which recorded the belief that a proposed Dublin Science and Art Museum should be 'under the direction of Irish management, a sister to, but not subordinate to, the English institution' (1983a: 339). Although we may have good reason to suppose that colonial powers would have had an increased interest in regulating and overseeing the growth of scientific organisations at this time, Jarrell does not show us that, in the Irish case, this was done in a distinctively colonial way nor in a way detrimental to indigenous science. It is clear that Britain took an interest in Irish science and that this interest was presumably related to the new perception of science 'as a tool for national development' (1983a: 330) To what extent, though, can Irish science be said to have been actively or effectively shaped by colonial interests?

The colonial interest and Irish science

Allusion has already been made to three sorts of ways in which science in Ireland appears to have been subject to British colonial influence and to have furthered British interests: first, by justifying political differences on a racial basis, second, by setting up a university professorship as the head of a surveying school; and third, by granting precedence to projects in England over those in Ireland even when they might have been of greater utilitarian benefit in the latter century, as was the case with the drift survey. There is also the weak sense that Britain controlled all important institutions in Ireland and the control of science simply followed suit. But it is unclear that intervention *per se* is enough to allow us to view such control as acting in the imperial interest. The argument to be put forward in this section is that in fact an important influence of the colonial power was an influence of omission.

There are two components to this claim. On the one hand, although as Jarrell notes there developed a large-scale British concern with the administration of science, British science was not as economically significant as was the case in other European countries. Just as marked as the scientific achievements of nineteenth-century England were the complaints about the lack of

professional regard for science and the low level of importance attached to science and technology by government and prominent persons. As has often been stated, England's industrial revolution did not depend on technical changes introduced by natural philosophers. New industrial machines were generally pioneered by people of practical experience and even in areas, like geology, where scientific and practical advances appeared to be happening at the same time, there was little communication between scientists and practitioners who were divided by a great social gulf (Porter, 1973; Russell, 1983: 96–133). In this sense Ireland was being colonised by the wrong kind of scientific power from the point of view of rapid economic development. It was not so much that English control enforced on Ireland a colonial view of science which was ill-adapted for economic and social development; England merely extended its own contemporary view of science. As in England, Irish people of all religious affiliations frequently sought a route out of poverty through agriculture, service and the traditional professions and not through innovative, science-based opportunities (Lee, 1977: 17–18). And, in this context, it should be borne in mind that economic improvement was not denied to the majority population even through very traditional means. tenant farmers could become comparatively wealthy since land was commonly let at fixed rents for several decades with the result that climbing food prices greatly benefited the tenants (Daly, 1981: 19).

On the other hand, the ready equation of colonial control over science with local economic hardships overlooks the complex nature of the connection between the two. There could be scientific activity of great topical and public interest, such as the Leviathan telescope of the third Earl of Rosse at Birr Castle (Clarke 1973: 296); there could be science of truly international quality such as William Rowan Hamilton's algebraical work on optics and dynamics (O'Donnell 1983: 99–109), yet there was no guarantee that these scientific successes would relate except very indirectly to the wider public and economic adoption of science.

Ireland was thus faced with a twin problem. It was politically and economically subordinated to a central power which, even at the 'core', was far from maximising the economic benefit of science. And there was no certainty that scientific excellence would in any case bring economic benefits. Under these twin circumstances it was easy for science to become practised and valued as a *cultural* activity. Scientific attainment might be

esteemed but it would be evaluated alongside other cultural accomplishments, not in terms of its utility. At a societal level this had two consequences. First, the practice of science, virtually limited to a pastime of the Anglo-Irish minority, was culturally divisive. Secondly, given the connection of wealth to land ownership in agricultural Ireland and the absence of a machinery binding science and industry, there was little practical basis on which an applied science could develop. This did not entail that Irish science was parochial; indeed, it was aimed at an international audience – itself moving away from England at that time to European centres of excellence. Great skill at science could readily be subculturally significant while, at the same time, there was no systematic incentive to concentrate on economically important science. From an analytical point of view, the practice of science was largely alienated from its social context in the sense outlined at the beginning of this paper.³

Added to this, the relative smallness and overlapping nature of the scientific community encouraged a tendency for concentration in a limited number of scientific areas. The community was concentrated in Dublin, with many people holding more than one post, and with the leading people belonging to the same institutions and societies (Jarrell, 1983: 340–1; McDowell and Webb, 1982: 66–8). Thus, for example, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century mathematical physics in Dublin attained international standing. A small research tradition of science developed around specific practitioners (see Lopponen 1984: 139). This can perhaps be compared to the appearance of a 'tradition' of post-Borg Swedish tennis stars.⁴ Isolated blossoming of scientific talent can occur which, for socio-cultural reasons, generate concentrations of excellence. These points of excellence are, in Darwinian terms, selected for completely different attributes than one might wish if one were pursuing the best science for the purpose of socio-economic development.

To state that mainstream, intellectual science was societally alienated does not of itself indicate that there was no institutionalized scientific or technical activity which aimed to be relevant to the economy. Indeed, in the nineteenth century there were a small number of ventures in technical education,⁵ but they too demonstrate a disarticulation from apparent socio-economic requirements. The highest level institution, the Royal College of Science was founded in 1867 to assume and elaborate the teaching functions of the Museum of Irish Industry and, to a lesser extent, of the Royal

Dublin Society. At its foundation it had four faculties: mining, agriculture, engineering and manufactures (largely commercial chemistry) (Kelham, 1967: 297–300). It was not long, however, before agriculture was discontinued, as had also happened with the agriculture faculties in the Queen's Colleges (Kelham, 1967: 306). Nor did the other subjects enjoy much greater success. Kelham reports that for the rest of the century attendance was extremely low: 'Frequently there were only six students left in the [whole] second or third year' (1967: 304). Moreover, only a minority of the students were Irish, there were many English pupils (Coolahan 1981: 121). Thus, although the college sought to provide 'a complete course of instruction in science applicable to the Industrial Arts' (Kelham 1967: 300), it did not meet with local demand.

No sustained attempts were made to provide technical instruction for younger students and at a less advanced level until the 1890s. Legislation introduced in 1899 provided for technical education to be funded through rates levied by local authorities (Durcan, 1972: 132–3). But the centres for technical education faced severe accommodation problems and were met with a shortage of trained teachers; moreover, although the element of local funding could have led the courses to be responsive to regions' socio-economic needs, this hope was poorly realized (Coolahan, 1981: 89–90, 95). Coolahan argues that this neglect of technical education was copied from England's policy. But whereas England was shocked out of its complacency in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the success of its continental competitors, 'Ireland, which did not experience the same spur of industrial competition, waited longer and the establishment of a co-ordinated system of technical education in Ireland is a twentieth-century story' (1981: 83). There was thus no substratum of technical education or training which could have offered an alternative model of economically-orientated, non-alienated science.

On this interpretation, the important characteristics of Irish science in relation to economic and social development are only indirectly attributable to the colonial power. Economically beneficial science was not denied to Ireland and the development of scientific organisations was not strongly retarded. Neither did cognitive developments in Irish science match the colonial interest at an ideological level (see Outram, 1986: 46). Instead the influence of Britain was felt through the encouragement of the unco-ordinated British attitude to science. The kinds of scientific

study to which this led (astronomy, mathematics, palaeontology) could be held to be poorly calculated to meet the island's economic needs. But this apparent disfunctionality arose from the practice of science as a cultural, internationally-directed activity rather than from direct underdevelopment

The structure of recent Irish science

A partial test of this interpretation can be conducted by examining the state of post-Partition Ireland. If the disfunctionality of colonial science were imposed and directed by offices of the colonial administration then one would anticipate large changes after independence. A review of the recent provision for science in Ireland will allow this possibility to be investigated.

A useful comparative basis for a consideration of the recent Irish case comes from a statistical survey of the scientific output of different countries which was published in the late 1970s (Frame, 1979). This study looked at countries' scientific productivity in terms of the number of scientific publications in major journals and sought to correlate productivity with measures of national wealth. The authors claimed that when the correlation was examined the nations fell into two distinct groups. For both groups the correlation between wealth and output was good but the 'equation' linking output to wealth differed. The two groups corresponded, not unexpectedly, to the industrialised and the less-developed countries.

The chief interest of this statistical overview for present purposes, however, is what it incidentally reveals about the output of Irish science. The Irish Republic came out as low in both absolute scientific output and in national wealth amongst the group of industrialised nations. But when its position is compared with the 'prediction' of the regression equation it is evident that the output of scientific papers is considerably higher than would have been anticipated from its economic condition. Indeed, along with the UK, the Irish Republic stands among the few conspicuous outliers in the direction of 'over-productivity'. The study's author is concerned chiefly to account for the generalities observed rather than the position of particular nations. In many cases (in particular concerning less-developed countries) he relates the amount of science states engage in to their perceived economic needs although for some African states he acknowledges that the pattern

of research may be related to a colonial residue rather than to any calculation of current economic appropriateness. In the case of the Irish Republic also one can interpret the higher than average productivity of scientific papers in terms of institutions and arrangements which pre-date the formation of the state. Thus, the Royal Irish Academy emphasises the production of science of an international quality while the universities encourage work at the forefront of science (McDowell 1985: 1-92; Davies, 1977); these institutions foster the development and publication of science appropriate to international standards and in leading journals. This, along with the ease of publishing in English (and English is the language of most of the journals which figure in citation indices), would readily account for the high pure scientific profile.

The results of this survey are of very limited value in assessing the socio-economic value of nations' scientific output. The volume of scientific papers is a poor measure of economically significant scientific and technical research since, for example, the current economic leaders in the West, like Japan and West Germany, tend to emphasise aspects of technical research which are unlikely to yield publications in the same way that basic science does. High publication productivity may even occur in those countries where science contributes least directly to economic success. But if one turns to information available in Irish official statistics, one finds that this apparently high basic science productivity does not go along with high levels of other forms of scientific activity. The GERD/GDP ratio (a measure of how much of national wealth is expended on research and development as a whole) is still generally lower than other small European countries and significantly lower than the average for western states. In 1979 the figure for Sweden was 1.9 per cent, for the Netherlands 2.0 per cent; for Norway 1.4 per cent; and for Finland 1.1 per cent while the Irish Republic's figure was 0.8 per cent (NBST, 1983a: 5).⁶ The value of the ratio even fell between 1979 and 1982 to 0.7 per cent (NBST, 1983a: 5, 1983b). Thus, while the commitment to academic science appears to be high by international standards the same is not true for R&D as a whole. Further, the distribution of research effort into particular areas also displays some curious features. Academic research falls into a faculty and departmental structure which would be recognisable in other European universities whereas, according to an OECD report of 1974, the national R&D effort was skewed away from the general and justifiable pattern (1974: 34):

The exceptional character of the structure of Irish R and D in this respect is brought out by the fact that 45% of economically oriented R and D is located in a sector – agriculture – which accounts for 17% of GDP whereas the industrial sector – normally regarded as the science-intensive part of a modern economy – accounts for about 35% of GDP and only 42% of economically oriented R and D expenditure.

This passage from the OECD refers to national R&D expenditure figures; for governmental expenditure alone the situation at the time of the report was even more pronounced with the figures standing at 66 per cent for agriculture and 14 per cent for industry (1974: 34). Even in 1983 the governmental allocation for industrial R&D had only just overtaken the sum designated for agriculture and forestry, both having approximately one quarter of the R&D allocation (NBST, 1983b: 23).

Taken together these indicators imply that there exists a lack of alignment between the characteristic interests of academic scientists *and* the governmental R&D sector *and* economists' estimations of the nation's R&D requirements. This pattern, which conforms with the suggestion that science is practised as a cultural activity directed to an international audience, does not differ in its general character from the picture generated of pre-Partition science. However, these statistical indicators can only provide an outline image of scientific activity. Continuity of structure can only be shown through historical evidence. Briefly expressed, three principal influences can be identified

First, in the upheaval of rebellion and the ensuing civil war many of the institutions central to the fate of science were ironically unchanged because they came low on the list of priorities. Even the term 'Royal' was retained in the description of the Academy and the Dublin Society. While the Academy did face a challenge from a proposed National Institute, its rival's progress was thoroughly hamstrung due to divisions among nationalists (McDowell, 1985: 82–5). At the same time the prospects for the wider dissemination of science were hindered by educational policy. As Akenson makes clear, early Irish governments had no real education policy outside the issue of the teaching of Irish, indeed from time to time a minister for education was missing altogether (1975: 26). An early start was made on the policy for Irish language in schools. Time had to be made available for it in the school day and this was done by eliminating 'elementary science,

hygiene, nature study and most domestic studies' from the list of obligatory studies (1975: 44). By 1934 greater provision for Irish was being demanded and mathematical study was correspondingly reduced (1975: 48). Admittedly technical education had been subjected to some reform in 1930/31. Since, as we have seen, technical schools were financed through local authorities they lay under secular control and the government felt more free to take action about them (Coolahan 1981: 95). None the less, the emphasis of the schools was kept to 'severely practical' matters for fear of appearing to trespass on the Church's authority over general education (1981: 97). But even this limitation was insufficient and by 1942 religious studies and a greater role for the Irish language were being encouraged in technical education: 'Cultural studies became more central to vocational schools and their role in the restoration of Irish as a vernacular language became more emphasised' (1981: 98-9). The joint effect of these developments was to reinforce the minority, Anglo-Irish identity of science.

Such an identification was further fostered by the more general 'cultural implosion [of] the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s' (Akenson, 1975: 39). The cultivation of an Irish cultural identity and the shrinking away from external cultural models produced, in Fanning's words (1983: 128), a society dominated by 'a search for the common ground of a national identity fostered by the state where civil war differences would be no barrier to consensus and of which the Irish language and the Catholic religion were the distinguishing marks'. The cultural emphasis was on political independence, spiritual and non-material values and frugal living. Science, as such, was neither extolled nor opposed. But in so far as it was an activity of mainly urban, economically-advantaged, Anglo-Irish persons it stood at a disadvantage. Even the utilitarian arguments which, elsewhere, were being taken on board by scientists to enhance the public appreciation of the value of their work were not calculated to appeal to frugal values or to supporters of a traditional economy.

Finally, economic conditions in the decades after Partition were not calculated to foster links between science and manufacture. Industry, which might be thought a natural ally of science, had been long protected from external competition, either by a tariff wall or the exigencies of war. Industrialists were not inclined to look to science for innovation. Successive governments had sought to shield new industries, many of which then took advantage of the protection offered as an excuse to wax 'fat on the profits to be

made in the [protected] home market' (Fanning, 1983: 144). Thus by the time of the emergence of a new economic outlook in the 1950s, an attitude favouring modernisation of industry and agriculture and the ending of extensive protection for domestic production, science was poorly resourced and of low cultural value. Although policies then began to be reversed, changes were slow to take effect; even by 1960/61 the natural sciences and engineering represented only 21.2% of the university population as against a figure of 40.1% for the culturally conservative state of Northern Ireland (Osborne and Cormack 1985: 344). It was to be nearly a decade before Regional Technical Colleges were established to encourage students into higher technical education (Randles, 1975: 274).

Conclusion: The Irish case in comparative perspective

In this study, two principal interpretations of the social development of science in colonial and post-Partition Ireland have been examined: the first drew upon the sociology of knowledge; the second was based on the theory of dependency or underdevelopment. In the first case, although some scientific beliefs appeared to closely reflect colonial interests, such a pattern did not appear widespread. Rather, scientific activity was largely confined to the Anglo-Irish community and disputes did not correspond to ethnic-political divisions.

This result might encourage adherents of the second viewpoint. While some pronounced examples of apparent underdevelopment do arise, it is far from clear that in these cases the colonial power was pursuing its own economic interest or that indigenous scientific arrangements would generally have been more beneficial for Ireland. The underdevelopment interpretation also sits uncomfortably with the continued dislocation of science from socio-economic needs after Partition.

What does appear is that the colonial relationship encouraged a growth of science as primarily a *cultural* activity. In some respects this merely mirrored the position of science at the core. This tendency was, however, intensified by the agricultural (non-industrial) basis of wealth in Ireland and by the minority status of most scientific practitioners. The resulting smallness of the scientific community further encouraged the emergence of 'hot-spots' of excellence not necessarily related to perceived socio-

economic needs. Thus while the colonial relationship cannot be said to have suppressed useful science, neither did it foster science of any great utility. The inutility of science arose because of science's predominantly cultural status. Once institutionalised this pattern persisted into post-Partition Ireland yielding for several decades a scientific community displaying many signs of marginality.

If this interpretation is correct, the question naturally arises: how typical is this development of science as a cultural activity? A brief comparison between Ireland and another small, peripheral, formerly-colonised European country can throw some light on this question. Finland was a Swedish colony until 1809 when it was annexed to Russia as an autonomous Grand Duchy; it became fully independent at the time of the Russian Revolution. The nineteenth century witnessed a great development of Finnish national culture for, as Stolte-Heiskanen (1988: 4) notes: 'In the relatively static agrarian society the immediate aims of social development were the creation and consolidation of national culture rather than the economic transformation of society'. Educational opportunities for Finnish speakers increased greatly towards the end of the century but industry was still concentrated in the Swedish-speaking areas. Under these circumstances scholarly attention focused principally on 'national knowledge', concentrating on history, language, folklore and, in the natural scientific area, on 'mapping and taking [an] inventory of the natural resources of the country' (Lopponen, 1984: 130; see also Stolte-Heiskanen, 1988: 4). While science and technology were commonly associated with the aim of national development, there was far less consensus about whether priority should be given to agricultural or industrial development. This disagreement led to delays in the development of university structures and, before the end of the century, state research institutes were established in many fields (such as forestry research, geology and agricultural science) instead; these institutes continued in the decades after full independence. In reviewing the development of science policy in Finland, therefore Kaukonen (1987: 23) concludes that up until the 1950s 'Science [in the broad "Continental" sense] was mainly seen as a cultural activity'. By this he means that the humanities were dominant in the Academy and in scientific societies. It took subsequent policy interventions to pull the 'utility sciences', as he terms them, to prominence.

There are interesting similarities to the Irish case here. But Finland's earlier effective independence meant that the attempt to harness science to national aims was made at an earlier stage of its

(science's) development. Equally, the Grand Duchy came into existence before there existed an elaborate scientific community. The pressures which appear to have isolated the practice of 'high' science in nineteenth-century Ireland were therefore largely absent. Indeed, so far were the natural sciences from marginalisation in nineteenth-century Finland that some of them were institutionalised in state agencies.

From this very limited comparison it is possible to conclude that the Irish case cannot stand as a general model. Study of the Irish case does, however, indicate one pathway by which the practice of natural science may become alienated in the colonial context and argues for a historical sociology of the development and ideological role of national scientific traditions.

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Notes

- 1 I should like to express my thanks to Richard Jarrell for his encouraging advice and to Steve Bruce for comments on an earlier draft of this paper
- 2 In a private communication R. Jarrell has informed me that his listing of nineteenth-century Irish scientists contains a similar religious composition. See also Jarrell, 1987: 341–2
- 3 The point about the cultural nature of scientific activity is also made by Jarrell (1983b: 31–44, see also 1987: 345–6). None the less he uses the term cultural with more of a stress on participation and recreation, in my terms, science can be cultural without being local, recreational or parochial. Cultural science can be aimed at a professional, international audience. I use the term to indicate that the science is not selected for local economic, strategic or other applied purposes
- 4 It has been pointed out to me that this analogy ignores the economic investment in tennis training facilities and so on. A better analogy would be with a gymnasium sport for which little in the way of specific facilities is required (say badminton or volley-ball). Sporting ignorance prevents me proposing names here
- 5 The need for an explicit treatment of the position of technical institutions was drawn to my attention by an anonymous reviewer, to whom I should like to express my thanks
- 6 The source for these figures is a pamphlet produced by the National Board for Science and Technology (NBST, 1983a: 5, second table). It might be thought that these figures would give a better indication of a nation's propensity to spend on science if they were calculated in terms of wealth per capita rather than GDP. When this calculation is done for the five countries mentioned here Ireland does come out above the regression line (i.e. it spends more on R&D than the equation suggests a country of its per capita wealth would). Further analysis,

using data from more countries, would be beneficial here. None the less the GERD/GDP ratio is the one which Irish science planners appear to use in their publications and is enshrined in international comparisons used by planners (see Ronayne 1984: 71–4)

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Research note: Citation and social mobility research: self defeating behaviour?

Sara Delamont

Abstract

The citation patterns of schools of researchers studying social mobility in Britain are examined, and systematic neglect by each school of the work of the others demonstrated.

The publications by Payne (1987a, 1987b) from the Scottish Mobility Study are a welcome event. However, they crystallize an anxiety felt by outsiders to the 'core set' (Collins, 1985) of social mobility researchers in Britain. Instead of bringing together all the research on mobility in Britain into one cumulative (or contrastive) account, Payne, like all the other scholars writing on this topic, produces partial reviews of the literature.

This research note demonstrates that the various investigators on social mobility in modern Britain have *all* failed to address the empirical findings and theories of their competitors writing on the same topic, and then argues that benefits would arise from an adequate synthesis.¹

The problem demonstrated

Since Glass and his colleagues (1954) studied social mobility in post-war Britain, the topic has been of central interest to many sociologists. A number of projects have been conducted focused on social mobility and the grading of occupations in various parts of Great Britain. The ESRC (1987) *Horizons and Opportunities in the Social Sciences* singles out 'studies of stratification' as one of British sociology's major strengths. Most of the authors have published journal articles over the years, but this note focuses on

the monographs that have been produced, to show that the research is not being built into a cumulative database.²

To any disinterested observer, Britain in the last twenty years has seen four major surveys which gathered material on samples of English or English and Welsh men (a) Hopper (1981), (b) Richardson (1977), (c) the Oxford Mobility Study (Halsey, Heath and Ridge, 1980; Goldthorpe, 1980 and 1987), and (d) the Cambridge Study (Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn, 1980). There have been four projects on Scottish men (d) the Cambridge Group (Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn, 1980), (e) the Scottish Mobility Study (Payne, 1987a, 1987b), (f) the Project on Occupational Cognition (Coxon and Jones 1978, 1979a, 1979b, Coxon, Davies and Jones, 1986), and (g) and follow-up of the Scottish Mental Survey (Hope, 1984). Scottish mobility issues have also been illuminated by the research produced over the past two decades by McPherson and his colleagues on males and females. (See Gray, Raffe and McPherson, 1982; McPherson and Willms, 1987) There has also been one Irish project from which no monograph has yet appeared. The authors of all these studies are selective in their citation of the others' publications and fail to compare and contrast their instruments, methods, findings or theories systematically. There is no secondary source which enables us to compare or contrast all these studies. Heath (1981) cites very little of the work done outside Oxford, and his review, like Newby's (1982) paper for the SSRC has been made to look rather dated by the spate of publications during the 1980s. Halsey (1978, 1986) is accessible but does not recommend the reader to much research other than that of his colleagues at Nuffield.

With the honourable exception of the work emanating from McPherson and his co-workers, all the projects can be criticised for excluding women though Newby (1982: 53-5) highlighted their neglect and Heath (1981) used secondary sources to examine female mobility. This complaint and the subsequent debates have received ample space in *Sociology* in the 1980s. Other problems with the research have been neglected, and these will be the focus of this note.

The projects and publications based in England do not convey clearly whether their findings apply to the whole of the UK or only to one or two of its constituent nations. No Scottish-based project dares to suggest that work in Scotland is applicable to the whole UK without justifying that suggestion. Several of the English-based projects write glibly of 'Britain' without a single caveat. No

Scottish-based team could ignore all English studies with impunity but the failure of researchers based in England to address the issues raised by McPherson, Hope and Payne, has apparently passed uncensured. Both the Oxford and Cambridge-based groups ignore the material on Scotland gathered by the Scottish Mobility Survey based in Aberdeen (Payne, 1987a, 1987b) while talking loosely about Britain.

At present, the failure of leading scholars to address the work of others is the most striking feature of the literature on mobility. Goldthorpe is a case in point. His theories about the class structure, the categories of occupational classification sociologists should use, and other related matters have been controversial for twenty years. Normally Goldthorpe does not deign to debate his position with his critics. Thus, Hopper (1981: 2) claims that the whole of the Oxford Mobility Project was a waste of public funds because the research team, particularly Goldthorpe, had failed to read, or perhaps to understand, Hopper's theories and research. To an outsider, this appears to be a fundamental criticism, yet Goldthorpe has not published a reply. Hopper's monograph does not even get cited in Goldthorpe (1987), or in Payne (1987a, 1987b). Hopper himself fails to articulate his own critique of Goldthorpe in his monograph, and then does not cite most of the other work on the topic compounding his own isolation. Goldthorpe may find Hopper's approach deeply flawed, but he has not explained his objections for the rest of us. Nor has he addressed the theories of the Cambridge-based research team associated with Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn (1980).

Goldthorpe, Hopper and the Cambridge team are all united in one respect, however. All three have studiously avoided discussing the research of the Coxon and Jones Project on Occupational Cognitions (POOC). Coxon, Davies and Jones summarise the *credo* of POOC as follows:

the first stage was concerned to demonstrate that the theories (of social stratification and mobility) adhered to by many traditional sociologists did not stand up to empirical test. The second, by contrast, sought to develop an approach in which the conceptions and articulations of real people were given pride of place in a new description of the occupational structure. (1986: 49)

Admittedly, the original publications from POOC were densely written, very technical, and made few concessions. Yet the other

researchers on social mobility who have ignored them were the best qualified scholars in Britain to extract the message of POOC from those three volumes. Now there is a summary written for the intelligent laywoman (Coxon, Davies and Jones, 1986) that excuse has vanished. In all four books the main focus on the POOC critique has been Goldthorpe's work (Coxon and Jones, 1978, 1979a, 1979b), yet Goldthorpe has not been prepared to discuss these implications in print. His second edition does not mention Coxon *once*.

Heath's (1981) account of the field omits many studies including those of Richardson (1977) and the Cambridge Group (Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn, 1980). Hope (1984) has published an analysis of Scottish men drawn from the mixed Scottish Mental survey of 1947, in which he fails to cite the research of almost everyone else investigating social mobility in the UK. Hope's work shows that the issue is not simply a neglect of Scotland and Scottish researchers by English ones. Payne's new books (1987a, and 1987b) fail to cite Hopper, or deal with the work of Coxon and Jones (1978, 1979a, and 1979b). Coxon, Davies and Jones (1986) themselves fail to cite Hopper, Hope, Richardson, the McPherson team, or Payne, and thus confound the problem of lack of mutual citation. Newby's (1982) review ranges wider than the others considered here, but still fails to include Richardson (1977), any of the papers produced by Payne and his colleagues during the 1970s, Hopper (1981), or Heath (1981) in his citations.

Citation patterns, as the work the new historians and sociologists of science have shown us (e.g. Edge 1979, Gilbert 1977, Law and Williams 1982) are not measures of academic worth. Rather they serve rhetorical and networking functions. The failures of scholars to cite other relevant work tells us something about academic networks among mobility researchers. The most devastating way of demonstrating that another scholar is not part of the in-crowd is to leave them out of debate all together – to render them invisible.

Ironically, the emergence of Goldthorpe into public debate on the topic of women and the class structure *in itself* gives greater credence to the criticisms of stratification theory as sexist than to the challenges from Hopper, Coxon and Jones, or the Cambridge Group. As Harry Collins (1985) points out, in any academic area engaging in a debate automatically gives greater prominence and credence to the ideas one tries to discredit.

However, there is more at stake here than the fascinating spectator sport of 'spot the social network from the citations'. Two

important academic tasks need attention. First, all the studies on social mobility of men in Wales, Scotland and England should be brought together into one composite account. Second, the challenge of the approach used by Coxon and his colleagues should be answered. Only when experts have done these two tasks can non-specialists feel comfortable that they have the whole picture.

It would be naive to assume that pulling all these bodies of research together will be easy. The sampling, instruments, occupational classification schemes, and theoretical perspectives are all different. However, such a synthesis would be invaluable for the non-specialist.

It is time that a commentator who has a proper grasp of the mathematical models, no favouritism for any one project, and an understanding that Scotland is part of Britain, reviewed all the extant data on class, stratification and related issues to establish what is known about men in Britain.

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Notes

- 1 I am grateful to Pat Harris for typing this piece more times than anyone could reasonably expect. Barry Cooper, Tony Coxon and Peter Davies all read it in draft, but are not responsible for the ideas.
- 2 The failure of many authors to cite other people's work is a failure to cite journal articles and conference papers which appear in advance of monographs. I have not given details of all the articles here, but, for example, Payne's papers are cited in his two books (1987a, 1987b).

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Review article:

Middle mass and the pitt: a critical review of Peter Saunders's sociology of consumption

Roger Burrows and Tim Butler

Social Theory and the Urban Question (2nd edn)

Peter Saunders, Hutchinson, London, 1986, paper £8 95, 310pp

Abstract

This review provides a critical commentary on the sociology of consumption recently developed by Peter Saunders in the new edition of his *Social Theory and the Urban Question* and elsewhere. Comment is made on the politics of socialized consumption, the sociology of consumption sector cleavages and the concept of a privatized mode of consumption. Note is also made of the methodological critique of realism and the assertion of a Weberian alternative which underpins the contribution. It is argued that although the approach provides some insights it tends to get locked into a series of unproductive conceptual and methodological polarities in its attempt to undermine the supposed hegemonic position of Marxism within contemporary urban studies.

In the same manner as earlier theorisations of the urban question the 'new urban sociology' has been unable to sustain an analysis of a spatially delimited set of institutions and practices which possess their own specificity (Saunders, 1985a). However, it has been argued that the substantive concerns of the approach, when disarticulated from a concern with matters spatial, provide the basis for a new sociological research agenda based around issues of consumption (Saunders, 1986a: 289-351; Saunders, 1988b). This agenda, although it retains continuities with urban sociology, also exhibits the influence of the work of Pahl (1984) on the sociology of economic life, the 'post-Marxist' writings of Gorz (1982; 1985) and the ideological climate of the 'new right' (Green, 1986). The

boldest statement of this agenda has been presented in the closing chapter of the second edition of Saunders's *Social Theory and the Urban Question*, which attempts to respond to the call from Gans (1984) for a 'third paradigm'¹ in urban studies which seeks to 'focus on and emphasize people's experiences and interests as consumers rather than as producers' (Saunders and Harris, 1987: 1).

This paper reviews Saunders's sociology of consumption. We shall argue that although it offers some insights into the current dynamics of British society it is a *reactive* rather than a *proactive* perspective. We view it as an attempt to undermine the supposed hegemony of Marxist discourse within urban studies via the construction of a set of concepts and procedures which are, for the most part, the polar opposites of Marxian categories. As such it does little more than substitute one set of exhausted concepts with their conceptual opposites. However, Saunders's argument is still an important and complex one which demands a serious sociological engagement. In our view it would be a mistake in rejecting his political prescription – as we would wish to do – to deny out of hand the analysis leading to it.

A commentary on Saunders's sociology of consumption

1 The politics of socialized consumption

Saunders begins his analysis by deconstructing class-reductionist models of consumption processes. His argument is that an assertion of the analytic distinctiveness of consumption is *not* an argument for its complete autonomy from production. Production and consumption are related, but the relationship is interactive, not unidirectional. Production influences consumption in that it is a materialist truism that societies cannot consume what they have not produced, and it is the case that different locations within the relations of production tend to correspond with differential consumption capacities. On the other hand, consumption influences production in that societies tend not to produce what cannot be consumed, and different consumption practices generate differential potentialities for production. However, Saunders concludes that one can still make a useful analytic distinction between the two spheres because although 'interrelated, they are also distinct processes shaped to some extent by different factors' (Saunders,

1986a: 292). Thus, whilst class location is largely a function of the operation of labour and commodity markets, consumption is a function of this class position *and* the political 'logic' of state provided services, *and* the ability to engage in self-provisioning (Pahl, 1984, 1988; Pahl and Wallace, 1985). This observation, Saunders argues, implies the need for a *dualist* analysis of the two spheres.

The dual politics thesis consists of an attempt to locate the four major areas where political intervention and mobilization in the spheres of production and consumption differ. These are identified by Saunders as (i) the different 'social bases' mobilized, (ii) the different political modes through which this mobilization occurs, (iii) the 'level' of the state at which these different mobilizations occur, and (iv) the different ideologies which inform state activity in each sphere. His discussion of the different social bases mobilized is derived from a development and critique of a Marxist literature – Castells, Habermas, O'Connor and Offe – which argues that a distinction can be made between two different state functions: to maintain accumulation and to support people's consumption requirements. These two spheres of intervention coincide with two different types of social cleavage. Interventions within the sphere of production tend to relate to a class base, whilst interventions within the sphere of consumption tend to relate to a social base formed around sectoral cleavages. Following Cawson (1978, 1982) he further argues that while class-based producer interests tend to participate in more corporatist forms of state institutions, consumer interests generally tend to organize around more competitive or pluralistic state forms. Thus class based production issues tend towards 'closed' modes of interest mediation, whilst consumption based issues tend towards more 'open' modes. Further, there is a relationship between these different modes, the social bases to which they are 'attached' and the 'level' of the state at which they manifest themselves. Production based issues tend to be located at a 'higher' level of the state than consumption based issues. Thus the central state is primarily concerned with production, whilst the local state is primarily concerned with consumption.² Finally, Saunders argues that there is an elective affinity between the ideological beliefs of state managers and the level of the state at which they are located. Thus, managers working within the central state tend towards a 'capitalist ideology', whilst managers working within the local state tend towards ideologies of public service and citizenship. This

ideal type thus aims to identify the different processes which, in aggregate, lead to the state both supporting the interests of dominant classes and responding to the demands of less powerful groups. It is thus an attempt to solve the theoretical problem of the relative autonomy of the state discussed at so much length by writers in the 1970s.

From this Saunders derives two propositions. First, that the state will tend to act in the interests of capital the more its interventions involve issues of production, the more corporatist its mode of interest mediation, the more centralized its functioning, and the more key agents possess a capitalist ideology. Second, that the state will tend to act in the interests of more 'popular demands' the more its interventions involve issues of consumption, the more competitive its mode of interest mediation, the more localized its functioning, and the more key agents possess an ideology of public service and citizenship rights.

However, Saunders concludes his discussion by pointing out that despite his deconstruction of economic models of consumption, it is still the case that issues of production take priority over issues of consumption. The point is worth quoting at length because he underplays it later on in his analysis. He states that the

'politics of production' tend to set limits on the 'politics of consumption' . . . the concern to safeguard capital accumulation takes priority over the concern to cater for social need, the corporate bias tends to prevail over demands expressed through democratic institutions, the centre tends to extend its control over the locality, and the ideologies of private property tend to take precedence over ideologies of citizenship . . . there is an unequal relationship . . . for consumer interests are subordinated to producer interests on all dimensions (Saunders, 1986a: 311)

This dual politics thesis has already been the subject of much debate (Cawson, 1978, 1982; Cawson and Saunders, 1983, Duncan and Goodwin, 1982; Harrington, 1983, Saunders, 1986b). It has been argued that the demarcation between production and consumption is invalid; that the elements within each political dimension do not coincide; that it is eclectic, ethnocentric and ahistorical; that it is functionalist and reductionist, and that it deals inadequately with external and internal influences. However Saunders's defence on almost all of these points is exemplary, and

we would agree with him that the *substantive* approach has 'proved itself' (Saunders, 1986b: 37). However, although it is the strongest element of his proposed sociology of consumption it is also the least important from the point of view of any criticisms that one might wish to make of his overall project. The dual state thesis is rooted in a substantive – if not a methodological – research tradition with which we have little disagreement (Saunders, 1986b: 2–11).

2 Consumption sector cleavages

Saunders argues that just as class relations are determined by the (non) ownership of the means of production, so the main cleavage within the sphere of consumption is determined by the (non) ownership of the means to fulfil consumption requirements. Thus, the major consumption sector cleavage is that between those people who can meet their consumption needs through personal ownership of the means of consumption – the 'middle mass' – and those who cannot, and are thus reliant upon the state to provide it for them – the 'residualised underclass'.

Saunders attempts to analyse the historical development of this cleavage by offering an account of the processes which have led up to it. He claims that three different modes of consumption can be identified within a British context over the past 150 years. a *market* mode, a *socialized* mode and a newly emerging *privatized* mode. In the nineteenth century the primary form of consumption was provided through the market and the main contradiction was between low wages and high costs of consumption. This contradiction provided the context within which a more socialized system of collective consumption developed. This socialized mode of cash benefits and payments in kind attempted to deal with the contradiction by supplementing wages and lowering consumption costs. However, this socialized mode has given rise to a new set of contradictions – expressed in terms of the 'fiscal crisis of the state' on the left, and theories of 'overload' on the right – and this has ushered in the latest mode of consumption – privatized.

The emerging privatized mode of consumption differs from the earlier market mode in that it often entails a state subsidy (the most notable example being tax relief on mortgage interest), whilst it differs from the socialized mode in that it has involved (i) an abandonment of any pretence of universalism, (ii) user charges being increasingly levied at an 'economic level', and (iii) many

socialized benefits being (at least in part) sold back to the private sector.

He argues that there is nothing inevitable about this shift from one mode to the next. However, he does point towards four sources which he suggests are underpinning the current restructuring process away from socialized and towards privatized provision. First, the observation that although social expenditures have increased this has not led to either a fall in deprivation *per se* (Townsend, 1979) or greater equality (Le Grand, 1982) suggests that the socialized mode may be in a terminal crisis. Second, there is a growing demand for privatized provision because of (i) people's disheartening experience of public provision coupled with the high costs incurred by taxation to fund it, and (ii) a real shift in preferences towards a desire for privatized consumption (a shift which has an essentially psychological basis to it, and which has occurred independently of (i)). Third, the increasing ability of the majority of the population to fund their demand for privatized provision. Fourth, due to the operation of the 'exit phenomenon' (Hirschman, 1970) the privatized mode is developing its own momentum which it may become difficult to halt.

In the long run he suggests that the socialized mode will be seen as a 'holding operation' between the market and the privatized modes of consumption. This developing privatized mode will, he argues, have deep implications for the British social structure. His central conclusion is that we are moving towards a position in which the majority of the population will be able to satisfy most of their consumption requirements through some form of market – subsidized where appropriate by the state – whilst the minority will be 'cast adrift on the waterlogged raft of what remains of the welfare state' (Saunders, 1986a: 318). Further, this cleavage between the privatized 'middle mass' and the 'marginalised and stigmatized minority' (Saunders, 1986a: 318) possesses its own specificity in that it is only contingently related to class, gender and ethnic divisions – the tripartite dimensions which have hitherto dominated sociological analyses of inequality. He goes further by arguing that this consumption cleavage is *at least as fundamental* as the traditional class cleavage in the determination of many spheres of people's existence and, especially with respect to housing, 'may actually come to outweigh class location' (Saunders, 1986a: 323).

This obviously has major implications for the political dynamics of society and the models of social justice with which we operate, because 'whereas the class system is constituted in such a way that

a minority excludes a majority . . . the divisions arising out of consumption reveal an inverted pattern' (Saunders, 1986a: 318). This process of 'restratification' away from class cleavages and towards consumption cleavages means that the 'metaphor of the "triangle" of power and privilege is slowly turning upside down' (Saunders, 1986a: 318–19).

Saunders then moves on to consider the mechanisms by which this consumption cleavage operates. He argues that our understanding of existing patterns of inequality have been 'fettered' by the dominance of theoretical frameworks which have their empirical anchors in the nineteenth century – a period in which location within the relations of production *was* fundamental to life chances. In contemporary Britain with over seven million people employed by the public sector and many more dependent upon state benefits it is 'no longer axiomatic that class location is the fundamental basis of material life chances' (Saunders, 1986a: 319). The consumption sector cleavages identified cannot be reduced to Marxian class or Weberian class, status or party schemas. They have to be understood as 'a distinct phenomenon of the distribution of power in the modern period' (Saunders, 1986a: 320).

The relationship between material life chances and consumption sector cleavages is a complex one. Although Saunders does not wish to deny that consumption practices tend to reflect some pre-existing class inequalities, he does argue that this position ignores two crucial points. First, that as the recent work of Pahl (1984) has demonstrated, social class can be a poor predictor of household consumption practices, more salient are the divisions between those with and those without paid employment, and between those households with single and multiple incomes. Second, that despite any variability across social classes within consumption sectors, this does not detract from the fact that such sectors share 'fundamental material interests in common' (Saunders, 1986a: 321). The most important factor here is the cleavage between privatized and socialized consumption sectors in housing. One reason for this is that owner-occupation opens up access to a myriad of credit facilities, largely closed off to tenants, which can fund other aspects of privatized consumption. But, the major reason is that the recent history of private housing in Britain indicates that the capital gains to be made from buying one's own home provides a rate of return on investment far higher than any other alternative (Saunders and Harris, 1988). The implications of this are fundamental for Saunders because with almost two thirds of the

British population now owning their own homes 'we are approaching a situation where millions of working people stand at some point in their lives to inherit a capital sum which . . . is likely to exceed anything they could hope to save through earnings from employment' (Saunders, 1986a: 324).

In relation to the political implications of these developments Saunders argues that consumption location is an important determinant of both voting behaviour and attitudes towards socialized and privatized modes of consumption. Crudely, political alignment in Britain in the 1980s can no longer be understood in class terms. Rather, the left tends to draw its support from a coalition of state sector workers and state sector consumers, whilst the right tends to draw its support from those working within and primarily consuming from the private sector.³ He argues that this political realignment is not just a product of ideological mystifications which undermine underlying *real* class interests, rather it must be understood in terms of differences in material interests within the sphere of consumption which possess their own specificity. As we have already noted, Saunders accepts that some of the shift towards privatized modes of consumption is the result of public discontent with much socialized provision, which is often due to politically enforced expenditure restraint, such that people are 'pushed' towards privatized consumption solutions. However, he also attempts to make a case for an autonomous demand for privatized consumption which exists independently of this pressure. This analysis, which is the least developed area of his argument, but upon which he implicitly builds many of his later political conclusions, consists of two points. First, he draws upon social psychology to argue that

private ownership seems often to be associated with personal identity . . . the opportunity to extend the scope of objects in one's environment in which one can claim some right of personal and exclusive possession may represent one means of asserting . . . self against the enveloping intrusions of 'mass society'. (Saunders, 1986a: 328)

Second, and leading on from the first proposition, Saunders argues that this attempt at assertion of self is part of a wider move amongst individuals to control some wider sphere of their lives than has hitherto been the case. He argues that few individuals can assert control within the sphere of production, but that privatized

consumption can function as an alternative outlet for this 'need'. Again central to this claim is the home. He argues that the demand for home ownership is underpinned by a desire to overcome the 'ontological insecurity' invoked by the ever increasing time-space distancing of advanced societies (Giddens, 1984), thus

'a home of one's own' is above all else a property right which ensures both a physical (spatially-rooted) and permanent (temporally-rooted, in perpetuity and across subsequent generations) location in the world where the owner can feel, both literally and metaphorically, 'at home'. (Saunders, 1986a: 329)

3 The implications of privatized consumption

Saunders next considers the wider social and political implications of privatized consumption. He begins by noting that despite the prolonged recession experienced over the last decade or so the much discussed 'crisis' of capitalism has not manifested itself. Rather than there being blood on the streets the general reaction on the part of the population has been one of hopeless resignation and fatalism. This reaction to the restructuring of the British economy has been accompanied by an increasingly explicit move on the part of the state to develop a new discourse of political legitimization constructed around an agenda which stresses individualistic solutions to what were previously considered to be matters dealt with in a more collectivist manner.⁴

These developments have been accompanied by a paradox. It has been the case that although the recession has bitten deep into the British economy, real earnings have continued to rise. Thus, on the one hand we have witnessed record levels of unemployment, degenerating inner cities, and a relatively declining per capita GNP, whilst on the other we have seen record levels of consumption. This has been the case because even with such high levels of unemployment over eighty per cent of people who could and wished to have paid employment did so. In short, Britain has become a 'dual society' in which the middle mass of the population has remained almost untouched by the recession – indeed many have been gaining during it – whilst the marginalized minority have had to take the brunt of it (Pahl, 1988). As already discussed, this cleavage cuts across traditional classes and has to be understood on a number of different social dimensions of which

Saunders considers region, skill level, economic sector, age and gender to be worthy of note. Thus the criteria for being thrown into the metaphorical pit of poverty and powerlessness under Thatcherism cannot be understood in traditional class terms, rather it has to be analysed in terms of 'fragments of the population' (Saunders, 1986a: 335), of which groups such as the elderly, one-parent families and black youth are particularly prevalent.

The consumer spending spree currently being indulged in by the middle mass is part of a process first identified by Gershuny (1978) a decade ago, which he articulated in terms of the emergence of a 'self-service economy'. For Gershuny the observation that the service sector of the economy has a lower level of productivity than the manufacturing sector, led to the proposal that consumption is likely to become increasingly home-centred as people find it cheaper (and, as Saunders has argued, more satisfying) to buy manufactured goods and use them themselves, rather than buying in services. In the original formulations of this idea it was suggested that this trend may be associated with the growth of the 'informal economy' and the decline of 'formal' employment (Gershuny and Pahl, 1979; Pahl, 1980), but since the publication of Pahl's *Divisions of Labour* few people now hold to this view – least of all Pahl himself (Pahl, 1988). For what he has so ably demonstrated is that 'formal' employment and the possibility of 'informal' work and self-provisioning tend to 'go together' rather than forming the basis of some 'getting by' indifference curve. This observation points to the most crucial line of cleavage within the sphere of consumption. Crudely, it suggests that employment, home ownership and privatized consumption are closely associated, as are unemployment, non-home ownership and a reliance upon socialized consumption. But again, Saunders is keen that this cleavage should not be seen in class terms. He suggests that the ability of households to engage in privatized consumption, 'informal' work and self-provisioning as opposed to being reliant upon socialized consumption is a function of whether household members are employed or unemployed, household structure more generally, especially the ratio of earners to non-earners, and the stage of the life-cycle of the household. This underpins the 'polarization thesis' implicit within much of Saunders's discussion. This posits that British society is shifting towards a situation with 'households busily engaged in all forms of work at one pole and households unable to do a wide range of work at the other' (Pahl, 1984: 314). As Saunders puts it:

the division between the employed and the unemployed tends to coincide with that between privatized and non-privatized consumers . . . the same people who work in paid employment and who also work most in the home are also those who make most use of the formal services purchased through the market. The line of exclusion is . . . drawn at around the same point no matter which aspect of resources we focus on . . . households which earn money are the households which provide for themselves are the households which buy private sector services . . . are . . . normally the households which own their own homes. (Saunders, 1986a: 339)

Saunders concludes with what must be one of the most confident statements in the recent history of British social science: 'I shall take this polarization thesis as given, for the evidence and arguments which have been marshalled in support of it . . . are . . . overwhelming' (Saunders, 1986a: 340). This said, he moves on to consider the implications of his analysis for social policy and the future of welfare, asking: 'How . . . could changes be instituted which might break down this depressing and frightening cleavage . . . between the new privileged majority and the marginalised minority?' (Saunders, 1986a: 340).

4 Social policy and the future of welfare

Saunders argues that the solution to the problem cannot be situated at the level of production, instead, as befits a proposal deriving from a sociology of consumption, he argues the solution must be seen in terms of enhancing the consumption capacity of the fifth of the population currently reliant upon the supposedly declining socialized mode of consumption. For Saunders the only solution to the problem involves not a defence of socialized provision, but an extension of privatized consumption via a shift away from state provision in kind towards state provision in cash. Such a shift, he argues, would transform social power relations away from those who currently control collective consumption provision towards those who use it. He argues that state consumption expenditures constitute some twenty five per cent of British GNP, of which almost half is already in the form of cash transfer payments. The other half is spent on state provision in kind, of which some eighty per cent goes on education, health and social services and twenty per cent on housing and transport

provision. He suggests that this state expenditure on provision in kind should be gradually reallocated in the form of cash to those people reliant upon socialized consumption to enhance their ability to engage in privatized consumption. Obviously cash payments would not be uniform, many of the majority middle mass households would receive no (or very little) extra cash, whilst many members of the currently marginalised minority would receive a substantial amount. Following Minford, he calculates that such a policy would, on average, provide each household with an extra two thousand pounds per annum at 1981/2 prices. Further, a minimum income level would be established to ensure that every household could purchase at least the degree of provision they 'enjoy' within the existing system.

This policy would, Saunders argues, have four fundamental effects. First, it would bring about a redistribution of income in favour of the worst off. Second, it is likely that it would involve a reduction in the costs of the majority of services due to the effect of increased competition. Third, it would break the emerging cleavage between net recipients and net donors within socialized welfare services. Further, such a system would be likely to reduce minority stigmatization, because as Saunders notes, cash shows no traces of its origins and thus in the market for privatized welfare all agents appear as customers and not, as under socialized provision, as stigmatized and dependent clients. Fourth, if Pahl (1984: 336; 1988) is correct, increased cash benefits would better enable all households to engage more fully in informal work and self-provisioning. Thus, in aggregate, more work would be done, and done in a way which allowed for an increased number of people to assert more control over key aspects of their lives.⁶

The overall justification for this 'consumptionist' position can be understood in terms of the arguments of the recent 'post-Marxist' work of Gorz (1982; 1985). Although he is not uncritical of Gorz's work, Saunders does agree with him that

in advanced industrial societies, liberation through the formal production sphere is almost certainly impractical. The sphere of consumption is as important and crucial as it is precisely because it is here that the potential exists for extending people's control over their own lives. (Saunders, 1986a: 347)

Thus, in the last instance his position appears to shift towards one in which consumption is given a primacy. Liberation can never be

achieved through changing the relations of production, instead we have to turn to the sphere of consumption, especially the home, in order to exert any sort of control over our lives,

Critique

Throughout the last decade the work of Peter Saunders has been central to the most fruitful debates within urban studies. However, the work discussed here involves a decisive theoretical and political break with the domain assumptions of that literature. This break is indicative of a wider sociological shift, of which Saunders is an important part, as many on the left are forced to come to terms with the fact that many of the old 'certainties' appear to have gone forever, and that there is a real possibility that Thatcherism, or some variant of it, will be with us for a good many years yet. Many are experiencing a feeling of anomie, as the restructuring of whole spheres of life change at a rate much faster than one's ability to understand and analyse them. Saunders throws many issues involved in this experience directly at us in a starkly provocative manner. His acceptance of many 'new right' motifs (Saunders, 1985b) in this respect is especially hard to take. However, an engagement with his analysis without resort to the sort of 'knee jerk' reactions that Saunders both expects, and for the most part has so far received, is a vital undertaking. All debates centred around the future of welfare (for that is what the sociology of consumption ultimately reduces to) are crucial within the present conjuncture. At times of personal and political uncertainty the best way to proceed is by means of engagement and exploration. It is in this light that our comments on Saunders' sociology of consumption, although essentially critical, should be viewed. We shall consider some substantive problems, his policy proposals and conclude by examining some broader theoretical and methodological topics.

Some substantive problems

Let us begin by stating that we find some elements of Saunders' analysis seductive. The concept of a privatized mode of consumption is a useful descriptive device which appears to broadly encapsulate the emerging organizing principles of welfare under Thatcherism.

However, the central notion of 'privatization' still requires a fuller account, as at the moment it is specified almost entirely by way of a contrastive juxtaposition with 'market' and 'socialized' systems, such that any clear positive specification of the actual mechanisms of welfare provision, financing and regulation being proposed under such a privatized system is impossible.

However, there are other elements of Saunders's project with which we are more concerned. First, although we accept that there does appear to be a social division emerging between relatively rich and relatively poor households, which existing approaches to the analysis of inequality have difficulties in coming to terms with, we are concerned that Saunders's model of this polarization is overdrawn and oversimple. Crudely, one is left with the impression that the middle mass of the population may be unproblematically equated with privatized provision whilst 'the underclass' may be equated with socialized provision. We would wish to problematise this association on three counts. First, as Saunders himself notes in passing, there is now a very significant literature which demonstrates beyond much doubt that it is the middle mass who benefit proportionately more from socialized provision than the poor (Le Grand, 1982, Goodin and Le Grand, 1987). Second, the fact that some seven million people are employed by the public sector does tend to point to the conclusion that a significant proportion of the middle mass are reliant upon the 'production' of socialized provision in order to finance their own supposedly increasingly privatized consumption practices. Third, as Forrest and Murie demonstrate through a series of local housing market case studies, although it does appear to be the case that socialized housing provision is increasingly becoming the domain of the 'non-working class' (Forrest and Murie, 1987: 5-9), owner-occupiers are by no means unambiguously part of the middle mass. There are often quite stark regional variations in the tenurial locations of 'marginal' populations.

Second, the supposed homology between the middle mass and privatized provision, especially in relation to home ownership, is developed by Saunders in order to argue for the essential 'unity' of the grouping as a political force. To what extent is Saunders correct to argue that owner-occupiers have a set of real material interests in common which possess their own specificity? Recent work (Forrest and Murie, 1987; Hamnett, 1987) would seem to suggest that Saunders is only partially correct. His analysis is a very 'southern' one, which begins to look somewhat suspect when

one attempts to apply it to the country as a whole. For example, Hamnett argues that although home ownership *per se* has comprised a source of accumulation not open to non-owners, rates of accumulation have been very uneven spatially. These differences in accumulative potential between regions are obviously positively related to the cost of housing; however, the house price/income ratios are much higher in high price regions than in low price regions. This leads to major differences in access and affordability. On the other hand, the size and quality of housing (i.e. the use-value) available for a given price is much less in high price areas than in low price areas. These observations lead Hamnett at least to conclude that as there is:

an inverse relationship between accumulation potential, housing costs and short term use-values at the inter-regional level . . . these marked . . . inequalities in accumulation potential, access, affordability and value for money . . . (make it seem) . . . unlikely that all owner occupiers share common economic interests or that owner occupation can give rise to common political pressure. (Hamnett, 1987: 28)

Thus, there seems to be some doubt concerning the analytic usefulness of regarding *all* owner-occupiers as constituting a social base from which some discourse of political unity may emerge.

Third, we are concerned with the analysis that Saunders offers regarding the explanation of how the current social polarization has come about. Although he points out that there is an homology between 'forms of work' and 'modes of consumption', he leaves the nature of the connection rather vague. There is now evidence concerning the complex restructuring of production which, if correct, would seem to explain the current polarization which manifests itself within the sphere of consumption. This is not to argue for a production based *determination* of consumption practices, but it is to argue for a more prominent role for the *articulation* of production with consumption. Crudely, the explanation goes something like this. With the supposed decline of Fordism, we have been witnessing the development of more 'flexible' forms of accumulation. This has involved the restructuring of production in a number of complex ways. However, the most important element in this process has been the creation of a majority 'core' workforce and a minority 'periphery' workforce. Workers within the 'core' tend to earn wages at a level which

allows them to support themselves and other members of their household. Workers in the 'periphery' however, tend to earn wages which, given the current manner in which social security payments are made, are only worth working for if they are added to another 'core' wage (i.e. 'component wages'). This is leading to the development of 'work rich' households (i.e. 'core' wage(s) plus 'component' wage(s)) on the one hand and 'work starved' households (i.e. no 'core' wage and no 'component' wage(s)) on the other (Pahl, 1988). It is this situation, which is primarily the result of restructuring at the level of production, which is then translated into the social polarization at the level of consumption. This consumption polarization then comes to take on 'a life of its own' in the way in which Saunders suggests. However, it is very difficult to conceptualise developments at the level of consumption without relating them to such issues at the level of production. However, within the context of his current presentation Saunders is in danger of his position collapsing into a consumption based determinism.

Fourth, we would wish to question the functioning of the 'inheritance factor' as an element of Saunders' overall schema. Although we do not doubt its current importance as a possible factor contributing to the reproduction of the middle mass, there are other scenarios which may considerably undermine its impact (Means, 1987; Murie and Forrest, 1980). Prime amongst these is the changing demographic pattern of Britain in which ever larger numbers of elderly people are needing to be 'cared' for by a smaller and smaller group of 'carers' (Falkingham, 1987). It would seem likely that the increasing cost of care of the elderly in a largely privatized system would absorb much of the capital appreciation from home ownership. Thus it could lead to a restructuring of inequality within old age rather than across generations.

Finally, we question the confidence with which Saunders accepts the empirical evidence in support of his sociology of consumption. Although he is now engaged in a study of his own in order to gain empirical evidence (Saunders 1988a; Saunders and Harris, 1987, 1988, Savage *et al.*, 1987), the only piece of empirical research which broadly supports the majority of his substantive framework is that of Pahl (1984), which although already regarded as something of a classic, is after all an intensive piece of research, the exact generalisability of which must still be open to question. It thus seems to us essential that national level data are utilized in

order to examine further many of the theoretical proposals currently being floated.

Policy proposals

The problems Saunders identifies with socialized welfare provision in kind have long been the target for criticism. However, whereas for the most part the left has been keen to formulate policies which recognize that the state is constituted as a complex matrix of both relations of production and consumption (London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1979) he, rather oddly given his conceptualisation of the ultimate determinancy of the 'politics of production' (see above), views the solution as being located *only* within consumption. The reasons for this are complex, but hopefully we shall begin to confront them in some of what follows. It is not our intention here to rehearse the usual criticisms of market systems of welfare allocation. We shall be more concerned to make a number of more general sociological comments on some of the issues which underpin his policy proposals and their relationship to his more substantive sociology of consumption.

Let us begin by observing that Saunders's policy proposals are the product of a supposed conjuncture between two sets of factors. At the level of individuals and households it is claimed that people desire more privatized forms of consumption due to their supposed dissatisfaction with existing state provision and an autonomous 'need' invoked at a psychological level by the experience of late capitalism. This desire has been coupled with rising real incomes for the majority which increasingly allows for privatized purchases. Meanwhile at the level of the state there has been the recognition that socialized welfare provision has been a major contributory factor towards the 'fiscal crisis – although just how Saunders's privatized solution, which still involves massive state subsidies, would solve this problem is unclear. This leads Saunders to conclude that what people want and what is likely to be on offer are potentially in mutual alliance. Many of these concerns are currently being mirrored in the USA due to the perceived inability of a system of largely privatized care to deal with the same problem without leaving the individual bankrupt. The concerns that Saunders points to are real ones: the fiscal crisis; the unpopularity of some existing forms of socialized provision (especially housing); caring for an increasingly dependent popu-

lation; and growing social polarization. However, we would suggest that these problems *transcend the form of the provision of welfare*. In Lindblom's distinction between market and political systems of allocation, each has its own problems in dealing with scarcity, in command forms where political decision making predominates then rationing will result, in market systems the ability (or otherwise) to pay will be of consequence (Lindblom, 1977). It is precisely the consequences of the latter that concerns many members of the middle mass in the USA who envisage old age and potential senility leading to financial deprivation for them and an unbearable burden for their children.

We are suggesting that whatever the mode of welfare provision adopted, there is evidence to suggest that the underlying problems that Saunders has located will still manifest themselves in one way or another. This leads us to suspect that rather than adopting *a priori* stances on the provision of *all* forms of welfare (as Saunders wishes to do in relation to the market, and many on the left wish to do in relation to the state) a more productive way of proceeding would be to take more seriously the notion of a 'mixed economy of welfare' within which different areas of provision, financing and regulation were determined by a plurality of considerations, not just narrowly political and ideological ones. This stance leads us to suspect that Saunders's attempt to understand the future of welfare in terms of a set of either/or conceptual polarities: state and market, socialized and privatized, cash and kind etc. is likely to fail. This tendency operates at a number of levels within his work and considerably weakens his project. Saunders's political 'gestalt shift' to the 'new right' leads him to construct a sociology based upon a set of concepts and procedures which are the polar opposite of the ones he wishes to deconstruct. In the final sections of the paper we shall attempt to explore this tendency within the context of some wider concerns.

Conceptual polarities: interests and preferences

The construction of concepts such as social class or consumption sector cleavage serve three broad functions within sociological analysis. First, to locate taxonomic categories within the complexity of social life which have some kind of explanatory power in the explication of other forms of social phenomena. Thus, for example within Saunders's own analysis key factors invoked in order to

account for the actions of the state are the 'causal' influence of such groupings. Second, to identify a structural 'fault' running through society to which the more serious political disturbances are thought to be ultimately located. Third, at a more political level, to locate groups which may be won over within the construction of some form of hegemonic project. However, the issue of the social mechanisms by which such taxonomic groupings – 'a social base' – are, or are not translated into causal groupings – 'a social force' (Pickvance, 1977) – is a complex one to which there appears to be no satisfactory solution. However, the dominant mode of specification within recent years has derived from Marxism. It is this dominance that Saunders' appears to be keen to undermine, and an analysis of some of his concerns relating to this issue is useful in attempting to understand the implicit agenda of the sociology of consumption. Within Marxism the identification of classes has traditionally been understood in terms of the articulation of a set of structurally defined 'objective' interests which function both to taxonomically define a collectivity *and* to guide political action by equating revealed preferences with these externally defined interests (e.g. 'a class *in* itself' becoming 'a class *for* itself'). It has been argued that this model is inadequate for a number of reasons, the majority of which are reducible to debates centred around the analytic usefulness of the concept of objective interests. Objective interests are usually defined in one of two ways (Benton, 1981). In *Habermasian* terms, they are thought of as being the revealed preferences that people would display under conditions of autonomy from the supposed ideological mystifications of capitalist relations (of which consumption is often considered to be *the* key 'fettering' influence). In *Lukacsian* terms, they are thought of as being the revealed preferences that people would possess if they had a 'scientific' understanding of the social formation within which they find themselves.

Many writers have noted the possible authoritarian implications of these approaches in that both are clearly based upon the assumption of Marxism as an epistemologically privileged discourse. Saunders regards such assertions as little more than 'epistemological imperialism' and his explicitly stated anti-Marxist stance can perhaps be understood as deriving from a frustration with the continual 'imputation' of objective interests vis-a-vis socialism to the 'working class' on the part of some of his contemporaries.⁶ His reaction to this issue has been to argue for the primacy of revealed preferences over the analysis of supposed objective interests in the

analysis of consumption, i.e. to take seriously what people say they want, rather than attempting to 'map' their discourse onto a set of 'objectivist' structures. Our objection to this procedure is that it tends to conceptualise preferences at an individualistic level without fully considering their mediation via complex social and political processes. This is indicative of the asymmetry in Saunders's concern for different forms of power. Whilst he is keen to undermine the supposed power of 'welfare professionals', he is willing to ignore wider social and cultural processes influencing popular understandings. Yet again Saunders sets himself up and then gets caught in a polarity. The choice is between *either* the imposition of an 'objectivist' structure of real interests derived from a supposedly 'correct' science *or* the acceptance of a subjectivism in which we have to take the discourse of 'the people' as the 'correct' line. We find both the 'imputed interests' model and the 'libertarian populist' model inadequate. Although we *can* accept that no sociological or political discourse can possess an epistemologically privileged insight into social life, we *cannot* accept that this implies that we have to accept whatever unmediated populism wins out. If sociological discourse possesses any utility at all it *must* provide analyses of social phenomena which are for the most part analytically superior to competing 'lay' explanations. To the extent that it does this – and for the most part it does – and to the extent that it takes popular revealed preferences as one of its central objects of inquiry, then it is able to be critical of them (Giddens, 1987; Sayer, 1984: 211–34)

Methodological polarities: realist concepts and ideal types

Saunders's sociology of consumption is not just an attempt to rearticulate the *substantive* concerns of urban studies, it is also premised upon the deconstruction of realism as a valid methodological strategy within social research, and the assertion of a strongly Weberian alternative. Saunders's project is underpinned by the construction of ideal types which build up a picture of how different 'parts' of the social world influence each other. Such constructions, he argues, are derived from empirical research, and not, as in the case of Marxism, from *a priori* theory. He argues that many of his contemporaries fall into a 'holistic' trap because their Marxist theory imposes upon them a set of pre-given totalising conceptual relations that they find difficult to think outside of. For

Saunders on the other hand, there is no natural necessity in the social world, and thus relations between objects have to be understood as contingent, and can thus only be understood via nominalist procedures. Any attempt to produce real definitions of social phenomena by attempting to specify necessary relations and to disaggregate these from contingent relations, as realism claims to be able to do, is doomed to failure. For Saunders the adoption of realism within urban studies is

leading to a repeat of the sorts of claims being advanced by Althusserian philosophy . . . it accords explanatory primacy to causes which can only be identified theoretically and which . . . remain effectively immune to falsification even though there may be no evidence that they are operating or even exist . . . 'necessities' are simply asserted while the catch-all category of 'contingency' takes care of all the problems . . . Realism . . . provides a spurious intellectual justification for asserting a left orthodoxy and discounting alternative approaches. (Saunders, 1986a: 359–61)

Strong words indeed, and not without some justification. It is certainly the case that a number of the main protagonists in the development of contemporary realism have had an engagement with Marxism in general, and the Althusserian variant in particular (Benton, 1977; Bhaskar, 1979; Keat and Urry, 1982). It is also the case that the majority of work so far influenced by realist philosophies of science have been broadly Marxist in orientation (Outhwaite, 1987). However, there is nothing inherently Marxist about the methodological proposals that realism puts forward. Indeed, realism appears to be a relatively open project once it is disarticulated from an explicitly Marxist discourse (Burrows, 1989).

We believe that Saunders misrepresents the actual procedures by which realism operates within concrete investigations. He is wrong to deny the possibility of locating any ontologically necessary relations between social objects. Further, it seems that his denial is based not so much upon explicitly methodological criteria, but more upon an inability to see the methodological wood for the political trees. His approach limits his conceptual perception in much the same manner as Marxist problematics limit Marxist analyses. Further, there is a much closer homology between realist concepts and ideal typical constructs than either

side of the (essentially political) divide has been willing to allow. In the context of the mundanities of empirical research the major differences between the two approaches are that ideal typical constructs do not make explicit the process of abstraction which underpins their construction in the way in which realist abstractions attempt to do (Bhaskar, 1979: 54–6; Sayer, 1984: 80–7), and give equal status to causal and taxonomic groups (Sayer, 1984: 221–7), whilst realist concepts tend to privilege substantial relations of connection over formal relations of similarity within their construction; and deny, at the level of rhetoric at any rate, that legitimate distinctions can be made between necessary and contingent relations between objects. Our view is that rather than viewing realism as an empirically based Althusserianism, it is more useful to consider the approach as making explicit a set of broad methodological guide-lines for the construction of ‘anti-taxonomic abstractions’ which accept the possibility of identifying at least some necessary relations within the social world.

In denying the possibility of identifying necessary social relations within sociology his ideal typical procedures ultimately lead him to formulate constructs which are unable to recognize the essential connectedness of the ‘social’. It is all very well to produce abstractions of consumption processes which stress their specificity – we have no objection to such a procedure *per se*. However, in adopting this stance there is a danger of reifying this specificity to such an extent that consumption becomes treated as a separate ontological sphere. In short, consumption practices and production practices can usefully be analysed as delineated spheres (as occurs within the context of the dual state thesis for example), as long as it is remembered that in reality they are internally related. When it comes down to it Saunders replaces one form of essentialism with another. Rather than human emancipation being achieved via class struggle it will be achieved via privatized consumption.

The source of this problem can be found in yet another polarity that Saunders constructs for himself. He states that:

In social science . . . we can proceed basically in one of two directions. Either we can assume that we already have the correct theory for understanding society as a totality, in which case we can proceed from the whole to the parts knowing in advance what the interrelation of the parts will be like . . . Alternatively, we can assume that the social world is a very complex place which cannot be known in its totality, in which

case we proceed by developing partial understandings of aspects of that world and gradually build up a picture of how the different parts affect each other. (Saunders, 1986b: 16).

We do not accept this either/or polarity between holistic and ideal typical approaches. It seems to us that some form of *rapprochement* is not only possible, but actually exists within a more realistic assessment of realism. Saunders is wrong to equate realism with Marxism and holism. Realist research practices need not begin with *a priori* theory. There is no reason why the abstractions realism produces should not be based upon empirical research and why they should not deal with 'parts' or 'lower level' social structures in the same manner as ideal types. The only major difference is that a realist orientation to conceptual modelling demands the attempted specification of ontologically grounded relations (which may of course be theoretically attacked and/or found to be empirically wanting) with other abstracted 'parts' of society. Such an orientation is thus less likely to produce constructs which map conceptual delineations onto ontological considerations such as interventions in social policy.

Concluding remarks

We view Saunders' work as a catalyst. He has been brave to argue for such a heretical position. Many of the themes he introduces are important ones, which although somewhat overdrawn, do require urgent attention. His work demands debate and it is hoped that dialogue can continue without personal attacks. For such a supposedly critical discipline sociologists are often very defensive and unreflexive about their own subject. None of us possess epistemologically privileged access to the social world and it is about time we opened ourselves up to alternative conceptualisations however painful this may be.

This paper has been concerned to examine Saunders's sociology of consumption at an essentially conceptual level, and it leaves it to others to widen the debate. Our conclusions are mixed. We believe Saunders has identified a new cleavage at the level of consumption (although it is somewhat overdrawn) and we find his concept of a privatized mode of consumption a useful if rather underdeveloped one. However, we are concerned that he has achieved these partial insights at a cost. First, the role of

production and formal work *are* underplayed and their continuing crucial importance needs to be reasserted, albeit in an anti-economistic manner. Second, it concerns us that in asserting the analytic specificity of consumption, Saunders has lost sight of the crucial matrix of cultural power within which capital and class (within the sphere of production) are explicitly implicated, and which provides the context within which consumption occurs. Third, Saunders has produced his insights in a manner which depends upon the implicit construction of a series of unproductive polarities: production versus consumption, class-versus consumption sector, state versus market, totality versus individual, theoreticism versus empiricism, structure versus agency, realism versus nominalism, Marxism versus liberalism, interests versus preferences and so on. This reactive approach has led to the construction of a set of concepts which do little more than replace one set of exhausted analytic categories with another. If sociology is to move forward it has to begin to break with such polarities. In this instance the polarities have operated in such a manner so as to produce a sociology which tends only to see individuals and households and which has all but lost sight of the core institutional order of *society*. If the sociology of consumption is not to collapse into a sociological justification for Thatcherism ('there is no such thing as society, only individuals and families') it must become more than that.

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Notes

- 1 The other two 'paradigms' being neo-ecological perspectives and Marxism
- 2 The major exception to this rule is of course cash transfer payments (see Saunders (1986a 303-4) for some possible explanations of why this might be the case)
- 3 See the work of Duke and Edgell (1984), Dunleavy (1979, 1980) and Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) for arguments and data supporting the consumption sector cleavage argument, and the more recent work of Marshall *et al* (1988) which throws some doubt upon it
- 4 This has also been the case within the sphere of production, especially in relation to the construction of an 'enterprise culture' as an alternative to more collectivist employment policies (Curran and Burrows, 1987, Ritchie, 1984, 1987) Thus the attack on socialized modes of consumption and the development of 'small business revivalism' are clearly two sides of the same political coin
- 5 It has long been the case that transfer expenditures have been more prominent in

the welfare systems of continental western Europe (although not in Scandinavia) than in Britain, and as such it is a pity that Saunders' analysis does not contain such comparative evidence to support (or otherwise) his claims here

- 6 For an analysis of this 'habit' see Goldthorpe (1988), Pahl and Wallace (1988), and the introductory comments of Pahl (1984)

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Extended review: Rules, communication and difference

Philip Corrigan

The Rules are No Game: the strategy of communication

(with 'Women in Production: the Chorus Line' by Ronda Hammer and Anthony Wilden) Anthony Wilden, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1987, £25.00, 432pp

Man and Woman, War and Peace: the Strategist's Companion

Anthony Wilden, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1987, £25 00, 355pp.

The objects themselves

These are in the midst of multiple media of *distraction* and the continuing flow of *rotten criticism* (two phrases taken from the late Raymond Williams) – different texts. In their distinctive ways they contribute to what I have come to call *social linguistics*, or, perhaps, *social-historical semiotics*. Theoretically, Anthony Wilden has made some of these resources available before, notably in *System and Structure* (2nd edn, London, Tavistock, New York, Methuen, 1980) and subsequent articles; but, for me, the finest focusing thus far was his book *The Imaginary Canadian* (Vancouver, Pulp Press, 1980). This – I shall call it necessary oscillation (theory/focus: seeing/showing) is sustained in these two volumes, for me, by 'context theory: Theorie des contextes: The new science' (Postscript to *The Rules* . . ., henceforth *Rs*), and 'In the Penal Colony: the body as the discourse of the other' (Chapter five of *Man and Woman* . . ., henceforth *M&W*).

The Body in Question

Before any comment or critique by me, allow me to return to this word 'distinctive'. Anthony Wilden begins *Rs* with 'The naming of parts and the twentieth century war' (pp. 1–63), which in turn, is preceded by 'To the Reader' (*Rs*, pp. xi–xv). As the latter is the key to the former, so the former is the key to these two volumes (key as for doors, sardine cans; but also as in music – What key is this in?; and, as in being 'all keyed up'). Insofar as the distinction between 'style' (rhetoric) and content (how and what) is still valid – after all, the argument(s) of these two books make a profound challenge – I feel so keenly how Wilden's days (years) at Christ's Hospital (a private school *called* a public school, not a hospital, not a church), Horsham, West Sussex, England (especially his salutations to his History Teacher there, David Roberts) 'produces' the flow of his textuality. Following (my own) Recognition Rule, that it takes One to Recognize One, I *then* understand the 'peculiarities' of the writing, the admixture of the cigarette cards, jokes, *Vancouver Sun* stories, cartoons, quotes, 'findings' all; together with the extremely helpful 'apparatus' (giving us the dates of persons mentioned, and the luxuriant bibliographies – pp. 323–98, in *Rs*; pp. 297–312, in *M&W*); *and*, the engagement with ideas, with intellectuality. But, as a metacommunicative comment, I think I understand why the work of Gregory Bateson 'appeals'. Anyone whose body had been subjected to that specific form of English masculinity¹ called 'Christ's Hospital' embodies double-binds, along with so much that Lacan (who named himself 'an hysteric') spoke. You 'got', that is if your parents did not pay, to Christ's Hospital by virtue of being in a narrow top percentile of the 11-plus examination at the end of your primary schooling. I was in a slightly lower percentile, so I 'got' to Aske's Haberdashers' Hatcham Grammar School for Boys, Telegraph Hill, New Cross, London, England, in 1953. I 'was learned' something(s) there too, if pressed I too would name particular History or English 'Masters', as teachers-from-whom-I-learned²

Furthermore, *how else* did power come to be (accurately) seen, by Wilden, as male supremacy, as male *bullying*? For these books are about – to use my terms – the figure in dominance and authorized grammar, that is about masculinity as right, about how rules (tacit, silent *and* certain loud) structure communication(s). They also destroy, and – in a different sense to the current literary

or discourse theorists – they deconstruct: deconstructions, denials, destructions, and deformations never more hurtfully, powerfully so as when people are differentially disembodied by communication(s) that constrain(s) invisibly, but (for those thus constrained) *materially*.

The words to say it

Rather than review these books I want to respond to them dialogically, using the rich resources Wilden offers to further and focus his argument which at times ‘forgets’ that the grammar rules are authorized, some bodies rule.

He begins *Rs* by bringing forward work clarified in *System and Structure*, the important distinctions between The Real, The Imaginary and The Symbolic (pervasive themes through both books). He also clarifies another pervasive topic, that of orders/levels of complexity, constraining³ contexts, and dependent hierarchies in which higher (environments) constrain lower levels *but* are more diverse and complex. Confusion between, or conflation of, (a) the real and the imaginary (and/or taking the symbolic to be *only* either), and/or (b) levels; leads to false opposition and binary divisions. These ‘Either/Or’ structures (dichotomies or dualisms) are constructed (imaginary) oppositions using symbolic means and illocutionary force, i.e. they order us differently, in all senses of order.⁴ Codes classify (often dichotomously, always (?) hierarchically) relationships, combinations, rules. But ‘By recognizing that rules may be broken, we recognize that rule governed systems are open to innovation’ (*Rs*, p. 103). In contrast, Wilden argues mediation (called Thirdness by Peirce. *Rs.*, p. 160) is (or is a representation of) the specific system-environment relationship, fundamentally that of nature society (this is *not* a binary opposition): ‘the medium is not the message, it is the means of communication’ (*Rs.*, p. 319; cf. *M&W*, *passim*, but espec. Chapters one and seven).

This brings us to a relational analysis (versus the still dominant idealism and reifications of positional and categorial analyses) already found in those Three Who Made A Revolution. Marx. Freud. Saussure. It also, thus brings us to an analysis not only of rules, but of *ruling*. Here Foucault⁵ should have entered in, since for Wilden: ‘Control requires a representation of what [i.e. whom, P.C.] is being controlled . . . Reductionalism crosses boundaries

between levels and orders of complexity without recognizing their existence' (*Rs.*, p. 192) The argument then becomes more focused, first, on the two code/message disorders and resources the axes of metaphor (similarity) and metonym (contiguity) (Chapter six), and, digital and analog coding in relation to left-brain and right-brain functions (Chapter seven; see Tables 7.1 through 7.4, and 8.1, all brought together in the Magna Charta of Context Theory, p. 1, *Rs.*, pp. 315–17, which contrasts the old view and the new view). This celebrates the arrival of 'Both-And' vs 'Either-Or' representation, negotiation; and, ruling versus co-operative social solidarity (*Rs.*, pp. 276 f.) Second, the specific revolution of Montage (not only true of Eisenstein, whom Wilden quotes, but Brecht, Benjamin, Bloch and Kracauer⁶ for example, not to mention a wider group in the USSR around whom, I would argue, have filiations to those late Bolsheviks: Pashukanis, Rubin, Volosinov/Bakhtin, re-founders of relational analysis in the late 20s), and, more generally, of montage-as-critique, is linked to Ronda Hammer and Wilden's one-hour videotape montage 'Women in Production: The Chorus Line, 1932–1980' (discussed *Rs.*, pp. 283–300; available from Department of Communication, Simon Fraser University) This leads to *M&W* (which has some necessary overlap with, and fruitful repetition from, *Rs.*).

Chapter one, 'Oscillation, opposition, and illusion East and West', uses the figuration (as in grammar as well as visually) of figure-and-ground oscillation to focus upon and form the 'Three Way Rule': 'The minimum number of connections required to establish a relation is three: system, environment, and the boundary mediating between them' (*M&W*, p. 7). Typically, if differently, we resolve figure-ground oscillations by seeing boundary as a property of the imagery, not of differential perception, governed, I would add, by the Rule of Rules: There is a correct answer, response, and you had better Get It Right! (Paradoxical Pedagogy).

Wilden then moves – the most crucial move in the two volumes – to a double un-or dis-covering: First, oscillations can be caused in perceivers/receivers of messages that 'tangle hierarchies'. Insofar as messages are reports, commands and questions, those that reduce qualities or levels to oppositions and/or symmetries establish, as real constraints on the real, double blind paradoxes, e.g. 'Be Spontaneous!' (*M&W*, p. 10). Paradoxical injunctions also deeply rely upon symmetrization (imputed equivalence) and inversion (reversed dependence), thus through (and because of) domination, locutionary statements have illocutionary force: *this*

is the grammar that declares the differences that matter. The most powerful features of this ruling grammar, those that enshrine the figure in dominance as legitimate (and grants that special form of power called Jurisdiction, the right to speak the Law-of the Father, of God, of the State, of the Text) is the 'tangled contradiction' which denies itself (the paradoxical paradox). Here should have entered Barthes, who identified these Doxa as that which is so natural, neutral and universal, that it is (the) Obvious⁷ – the flat tautologies of the male bourgeois mind, the frozen speech of myth, the rules that write me, written

Secondly, we need a differentiated understanding of how these rules are no game, by those subjected to, and subordinated by, them; by fighting back with metacommunicational politics from the prisons of inversion through the 'paper flowers' (Marx) of symmetry⁸ to necessity; and, *then*, I would add, transforming that claimed necessity by using energies and capacities discovered in recognizing and oppositions and constraints as resources for construction. Then we differently see relationally, then live historically, then shall define ourselves: living again at the heart of the real (Berger)

At the centre of these two crucial moves Wilden places that particular form of power called masculinity – *male bullying* – which defines situations for that self and for others. If women do not conform to these rules regarding communication then they shall be *shut-up* by 'Scold's Bridles', *half-drowned* by ducking stools, or burned as witches (M&W, pp. 49–54). Thenceforth, M&W explores the features, contradictions and consequences of this grammar (of the figure-in-dominance) in relation to classism, racism, and sexism: the three great world systems of domination, subordination, exploitation and oppression (chapters 2–5, plus 'Postscript', M&W, pp. 287–94)

Central to all of this is empowered meditation by men and consequential oscillation by women (see especially the diagrams *Rs*, 4.5, p. 161; M&W, 2.3 p. 82, and, 3.3 p. 109)⁹ Rules of this social grammar rule by dividing and then establishing competition *between the divided*:

The dominant mediator in this structured divide and rule is competition between men (not competition between women, actual as that may be) and this is mediated by competition between commodities and corporations in our society .

The situation is similar to that of non-whites under domestic

and foreign colonialism, summed up by Frantz Fanon . .
(*M&W*, p. 110)

This grammar is legible as a lexicon (Visualized as a repertoire) ' (Virgin), Mother, Wife, Whore, and Witch (bitch)' (*M&W*, p. 114). Traced out in those 'machineries of alliance' (with and for the powers that be), we can learn to see this in stereotyping in television and film (on the latter see *Rs*, pp. 261–9; *M&W*, pp. 114 f, especially 128–33). The figure in dominance is, then, the difference that makes (the) Difference(s); a beginning 'dictionary' of which is provided for race (Black), sex gender (Woman), sexual orientation (Gay), and ethnicity (Jew), (*M&W*, p. 127, but see all of Chapter five as central).¹⁰

Chapters six and seven of *M&W*, (re) turn to strategy and examine the work of Sun Tzu, Zenobia, De Jeney, Von Clausewitz, T E. Lawrence and Chu The, with others, in relation to analyses of battles and forms of war (imperialist vs people's war; regular armies vs guerrilla groups; cf 'Index of Battles . . .' *Rs*, pp. 405–6 and 'Wars/major battles/revolutions' in 'Subject Index' *M&W*, pp. 334). Here is another way to be armed for struggle. Secret Semaphore!

Concluding comments

It is perhaps my mis-conditioning, but I *do* think (and feel) that Anthony Wilden – because, in part, the necessary experienced painful embodiment of subordination (and the differenced voices of resistance and refusal) are not sufficiently included – drifts dangerously close to mistaking problems of worlds as if (only) problems with and of words. The necessary suggestion he makes, that to solve paradoxical injunctions and double-binds, we must communicate *about* them; ignores the already always existing *extra*-communicational forms that either prevent that happening (for and from the subordinated) or make it very dangerous. That is too easy to say ridding the world of the figure in dominance and his authorized grammar is more than a problem of communication 'It' is the social problem of our epoch

To pose the same question – for that is all my conclusion amounts to – another way, do not these wonderful books remain trapped in a structuralist problematic (Lacan is thus there and not there, absent when he is quoted, and heard when he is absent; the

absent entries of Foucault and Barthes I annotated above) without the mixed benefits of post-structuralism and the (re) turn of the subject? Contrast that *vade mecum* of our times *Changing the subject* (edited by J. Henriques and others, London, Methuen, 1983). Nevertheless, I would stress, finally, that Wilden's work is quite radically different from the curious acclaim awarded to Giddens and others who find in 'structuration' the (magic) solution of the necessary dialogic of structure-and-agency, Society and Self, since Wilden never forgets Lenin's twentieth century question, Who, whom?. He could do with more – and differenced – bodies through, fortunately, as Duke Ellington once told the audience at Newport, 'We have a lot more, a lot more' Hooray for that!¹¹

Notes

- 1 For one complementary study that links such Public Schools with the formation of what is now 'Canada', see P A Duane, *Gentlemen emigrants From the British Public Schools to the Canadian Frontier*, (Vancouver, Douglas and McIntyre, 1981)
- 2 See P Corrigan, 'The making of the boy' What my grammar school did for my body' *Journal of Education* (Boston), 1988, forthcoming
- 3 '... constraints are the basis of complexity and the conditions of creativity Only by using the constraints of the code of English can I write this sentence, for example' (*Rs*, p 77) 'Constraints are neither causes, nor forces, nor obstacles nor barriers [they] do not determine' (*Rs*, p 175) Cf P Corrigan, 'Dichotomy is contradiction on 'Society' as constraint and construction' *Sociological Review*, 23, 1975
- 4 Cf P Willis and P Corrigan, 'The orders of experience', *Social Text* 8, 1983
- 5 I am thinking of his 'Summa', M Foucault, 'The subject and power' *Critical Inquiry*, 8, 1982, but also his neglected Questions of method, *Ideology and Consciousness*, 8, 1981, especially his discussion of 'programmes of power' Foucault exposed the 'projections' that define, that cartographize, enumerate, delineate, and classify
- 6 Cf D Frisby, *Fragments of modernity*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1985)
- 7 R Barthes *Mythologies* (London, Paladin, 1972), *The Eiffel Tower, and other mythologies* (New York, Hill and Wang, 1979), P Corrigan, 'Doing Mythologies', *Borderlines*, 1, 1984
- 8 There is now evidence that what I called 'stalling' in 1980 is a resistance to go beyond symmetry (i.e. equality of opportunity, equality as equivalence, and all talk of rights), P Corrigan, 'Towards a celebration of difference(s)' in D Robbins (ed.), *Rethinking social inequality*, (London, Gower Press, 1982), C Mackinnon (1984), 'Difference and Dominance' in her, *Feminism Unmodified* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), N F Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987)

- 9 Just as mediations need not be 'male functional', so too can double-binds be fruitful (*M&W*, pp 92–6)
- 10 Although Wilden extends masculinity in terms of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Male (*M&W*, p 109) he sufficiently stresses how homo-phobia is an essential component of heterosexism in making up hegemonic masculinities. Creation of a not-me(other) *and* the denial of any possible third (or more multiple) places, ways, sites and possibilities in 'normality'. This lust for certainty can become so strong that any and all boundary-markers or border lines are ruthlessly destroyed (or banished out of sight). One of the first modern genocides, of 'The Rom' (so-called gypsies), in sixteenth-century England shows this clearly. 'It was 'the Rom' who were amongst the first – along with gay males – to be exterminated by NSDAP in the 1930s: witness the current 'control-waves' in England (clause 28) or in the USA or Canada (testing and quarantine)
- 11 I have previously argued the importance of the 'East Anglia School' (Holliday, Kress, Hodge and Fowler) in *Sociological Review* and so I very much welcome R. Hodge and G. Kress, *Social Semiotics* (Oxford, Polity Press, 1988) which I shall review more fully later

Extended review

Bourdieu's *Choses dites*

Dick McCleary

Choses dites

Pierre Bourdieu, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1987, 65 f, 219pp

What is the sense of a sociologist's talking about things he has already written about and then – apparently compounding superfluity with contradiction – editing transcripts of what he has said and putting these *choses dites* back into writing again? It is just this tack that Pierre Bourdieu has taken in publishing in book form the collection of interviews, lectures and discussions which make up the bulk of *Choses dites*. Understanding the strategy behind this tactic shows how the book is meant to be read, highlights its value, gives insight into Bourdieu's thinking, and raises interesting questions about the nature and function of sociology.

In recent years, Bourdieu has become increasingly concerned with the *writing* of sociology. The more clearly and persuasively he thought he had analyzed the social and epistemological foundations and functions of social science and (more broadly) of current intellectual culture, the more social scientists and intellectuals seemed to misunderstand his analyses. And the more he analyzed and came to understand their misunderstanding, the more he became concerned with developing ways of writing sociology which would be less easily misunderstood. The theory and practice of Bourdieu's sociology and its communicative styles and strategies are dialectically interrelated.

Sociology for Bourdieu is 'the general science of the economy of practices': it treats all social practices as 'economic' in the broad sense of being concerned with the production, exchange and use of desired but scarce goods, and being 'directed toward the maximizing of material or symbolic profit' (Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of*

Practice, Richard Nice, trans., p. 183). Social practices are generally concerned with accumulating capital in the broad sense of winning power to control the product of past labours (especially the means of producing further products) and the power to control the social mechanisms (especially the organized bodies of specialized agents) that are essential to producing this product, and then using this control to enhance and extend that power. Capital in the narrower, traditional sense consists in the power to control and use the means and social mechanisms required for the production of goods and services to exploit the labour power of workers for a profit. In the more general sense it has in the 'symbolic economy' which has been Bourdieu's chief concern, capital consists in the power to control and use the means and social mechanisms required for cultural production to shape perception and understanding in accordance with the shapers' views and interests. The differential distribution of all forms of capital among agents and groups of agents determines their position in the social space of dominant and dominated classes. Their position in turn determines their habitus – the 'system of durable, *transposable* dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures [which constitutes] the *socially informed body*, with its tastes and distastes, its compulsions and repulsions, with, in a word, all its *senses* . . . not only the traditional five senses . . . but also the sense of necessity and the sense of duty, the sense of direction and the sense of reality, the sense of balance and the sense of beauty, common sense and the sense of the sacred, tactical sense and the sense of responsibility, business sense and the sense of propriety, the sense of humour and the sense of absurdity, moral sense and the sense of practicality, and so on' (Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of Practice*, p. 124). Thus the position of agents and groups of agents, by structuring the structuring structures of their habitus, determines the practical sense and logic which govern their practice. The theoretical task of sociology as general science of the economy of practices is to make clear the historical and structural socio-logic of social practice by classifying, positioning and relating agents differentially according to their individual, group and class struggles to accumulate material or symbolic capital.

But the road to objective sociological inquiry and understanding is blocked by the internal struggles of the field of sociological and intellectual production, as well as by the struggles between the overall field of cultural production and the field of economic production. Those within the field of cultural production – and the

special sector of it which is the field of sociology – who have the power to control the forms of language, kinds of education, modes of understanding, sorts of titles and types of publications and positions needed for success, consciously and unconsciously use their control to establish an orthodoxy and censor all unorthodox thought and expression in ways they believe will enhance and extend their power. Censorship within the field does not, however, ordinarily take the blunt, brutal form of uncompromising denial to which political and economic powerholders commonly resort. Instead it takes the form of what Bourdieu calls 'symbolic violence

which can be done by the one who does it and undergone by the one who undergoes it only in a form such that it is mistaken as such, that is, is taken to be legitimate'. Sociological discourse is thus like all discourse necessarily a 'compromise formation' produced by dialectically developing relations between the languages, techniques and procedures which have been established as legitimate forms of sociological expression, and the 'euphemizing strategies' for using these forms which sociologists adopt in order to express what the requirements for professional success give them an interest in expressing (Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire*, Chapter 1, Part III, 'Censure et mise en forme')

As a consequence of the symbolic violence which mis-shapes their discourse, sociologists can accomplish their theoretical aim of objectifying the social world only by reflecting on the ways in which the classifications that they employ to objectify it also function as unconscious classificatory strategies in their struggles to advance their individual, professional and social class interests. Sociology, as the general science of the economy of social practices, must be a 'socioanalytic' science of the social and epistemological foundations and functions of its own theory and practice. Sociologists must 'objectify the objectifying subject' (*Choses dites*, pp. 112–16): they must work through and objectify theoretically the practical sense of their theorizing, which has been repressed by their adoption of euphemizing strategies that uncritically accept and utilize the spontaneous sociology inherent in the orthodox sociological discourse of 'normal science'. Only socioanalytic sociology can enable sociologists to understand that 'knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, of the categories which make such knowledge possible are the main stake of political struggle, which is an inseparably theoretical and practical struggle for the power to maintain or transform the social world by maintaining or transforming the categories in terms of

which we perceive the world' (Bourdieu, 'Espace social et genèse des "classes"', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 1984), and that as a specialized body of agents, socially disposed and positioned to realize their professional political interest in gaining both an objective understanding of society and the power to establish their way of understanding as the sole legitimate way, they are themselves inescapably involved in the classification and group and class struggles of their time and place. Only by objectifying theoretically their practical involvement in such struggles can sociologists objectify the ways in which their position and dispositions as professionals and dominated members of the dominant class distort and limit their understanding of the differently disposed and positioned groups and classes, differently involved in these struggles, whose practice and practical sense they are seeking to understand.

For precise social reasons, the practice of sociology as a socioanalytic science of the economy of social practices is not easy. Most of today's sociologists work for state institutions which serve the interests of the dominant class. As a result, 'an important part of sociological discourse owes its immediate social success to the fact that it responds to the demand of the dominant class, which often comes down to a demand for rational instruments of management and domination or to a demand for "scientific" legitimation of the dominant class's spontaneous sociology' (*Choses dites*, p. 65.). In their struggles to maintain dominance of their field or to win recognition from those who dominate it, sociologists tend to adopt unconsciously the euphemizing strategy of renouncing the rigours of a technical sociological vocabulary for a commonsense language which better serves their professional interests in serving the interests of those their profession serves. Since the language of common sense is the language in which the spontaneous sociology of the dominant class speaks, an important part of today's orthodox sociological discourse is not scientific: it ideologically simplifies and distorts the complex realities of the social world – and of sociology's place in that world – which it is the task of a truly scientific sociology to clarify.

As a consequence of these social and epistemological conditions of current sociological practice, the world of orthodox sociology is 'a world apart' from the social practices it aims to understand (*Choses dites*, 'le champ intellectuel: un monde à part'.) It is a world of literate and leisured people whom the state has helped acquire the specialized training and language they need to be able

to look theoretically on social practices in which they are not practically involved, and to be able to compete in the field in which their profession does practically involve them for the power and the glory with which only those who dominate it can crown them. Orthodox sociology is written by theoreticians for other theoreticians and intellectuals whose analogous relation to social practice and the language of social practice tends to transform both practice and its language into theoretical problems for professional readers, and into a stake in the struggles for recognition and dominance which characterize the politics of sociology. Orthodox sociological writing is an 'intellectualocentric' writing which in basing 'the practice analyzed . . . on the observer's relationship to the social world and thus on the [privileged] social relationship [of freedom from practical necessity] which makes observation possible . . . has a good chance of providing nothing but this point of view . . . [as can be seen in] all those dissertations on the "people" which speak less of the people than of the relations their authors have to the people or, more simply, of the social position in terms of which they speak about the people' (Bourdieu, *Le sens pratique*, pp. 49–50.)

Yet once sociologists have accomplished the always difficult and often painful socioanalytic work of breaking with the established practice and language of their field (Bourdieu has suggested in *Homo Academicus*) and have established the logic governing the objectification of their scientific work of theory construction, they can make use of this logic to assure greater logical and sociological control of their writing and its consequences. By writing in ways which let their readers know what they are doing, they can more effectively offset the mistaken readings which tend to undermine their scientific work of theory construction.

Broadly speaking, sociological discourse is misunderstood because those who read it tend to interpret statements made in its constructed language in terms of the function they have in ordinary language, and in so doing to substitute the logic of commonsense understanding for the logic of scientific understanding. The aim of sociological theory construction and the language in which it is undertaken and communicated is to provide an objectified, codified form or theoretical isomorph of the practical schemata of perception and action which orient social practice. The lexicon of sociological discourse, however, does not differ from that of everyday discourse. Consequently, readers tend to substitute the subjects and objects of everyday social practice for the epistemological

subjects of the constructed sociological theory, and – especially in those instances in which sociologists are theorizing about a social field of classification and group and class struggles which they and their readers both inhabit – to mistake observation statements about theoretically constructed agents for performative denunciations of empirically existing individuals, thereby turning scientific theory into the symbolic violence and capital of *ad hominem* polemic.

To counter such mistaken readings, sociologists must write in ways which require, induce and enable their readers to read their writings scientifically: that is to say, to accomplish the socioanalytical working thought necessary to objectify and understand the epistemological and social foundations and functions of their own interests in reading these writings, and on this basis to avoid misinterpreting them ideologically in terms of those interests. The style of sociological writing must be shaped by strategies which recognize (as Bourdieu puts it in *Choses dites*, p. 67):

that the complex can be expressed only in a complex way; that . . . reality is not only complex but hierarchically structured, and this structure must be conveyed . . . ; [and] that . . . this complex and structured reality . . . [cannot] be conveyed as such but only through [the writer's] simultaneously conveying his point of view concerning it by expressing his position in respect to what he is describing. . . . [Sociology must thus be written in a discourse interrupted by] parentheses which are like those of Max Weber the places where metadiscourse finds its place in discourse. They are the quotation marks or different forms of indirect style which express so many ways of establishing relationships with the things [that the sociologist] is relating and with the people to whom he is relating them. One of the big problems of sociological writing is knowing how to indicate the distance between the writer and what he is writing about. When I say [in my sociological writing] that the comic strip is an inferior art form, people may think that I am saying that this is what I think. Thus I must say simultaneously that this is the way it is but it is not I who think that it is. My writings are full of signs meant to keep readers from twisting or oversimplifying what I write. Unfortunately, these warnings go unnoticed or make my discourse so complicated that hurried readers miss not just the subtle signs but the obvious ones and, as is evident in their objections to my writings, read almost the opposite of what I was trying to say.

In the Introduction to *Choses dites*, Bourdieu explains that it was just such failures of the strategies he had developed to help readers free themselves from mistaking sociological theories about the social world by taking them only in terms of the commonsense language and spontaneous sociology which legitimated their own social and ideological position that led him to talk about things about which he had already written. For the give and take of conversation with interviewers and questioning audiences often turns into real dialogue. The logic of dialogue helps breach one of the main, most deeply internalized, least conscious censors orthodox sociological practice incorporates: the professional norms of normal science which by classifying questions raised in unorthodox ways as trivial or downright inadmissible, prevent orthodox sociologists from even entertaining them. A socioanalytic sociologist who is actually conversing with others can sense in their questions the hesitations and resistances that orthodox sociological theory and practice engender, and can respond directly to them with clarifications, denials or refutations. Sociologists talking about sociology can go straight to the points of greatest resistance, as socioanalysis requires, and by moving back and forth between abstractions and illustrations, and having recourse to metaphors and analogies, can help their questioners grasp truths they find difficult even to consider.

Choses dites is thus meant to be read as one might read a collection of Platonic dialogues. Each individual selection is to be taken as a written account of an effort Bourdieu is making, in specific circumstances, to overcome the resistances that a particular audience is offering to the truths he is seeking to convey. Reading *Choses dites* with full understanding thus requires some prior knowledge of Bourdieu's other works and the reception they have had. But substantive knowledge is not enough since Bourdieu is speaking to readers through written accounts of his speaking to listeners, reading *Choses dites* as a collection of dialogues also requires an empathic and self-questioning imaginative struggle for the self-transforming objectifications of socioanalytic self-understanding. If *Choses dites* is read in this way, Bourdieu believes, the different treatments it gives a same theme in different contexts, and its different applications of a same approach in different realms will reveal what the sustained and ordered argumentation of more polished sociological writing often conceals and can never fully convey: the concrete practice of sociological thinking as socioanalysis. In short, Bourdieu intends that *Choses dites* be read

as he composed it: as socioanalytic discourse whose aim is to enable readers to gain sufficient mastery of their own practice to comprehend the method in terms of which it is being objectified theoretically in the book they are reading and to confirm these objectifications empirically for themselves, and reciprocally and concurrently, to gain sufficient understanding of these methodical analyses to objectify and master their own practice

Bourdieu's analyses of the intrinsic relation between the writing of sociology and the science of sociology, and his concern to invent the styles and strategies needed to conduct and communicate socioanalysis successfully, raise interesting questions about the nature and function of sociology itself.

How can sociologists write in ways that avoid the illusions and mystifications of ideology, and instead help establish the objective and universally true understanding of social reality which sociology aims to establish?

In the 'resolutely historicist' view that Bourdieu adopts in *Choses dites* (pp. 43–6), they can do so only under historical conditions which sustain the social forms of communication that make the production of universal truths possible. Under existing conditions of classification and group and class struggle, the best sociologists can hope for is relative objectivity, universality and truth. Under current social and epistemological conditions of sociological practice, sociologists tend to absolutize their partial theories, with the result that 'a good part of so-called "theoretical" or "methodological" works are only ideologies justifying a particular form of scientific competence' (*Choses dites*, p. 48.). Socioanalysis of the conditions underlying this tendency can, however, enable sociologists to avoid it: by helping them objectify the foundations and functions of the work of classification and theory construction in terms of which they objectify social practice and practical sense, socioanalysis offers them the possibility of thinking and acting without illusions. The collective, cumulative scientific work of socioanalytic objectification, if properly conducted and communicated, can make it progressively possible for sociologists – and their readers – to recognize and understand their need and will to use sociological analyses as symbolic capital and ideological weaponry in group and class struggles, and having understood, to eliminate from their understanding of the social world all traces of these distorting limits to objectivity, universality and truth.

If the socioanalytic styles and strategies capable of facilitating the relatively objective understanding of social reality which is

currently open to us depend upon the historical conditions which make them possible, must not sociological writing itself be historical?

Bourdieu argues in *Choses dites* that sociological theories can be relatively objective only if they explain each stage of a given social structure as 'both the product of prior struggles to transform or maintain it and (through the contradictions, tensions, and relations of force which constitute it) the source of subsequent transformations (p. 56). Social reality is historical reality, and sociology must be an historical sociology which understands the social structures of any given society as the upshot of the whole historical process which has produced them and as the basis for their future reproduction or transformation. It would seem that sociological writing would have to be historical in order to communicate and clarify social realities.

If social realities are constituted by contradictions and conflicts between historical actualities and possibilities, can sociological writing establish even relatively objective understanding of the social world if its styles and strategies are concerned simply with liberating its practitioners and readers from their illusions and not with liberating them from the sociohistorical conditions of classification and group and class struggles which make such illusions necessary?

Bourdieu consistently maintains that under current conditions the sociologist's act of conducting and communicating his scientific analyses must always also be an act which involves him in the power struggles of a present social world whose future is open and at stake – and is affected by his work. In this sense, the question of the proper style and strategy of socioanalytic writing must be political as well as scientific. And it would seem that as a sort of scientific performative whose objectivity is measured by its success in helping its writers and readers gain an understanding of their position which makes it possible for them to liberate themselves from their illusions, socioanalytic writing would have to be capable of making clear to those who are subject to the repressive social structures, the institutions and practices, and the habitus being socioanalyzed, not just the pseudo-scientific character of orthodox social theories but the objective historical possibilities of transforming the repressive society which makes such mystifications necessary. If so, the criterion of the objectivity, universality and truth of sociological writing would be its ability to objectify the logic of social practice – and of the historical conflicts and

contradictions structuring that practice – not just for fellow social scientists and intellectuals but for those economically, politically and culturally dominated groups and classes whose struggles to be free of domination give them an objective interest in knowing the truth about the social world they inhabit.

Is it socially and epistemologically possible for sociological writing to become objective and universally true in this sense if those who write it are not practically involved in the daily struggles and practice of the dominated, and are not effectively communicating with them – not just in order to help the dominated understand but to be helped themselves to understand realities of social practice and practical sense which they could not otherwise grasp or even consider?

Logically, it would seem that understanding that one's scientific understanding of social reality was illusory, and understanding why it was, would presuppose a correct understanding of social reality which it is socially and epistemologically impossible for an intellectualocentric sociology to attain. And as a matter of actual historical and sociological practice, Bourdieu makes clear in his introduction to *Le sens pratique* that he could not have developed his conception of sociology as socioanalysis if he had not been involved, as a man of Béarnaise peasant origins who had struggled successfully to become a dominated member of the dominant class, in the group and class conflicts and contradictions of imperial and metropolitan France.

Bourdieu's socioanalytic conception of sociological theory and practice also raises the question of whether the conduct and communication of socioanalysis must not of necessity be – as he says in his introduction of *Choses dites* (p. 10) that it always risks being – 'sociodramatic'?

In psychoanalysis, certainly, the theoretical construct of transference, and the concept of less illusory and more autonomous interpersonal and social relations with which it is linked, can only become true through the psychodrama of therapeutic practice. In Marxian social theory, moreover,

[the] unity of theory and practice as a policy relates to the task of instituting a rational world. The unity of theory and practice . . . [as] a feature of an established socialist society . . . is a constituent of the revolutionized rational world that policy achieves. It is a world in which the theory explaining the practice of socialist man appears in his practice, and needs no

separate elaboration in a theorist's head' (G A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, p. 339)

If socioanalysis shows that in class societies all sociological theory is inescapably policy, and if its own liberating policy must be to establish the truth of its theoretical analyses by persuading others that they are correct analyses of their practice which in a more rational world they would knowingly embody in their practice, and that its policy can be realized only through dramatic individual and collective struggles, must not the styles and strategies of socioanalytic writing be sociodramatic?

These questions are not new. But Bourdieu has done more than revive them, he has revised them. And it is the questions raised by his analyses of the intrinsic relations between the writing of sociology and the science of sociology, and by his concern to invent the styles and strategies needed to conduct and communicate socioanalysis, which makes *Choses dites* more important than the mere sum of its contents.

Book reviews

Homo Academicus

Pierre Bourdieu (translated by Peter Collier), Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £25.00, xxvi+ 364pp

Opening a book by Bourdieu is like tuning in to a Bach fugue. The sentences are elegant but never-ending. You slide down a verbal slipway of ingenious repetitions, inversions, negations and demonstrations all of unexpected symmetry. There is a real danger of dizziness. In the case of *Homo Academicus* a good way to get your bearings is to start by looking at the last chapter, 'The critical moment'.

The critical moment in question was May 1968, the time of student revolt and upheaval within the Parisian faculties. At the heart of the crisis was the 'structural downclassing' (p. 161) of students and younger academics caused by, *inter alia*, the great increase in numbers passing through the education system. This was particularly painful for offspring of the more privileged classes who, finding themselves unable to 'reconvert their inherited cultural capital into academic capital', fell back on 'a protest against the legitimacy of the instrument of their exclusion' – the existing university organisation. In doing so, they threatened 'the whole of their class by attacking one of the bases of its perpetuation' (p. 163).

Most affected by the influx of new students into the elite institutions were the younger disciplines, especially psychology and sociology. On account of their content and their position within the academic hierarchy, these subjects provided a 'refuge' (p. 165) for marginal students – not only those who were short on cultural capital but also those from dominant classes who were well endowed with this capital but found that it did not buy them

the career opportunities they had anticipated. 'The linkage of the social sciences into the occupational structure was ill-defined, allowing students to 'surround themselves and their future with an aura of indeterminacy and vagueness' (p. 165)

Sociology, in particular, was not only located at 'the place of intersection of two latent crises of maximum intensity' (p. 170) – as experienced by the two categories of marginal students just mentioned – but also felt the unsettling presence of several junior teachers, recently appointed and only weakly integrated into the university system.

During 1968, a series of such crises in several disciplines became synchronised and politicised. 'Fantasized alliances' (p. 164) were forged between dissatisfied groups in homologous situations, alliances mediated by vocal leaders and remaining plausible only as long as members of allied groups had little to do with each other. An anti-institutional and 'spontaneist' (p. 176) mood developed, encouraged by new perceptions of time and space and a temporary feeling that all things were possible.

In fact, the political positions taken up by antagonists within the university system during 1968 were directly related to their location within competing hierarchies. The earlier chapters are largely devoted to elucidating the relevant socio-cultural logic and its manifestations in relations of proximity and distance within and between faculties and institutions.

Bourdieu recalls astonishing a young American visitor in the early 1970s by informing him that all his intellectual heroes – Althusser, Barthes, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault – held marginal positions within the university system, in many cases being debarred from officially directing research. This was one manifestation of the cross-cutting tensions within the system. For example, between the established social hierarchy of hardened committee men and women, comfortably tied into bourgeois power positions, and the cultural hierarchy – freer, more innovative – with closer ties to the world of journalism and the fashionable reviews. Medicine and law are well represented in the first hierarchy, the arts and sciences in the second. Another division opposes the older professors to their younger colleagues

On the basis of very detailed analysis of large numbers of individuals, drawing upon details of social background, educational and scientific power and prestige, political involvements and so on, Bourdieu provides us with a 'map' which locates individuals and institutions in social and cultural space. We are shown where

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to find the sector of strictly internal prestige, the sector of external renown [e.g. in the media] and of young or minor masters, the sector of great scientific prestige and so on. In the final chapter, this map becomes a guide to a battleground.

Aston University

Dennis Smith

Feminism as Critique

Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds), Polity Press, Oxford, 1987, £8 50, 193pp.

This book is a collection of papers by authors in the Marxist-feminist tradition who here address different aspects of contemporary social and political theory, ranging through Marx, Habermas and Foucault. What the papers have in common is a detailed account of the deficiencies of such work when viewed from a feminist perspective, which in some cases (e.g. Balbus on Foucault) substantially undermines key aspects of the theory. The objective of the book is to further the feminist task of theoretical reconstruction which asks: 'how the shift in perspective from men's to women's points of view might alter the fundamental categories, methodology and self-understanding of Western science and theory' (p. 1).

We begin with Nicholson's appraisal of Marxism, and a challenge both to the autonomy of the economic and the adequacy of his conceptualisation of 'production'. If Marx's broadest definition is accepted then all activities concerned with society's physical existence could be included, whilst narrowly defined production and economy imply only the activities of those engaged in the creation and exchange of commodities. In the former case the autonomy of the economic is considered to be self-evident and in the latter case questionable. One problem to emerge from this confusion is the danger of neglecting to include 'many traditional female activities' (p. 27) as part of the productive realm, which in turn is used to challenge the cross cultural validity of the theory. Here, however, we are introduced to one of the tensions which runs through the book; the problem of defining 'women' or 'the feminine' with reference to a particular configuration of activities or characteristics.

The following paper, Fraser's treatment of Habermas, finds the

identification of the capitalist economic system as the 'system-integrated action context' *par excellence*, as against the 'socially integrated action context' of the restricted nuclear family to be problematic. The distinction turns upon the moral-cultural dimension, and yet each sphere is found in fact to be a 'mélange of consensuality, normativity and strategicity' (p. 40). One of the refreshing features of Fraser's argument here is her insistence on the significance of individual, self-interested strategic calculations *within* the nuclear family, and the importance of power in regulating the family dynamic. This argument is developed into a critique of the public-private dichotomy, and a penetrating review of aspects of the welfare state. In reading off the gender significance of her analysis, however, we are left to address the question of why particular spheres of activity become gendered at all, and the problems confronting feminists once they take gender categories as a *basis* for theorising.

In Young's paper modern ethics and its opposition between reason and desire is argued as defining out particularity, and hence achieving a unity by the exclusion of women, as well as other disadvantaged social groupings. Her apparent acceptance of this gendered dichotomy seems to me to be problematic, and the fostering of a 'distinctively women's culture' (p. 75) in response begs a number of questions. Benhabib's admirable article on the generalised and concrete other (illuminating the Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy) develops the idea of a feminist contribution to moral philosophy, but falls quickly into the characterisation of women as 'more adept at revealing feelings of empathy and sympathy' (p. 78) and thus having a greater propensity to take the standpoint of the 'particular other'. This association is attributed to the specific nature of modern bourgeois society which constitutes women as a series of negations, but only in the final passage does the question of the reproduction of gender identity arise.

It was with some relief that I arrived at Markus's contribution on 'Women, success and civil society' which provides some necessary clarification in the course of an examination of gender-role expectation, 'success-avoidance', and the reformulation of the 'achievement principle'. Her statement is simply that:

specific ways of experiencing the world, together with some associated personality traits, while functioning in the present as part of the mechanism of oppression, in virtue of being ascribed *exclusively* to women . . . (should) be reevaluated as possible

components . . . of the restructuration of the dominant culture.
(p. 97)

A more specifically targeted paper follows, in which Balbus provides a point by point confrontation between the genealogy of Michel Foucault and feminist psychoanalytic theory. This is deftly achieved, and used to identify a number of inconsistencies in the Foucauldian position; notably, a rejection of an 'integrated system', alongside a view of the 'disciplinary society'; a ban on continuous history hand in hand with a view of society as a succession of different power/knowledge complexes, or different regimes of truth; and a rejection of the founding subject, who nevertheless seems to appear undaunted in the guise of the theorist. Thus an untenable theoretical position is constructed which, 'would make it impossible for women even to speak of the historically universal misogyny from which they have suffered' (p. 207).

Foucault's notion of the 'technology of the self' is, however, taken up as a possible basis for deconstructing and reconstructing gender identities, and a useful link is forged with Butler's discussion of Beauvoir, Wittig and Foucault, and the 'becoming' of gender which involves a 'sculpting of the original body into a cultural form' (p. 131). Here, at last we have an explicit acknowledgement of the problem of identifying an essential femininity, and a counter suggestion by Beauvoir that women in fact have no essence at all, and thus no natural necessity, only: 'an enforced cultural option which has disguised itself as natural truth' (p. 142).

Finally, Cornell and Thurwell, in the most esoteric article of the book, take on the Lacanian framework which sees gender identity conferred by social-linguistic conventions, in which women as 'other' are, according to Kristeva, 'left out of the social-symbolic contract'. They thus, it is argued, assume a purely negative function and represent a 'potential subversive force that goes straight to the foundations of our social life' (p. 152). The authors, however, wish to emphasise Kristeva's softening of the boundaries between the masculine and the feminine which could highlight the repressed 'feminine' elements in otherwise 'masculine' symbolic discourse, and this seems to be a fitting conclusion for a very challenging and stimulating book.

Erving Goffman: Exploring the Interaction Order

Paul Drew and Anthony Wootton, (eds), Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £29.50, paper £9.95, vi + 298pp

This collection of papers originates from the international conference entitled *Erving Goffman: an interdisciplinary appreciation* held at the University of York in July, 1986. Although Goffman never described himself as a social theorist, preferring the more modest label of 'student of society', the book displays a number of respects in which Goffman made contributions to theory in both the narrow and broad senses of the term. The overall approach of the papers is sympathetic but critical and engaged and they all show how Goffman's fundamental project, the sociological exploration of the interaction order, is a thoroughly 'respectable' enterprise in the most worthy sense of the term: as deserving our regard and careful consideration.

The papers fall into two broad categories. The first examine the general character of Goffman's sociology and its location in relation to established theoretical traditions. Adam Kendon's paper sketches the basic features of Goffman's approach to face-to-face interaction, underscoring its thoroughly sociological concern with the social orderliness of interaction. What was new in Goffman's approach, and what distinguished it from related fields such as small group theory, traditional social psychology and studies of communication, was its emphasis on how interaction was done: on the practices through which ordinary strips of interaction were accomplished. Yet, granted that the interaction order can be treated *sui generis*, the question remains: what are the appropriate ways to analyse it? Papers by Randall Collins and Robin Williams address this issue. Collins maintains that Goffman's 'core intellectual vision is a continuation of the Durkheimian tradition' (p. 43) and proceeds to show how Goffman's early interest in interaction rituals and the cult of the self is matched by a later interest in the ritual grounds of language and experience. Williams also stresses that for Goffman the interaction order was most fundamentally a ritual order, and presents an analysis of the methods used to investigate this orderliness. Williams suggests that the standard criticisms of Goffman's project, namely its apparent lack of cumulativeness and associated problems of concept and data management, serve instead as sources of its success. The corpus of Goffman's writings represent a series of attempts to stabilize an appropriate conceptual framework to

investigate the interaction order and offer a method for making sociological discoveries that is quite consistent with current critiques of prescriptive methodology. Whilst Williams offers an intriguing analysis of the procedural basis of Goffman's method, unfortunately the case cannot be developed with detailed reference to the development of Goffman's writings in the allotted space. Anthony Giddens reviews the substance of Goffman's sociology to argue that Goffman was indeed a systematic social theorist. However Giddens is less happy about Goffman's conception of the interaction order and micro-macro link, maintaining that it fails to adequately grasp 'the recursive character of the structural properties of social systems' (p. 275), with damaging consequences for the treatment of human motivation and social change. Giddens's totalizing stance stands in marked contrast to the more limited ambitions of Goffman and underlines some of the difficulties in integrating his work into broader conceptions of social life.

The second category consists of papers which empirically apply and test the adequacy of elements of Goffman's sociology, and activity approved and encouraged by Goffman as the best way in which sociologists could respond to his ideas. Over the past decade conversation analysts have been Goffman's sternest critics and Emanuel Schegloff's paper, which he announces as a continuation of the 'fight' (p. 89) between Goffman's and his own position, is the sharpest and most vituperative contribution to the volume. In a richly detailed and persuasively argued paper Schegloff complains that Goffman's valorization of ritual over sequential considerations in the analysis of conversation represents a retreat from the sociological study of interactional practices to concern with the 'psychology' of the self, a move that is inconsistent with Goffman's own avowals to study 'moments and their men'. Further, Schegloff finds Goffman's analysis of talk to be insufficiently data-driven, a method he characterises as 'sociology by epitome'. Only 'domesticated' fragments of data are drawn upon by Goffman in order to deliver exactly the analytical point he wishes to make – which is no way for a truly empirical sociology to proceed, as Schegloff demonstrates in his analysis of a conversational fragment. Kindred sentiments inform Christian Heath's study of embarrassment in medical consultations. Heath indicates how talk and gaze in such episodes are systematically organized, a very different conclusion to the 'flooding out' notion employed by Goffman. Heath's skilful analysis shows that keeping faith with the spirit of Goffman's work may require departing from its letter. Similarly,

Stephen Levinson's lengthy paper develops Goffman's thinking on 'footing' in an analytically meticulous and ethnographically impressive way. P.M. Strong's study of paediatric clinic encounters also reveals intellectual indebtedness to Goffman's seminal insights, but he too goes beyond Goffman in attempting to relate different types of ritual order to social structural arrangements.

The extravagant panegyrics and ill-considered critiques that Goffman's work has sometimes attracted are thankfully conspicuous by their absence in this volume. From it readers will learn much about the scope, nature, adequacy and possibilities for development of Goffman's work. Goffman was unquestionably a major figure in mid-twentieth century sociology and his legacy is only beginning to be unpacked. But isn't it odd that this collection (like its predecessor, the 1980 volume edited by Jason Ditton) should be assembled on *this* side of the Atlantic?

University of Salford

Gregory Smith

On Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method

Mike Gane, Routledge, London, 1988, £20 00, 193pp.

In 1972 Stephen Lukes published his book on Emile Durkheim. No such comprehensive study on the founding father of French sociology had appeared before in any language. A decade and a half on, it is still *the* reference book – the starting-point for all matters Durkheimian. Not surprisingly it created further interest in research and interpretation as other scholars began to examine specific components of Durkheim's work in greater detail and with more freedom than Lukes was able to do. In such areas as anomie, suicide (which has always been popular), and religion, this has already been done. Now Mike Gane has followed the path and tackled Durkheim's concept of how sociology should go about its business in a scientific way. Inevitably this has meant focusing on *The Rules of Sociological Method*. By a strange coincidence, just at the time when Gane's book appeared, the French publishers, Flammarion, issued yet another edition of Durkheim's manifesto for sociology, together with a long introduction by Jean-Michel Berthelot from Toulouse University.

How is one to begin to look at *The Rules*? To answer this decides the colour of all that is subsequently said – criticism and hostility or sympathy and appreciation. Everything turns on the

issue of what Durkheim was trying to do in the book – a book which first appeared in article form in 1894. One approach is to analyse the text in isolation and to examine its contents according to certain objective criteria based on the canons of science. It usually disregards any motives the author had in writing the piece, whether they were clearly revealed or not. The second approach starts with precisely such motives and judges the results in the light of intention.

Probably no classic in sociology has received such different and contrasting interpretations, but above all, such a great hammering, as has *The Rules*. This has usually been due to the fact that commentators have adopted the first position and found that Durkheim's attempt to make sociology a science is floored by all the accepted criteria of scientific procedure and proof.

Gane adopts the second way and moves according to a simple, direct and convincing plan. Having set out the main arguments in *The Rules*, he relates them to Durkheim's major writings in sociology and to other works which attempt to expound the nature of the discipline Durkheim was responsible for establishing in France and elsewhere. He emphasizes that *The Rules* is not an isolated attempt to produce a manifesto for sociology, which becomes conveniently forgotten as another method is adopted which is never explicitly enunciated. He demonstrates that at no time had Durkheim reason to deny what he had stated in *The Rules*. That he only added an introduction to the 1901 edition and got involved in a controversy with Tarde is evidence that he felt that many contemporary criticisms were not worth answering.

But Gane not only sets *The Rules* within Durkheim's *oeuvre*. He also places it within the social and political situation of the day and the criticisms levelled against it in France and elsewhere. In particular he sets out the comments of Lacombe in the 1920s, which are important but often overlooked. The Anglo-Saxon critics have been numerous – Gehlke, Alpert, Parsons, Gisbert, Giddens, Hirst, Lukes, and others. The array facing Gane is formidable but undaunted he argues that Durkheim has been misunderstood by them all. One must ask more carefully than they did – what was Durkheim trying to do within the social situation in which he was placed and, as Berthelot suggests, at a period when theories about science were undergoing change?

Gane holds that there are two themes running through *The Rules*. The first is to define the nature and content of sociology: the second is to devise methodological procedures. He argues that *The*

Rules has turned out to be a 'treasure house of ideas and methodological suggestions' and was written in order to make sociology acceptable as a discipline to be taught in universities (p. 171). It was never intended to be a text-book of 'pseudo-scientific dogmatism', which would be subjected to the rigours of the philosophy of science as Berthelot, and others before him, have seen it to be. A method is to be judged by its application and one only needs to point to Durkheim's own work and that of the *Année Sociologique* school to be convinced of its fruitfulness.

Critics have so often failed, both in connection with *The Rules* and other works, by labelling Durkheim and pressing him into an unwarrantable corner. Gane supports the contention, long held by this reviewer, that Durkheim is not to be stereotyped as empiricist, materialist, spiritualist, realist, idealist, positivist, even rationalist in a conventional sense. The same kind of restriction goes for his political affiliation. Perhaps the only label he would have accepted is sociologist! His thought is far too subtle to be categorized in conventional philosophical terms.

He knew that the major methodological issue was treating social facts as in some way human and yet trying to show that they had 'thing-like' qualities. He resorted to the phrase *comme des choses*. And, of course, all turns on what is meant by *comme* – a word some critics prefer to forget.

Nevertheless Gane knows that he has not negated all the criticisms of *The Rules*. As the book will not go away, neither will certain problems, for example, the issue of normality and abnormality applied to social facts and types of society, and the dualism of the individual and the social. Gane's study will, however, make the controversy over *The Rules* more firmly based in the future. We have here a most commendable piece of Durkheimian scholarship.

Cambridge

W S F Pickering

The Shaking of the Foundations

Ronald Fletcher, Routledge, London, 1988, £25.00, paper £11.95, xiv + 287pp

In his approach to social problems, Fletcher has always been a Durkheimian. That is to say that he has been a supporter of

contemporary change in social institutions arguing that the abandonment of the customs and traditions of the past betokens not moral decay and the collapse of civilisation but their reform to meet changed social conditions. In this work he completes the Durkheimian argument by warning of the dangers of anomie: of the replacement of moral regulation by societal institutions with egoistic individualism and the need to balance increased freedom with an ethic of social responsibility. Put thus the argument sounds neither original nor contentious. In fact it is both and I predict that the book will be ignored by all sociologists under 45 and by most of those over that age.

I predict this result on the basis of two facts. Fletcher is not a Durkheimian but a product of the post war London School of Economics which as we all know was at that time heavily influenced by evolutionary social philosophy. What is remarkable is that his thought constitutes a time capsule in which this style of thought is preserved into the present age. It feels remarkably old fashioned even to your reviewer who is himself generally considered pretty archaic. What is both archaic and contentious is that Fletcher reads the historical record as a march of progress, a position which puts him at odds with both romantic conservatives who read the record as one of moral decay and the proponent of various strands of radical thought who wish (usually in a rather atemporal fashion) to emphasise the nastiness of the present.

Fletcher, progressive though he is, belongs to a generation which grew up well before the sixties and to whom the sequelae of that decade came as something of a shock. He has, therefore, what I shall term generational sympathies with those who (whatever their intellectual position) reacted to the seventies with alarm. This alarm has led to his present venture which comprises two books, one a critique of the radical critiques of the family (*The Abolitionists*; not reviewed here) and the present work. The book has two parts – the first is an update of his *Marriage and the Family in the Sixties* and covers much the same ground as the chapter on ‘official statistics and the family’ in this reviewer’s *Family and Industrial Society*, though at much greater length and far more fully in respect of the divorce statistics. He comes, moreover, to much the same conclusions. These allow him to stick to the progressivist thesis of his earlier work, namely that the family is not in the process of dissolution or de-institutionalisation but remains strong and one of the major social institutions of society. This makes him more sympathetic to ‘the abolitionists’ who also

believe the family to be strong (if repressive), than the conservatives.

The second part of the book reflects the social experience of the 'seventies and the 'eighties. Though Fletcher continues to welcome the legal changes which have affected the family, he expresses concern over what he sees as the 'demoralisation' of society, and poses the question of whether 'the changes we have witnessed in our time . . . may be in danger of destroying the very foundation of morality at its roots' (p. 216). In other words, have not changes which are in themselves desirable (i.e. 'progressive'), had unintended and undesirable consequences? This doubt, which qualifies his optimism, does not lead him to give an inch to the conservative critics of the contemporary family. 'Not by any stretch can the family be blamed for all this . . . the family is also the victim of [the] unforeseen consequences [of society's improvements] and of society's large scale evils' (p. 216).

This type of discourse appears to your reviewer to be hopelessly unsociological both in its resort to common standards of evaluation and its personification of the family

If the foundations of morality are threatened, who is 'to blame', if not the family? Fletcher identifies two factors the disruption of an encultured stable social life caused by the two world wars, the change in the attitude to the welfare state and secularisation. Why are we facing this threat? At this point the sources of Fletcher's family theory and societal theory are made explicit. His social theory derives from Cooley and Mead, and proposes that society is only possible on the basis of generation within the individual of basic sentiments of human belonging which have their origin in the primary group *viz.* in family, neighbourhood and peer groups. The second is rapidly being destroyed, the third taken over by the media, and the first is (if the reader will pardon the phrase) increasingly structurally isolated from the major societal structures of bureaucracy and market. His family theory is based on Westermarck and exhibits the classic confusions endemic in this area. The family is assumed to be 'universal' but there is a fatal hesitancy about whether its universality is the result of the institutional expression of universal human sentiments generated by procreation or a functional necessity for the generation of social sentiments on which 'society' depends.

It is not therefore surprising that a similar hesitancy infects Fletcher's view of the future, though he inclines to caution and, on the basis of his own evidence to a not entirely justified optimism.

Should one read Fletcher? On the whole, yes. However, *outré*

and infuriating, he is always stimulating and provocative, as perhaps only a voice from the past talking about our contemporary predicament and common future can be

University College, Swansea

C.C. Harris

Rethinking the Life Cycle

Alan Bryman, Bill Bytheway, Patricia Allatt and Teresa Keil, (eds), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £29 50, paper £11 95, xi + 255pp

Women and the Life Cycle

Patricia Allatt, Teresa Keil, Alan Bryman, Bill Bytheway, (eds), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £29 50, paper £11 95, xi + 229pp

To find that you are effectively reviewing the 1986 BSA Conference on the Sociology of the Life Cycle is something of an unnerving discovery. As with all conferences producing edited collections, the opportunities for unevenness, poor editing and lack of a central theme are very great. I am glad to report that the two books have been very sensibly edited into two central themes around which most of the papers do clearly revolve. Inevitably, some papers are closer to the themes than others but I am also happy to say that the standard of papers is uniformly high.

In the first book, a central paper by Chris Harris follows a useful introduction by the editors. Harris explores a Processual Approach to the individual and society with particular emphasis upon age, space-time, life course, and history, what emerges clearly is a sense of the complexity of individual life courses. After a detailed exploration of the life cycle concept, Murphy concludes that, in the light of diversity in family forms, 'the concept of the family life cycle is an impediment rather than an aid to understanding demographic aspects of family change' (p. 50). Bellaby explores folk models of the life cycle. Jacqueline Burgoyne provides a wide-ranging and stimulating exploration of popular notions of 'the family' and the family life cycle in the post-war era. Whilst Williams looks at images of old age, Peter Wright explores the social construction of babyhood. Frankenberg synthesises notions of cycle and life course along with the theme of 'death-and-dying' to explore the notion of life as 'pilgrimage' to combine 'individual

choice . . . with the necessity of structure'. In the section on Resources and Transfers, Cheal probes intergenerational transfers, Finch looks at family obligations and Dale explores life cycle, household income and material assets. Morris looks at life cycle and the labour market whilst Took and Ford look at mortgage arrears in terms of housing careers.

There is a wealth of detail in these papers which clearly demonstrates the advantage of looking at life as actually experienced rather than some archetypal model of the life cycle. The conference topic was seen as reflecting an emerging area of interest – I have to say that I see a significant future for sociologists in this area. Taken together, the papers suggest that we face two major demands. Firstly, sorting out some resolution of the conflict between 'life cycle' and 'life course' – perhaps seeing individuals negotiating pathways through life. Secondly, beginning to tackle the equally demanding problem of how to go about research in this area to discover how and why people follow particular life courses rather than impose our own preconceptions and theorisations upon their actions.

Following another intelligent introduction, the second book opens with two fascinating chapters. Oakley's work on evidence about Gender and Generation brings together material that is bound to be developed further whilst Roberts takes up the increasingly popular issue of the social class position of women. I personally found the second part of the book the most interesting since the various chapters begin to explore the detail of the private lives of girls and women. Griffiths looks at adolescent girls and the contest between maintaining links with girlfriends or boyfriends. Beuret and Makings look at women and courtship, particularly where women have the greater economic wealth. Griffin attempts to redress the bias towards male youth in exploring the transition to work and non-work of female youth. Mason looks at gender inequalities in the later years of marriage whilst Deem explores the leisure participation of women over the life cycle and Yeandle looks at women at midlife. In Part III, Cunnison looks at women's trade union participation over the life cycle and Wimbush explores the transitions to motherhood. Brannen looks at the 'Turning Point' arising from the question of whether or not to return to work after childbirth. A related paper by Bird and West analyses the 'interrupted lives' of women and their return to work. Marsden and Abrams look at married daughters caring for their elderly mothers.

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This second collection demonstrates very clearly that life cycle and/or life course analysis is particularly fruitful in exploring the lives of women. Again, there is a clear strain between life cycle with its implications of stasis and pre-determination and a much more dynamic sense of the life course. The bulk of the papers emphasise transitions and turning points in womens' lives, often omitting the detail of links to the occupational lives of men and the pre-school and school lives of children. As a means of redressing the neglect of so much of female existence, the theme is ideal – I am sure that a very great deal remains to be done here and I am convinced that, again, the theme will allow us to penetrate the veil of popular ideology about womens lives and see instead the details of their actual lives – that is, life courses as lived as opposed to life cycles as idealised.

Taken together the books raise a simple, even familiar, but none the less uncomfortable problem for sociologists. Each of the papers contributes something to the overall theme of the astonishing complexity and richness of human social life, especially in terms of developmental change. Most simply, the shape of an individual life course depends upon a myriad of inter-related factors: to understand that life course we need to regard individual life courses as unities. Having said this, when you look at the papers most reflect the level of narrow specialism common in the discipline. Whilst papers by Harris and Oakley attempt to bring together many of the factors that influence life courses, it is noticeable that most other sociologists find his approach unattractive.

Wolverhampton Polytechnic

Jon Bernardes

The World We Created at Hamilton High

Gerald Grant, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988, \$29.95, 285pp.

Grant argues that 'too many educational reports lacked historical perspective' (p. 5). In this book he tries to correct that by describing life for staff and pupils at Hamilton High from its opening in 1953 until 1987. The American high school under scrutiny, located in a small city in the north eastern USA, started out serving German/Polish/Irish/Italian Americans who had not chosen parochial (Catholic) schooling. In 1953 it seems to have

been the archetypical American high school we know from *Happy Days*. Clean cut girls and boys in twinsets and crewcuts respectively studied Latin and aimed for College. Rick and Joan and their friends shine from the yearbooks while the deep divisions of American society are invisible. Hamilton High was very sexist (girls had few sporting opportunities and little science) and racially harmonious because everyone was white. By 1987 the school was one third Black; had substantial groups of Hispanics and Asians *and* many physically and mentally handicapped students 'mainstreamed' there. The student body now has the the racial mix of the squad room at Hill Street *and* the generally harmonious social relations of that squad room. Grant reports some racial divisions and hostilities in the student body in the 1980s, but they are minimal compared to the conflicts, fears and prejudices of the 1970s when the school was first integrated. Hamilton High today is a friendly, optimistic school, and in a comment that reveals how very *American* the school is, Grant tells us that 'eight of the sixteen cheerleaders' (p. 97) are black.

The book is in two halves. In the first part Grant gives us the history of Hamilton High from the pre Korean *Happy Days* era, through the turmoil of the late 1960s and 1970s into the multiracial peace of the 1980s. The second half is more philosophical and speculative. Diagnosing the school as cheerful but devoid of any clear motivational or ethical consensus (effectively an amoral institution), Grant devotes the second half of the volume to the causes and cures of this malaise. The division is unhelpful, in that many data which would have illuminated the first half are only presented in the second. From the volume as a whole, however, a depressing picture of American high schools emerges, and the rest of this review focuses on reasons for the malaise.

The data Grant provides are drawn from oral history, documents surviving about the school, and research projects conducted on it by insiders and outsiders since 1971 using interviews, questionnaires and observation. Since 1983 America has been engulfed in a wave of public despair about the state of their high schools as severe as the moral panic precipitated by Sputnik, and there is no doubt that most American adolescents should be able to read, write and calculate better than they do. Japanese and German schooling appear to be much more effective, because the schools are better and/or because the family/community support for education is more efficacious. There are certainly three ways in which Grant's study shows the American high school to be in trouble. The first

concerns cheating. Data from students reveal that copying and cheating on tests are common (especially among the 'best' students who care most about grades) and that teachers either do ignore it or are believed by pupils to turn a blind eye to cheating. Staff who tried to stop unfair practices could meet harassment. One English teacher reports (p. 53) parents hiring a lawyer to examine all the marked work for a whole term to see if she were discriminating against the boy she had accused of cheating. A science teacher reported that s/he had stopped trying to prevent or catch students cheating because 'The parents are going to get a lawyer, the kid's going to get off, and you're going to look like a fool' (p. 53).

Both the high incidence of cheating and the adult responses to it are disturbing to read. Neither pupil nor adult behaviour seems likely to lead to genuine learning or even high scores on national tests. The data from other countries on this issue are sparse, and it is unclear whether cheating is an American problem or a widespread one. It would be nice to know whether the higher achieving Japanese and German students also cheat throughout secondary school.

The second finding from Grant's work which goes a long way to explain low academic achievement concerns part-time employment. In 1980 63 per cent of high school seniors had a part-time job, many of them taking more than fifteen hours a week. (Actual teaching in *lessons* in schools only takes ten hours a week, and homework only five hours) Grant points out that Japanese teenagers do not have jobs, and are not even expected to do any housework because school work is seen as so tiring, time consuming and important. In the USA it is students from richer homes, living in affluent areas, who have jobs, so they are not working to eat, but to run cars and buy clothes etc Grant does not match these figures with the data on teachers, but these are equally striking. Male high school staff frequently moonlight. The data are patchy and systematic research on the issue has not been done, but it appears that the typical male high school teacher rushes from the classroom to his other business (accountancy practice, hotel, sports shop or gunsmiths) The women rush off too, but they do mothering, housework and nurse elderly relatives, which is equally exhausting though not lucrative. It is hardly surprising that lessons are dull and undemanding when both participants are spending so much time on paid and unpaid work elsewhere.

The third body of data in Grant's book which explain low levels of scholarship concerns drug abuse. Nearly 40 per cent of high

school pupils used drugs, 18 per cent several times a week often in school. Figures on alcohol are similar. Again one suspects that Japanese teenagers arrive in school without pot or beer in their satchels.

Grant's 'solution' is a national debate about the moral climate or ethos which should be established in schools, resulting in a clear set of values imposed by all adults on all adolescents. We can enjoy the rich data in this volume without subscribing to that vapid conclusion

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Sara Delamont

From School to Unemployment: The Labour Market for Young People

P. N. Junankar (ed.), Macmillan, London, 1987, £14 95 paper, xi + 310pp.

The chapters in this volume were first presented as papers to a conference held at the University of Warwick in 1984. While the editor has made attempts to add new material and so produce 'a free-standing contribution to the literature on youth labour markets' the volume still remains dated. Many of the papers were written as the economy was 'recovering' from the 1980/81 recession but when youth unemployment was continuing to rise. At that time, one of the dominant concerns of economists was the question of the relative pay of young people and this debate provides the focus of the papers in Part One of the book.

During the early 1980s the Chancellor of the Exchequer was arguing that one of the causes of youth unemployment was the high wages of youths relative to those of adults. The policy response was to price young people back into the market by lowering their wages. This argument receives some support from the findings of Wells. In his analysis of time-series data Wells finds that the level of youth employment, especially for 18 year old males, is inversely related to changes in their relative labour costs. On the other hand these findings are challenged by Junankar and Neale who find that 'the growth of youth unemployment is primarily due to the recession, and that the effects of *relative* wages are insignificant'. Similarly, in a comparative analysis of youth pay in OECD countries, since 1966, Marsden can not find any

obvious link between levels of youth relative pay in different countries and their respective levels of youth unemployment. Meanwhile, as these papers were being written, the levels of youth pay fell but youth unemployment continued to rise. Eventually youth unemployment fell in response to a combination of government special measures and a recovery in the late 1980s in the output of manufacturing to levels similar to those of the late 1970s. There is little evidence that the reduction in the relative wages of youths has had anything other than a marginal effect on the fall in the level of youth unemployment.

Part Two deals with the characteristics of the youth labour market. This includes a paper by Main on earnings and expected earnings among school leavers and their possible relationship to unemployment. In some respects this paper continues the debate referred to in Part One, but goes beyond it and examines the effectiveness of the Youth Opportunities Scheme, concluding that those who entered in 1982 had some advantage in obtaining employment when compared with those who were not on the scheme. Lynch reports a cross-section analysis of London youth which finds ethnicity and educational qualifications to be important in influencing the probability of employment and the level of earnings. She also finds that early unemployment experience 'scars' the young worker in both future earnings and employment.

Two of the papers in Part Three shift the focus to a more systematic evaluation of the role of Youth Training Scheme. Dutton argues that it offers the potential for a comprehensive scheme of training which if not grasped is likely to result in it eventually disappearing from view as similar schemes have done. Confronting the same question, Raffe argues that on the basis of its first year, the scheme was functioning as just another unemployment measure for females, but for males it held out the promise of incorporating a number of male jobs and hence being something more than an unemployment measure. The final paper by Rajan returns to the main focus of the book, namely the youth-adults earnings differential and youth unemployment, this time tackling it through a study of the impact of the Young Workers Scheme which was instituted to lower youth wages.

The main thrust of these papers, namely the concern with analysing the impact of youth earnings relative to those of adults, and their role in determining the level of youth unemployment, means that many of them will only be of marginal interest to sociologists. The only sociologist to contribute is Raffe. However,

this neglect of a strong sociological input should not be a reason for ignoring the volume. If sociologists are to provide an adequate account of the structure of the youth labour market, then the question of the role of wages in determining employment, job movement etc., has to be taken on board, as indeed Roberts and Raffe have already started to do elsewhere. In addition, the papers by Marsden and Ryan incorporate the systematic analysis of the impact of institutional features, such as national vocational training systems and trade unions on pay levels, which are of more central concern to sociologists. While these are sufficient reasons for sociologists to take account of the volume, I doubt whether they will be sufficient to encourage them to buy it.

University of Leicester

David Ashton

Political Parties: Organization and Power

Angelo Panebianco, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, £10.95, xviii + 318pp.

For those of us in Britain, witnessing the failure of the Labour party to come to terms with the changing reality of socio-economic life in the 1980s and the apparent immunity of Thatcherism to either economic or social dislocation, the publication in English of Angelo Panebianco's work on the organizational imperatives of power within West European political parties is timely, if somewhat perplexing.

Panebianco's thesis – published in Italian in 1982 and drawing on an historic lineage through Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Weber to Ostrogorski and Duverger – is that what a political party does is primarily the result of the alliances and struggles for power amongst the different actors that comprise the organisation. Furthermore, Panebianco concludes that the early formation of the party by its founding fathers will leave an indelible mark on what the party does in the future by conditioning the types of organizational struggle and policy conflict. Put simply Panebianco sees the early formation of parties over-determining the choices which it will be able to make in the future. The book falls into four major parts. In part one Panebianco draws heavily on the literature and concepts of the sociology of organization, with particular emphasis on recent work in the analysis of complex organizations. These concepts are then adapted to the case of

political parties. The author seeks to show that this approach is more useful in explaining how parties respond to the many pressures and challenges which they face than the more traditional approaches which analyse parties as part of an electoral system, or see them in relation to social classes or in terms of their impact on state policy. For Panebianco this approach leads him to conclude that the primary function and goal for the leader of a party is the maintenance of organizational stability, whatever the other goals pursued by party actors. The party must, therefore, develop an organizational order – of which there may be many types – which is a satisfactory trade off between the leader's goal of stability and other actors' desires for change.

In part two Panebianco draws on this grounding in organizational theory to develop a novel typology of political parties. This typology is based on the interaction between a party's generic type (whether it is charismatic, territorially penetrated or diffuse, or has a leadership legitimated internally or externally to the organisation), its institutionalized structure (absent, strong or weak), and the impact of environmental characteristics peculiar to the formation and experience of each party. In part three the typology is further elaborated by analysing organizational problems such as the role of size, the division of labour, bureaucracy and external pressures on party functioning. The author comes to the challenging conclusion that Michels was wrong to argue that size had an independent effect on organizational dynamics. This, for Panebianco, only occurs in exceptional circumstances. Normally it is the relationship between the organization and its external environment which has the more important impact. Furthermore, the author concludes that competitors for the same electoral terrain are much more threatening to party cohesion and stability than outright ideological opponents. In this light coalitions and alliances cause internal instability and threaten the party fundamentally.

In part four the author develops his own model of organizational change to explain how parties transform themselves. He challenges, without totally rejecting the explanatory utility of, two dominant theses of party change. These are, respectively, the idea that a ruling group consciously manipulates change for its own ends and purposes and the idea that generational change brings organizational change. Panebianco argues that change is not inevitable over generations if cooption of elites occurs. The author concludes that change is most likely to occur, however, where parties are weakly institutionalized. Finally Panebianco makes a number of interesting

points about recent changes taking place in Western political parties and the consequences for political processes generally.

Taking up the work of Kirchheimer, and his view that modern parties are moving away from Duverger's idea of a mass-bureaucratic to an electoral-professional type along American lines, Panebianco argues that while there may be trends in this direction it creates more problems than it solves. It leads to a more independent but a more puzzled and isolated voter. The result may well be one of three possible solutions. The first may be that the mass-professional party heralds the dissolution of parties altogether. The second involves an ideological backlash as parties attempt to return via extremism to their historical mass-bureaucratic bases of support. The third involves real political innovation and evolution of democracy as new political leaders create new organisations to represent changing social and political coalitions.

It is clear from this brief survey of this complex and sometimes convoluted book why readers may be a little perplexed after reading it. While there is much of interest within it one is left somewhat unclear as to what the author's typology tells us about the future of political parties in Western Europe. While one can be in no doubt that the author makes apposite criticisms of weaknesses in the earlier works of Michels, Weber and Duverger, it is not at all clear whether the framework adopted here takes us any further in simplifying the comparative analysis of political parties. Indeed the exclusion of monist and American style parties from analysis also detracts from an inclusive typology. But, perhaps the most perplexing factor of all is the fact that the author's analysis does not enable him to make any firm judgement at all about the future of political parties. After reading this book one would be unable to tell the Labour party what it ought to do to help itself or tell whether Mrs Thatcher is an aberration or the harbinger of new developments. It is clearly not a book for the undergraduate market.

University of Hull

Andrew Cox

Intercompany Relations: The Structural Analysis of Business

Mark S. Mizruchi and Michael Schwartz (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, £30.00, x + 330pp

A spectre is haunting the Halls of Academe. It is the Spirit of Capitalism. Rumoured long ago to have gone East, it is now to be

conjured back into life at the scene of one of its early triumphs. The particular manifestation promised universities is that Youngian fantasy the Enterprise in Higher Education Initiative which aims to inculcate a proper appreciation of the virtues of profit, the market, and business organisation amongst undergraduates too often seduced by the critical and unrealistic tradition of intellectual endeavour. Given the ideological offensive mounted on behalf of a particular vision of capitalism and, in particular, of business, the role of academics and intellectuals in maintaining analytical and critical diversity is especially important. In this sense this book is an example of those qualities of enterprise and innovation which all but the most jaundiced of observers will recognise as the hallmark of the social sciences in the last three or four decades. A variety of authors of different theoretical persuasions explore business within one broad approach, here labelled, 'the structural'. By this is indicated analysis which takes as its starting point the notion that corporate behaviour cannot be understood in terms of the actions of separate and distinct firms, but must be related to the complex networks of relationships that exist amongst them.

Two perspectives dominate this form of structural analysis, one which gives primacy to organisational interests – 'resource dependency' – and another which is focused on class. As certain of the contributions to this volume attest, these are not necessarily to be regarded as mutually exclusive. After a useful and comprehensive introduction by the editors Pfeffer explores the attractions of the resource dependency approach, stressing the interdependence of the organisations which are at the core of advanced industrial societies. The basic premise here is that business organisations struggle to reduce the degree of uncertainty in the environment in which they operate, a critical part of which is the complex pattern of interdependencies of which they are, themselves, part. The conflict and co-operation which characterises these inter-relationships in the competition for scarce resources is, Pfeffer argues, better understood in terms of these dependencies than, for instance, through class analysis which, he claims, imputes too great a unity to the corporate world.

The following chapter, in which Soref and Zeitlin examine the internal structure of the capitalist class in the USA, is something of a rejoinder to the resource dependency position. They argue that it is in the nature of capitalism that major conflicts exist between the giant corporations which dominate the economy, but that a degree of class unity has been achieved. Interlocking directorships

are treated as a broad index of the attempt to achieve co-ordinated action, and finance capitalists emerge as of particular significance in this respect. Finance capitalists should not be thought of as only bankers since many have their base in industry. This observation is confirmed elsewhere in the collection by Bearden and Mintz. Their examination of the directoral interconnections between major corporations in the United States and of the interlocking overlappers themselves reveals the centrality of bank boardrooms, but also demonstrates that finance capitalists often have non-financial backgrounds. In their contribution Fennema and van der Pijl advance the argument that there is a correspondence between the growing significance of financial institutions within the intercorporate network and the decline in the position of the USA in the world economy thereby relating the structuring of corporate linkages to changes in the international economic system. In a similar but more ambitious exercise Scott analyses the relationship of the patterns of capitalist development experienced in Western Europe to corporate networks. Building on data derived from the Bad Homburg project he explains how the varying structures of intercorporate connection discernible in Britain, Germany, France and other countries can be understood in terms of the contrasting routes taken through industrialisation to late capitalism. Again finance capitalists emerge as of special importance often being interconnected at the formal level through the boards of banks or holding companies. Against these examples drawn from Europe and America the Japanese data presented by Taira and Wada suggest a far more formidable level of integration within the corporate elite and between it and government. Indeed the formal separation between government and business appears almost meaningless, and it is to this factor that the authors feel more attention should be paid in accounting for Japanese economic success, rather than the present stress on management practice in a purportedly free market.

There is much else of interest in this compilation including structural analyses of markets, of money, of the relationship between corporate structure, decision-making and urban systems, and of the changing contours of power in Columbia. This is the first book in a series to be based on this variety of structural analysis in the social sciences and provides a promising start to the venture. It demonstrates the weakness of those approaches which lay almost exclusive stress on managerial style, leadership, or culture when seeking to understand business. Just as an under-

standing of 'individuals and their families' requires an analysis which places them in a social context, so too an adequate grasp of the workings of the corporate economy requires the recognition that the structure of intercorporate relations between major business organisations both enables and constrains their activities. As we move into an era of greater economic integration between European transnational corporations with Europe, with an extension of the activities of Japanese and American corporations within the EEC, and of an increasing inter-dependency between the main operators in all fields of economic activity, it is apparent that this type of analysis will be indispensable to an adequate understanding of business behaviour and corporate power.

University of York

Philip Stanworth

A Divided Working Class. Ethnic Segmentation and Industrial Conflict in Australia

Constance Lever-Tracy and Michael Quinlan, Routledge, London, 1988, £25 00, paper £10 95, xviii + 338pp

The portrayal of immigrant workers in academic literature is oftentimes characterized by different stereotypes. They tend to be characterized either as passive agents, ignorant of the rules of the game who are 'super-exploited' by employers, or as a vanguard within the working class which has yet to be despoiled of its revolutionary potential because of racism and various forms of exclusion. With clarity, this book warns us against simplistic conclusions regarding the nature of immigration and the 'role' of immigrant workers in advanced capitalist countries. The authors' aim is the examination of the impact of post-1945 immigration upon Australia's workforce and labour movement. While seeking to remain within the framework of political economy, the book challenges both those political economy oriented theorists who have tended to define immigrants as a reserve army of labour, as well as those who adhere to theories of the dual labour market and who suggest that immigrants tend to be confined to the secondary labour market. The first two chapters sketch out their criticisms of these theoretical traditions as well as their alternative conceptualization. They suggest that given that the vast majority of immigrant

workers in Australia are presently employed in stable positions, they form part of the active labour army. It makes little sense, they argue, to regard such people as part of the reserve army of labour, which Marx identified as those who are either unemployed or frictionally unemployed. Similarly, they demonstrate that while there is an ethnically segmented workforce within Australia, with non-Anglophone workers concentrated in a range of jobs which are unskilled, unpleasant, repetitive and dangerous, these jobs tend also to involve the process of commodity production in large enterprises characterized by stability and high rates of unionization. This occupational concentration, they argue, is rooted in the historically constituted dynamics of capital accumulation in Australia. This process involved a proliferation of better paid and more desirable non-productive related jobs which indigenous workers filled, and an increasing pressure for surplus value placed on the remaining productive jobs. As in Western Europe, this resulted in a labour shortage, which foreign-born workers were recruited to fill.

The third chapter deals with the interaction of immigrants with working class organizations. It demonstrates that while there has been a diverse array of immigrant worker organizations in Australia, immigrants have by and large not formed their own unions. Rather, they have become attached to extant worker organizations. This, the authors argue, was the result of several conditions: a state sponsored national system of compulsory arbitration and high rate of unionization left little scope for the development of alternative organizations, the vulnerable 'outsider' status of immigrant workers militated against their defying established norms within the workplace, the heterogeneity of immigrants, in terms of national origins and their geographical dispersal within the country, worked against the development of what they call a 'ghetto' approach; and the pragmatic orientation of Australian unionism precluded unions from practising overt discrimination. Chapters four and five are the most novel parts of the book, and consist of case studies of immigrant workers and their industrial organization within the steel industry and at Ford's Broadmeadows plant. Their interviews with immigrant shop stewards makes for a fascinating account of the complexities of the interface of union, employer and immigrant industrial strategies. Their main analytical conclusion in this regard is that 'the special characteristics inherent in being an immigrant can be seen to co-exist with a wide array of both union and employer industrial

strategies, which leads to a number of different responses and perspectives amongst immigrant workers' (p. 316). Thus, immigrant workers are seen, not as passive objects which necessarily divide and weaken the working class, nor as separate from the working class, but as active agents who are inserted into pre-existing structures, draw upon past traditions of resistance, and meaningfully intervene in social processes.

There are a few points which would improve this otherwise interesting, theoretically relevant and well-researched work. A more strict editorial hand would have been helpful: it is difficult to digest the forty-four tables in the book, especially when over half of them appear in one chapter. More substantively, an overview of the conditions of steel and automobile production would have been useful. Management practices tend to be conceived in terms of company styles, yet one is left wondering about the structural constraints which shape these particular practices. We are never really told, for example, why Broken Hill Proprietary Company became an 'entrepot employer' of immigrant workers. Finally, while the authors raise the issue of racism at several points, they do not deal with it systematically. In a way which may let the Australian working class off too easily, they skate over the implications of the 'white Australia' policy and the degree of support it received from unions.

University of Saskatchewan

Vic Satzewich

John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971

Colin Holmes, Macmillan, London, 1988, £33.00, paper £10.95, x + 448pp.

In the current British public consciousness, the term 'immigrant' is usually considered to be synonymous with terms such as 'coloured' or 'black'. Paradoxically, this conceptual correlation is implicitly reinforced by the bulk of academic research on post-1945 immigration to Britain. This is because it concentrates almost exclusively upon immigration from the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean, and upon the consequences of these migrations for political and economic relations in Britain.

Such an emphasis may be justified insofar as the response to

these migrations from different sections of the British population has, by virtue of its extent and its racism, brought about a number of significant changes within Britain since 1945. But it is less justified insofar as settlers of New Commonwealth origin in the post-1945 period do not constitute the largest population of immigrant origin. Rather, it is settlers from Ireland who warrant this description. And when we widen our historical time-period, as Holmes does in this book, to include the one hundred years that begins in 1871, this point is dramatically reinforced. Taking this period as a whole, migrants from other European countries have predominated numerically throughout, with those from Ireland being the largest from any single country. In this light, the commonsense equation of 'immigrant' with 'blackness' cannot be justified.

Anyone wishing to evaluate the evidence for this conclusion will find Holmes's book indispensable. It is the most thorough and detailed academic survey of the different migrations into Britain, of the characteristics of these populations, and of the reaction of the British population that we have, and its excellence is unlikely to be rivalled for many years to come. The text is a fiesta of detail, richly supported by a multitude of references. Indeed, the ardent reader could spend many months usefully following up the postgraduate theses, papers and books that Holmes cites in order to expand upon the detailed picture that he presents.

As a result, Holmes corrects several misconceptions and mistaken emphases in the academic literature. For example, almost all the literature on migration to Britain usually cites evidence only for England, and thereby ignores the often distinctive history of migration to Wales and Scotland. Holmes is more careful than most to attempt to correct this error, although he could be faulted for presenting an analysis which underlines the continuities to the exclusion of the differences in migration patterns to these different regions of Britain.

Additionally, he is sensitive to the fact that not all migrant populations have become sellers of labour power to British employers short of semi- and unskilled manual labour. Not only does he highlight the many refugee migrations to Britain, wherein those who entered the country had little reason to reflect upon the use to which their labour power might be put, but he also highlights the variety of class positions some sections of certain migrant populations have come to occupy.

The complex picture that Holmes presents does, nevertheless,

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have some gaps. For example, he ignores the small but significant migration to Scotland from the Indian subcontinent during the 1920s and 1930s and the refugee migration to Britain from the Low Countries during the Second World War. These migrations he fails to refer to at all, while others he is aware of but is unable to document because of the absence of any significant academic research.

This complex empirical mosaic is perhaps to be expected of a skilled and highly regarded social historian such as Holmes. As such, the book is a most important contribution to the literature and warrants reading by every sociologist, geographer, and political economist interested in migration to Britain. But they should also be warned about the conceptual weakness of Holmes's book. While he is anxious to avoid the errors that arise from the use of a loosely defined concepts of racism, he leaves this reader confused by his use of undefined concepts such as 'antipathy', 'xenophobia' and 'anti-foreign' sentiment. Moreover, there is a tendency in the text to employ the language of 'race' (and associated terms such as 'racial cosmopolitanism', 'racial solidarity', 'racial minority' and 'interracial conflict') when discussing migrant populations from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent but not migrations from elsewhere in Europe. This is despite the fact that Holmes cites evidence in the form of a number of quotations which show how most European migrations to Britain have been racialised (for example, pp. 68, 79, 113, 141).

The implication of Holmes's emphasis is that migrants from the Caribbean, Africa, China and India and Pakistan are of a 'different race' and that their presence gives rise to a situation of a 'race relations'. This is in line with the assumptions of British 'race relations' sociology and with common sense discourse, but it is nowhere legitimated theoretically by Holmes. In the light of the book's undoubted virtues, it is therefore unfortunate that Holmes is so concerned to highlight the historical evidence that demonstrates the limitations of the way in which a number of key sociological concepts have been used that the untheorised concepts that he does employ reflect the mistaken common sense of the wider British population.

University of Glasgow

Robert Miles

The Burden of Representation. Essays on Photographies and Histories

John Tagg, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £25 00, paper £7 95, xii + 262pp

Members of the intellectual circles who have made great strides in developing the field of cultural studies over the past two decades have rarely been guilty of undue modesty. It is not therefore surprising that John Tagg should have collected recent essays presuming that they form a coherent argument (although it might have been expected that he would edit out the repetitions and duplications of argument and phrasing). One consequence of this approach though is that the book is almost as interesting for what it tells us about the intellectual and political debates within these circles as for what it tells us about the meanings of photographs. In relation to the first perspective the essays describe a trajectory from Althusser to Foucault – a trajectory he seems to feel is relatively short while others would see it as more complex. In relation to the second perspective there is a persistent engagement with the themes of how we can assess the truth of an image, whether it is possible or appropriate to attempt a distinction between aesthetic value and ideological significance, and how the self-evident literalism of photographic images, their innocence, can be linked into the machinery of power. Binding these projects together is: 'an attempt to break from ahistorical modes of textual analysis without falling into a reductive account of the relations of cultural practices to economic and political social relations and the state' (p. 29).

The central theme of Tagg's argument is that photography, as with any semiotic system, is not a version of an independently knowable reality but constitutive of what that reality will be. This is because photography is an instrument of, one of the mechanisms of, the organisation and use of power in the social formation (of Britain? it is not clear) over the past century and a half. In order to make this argument as forcefully as possible power is often anthropomorphised to produce rather curious effects. 'In fact, power produces. It produces reality. It produces domains of objects, institutions of language, rituals of truth' (p. 87). This is also, however, due to a very reasonable attempt to get away from mechanistic determinism. The sentences just quoted follow immediately on an argument that power should not be conceptualised solely as versions of constraint, and elsewhere he is willing to

tackle the difficulties of theorising power and also to recognise that 'power can no longer be seen as a general form, emanating from one privileged site, uniform in its operations, and unified in its determinist effects' (p. 21). He is therefore fighting on two fronts simultaneously – both assailing previous forms of cultural history and attempting to show that photographic practice has not been innocent, has indeed been profoundly implicated in the production of 'truth' in contemporary social order. Thus a relatively uncontentious history of types and market for photographic portraiture can develop into an unmasking of 'the governmental strategy of capitalist states whose consolidation demanded the establishment of a new "regime of truth" and a new "regime of sense"' (p. 61). The historical conceptualisation of social change being drawn upon here is sometimes a little startling, as for example when he at least twice envisages an abrupt transition from an absolutist monarchy to the institutional differentiation of 'the microphysics of power' in the modern state. But it does provide for a salutary alternative to conventional historiography focused round photographic *auteurs*.

I have indicated that in marking out his project Tagg is not loath to note the deficiencies of previous forms of cultural history including Marxist perspectives. As he scathingly points out, 'So much "Marxist" art history has been caught in the circular trap of trying to explain the image production of a society by reference to a "mental outlook" or "world view" which is itself only present in the *representational activity* of that society' (p. 209). And thus any attributions to class views are comfortingly self-confirming. While this is well-put and fully justified it is difficult to escape the feeling that despite the complexity of his interactional theory of representational practices and material conditions his accounts of photographic practice are equally prescriptive if not so crudely derived. He for example concludes a sustained assault on the social reformism of New Deal documentary photography by warning that we should be aware that the constitution in the FSA photography: 'of "poverty and deprivation" . . . as both the target and the instrument of a new kind of discourse which became . . . a formidable tool of control and power' (p. 174). If somebody is so committed to the conventional character of realism that they are puzzled by why people accept photographs as realistic (cf p. 188), it is less surprising that they are willing to blind themselves to the complexity of cultural significance of representational style. In practice of course Tagg is not insensitive but the fury of his analytic

project means that respect for the image is sacrificeable to more abstract goals

Not all of the essays are of equal value. The force of chapters such as the Introduction and that on the photograph as evidence in law must be offset against the piece on the legal reality of photographs as property. An unnecessarily dense display of discursive concerns is ultimately revealed to be only relevant in French legal theory and in English Law photography presented no special problems. Its inclusion and other redundancies in the book are a pity because they suggest that Tagg has not fully thought through the purpose of this book at this stage. The weaknesses detract from an original contribution to cultural historiography. The intelligence and commitment displayed in this contribution will ensure that Tagg's further work will command serious attention.

University of Durham

David Chaney

Black Culture, White Youth: the Reggae tradition from JA to UK
Simon Jones, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £33.00, paper £9.50,
xxvii + 251pp

This interesting and important book explores issues neglected in the sociology of both British youth and British racism: 'the interactive dimension of black-white relations and the question of white responses to black culture' (p. xix). Music historians have long taken for granted that the dynamic of British pop culture is the white love of black sounds, and, in *Subculture*, Dick Hebdige famously traced 'the phantom history of race relations' in youth styles, but, as Jones points out, little work has been done on what this means in terms of everyday contacts and experience. While the most popular black music here has been Afro-American, the impact of Afro-Caribbean music may, therefore, have been more 'more profound and far-reaching – for that impact has been more heavily mediated by the *presence* of a substantial section of the Afro-Caribbean working class in the heart of urban Britain' (p. xxiv). To be a white reggae fan is to confront the problems and possibilities of 'race relations' which blues and soul fans, disco and house dancers, evade in fantasies of 'America'.

Jones's concern is with what its white followers get from reggae

music and how such a taste reflects – or is reflected in – black/white social relations. He approaches these questions with the two pronged method of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (*Black Culture, White Youth* started out as a CCCS PhD) – on the one hand, a historical-cultural reading of reggae – to uncover the ideological values encoded in it, on the other hand, an ethnography of a small group of Birmingham reggae fans.

The first part of the book, the reggae reading, is an efficient summary of left cultural orthodoxy, the music celebrated as an authentic working class folk form. Jones roots reggae's expressive conventions in traditional African music in order to explain its continuing ability to 'represent' its audience's experiences and dreams. He puts special stress on the 'social relations of consumption'

For it is only in the context of consumption, though the sound system in particular, that the music is socialised and fully brought to life as an expressive totality of various communicative and signifying practices, including dub, DJ-ing, singing and dance (p. 30)

The problem with this account of a perfect fit between collective experience and musical expression is its idealisation of the production process, which becomes apparent when Jones turns his attention to the development of reggae and its audience in Britain. He has done a fruitful trawl through back issues of the music press to show how reggae was packaged here – as a new form of 'rebel rock' (in the selling of Bob Marley, most obviously), as the sound of a 'minority' community (on local and pirate radio) – but he assumes without much further evidence that people do consume according to such ideological suggestions, suggesting, for example, that marketing labels like Lovers' Rock and 2-Tone described social as well as musical phenomena.

The implication of Jones's approach is that reggae is, by its Afro-Caribbean nature, the product of a quite different system of signification than other forms of commercial pop music. I doubt this (just as I doubt that it is, uncomplicatedly, *the* sound of black British youth) and it is perhaps unfortunate that Jones completed the bulk of his research before the rise of hip hop culture, which has displaced (or absorbed) reggae politics in the last couple of years. The current vibrancy of the British hip hop scene suggests that reggae's cultural importance too may have been less its

musical 'message' as such, than its accessible business structure (many of the original punk labels emerged from reggae servicing companies).

But if the weakness of Jones's book is his neglect of the production process, witness his sometimes naive tendency to take reggae sales ideology at face value, this is because he is, in the end (another CCCS trait), writing as a consumer himself – and white reggae consumers, as he shows in the second, ethnographic part of the book, are, indeed, naive and idealistic. Jones's study of the ways in which white fantasies of blackness and coolness and community come up against their reality in the very act of musical consumption (in clubs and shops, schools and streets) is suggestive and moving. He shows how inner city and suburban working class teenagers confront different patterns of racism, how racial differences themselves are overlaid (and undercut) by shared class and gender experience, how cross-race identities are used to solve (or exacerbate) problems at home or school. In this complex play of black and white youth culture (much more complex than the usual descriptions of white racism and black 'separatism' suggest) reggae becomes a *solution* to the conflicts and tensions 'inscribed into the most intimate forms of social interaction between young blacks and whites' (p. 177) – not just a symbolic solution, as subcultural theory suggests, but, in its institutions of consumption, a material solution too, a setting where a utopia of 'no racial fuckries' can be lived out.

John Logie Baird Centre

Simon Frith

Constructive Drinking: Perspectives on Drunk from Anthropology
M. Douglas (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987,
£25.00, ix + 291pp.

The opening chapter of the book, which is written by the editor Professor Douglas and entitled 'A distinctive anthropological perspective', explains that the book is divided into three sections: drink constructs the world as it is', 'drinking constructs an ideal world' and 'alcohol entrenches the alternative economy' Douglas explains that these are the three ways in which drink socially constructs the world.

In the first section, the reader is provided with information on

drinking in a wide range of different societies including Austria, the United States, Newfoundland, Tuscany, and Zaire. Of these relatively standard anthropological approaches to drinking the articles by Gusfield and Mars are by far the most interesting. Gusfield examines the way in which drinking symbolises or demarcates the end of one time period and the beginning of another. For example the phrase 'It's time for a drink' is used to mark the end of work and the beginning of leisure time. The article by Mars illustrates the way in which alcohol is used as a social marker for group inclusion and exclusion amongst longshoremen in Newfoundland. The consequences of failing to be in the in-group determines the longshoreman's ability to obtain regular paid employment.

In the second section which examines the role of drinking in constructing an ideal world, we find articles on Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), a Tonga ceremony, a day care centre for the elderly and an analysis of drink in Simenon's detective books about the adventures of Inspector Maigret. Antze's article on Alcoholics Anonymous utilises Turner's work on the 'cults of affliction' to illustrate the way in which AA uses rituals both to cure the individual and to 'initiate the victim' into a specialised community. Once sufferers have become part of the cult then they become healers for new sufferers entering the community. The article by Hazan on tea drinking amongst the elderly is also particularly interesting because unlike the other articles it examines the use of rituals around a non-alcoholic beverage – tea. According to Hazan, the clients at the Day Centre used the tea-time ceremony to attempt to recreate some element of stability and familiarity in their lives. Outside the centre their lives were determined by worries about illness and death. In addition to emphasising the communally enforcing elements of tea drinking Hazan contrasts the rituals of tea time with the factionalism and individualism of lunch time, thereby providing us with an illustration of the way in which the rituals of eating and drinking can be instilled with totally opposite meanings.

The articles in the third and final section of the book examine alcohol production in Mexico, Poland and Soviet Georgia. Although individually each of these articles produces valuable information about the political economy of alcohol, this section of the book was the least well integrated a point that was reflected in the introduction to the book which failed to adequately explain the relationship of this section to that of the other two.

If the purpose of this book had been merely to provide the reader with more information on the anthropology of drinking then the collection would have achieved its aim. However, according to both the sleeve notes and the opening chapter, the purpose of this book was 'to present a distinctive anthropological approach to the study of drink, and to provide a corrective to the view of drinking only as problematic'. This is an important and worthwhile aim, however, unfortunately, the articles within 'Constructive Drinking' do not live up to the claim put forward by its editor. For in spite of providing us with information on such issues as the use of drinking rituals to maintain in-groups and out-groups and the role of alcohol to separate different time periods, we are given few insights into how an anthropological perspective or methodology could contribute to an understanding of alcohol problems. Hence the book merely re-inforces the further development and consolidation of two parallel approaches to the study of alcohol, a trend which the editor would appear to be against. The fact that this book does not attempt to apply anthropological insights to problem drinking is even more surprising given the fact that Douglas suggests a number of possible issues that anthropologists might examine, for example to what extent does the surrounding culture's attitude to drunkenness affect the prospects of an addict's cure. Therefore instead of producing new insights into the cultural analysis of alcohol problems and their treatment this book, because the articles fail to live up to the promises in the opening chapter, remains an interesting but rather traditional examination of the culture of drinking

The Polytechnic of North London

Geoffrey Hunt

Quantity and Quality in Social Research

Alan Bryman, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988, £25 00, paper £9 95, viii + 198pp.

Discussions of research methods in sociology courses almost always carry within them the potential for crushing boredom. In particular it is often difficult to engage students in a meaningful way with questions of method. In part at least both the problem of boredom and that of lack of engagement stem from a tendency by many writers to treat research methods as matters of abstract

technique rather than as logical and coherent extensions of philosophical and theoretical positions. Bryman's text completely avoids this failing and is a lively and cogent addition to the small group of really worthwhile modern research methods books.

The book is written as an interrogation of the relative merits and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry and an exposition and comparison of the different philosophical and theoretical bases upon which they rest. The latter are expressed on terms of opposing conceptions of the role of the researcher, the relationship between researcher and subject, the relationships between theory/concepts and research, research strategies, scope of findings, image of social reality, etc. Neither approach is partially presented, although qualitative methods probably get more space and discussion. The two approaches are first of all laid out separately, although within a common framework of analysis (summarized on p. 94). A number of criticisms commonly aimed at the qualitative paradigm are then explored. The book concludes with chapters on the comparison of, and then the possibilities of combining the quantitative and qualitative. Interestingly and usefully the argument is liberally illustrated with comparisons of actual pieces of research. The possibilities and outcomes of the use of different methods to address particular research questions are thus indicated. There are also plenty of reflective quotations from researchers of both persuasions. It is possible at times to get some sense from the text of the immediate nature of the research enterprise in each case and the often unexpressed links between what researchers want to do, and can and cannot do, within the limits of their paradigmatic practice.

Bryman ably demonstrates the importance of understanding the relationships of the different approaches to a range of different but related social theoretical positions. That is to say, he emphasizes, on the one hand, an ideal-type polarization between quality and quantity in social research. But, on the other hand, he is careful not to over-state the unity within the paradigms. There is often as much infighting between qualitative researchers with slightly different theoretical leanings as there is across the paradigmatic divide. The conclusions of this careful process of comparison are not earth shattering; in a nutshell they are that (i) qualitative and quantitative researchers are asking different sorts of questions and can provide different kinds of research insights, and (ii) it may be possible with care to employ quality and quantity in complementary

fashion. But really that is not the point. The point is the argument itself. The careful rehearsal of the differences between and limits and possibilities of the two sets of methods.

I enjoyed this book and I would be pleased if my students were to read it. It is well written, sensible and accessible. My only criticisms are in the form of minor quibbles very much in the spirit of Bryman's project. I will mention two. First, it was a pity perhaps that in the discussion of qualitative methods no mention is made of the use of naturalistic sampling. The issue of sampling is a critical point of separation between quality and quantity. Qualitatives do sample but in very different ways and for different reasons from their counterparts. Naturalistic sampling, and theoretical sampling, are well established in the qualitative tradition. There is an extensive treatment of the former in the methodological appendix of *Boys in White*, and some interesting reflections in Strauss *et al*'s *Psychiatric Institutions and Ideologies*. In a different sense the issue of sampling bears upon Bryman's discussion of generalization. That is with regard to the choice of cases. There is no reference to the careful selection of 'critical' cases. This is an important counter, in some research, to criticisms of generalizability. Second, I would have welcomed more attention being given to the relationships between qualitative research cases. Clearly, there is a strong tendency among qualitatives to take each case, each setting, as peculiar and discrete. But there is a debate among ethnographers, which Bryman does mention, concerning the possibilities of theory testing between cases. And there have been attempts, for example in educational research (Lacey, Hargreaves, Ball, Turner, Beynon), to compare and develop concepts between cases. This debate further highlights a crucial tension in the qualitative between researchers who aim for substantive or formal theories and those engaged in more modest concept elaboration. Again this is a difference in practice rooted in philosophical differences.

Despite these minor omissions the undoubted merit of Bryman's book is that he raises these kinds of issues in ways which will interest any novice or experienced researcher.

Kings College London

Stephen J. Ball

Exploring Data. An Introduction to Data Analysis for Social Scientists

Catherine Marsh, Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £35 00, paper £10 50, xx + 385pp

We have in Britain a vast range of statistical data covering a multitude of issues and collected for a variety of widely differing purposes. To be able to understand, manipulate and explore these data should be a fundamental part of the training of any social scientist. This book provides a major contribution towards achieving these objectives. Of equal importance, however, it places data analysis firmly within a social and economic context which provides compelling insights into twentieth-century Britain. It is this dual function of exploratory data analysis within a wide-ranging social context that is likely to make this book of immense value to a range of undergraduate courses in social science

Exploring Data is not only written simply and clearly at a level which should be readily accessible to undergraduates, it is also *interesting*. Each chapter focuses on a substantive issue of concern to social science – for example, unemployment, income, education, then, by means of examples from real data, it introduces in step-wise manner the principles of exploratory data analysis. Nothing is taken for granted; thus the first section is concerned only with univariate analysis, starting with definitions of basic terms such as ‘variable’, and ‘case’ and then going on to demonstrate ways of displaying data in order to get a feel for its structure or patterning. It explains in a clear and meaningful way those summary statistics such as mean, standard deviation and variance that are fundamental to statistical analysis but which are so often ‘explained’ simply by providing a formula. The importance of 2-way and 3-way contingency tables as a mainstay of much social science is recognised by a detailed explanation of their production and, in an appendix aptly headed ‘good table manners’ the reader is given a thorough grounding in designing and presenting a table. Other chapters dealing with scaling, smoothing, scatterplots, transformations, standardisation, causal explanations and median polishing provide an extensive introduction to data analysis. Each chapter ends with a set of exercises (to which the answers are given at the back of the book) and an appendix which provides useful background information into the data source which has been used in that chapter.

I think that this down-to-earth, ‘hands-on’ approach to data

analysis is an essential preliminary to more sophisticated analysis. When we now have readily available soft-ware packages that can produce instant statistical analyses with little or no effort or understanding on the part of the user, it is vital that social science training includes a firm foundation in the basic principles of data analysis and statistics. I was particularly heartened to find Twyman's law introduced as 'perhaps the most important single law in the whole of data analysis: The more unusual or interesting the data, the more likely it is to have been the result of an error of one kind or another' (p. 35). It is a lesson well learnt at an early stage!

Through the use of methods of 'hand' calculation, this book demonstrates the way in which exploratory analysis can illuminate data structures and investigate relationships which might be missed by immediate recourse to standard methods of computer analysis. As the author notes in the final chapter 'I would like to think that readers, on completing this book, would all swear a solemn oath: never to skip over the numerical evidence for an argument nor to take somebody else's word for what the data has to say' (p. 294)

Inevitably, there are some topics which are not covered and others where the reader might wish less detail. But the strength of this book lies in the fact that it is wide-ranging and relates a clear account of exploratory data analysis to some of the key issues with which social science is traditionally concerned. As a bonus it contains a good deal of information on the data sources which are available and the reasons which underlie the collection of a particular statistical series – whether the Census, the unemployed claimant count or the OPCS Longitudinal Study. Finally, an extract from each dataset used is printed in the back of the book so enabling the student to carry out all the analyses for him or herself, whether by hand or using Minitab.

I am confident that this book will quickly find its way into a very wide range of undergraduate courses on data analysis.

University of Surrey

Angela Dale

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Moral theory based on the 'heart' versus the 'mind': Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kantian ethics

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Abstract

Schopenhauer criticized Kant's moral theory on the grounds that it was non-empirical and inadequate, because it attempted to establish morality on the basis of reason and duty. Contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer argued that genuine morality is irrational, based on compassion, and a human product, hence that it could be studied empirically. Schopenhauer established the 'science of morality' which occupied the attention of a host of turn of the century precursors of the social sciences, especially Durkheim. Durkheim's version of the science of moral facts is compared and contrasted with Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, and it is demonstrated that Durkheim tends to follow Schopenhauer's lead. Problems with Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's critiques of Kantian ethics are also discussed.

In his 1841 essay entitled *On the Basis of Morality*, Arthur Schopenhauer offered a severe criticism of Kant's rationalist system of morality. Whereas Kant removed morality from phenomenal, empirical considerations and restricted it to *a priori* categories, Schopenhauer argued that morality ought to be studied empirically (see Taylor, 1965). Whereas Kant argued that the basis for morality was duty, Schopenhauer argued that genuine morality must be based on compassion and desire. In short, to use Schopenhauer's ([1818] 1977) dualism between the 'heart' and 'mind' that is the basis of his distinction between the 'will' and 'idea', Schopenhauer aligned morality with the 'heart' and thereby reversed Kant's understanding of morality as a phenomenon of the 'mind' and the Enlightenment.

Schopenhauer's achievement had a lasting impact on turn of the century concerns with the empirical study of morality (see Fox,

1980; Lévy-Bruhl, 1899, 1905, Logue, 1983, Wundt, 1906) It must be noted that Schopenhauer is correct to assert that Kant ([1788] 1956: 118) strictly and explicitly prohibited this linkage between empirical science and morality. Durkheim's colleague and collaborator at the Sorbonne, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1905:15), also remarked on the deficiency of 'Kant's teaching . . . [in that] it establishes universal and necessary principles without borrowing anything from experience'. Following Schopenhauer's lead, Wilhelm Wundt's (1906) *Volkerpsychologie* concerned itself in large measure with the scientific study of morality. Similarly, Durkheim and his followers understood their version of sociology as an attempt to establish a 'science of moral facts' (see Durkheim, [1920] 1978, Davy, 1927, Hall, 1987, Lévy-Bruhl, 1899, 1905; Mauss, [1950] 1979; Mestrovic, 1988a, Pickering, 1979) Pickering (1979) is correct to assert that the Durkheimians were not alone in this concern with establishing morality on a scientific basis, and cites the works of Landry, Fouillée, Belot, Bayet, and Westermarck as efforts within the programme established by Durkheim And Durkheim in turn was aware of and reviewed many of the works by these philosophers (in Pickering, 1979).

Moreover, the concerns with the scientific, empirical study of morality by the precursors of today's social sciences were part of a larger and more general influence of Schopenhauer's philosophy on what Ellenberger (1970) called the *fin de siècle* spirit that captivated many turn of the century writers in diverse fields (see also Bailey, 1958; Baillot, 1927; Hamlyn, 1980; Janik and Toulmin, 1973; Lukács, 1980, Magee, 1983, Mestrovic, 1988b; Simmel, [1907] 1986). Although scholars are aware of Durkheim's concerns with the scientific study of morals, even if they disagree with how central this concern was for Durkheim's sociology as a whole (see Hall, 1987; Pickering, 1979), the role of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant in Durkheim's writings has been completely neglected in sociological analyses. The central aim of this essay is to establish the philosophical context of Durkheim's ethical concerns.

Henri Bergson, who was also Durkheim's colleague at the Sorbonne, betrays Schopenhauer's influence in his own critique of Kantian ethics. In *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Bergson ([1932] 1954: 210) notes that in contradistinction to the Enlightenment belief that intelligence could counsel ethics, 'intelligence . . . would more likely counsel egoism' (which is also Schopenhauer's conclusion). Like Schopenhauer, Bergson cites many problems with a purely intellectualist moral philosophy. that

such a philosophy can only 'adduce reasons, which we are perfectly free to combat with other reasons' (p. 270); that intelligence is a dissolving power compared to intuition (p. 122); that intelligence can never bring forth moral action, only rationalizations (p. 48); and that 'morality expresses a certain emotional state, that actually we yield not to a pressure [Kant's duty] but to an attraction' (p. 49). In sum, contrary to Kant, Bergson ([1932] 1954. 85) asserts that 'because we have established the rational character of moral conduct, it does not follow that morality has its origin or even its foundation in pure reason'

Similarly, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl – to whom Hall (1987. 34) refers as 'an independent originator of the sociology of morals' alongside Durkheim – criticizes severely Kant's rationalist system of ethics. In *Ethics and Moral Science* Lévy-Bruhl (1905. 43) refers to Kant's rationalism as 'a strange rationalism' and as 'a theory of a strange kind' (p. 45). This is because for Kant, facts belong to the world of phenomena while the reason that should guide morals is relegated to the unreachable world of noumena. 'The reason to which he [Kant] relates moral order is not the reason that knows, the reason the function of which is to found science – it is the reason that commands and that does so in the name of principles that are not instituted by the reason that knows'. Moreover, with regard to morality, 'Kant demands nothing from the non-intellectual powers of the soul' except obedience, despite the fact that in Lévy-Bruhl's opinion, 'it is not the idea which determines the actions of the greater number of men, but feeling' (p. 44)

Bergson and Lévy-Bruhl are only two illustrious thinkers among many from Durkheim's intellectual milieu who expressed an awareness of the problems with Kant's rationalist system of ethics along Schopenhauerian lines. And both thinkers referred favourably to Durkheim as being in the forefront of efforts to transcend these difficulties with Kant. Yet, as a rule, neither Durkheimian scholars nor investigators in contemporary moral theory acknowledge the polemic between Kant and Schopenhauer and its import for the scientific study of morality. Despite evidence for Schopenhauer's influence on turn of the century intellectuals in general (Ellenberger, 1970), and the scientific study of morality in particular, his importance in contemporary studies of morality has been almost completely overlooked. The most dominant forces in modern studies of morality are the works of Kohlberg (1958, 1970, 1984) and Habermas (1970, 1984), which are informed, explicitly or implicitly, almost entirely by Kant's philosophy. The contemporary

focus in moral theory on the rationalist basis of moral judgment and on duty, along with a neglect of the role of compassion in morality, are all clear indicators of the continued influence of Kant's (1788) problematic influence at the expense of neglecting Schopenhauer's critique.

The aim of this essay is to contrast sharply the systems of morality informed by Kant's philosophy versus the ways in which Durkheim's system of morality is informed by Schopenhauer's philosophy. The polemic between these thinkers and philosophies is still very relevant to contemporary concerns with morality. Schopenhauer's philosophy leads to genuine empiricism (see Mann, 1939), while Kant's *a priori*ism cannot and does not lead to empiricism. Yet the social sciences today are informed by Kant's, not Schopenhauer's philosophy! This contradiction is not immediately apparent, because contemporary social theory has tilted toward the 'mind' pole of Schopenhauer's famous dualism, while the 'heart' pole has been obscured, distorted, and even denied (see Mestrovic, 1989). Thus, from the perspective of a sociology of knowledge applied to sociology itself, it is intriguing that contemporary social theory has its one-sided theories of rational social action, cognitive development, value-free science, goal-oriented behavior and other 'heartless' vocabulary – along with chronic epistemological crises. Yet it is a verifiable fact that the *fin de siècle* precursors of the social sciences wrote in a more pessimistic, irrationalist, anti-Enlightenment vein, and much of what they wrote is still relevant (Bailey, 1958; Bergson, 1932; Ellenberger, 1970).

I will begin with Schopenhauer's (1841) critique of Kant (1788) regarding morality based on duty versus compassion, and move to a comparison and contrast with Durkheim's philosophical underpinnings for his understanding of the sociological study of morality. I agree with Pickering (1979) and Hall (1987) that the sociology of morals is central to Durkheim's entire sociological thought, and that he was influenced primarily by German moralists of his time in this regard (see Durkheim, [1887] 1976a, [1887] 1976b). But whereas Hall (1987) does not trace this German influence further than Wilhelm Wundt, with whom Durkheim studied from 1885 to 1886, it is important to note Schopenhauer's influence on Wundt and turn of the century German intellectuals in general, including Nietzsche (see Fox, 1980; Simmel, [1907] 1986). Durkheim must be distanced from the confines of Kant's formalism and non-empiricism. Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's

emphases on compassion and other components of the 'heart' as the basis for morality will be opposed to Kant's rational approach to morality and Kant's condemnation of compassion (see Schopenhauer, [1841] 1965: 183). An attempt will be made to trace the resolution of the polemic between Kant and Schopenhauer as it is found in Durkheim's 'science of moral facts', as well as its relevance and implications for some current epistemological and practical problems in moral theory. Problems with Durkheim's efforts in this regard will also be addressed briefly.

Schopenhauer's critique of Kant

Schopenhauer's reputation as a philosopher is based on his strong emphasis on the 'will to life', what he sometimes called the 'heart' – passion, desire, sexuality, the unconscious, compassion etc – as a force stronger and more important than reason, the 'idea' or the 'mind'. Thus, in the opening moves of his *Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer ([1841] 1965: 48) makes clear his aims to criticize Kant's linkage of morality with the 'mind':

I allude to the daily writers of compendiums who, with the cool confidence of stupidity, imagine they have established ethics if only they appeal to that '*moral law*' that is supposed to be inherent in our faculty of *reason*. I therefore confess the particular pleasure with which I set to work to remove the broad cushion from ethics, and frankly express my intention of proving that Kant's practical reason and categorical imperative are wholly unjustified, groundless, and fictitious assumptions, and of showing that even Kant's ethics lacks a solid foundation.

While these opening remarks by Schopenhauer are clearly offensive, the rest of his critique is dispassionate and compelling, and deserves serious consideration.

Thus, Schopenhauer ([1841] 1965: 62) notes that for Kant, ethics 'is to consist of a pure, i.e., a *a priori* knowable part and an empirical one' and that Kant 'rejects the empirical part as inadmissible for the establishment of ethics'. Moreover, Schopenhauer questions how these *a priori* moral concepts could 'have the power to put bridle and bit on the impulse of strong desires, the storm of passion, and the gigantic stature of egoism' ([1841] 1965: 62). According to Schopenhauer ([1841] 1965: 66),

Kant's system of morality is to be based on 'pitiful, miserable duty', *not* anything subjective such as feeling, inclination, impulse, or compassion ([1841] 1965: 70). Indeed, it is a verifiable fact that Kant ([1788] 1956: 75, 91–96) repeatedly rejects any connection between morality and desire, happiness, compassion or feeling in general (see also Cartwright, 1984)

One of Schopenhauer's ([1841] 1965: 90) objections to Kant's system is that, because it is based on duty, and because duty is based on fear of authority – consider Kant's ([1788] 1956: 30) frightful analogy between the law and the gallows – morality based on duty is really egotistical, and therefore immoral: 'All actions that arise from motives of such a kind [the categorical imperative] would always be rooted only in mere egoism' (Schopenhauer, [1841] 1965: 137). If we act morally because we feel that we *must*, not because we spontaneously desire to be moral, Schopenhauer argues that this is not really morality: 'To Europeans, the source [of morality] positively must be a command of duty, a moral law, an imperative – in short, an order and decree that is obeyed. From this they will not depart, nor see that such things always have only egoism as their basis' ([1841] 1965: 187).

Schopenhauer ([1841] 1965: 83) also objects to Kant's linkage between reason and morality:

A man can go to work very rationally and thus thoughtfully, deliberately, consistently, systematically, and methodically, and yet act upon the most selfish, unjust, and even iniquitous maxims. Hence it never occurred to anyone *prior* to Kant to identify just, virtuous, and noble conduct with *reasonable* or *rational*, but the two have been clearly distinguished and kept apart. . . . Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, and in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible. In the same way unreasonable and noble-minded can very well coexist.

Thus, in contradistinction to Kant, Schopenhauer ([1841] 1965: 91) writes that one 'can very well will injustice and uncharitableness as a universal maxim'. It is striking that in his own critique of Kant, Durkheim ([1893] 1933: 412) echoes Schopenhauer's line, above, when he writes that 'The egotistical maxim is no more stubborn than the other [charity] in assuming a universal form; it can be practised with all its implied consequences'

Schopenhauer objects to the fact that animals, as non-rational

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creatures, are excluded from Kant's system, such that animals 'can therefore be used for vivisection, hunting, coursing, bullfights, and horse racing, and can be whipped to death as they struggle along with heavy carts of stone' ([1841] 1965: 96). Long before Darwin, Schopenhauer argued that humans are bound to animals (as well as plants, indeed, all life) on the basis of the 'will to life' that they share, and he concluded that no system of morality that excludes compassion for animals could be truly moral.

Schopenhauer notes that Kant's system does not distinguish between the quantity and quality of an immoral act. For Kant (1788), stealing is stealing, but for Schopenhauer, the act of a dying man who steals bread from starvation is fundamentally different from the act of a rich man who defrauds a poor man of his last possession ([1841] 1965: 155).

But Schopenhauer's most potent criticism of Kant stems from his conviction that compassion and justice – which he regards as a unity, and which I will refer to hereafter as compassion – is the real basis of morality, not duty. Compassion stems from the 'heart', not the mind. It is irrational. Because it is not based on duty and fear, it is a genuine, albeit momentary victory over man's innate egoism, and as such is exceedingly rare in the world. It extends to other humans as well as animals.

Schopenhauer argues for the primacy of compassion over duty as follows: He asks the reader to imagine asking someone to evaluate why he should *not* commit an act of murder against someone who has done them wrong. (This is an interesting contrast to the *cognitive* moral dilemmas found in modern theorists ranging from Piaget, 1932 to Habermas, 1984, because Schopenhauer's dilemma focuses on the passionate, irrational desire for revenge.) Schopenhauer reviews the many possible *rational* explanations such a person could give, including Kant's, that 'he may say: "I consider that the maxim for my proceeding in this case would not have been calculated to give a universally valid rule for all possible rational beings, since I should have treated my rival only as a means and not at the same time as an end"' ([1841] 1965: 168). Schopenhauer continues

But Titus, whose account I reserve for myself, may say 'When it came to making the arrangements [for the murder], and so for the moment I had to concern myself not with my passion but with that rival, I clearly saw for the first time what would really happen to him. But I was then seized with compassion and pity,

I felt sorry for him; I had not the heart to do it, and could not'. Now I ask any honest and unbiased reader: Which of the two is the better man? To which of them would he prefer to entrust his own destiny? Which of them has been restrained by the purer motive? Accordingly, where does the foundation of morality lie?

It would be interesting and important to verify empirically whether Schopenhauer ([1841] 1965: 170) is correct to claim that 'Nothing shocks our moral feelings so deeply as cruelty does', and that when confronted with an immoral act, we do *not* ask, 'How it is possible to act according to a maxim that is so absolutely unfitted to become a general law for all rational beings?' Rather, Schopenhauer claims that we ask ourselves, 'How could anyone be so heartless?' The important point is that Schopenhauer's critique is cogent, and should not be ignored as it has been in contemporary discussions of this sort. Schopenhauer concludes that 'Boundless compassion for all living beings is the firmest and surest guarantee of pure moral conduct' ([1841] 1965: 172), and this includes compassion for animals.

Even in his time, Schopenhauer pointed to far-reaching implications of his critique with the interesting empirical observation that 'The American penitentiary system is based on this [Kantian system], in which the intention is not to improve the *heart* of the criminal, but merely to put his *head* on the right lines' ([1841] 1965: 194). It seems that his remark still applies to the American prison system, even to efforts to reform criminals and teach morality via the 'mind' in general, and it would be an interesting project to determine how and whether improving the criminal's 'heart' could be made practical.

However, like Plato and Aristotle, Schopenhauer concludes that compassion (like virtue in general) cannot be taught intellectually. It is supposedly an irrational component of human nature that co-exists with egoism. Durkheim, who was nicknamed 'Schopen' by his students according to Lalande (1960: 23), had to struggle with the problem of how Kant and Schopenhauer could be reconciled in his own version of the 'science of moral facts'. If compassion cannot be taught, certainly it can be nurtured, and it may even prove to be an important component of socialization.

Durkheim's science of moral facts

Despite the fact that Durkheim's sociology continues to be misaligned with positivism – which was on the wane in Durkheim's time according to John Stuart Mill (1968), Baillot (1927) and many others – as well as other systems that emphasize the 'mind' rather than the 'heart', it is easy to recognize the broad outlines of Schopenhauer's influence on Durkheim's system of morality (see Mestrovic, 1988b). Like Schopenhauer, Durkheim clearly rejects the idea that one is born with *a priori* systems of morality inscribed in one's consciousness. Rather, for both Schopenhauer and Durkheim, morality is a human invention and is concerned with acts to which persons synthetically attribute praise and blame, what Durkheim (1893) called sanctions. Durkheim and Schopenhauer also share common threads with regard to their condemnation of egoism, their penchant for empiricism, their focus on compassion, and their similar notions of the dualism of human nature. Even if one wants to argue for the alternative that Durkheim's moral thought is *both* Kantian and Schopenhauerian, this argument will not undo Durkheim's disdain for *a priorism*, for which no middle ground or compromise with empiricism can be found, and it cannot explain why Schopenhauer is generally *not* invoked in discussions of Durkheim's moral thought.

Indeed, like Schopenhauer, Durkheim was concerned to demonstrate that, contrary to Kantianism and utilitarianism, rationality (in the sense of reflective thought and deliberation) is *not* essential to morality. In a debate held by the French Philosophical Society in 1908 Durkheim asserted that

As far as the actual facts are concerned, one does not in any circumstances find that reflection has always been and is even today considered a necessary factor in morality. Never at any moment in history has the individual been capable of rethinking the morality of his time as a whole. The philosopher probably does what he can to work it out but he never succeeds other than in an incomplete, truncated way, and he is well aware of it. In any case, the overwhelming majority of people are content to accept passively the reigning morality as it is, without questioning it and without understanding it. And yet it is incontestable that, in fact, the public *conscience* does not refuse

to admit that such non-reflective conduct has some moral character: otherwise scarcely any actions would be considered moral. Conduct which is thoroughly reflective is probably held to be morally superior, but a different form of conduct is judged to be neither immoral nor amoral. (Pickering, 1979: 55)

Durkheim's followers refer to his *Division of Labor in Society* as the opening salvo in his quest to establish within sociology an empirical science of moral facts (see especially Davy, 1927; Levy-Bruhl, 1899, 1905, Mauss, [1950] 1979). In this classic, Durkheim essentially attacks Kantianism, utilitarianism, and other efforts to explain social evolution as the outcome of human calculation and deliberation. His followers understood all of Durkheim's subsequent books as part of this same quest to distance the empirical study of morality from purely speculative, abstract, theoretical ethics. According to Durkheim:

For morality is distinguished by a religious characteristic which places it outside the bounds of truly scientific thought (in Pickering, 1979: 31).

Morality is not geometry, it is not a system of abstract truths which can be derived from some fundamental notion, posited as self-evident. It is a complexity of quite a different order. It belongs to the realm of life, not to speculation (in Pickering, 1979: 34).

Even today we do not go so far as to say that for an act to be moral it must be reflective. Otherwise take care lest morality becomes a thing of vanity and luxury. The vast majority of men carry out moral imperatives passively and the more cultivated men only partially reflect upon them. To be sure reflection raises and perfects morality but it is not the necessary condition of it. (in Pickering, 1979: 61)

Durkheim's quest to establish within sociology a science of morality culminated in his last, albeit unfinished book, entitled *La Morale* (Durkheim, [1920] 1978). As Davy (1927: 55) put the matter, Durkheim's social science is simultaneously a science of morality: the study of social facts was intended to make clear the study of moral facts. In general, throughout his writings Durkheim countered Kant's *a priorism*, especially in his controversial

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Primitive Classification (Durkheim and Mauss, [1903] 1975), in favour of a more Schopenhauerian empiricism.

Consider Durkheim's controversial notion of the 'cult of the individual', that collective form of individualism that he predicted would eventually become the new 'religion of humanity'. Durkheim depicts this higher, collective form of individualism as the outcome of irrational forces, not rational reflection:

How is it possible to justify egalitarian ideas by purely logical considerations? The role of logic is to help or oblige us to see things as they are. *But in fact we are unequal*. We have neither the same physical force, nor the same intellectual power, nor the same energy of will. The social services we render are of unequal importance and we are more or less easy to replace in the functions we carry out and we carry them out more or less well, etc. In spite of this, morality demands that to a certain extent we should be treated as though we were equal. It ascribes to us an equality which has no empirical foundation. Some powerful cause must therefore intervene which makes us see men other than what they are in tangible experience, which makes us see them in such a way that they appear equal to us, and which consequently transfigures them (in Pickering, 1979: 72)

In general, Durkheim aligns the emergence of new systems of morality with the controversial notion of 'moral forces' (see Pickering, 1979) that work apart from or despite rational reflection. In this regard, as with the emergence of the division of labor and organic solidarity, Durkheim's descriptions mirror Schopenhauer's depictions of the 'will' as a force that does its work apart from consciousness, that humans rationalize after the fact.

Far from being the conservative he is often misconstrued to have been, Durkheim seems to have been a liberal in a new sense of the term. Whereas liberalism is typically associated with the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, and other rationalist philosophies, Durkheim's liberalism is rooted in irrationalism. Like Schopenhauer, Durkheim apparently believed that rationalism leads to the conclusion that humans are unequal, and that it promotes injustice.

Durkheim on the notion of duty

To be sure, the intellectual affinities between Durkheim and Schopenhauer are not straightforward. Schopenhauer rejects

Kant's notion of duty completely, but Durkheim salvages and keeps some aspects of duty, although not Kant's version of duty. Durkheim denies that duty is the central criterion of morality, and the kinds of duty that he wants to maintain in morality are not deduced from theoretical ethics, but are the result of induction from empirical observations that demonstrate that humans construct rules and associate these rules of conduct with moral conduct (discussed in Pickering, 1979).

In the original introduction to his *Division of Labor* (Durkheim, [1893] 1933: 411–35) – which was dropped in subsequent editions – and elsewhere, Durkheim criticized the *a priori* basis of Kant's derivation of the notion of duty as well as the establishment of his ethics (see Durkheim, [1907] 1980; Durkheim, 1969, and the collection of reviews in Pickering, 1979). Durkheim ([1920] 1978: 195) writes:

We know that, according to [Kant's] school which has played a considerable role in the history of thought but which today has few representatives, the moral ideal is part of our nature. We find it completely formed within us, it is engraved deep in our consciences. To discover it, we need only look within ourselves, we need only scrutinize and analyze ourselves with care. But even assuming that this fundamental moral notion does have this origin, we can recognize it amid the other ideas which populate our minds only if we already have a representation of what is moral and what is not – that is, if we already have the notion that we are trying to discover. The problem is simply shifted, not resolved.

In other words, *representations* are required to recognize moral rules, even if their origin were presumed to be *a priori* for the sake of argument, and these representations must have an empirical origin.

While Durkheim kept the seemingly Kantian vocabulary of rules, duty, and obligation in his discussions of morality, he used these terms in the Schopenhauerian context of spontaneous respect for the sacrosanct quality of society's ideal rules, not some dry, abstract, cold, Kantian sense of duty, and not as respect for society's immediately apparent norms. Thus, in an essay entitled 'La Détermination du fait moral', Durkheim (1906) attacks 'l'insuffisance de l'explication que Kant a donnée de l'obligation morale'. According to Durkheim ([1906] 1974: 36),

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In opposition to Kant, however, we shall show that the notion of duty does not exhaust the concept of morality. It is impossible for us to carry out an act simply because we are ordered to do so and without consideration of its content. For us to become the agents of an act it must interest our sensibility to a certain extent and appear to us as, in some way, *desirable*. Obligation or duty only expresses one aspect abstracted from morality. A certain degree of desirability is another characteristic no less important than the first.

For Durkheim, desire *does* have a place in morality, even though desire is banished from Kant's (1788) system of morality. For Durkheim, as for Schopenhauer, moral rules must be followed spontaneously, 'from the heart', not out of passionless duty, which is merely a disguised egoism.

Thus, with regard to the simple obedience given to moral rules, Durkheim concludes that this is not genuine morality. Rather, Durkheim ([1906] 1974: 48) regards genuine moral rules as being embedded in the notion of the sacred, which inspires 'respect' while 'at the same time it is an object of love and aspiration that we are drawn towards'. Durkheim's many references to the sacredness of the human personality ([1906] 1974: 37), which he calls variously the 'cult of the human person' and 'cult of the individual' (distinguished sharply from egoism, see the discussion in Mestrovic 1988a: 128–141), also include this aspect of respect and compassion. Like Schopenhauer, Durkheim ([1906] 1974: 37) asserts that 'the qualification "moral" has never been given to an act which has individual interests, or the perfection of the individual from a purely egoistic point of view'. Thus, 'morality begins at the same point at which disinterestedness and devotion also begin' ([1906] 1974: 52).

Durkheim ([1906] 1974: 53) elaborates on the role of sympathy in morality: 'This explains the moral character which is attributed to feelings of sympathy between individuals and the acts which they inspire . . . When one loves one's country or humanity one cannot see one's fellows suffer without suffering oneself and without feeling a desire to help them'. It is worth repeating that Kant was adamantly against such feelings of sympathy as the basis for morality.

Moreover, it is a common mistake to conclude that Durkheim regarded all of society's apparent rules as being capable of

inspiring respect and promoting compassion (see Bouglé, 1938). His follower, Georges Davy (1927, 18–20) in particular, notes that Durkheim distinguished between the collective conscience, which is an ideal, and the 'average conscience', which is frequently vulgar, mediocre, and immoral. To pick one example out of many as support for Davy's claim, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 317) writes in *Suicide* that 'it is a profound mistake to confuse the collective type of a society, as is so often done, with the average type of its individual members. The morality of the average man is of only moderate intensity'. Thus, to return to Durkheim's 1906 essay on the determination of the moral fact, he argues that 'The society that morality bids us desire is not the society as it *appears* to itself, but the society as it is or is really becoming' ([1906] 1974: 38). Durkheim felt that what he was 'opposing to the collective is the collective itself, but more and better aware of itself' ([1906] 1974: 66). Durkheim (1906) calls explicitly for a reliance on the faculty of judgment, autonomy, and a 'higher' form of individualism as opposed to blind, passive obedience with regard to society's rules.

Durkheim's condemnation of egoism as the basis for immorality is evident throughout his works, but especially in *Suicide* (see Davy, 1927, 58). Moreover, Durkheim's focus on the affinities between egoism and anomie follows closely Schopenhauer's treatment of the infinitely striving 'will to life' and its relationship to suicide (discussed in Mestrovic, 1988a, 1988b).

Along these Schopenhauerian lines, it is striking that in his *Socialism and Saint-Simon* ([1928] 1958) Durkheim takes up the theme of socialism understood as a collective representation of compassion and sympathy for the suffering of fellow man. Scholars agree that Schopenhauer's philosophy, as opposed to Nietzsche's ([1901] 1968), leads naturally to socialism and concerns with compassion on a societal scale (Cartwright, 1984; Hamlyn, 1980; Magee, 1983). Similarly, in *Moral Education*, and elsewhere, Durkheim ([1925] 1961) argues that altruism is not a mysterious quality rationally induced in humans (as both Comte and Kant maintained), but is a 'natural', spontaneous quality in persons that co-exists with egoism. Again, this move by Durkheim is strikingly similar to Schopenhauer's conceptualization of a dualistic antagonism between egoism and compassion as inherent, non-rational qualities.

In sum, as Durkheim ([1906] 1974: 62) explains in the closing paragraph of his essay on the determination of the moral fact, he felt that his system of morality was an escape 'from Kantian a

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priorism, which gives a fairly faithful analysis of the nature of morality but which describes more than it explains. We recognize the notion of duty, but for experimental reasons and without rejecting the valuable aspect of eudemonism' Like Schopenhauer, Durkheim manages to keep the notions of desire, heart, and empiricism in his system of morality

The agenda of problems engendered by Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's critiques of Kant

Because Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kant's system of morality have been overlooked in the contemporary social sciences, the idea that morality could be based on compassion as opposed to Kant's transcendental duty does not really exist, and it is not clear how such a morality could be operationalized and subjected to empirical investigations. To be sure, there exist studies on 'altruistic behavior', 'reciprocity', 'exchange theory' and so on (see Gouldner, 1960), but these are approached primarily from philosophical perspectives that are inimical to or otherwise fail to acknowledge the gist of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant. The new problems in moral theory that Durkheim and Schopenhauer bring to the forefront include the following. If ethics is not identical with prevailing opinion, then how will one distinguish the group's 'real' moral values from the illusory ones? If moral values exist in relation to one's group, then how will one address the problem of conflicting values and cultural relativism in relation to different groups? How does one instill in individuals a desire to be compassionate or to be drawn to ethical behaviour from desire rather than passive duty? And finally, how does one study compassion as a social fact?

It is not clear that either Durkheim or Schopenhauer resolved most of these issues. Pickering (1979) has addressed some of these problems with regard to Durkheim, but Pickering's aims did not include placing Durkheim's efforts in the context of Schopenhauer's philosophy. With regard to instilling genuinely moral behaviour in individuals, the pessimistic Schopenhauer simply dismissed the possibility that the majority of humankind could be really 'good' in his sense of the term. Virtue is a rarity, and cannot be taught – this is how Schopenhauer ends his 1841 treatise on ethics, a gloomy echo of Plato's *Protagoras*. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's critique

of Kant may provide some fresh avenues in apprehending how the problems with Durkheim's moral theory may be resolved eventually.

Piaget, who is regarded by Hall (1987: 70) as 'Durkheim's foremost disciple', found a thorn that continues to trouble Durkheimian scholarship in general and moral theory in particular. According to Piaget's ([1932] 1965: 346) interpretation of Durkheim's troublesome dictum that morality must transcend public opinion,

One must make one's choice between these two solutions. For, either society is one, and all social processes, including cooperation, are to be assimilated to pure constraint alone, in which case right is bound to be determined by public opinion and traditional use, or else, a distinction must be made between actual and ideal society . . . [but] how, we would ask, is it possible to distinguish between society as it is and society as it is tending to become?

It is certain that Piaget never resolved this Durkheimian dilemma, and eventually tilted the direction of the scientific study of morality back to the Kantian emphasis on cognitive judgement involved in moral decisions, and on transcendental duty.

If one were to reopen the case that Durkheim was trying to make, then surely one would focus on the concluding pages of his *Sociologie et Philosophie* (1924: 124–41). In these pages Durkheim argues that contrary to Kant, moral values are not the inherent property of things (p. 132), but refer to society's ideal notions (as suggested in the previous section of this essay). In fact, Durkheim (1924: 141) makes the arresting remark that sociology is properly the study of values and ideals, not 'reality'. The distinction between 'real culture' and 'ideal culture' already exists in the sociological vocabulary (although it is not typically attributed to Durkheim), so that it may be possible to locate the domain of genuine morality in the realm of 'ideal culture', the ways that a society expresses how individuals ought to behave across generations, even if a particular generation at a particular time period is expressing a different morality in 'reality'. This may constitute part of the solution to the dilemma uncovered by Piaget, although it is by no means obvious in all cases how one should distinguish empirically ideal from real norms.

A related line of inquiry would attempt to wed Durkheim's distinction between real and ideal morality to Pickering's (1984:

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48, 285) analysis of Durkheim's shift from a non-idealist to an idealist stage of inquiry in his treatment of religious representations. Pickering notes that Davy made this allegation of a shift in focus by Durkheim, but that Durkheim never admitted it. If this supposed shift in emphasis turns out to be true, it holds the potential of opening a route to the eventual solution of how morality may be based on society's collective representations, yet not exactly on prevailing opinion.

As for the problem of cultural relativism, one would turn to Durkheim's *Moral Education*, wherein Durkheim ([1925] 1961: 79) admits that there exist 'different degrees of morality if for no other reason than that all human societies are not of equal moral value' at the same time that he alludes to a cosmopolitan 'society of mankind' (p. 81). Durkheim ([1925] 1961: 75) asks the poignant question, 'Ought one to commit himself to one of these groups to the exclusion of others?' He answers in the negative, because there ought not exist any real antagonisms among one's loyalties to various groups. In Western societies at least, all groups ought to be informed by a general concern for the ideal norms of humanity, what Durkheim often referred to as the cult of the individual. Durkheim explains how this is possible:

Nations grow upon the foundations of the small tribal groups of former times; then the nations themselves are joined in even greater social organizations. Consequently, the moral objectives of society have been more and more generalized. Morality continuously disengages itself from particular ethnic groups or geographical areas precisely because each society, as it becomes larger, embraces a greater diversity of climatic and geographic conditions, and all these different influences mutually cancel themselves (Durkheim, [1925] 1961: 75)

If this trend continues, Durkheim believes that eventually the ideal at which morality will aim shall be a universal 'society of mankind', not one's immediate group. Thus, according to Durkheim ([1925] 1961: 81), as 'society becomes increasingly big, the social *ideal* becomes more and more remote from all provincial and ethnic conditions and can be shared by a greater number of men recruited from the most diverse races and places. As a result of this alone, it becomes more abstract, more general, and consequently closer to the *human ideal*' (emphasis added).

In *Socialism and Saint-Simon* (1928), but to some extent even in

his *Division of Labor* (1893), Durkheim portrays the internationalization of collective representations as the result of economic trade. Especially in his *Elementary Forms*, Durkheim ([1912] 1965: 474) argues that in addition to economic internationalization, religious ideals and beliefs eventually become internationalized, a fact already treated at length by Pickering (1984). Given the widespread evangelism that has occurred in the world since Durkheim's death, his claims are certainly credible. Moreover, with regard to the ideals of moral individualism that this internationalism is supposed to establish, Durkheim's claims can be defended. For example, democracy and the notion of individual rights seem to be sweeping the world, even the communist nations of the present era. The right to privacy, the rights of various minority groups, the rights demanded by children that children of previous generations could not imagine, and other democratic ideals are taking root in Western and non-Western countries alike. Durkheim's notion of moral individualism as a set of collective ideals that bestow dignity upon the human person seems to be something that most persons in Western societies will probably agree upon, even if public opinion does not always act upon these ideals, and even if the majority of humankind cannot give a rational account for the origin and inception of these ideals.

Durkheim resolves partially the problem of how individuals may desire to be ethical with his notion of the sacred. Pickering (1984: 158) has demonstrated that an important dimension of Durkheim's notion of the sacred is its emotional content: 'The sacred commands respect and is also an object of love and devotion – the sacred is something that is earnestly sought after'. For example, in *Moral Education* Durkheim ([1925] 1961: 96) describes the sacred aura surrounding the ideal notions of what society considers good as follows: 'The good is morality conceived as something pleasing, something that attracts our will, provoking our desire spontaneously. . . . as a magnificent *ideal* to which our sensitivities aspire spontaneously' (emphasis added). To be sure, the sacred carries other dimensions as well, including an element of fear and duty (Pickering, 1984), and these do not escape Durkheim's treatment of morality. But it is certainly possible for Durkheim's sociology to address the Schopenhauerian problem of how the good may be able to attract and motivate individuals by things other than mere duty.

In *Sociology and Philosophy* Durkheim (1924: 132) refers to society as 'le foyer d'une vie morale interne'. Hall (1987: 117)

notes that the French term *foyer* was one of Durkheim's favourite images, and that 'the *foyer* was originally the fireplace or hearth, then generally a source of heat and by analogy a centre of activity, a focus of interest, or a hotbed of intrigue'. Durkheim consistently refers to society as this 'hotbed' of moral activity, with all of its implications of spontaneous passion and desire. While contemporary sociologists have treated his notion of constraint at great length, the notion of society as the *foyer* of moral life has been relatively neglected. Yet this notion holds the potential of resolving some of the difficulties of how Durkheim's morality might be understood.

Finally, with regard to Durkheim's notion of social facts and studying morals as social facts, it should be noted that the bulk of contemporary writings in moral theory continue to perpetuate the errors that Schopenhauer and Durkheim attributed to Kant and the Enlightenment. Morality is still studied in relation to cognitive development, deduced notions of moral reasoning, and pre-conceived notions of what moral behavior ought to be like. The gist of Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's contribution to Western culture in this regard is that studies of morality ought to begin inductively with a study of how persons actually behave, and the ideal notions of moral behaviour that they actually construct. To take these two thinkers seriously in this regard is to shift considerably the agenda of topics currently subsumed under the topic of moral development, and to reopen the debate of what Durkheim meant by social facts.

Studying morals as social facts

It has been mentioned previously that Durkheim's follower, Georges Davy (1927), argued that the notions of moral facts and social facts coincide in Durkheim's writings. It is beyond the scope of this essay to analyze this assertion fully. Let us assume that it is true for the sake of argument. It follows that the many topics treated by contemporary writers as comprising irreconcilable dualisms (such as the object-subject, fact-value distinctions) are treated dialectically by Durkheim as antagonistic unities, along the lines of Schopenhauer's claim that representations and the will are a unity. Thus, based on the preceding analysis, to study morals as social facts in a Durkheimian fashion, one would study the subjective representations of society's ideal and real norms, as well

as the 'thing' aspect of social and moral facts, their objective quality that gives rise to representations in the first place.

For example, it would be interesting to consider the sociological aspects of cruelty to animals and the treatment of pets and animals in general, from the perspective of real as well as ideal norms. Philosophically speaking, animals are almost completely exempt from moral responsibility in modern societies (Fauconnet, 1920). Does a correlation exist between societies that are generally moral – according to Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's standards of a new and higher form of individualism – and the compassion with which animals in general and pets in particular are treated in such societies? Does animal abuse correlate with societies and sub-groups that tilt more toward the 'mind' pole versus the 'heart' pole of Schopenhauer's famous dualism? It seems that such studies would be an important addition to the scientific study of morality as conceived by Durkheim.

It is interesting in this regard that although social scientists have addressed the issues of prejudice against the aged, women, and adult members of other minority groups, they are relatively silent on the issue of prejudice toward children. The term 'childism' or its equivalent is certainly not as recognizable as sexism or racism, for example. Yet consider that children are frequently the victims of many diverse kinds of family and institutional abuse, that juveniles perpetrate the most crime, and that in the West, violent death is among the leading causes of death among young people (discussed in Mestrovic and Cook, 1988). Even language embodies an unconscious lack of compassion toward children: the terms tot, brat, kid, imp, baby, chap, tyke carry fiendish formal meanings (for example, an imp is a child of the devil or of hell, literally, 'a little devil'). Other terms for children are still more blatantly aggressive: crumb-snatchers, tree climbers, yard-apes, sock-pullers, little monkeys, little monsters, rug-rats, etc. But according to the tenets of Schopenhauer's philosophy, children should be treated with great compassion, because, like animals, they are not really culpable for their acts. Is the fiendish vocabulary used for children a carry-over of collective representations from an era in which, according to Durkheim, a higher form of individualism was not yet firmly established? Are modern societies more or less compassionate toward children? And how do attitudes toward children correlate with Enlightenment? These are among the problems to be included in an agenda based on the present reading of Durkheim and Schopenhauer

Even in contemporary studies of child abuse, Durkheim's Schopenhauerian observations on this topic are never invoked, and have never been formally tested. Durkheim's essay entitled 'Childhood' is filled with pathos and expressions of compassion for the inherent weakness of children, but is not typically cited by sociologists (in Pickering 1979: 149–54). In *Moral Education* ([1925] 1961: 189) Durkheim argues that cruelty toward children increases with the development of civilization and enlightenment: 'In a word, civilization has necessarily somewhat darkened the child's life'. Focusing on corporal punishment as a social fact, Durkheim ([1925] 1961: 183) claims that 'in beating, in brutality of all kinds, there is something we find repugnant, something that revolts our conscience – in a word, something immoral'. This is a Schopenhauerian conclusion, and it rests on the Durkheimian argument, explicated above, that the ideal culture of enlightened societies *ought* to lead toward the cult of individualism and respect for the dignity of the child as a person. But in practice, this does not always seem to be the case. Durkheim continues ([1925] 1961: 184):

One might think a priori that the harshness of primitive mores, the barbarism of earlier times, must have given rise to this mode of punishment. The facts do not support this hypothesis, however natural it may seem at first glance. . . . [one comes to] the remarkable conclusion that, in the great majority of cases, discipline [among primitives] is very gentle. Canadian Indians love their children tenderly, never beat them, and do not even reprimand them . . . A Sioux chief thought the whites barbarous for striking their children.

Is Durkheim ([1925] 1961: 189) correct that 'the beginnings of culture were signaled by the appearance of corporal punishment'? This hypothesis has never been formally tested. It should be noted that it follows directly from Schopenhauer's own severe indictment of 'enlightenment', and his belief that reason and viciousness actually show an affinity for each other. Is this true? If it turns out to be true, then how can one reconcile this finding with Durkheim's claim that the ideal norms of Western societies are supposed to be evolving into a new and higher form of humanism? In general, Durkheim's thought leads to many contradictions from the perspective of rational analysis, a fact already noted by Alpert (1938), Lukes (1972), Pickering (1979) and many of Durkheim's

other commentators. From the perspective of the present analysis, however, one would venture the hope that when read in the context of the irrationalist and dialectical elements of Schopenhauer's philosophy, some of the apparent contradictions in Durkheim's thought may become comprehensible at least.

But the more important point is that both Schopenhauer and Durkheim advocated a genuine empiricism to settle the debates and issues that stem from such discussions. Surely the most important item on the research agenda based on the preceding is to establish whether anything like Durkheim's evolutionary cult of the individual exists. Other related agendas should include, but not be limited to, the sociological study of collective representations with regard to punishment in general as well as the treatment of criminals, the mentally retarded, the mentally ill, and other stigmatized, weak, members of societies that Schopenhauer and Durkheim felt deserve compassion. It was Durkheim's conviction that empirical studies of this sort would eventually resolve the abstract dilemmas of cultural relativism, the emergence of new values, the role of reason in morality, and other dilemmas that cannot be resolved in a thoroughly satisfactory manner by purely theoretical considerations.

Conclusions

Schopenhauer never tried to relate compassion to social factors, and argued that compassion could never be taught. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's emphasis on compassion as opposed to Kant's duty could be apprehended as part of the turn of the century revolt against the Enlightenment that influenced Durkheim and others in his time. Thus, in his *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Henri Bergson (1932) tried to convey the idea of morality as a kind of 'openness' as opposed to Kantian conformity to pre-established rules. Jean-Marie Guyau, in his *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction* ([1885] 1907), which Durkheim reviewed, represents one of the most forceful and in his time, most popular, attacks on morality derived from duty. A host of other now less-known authors turned to the theme of 'openness' as opposed to Kant's formalism in epistemological and moral fields of inquiry (see Bachelard, 1934; 1940; Baillot, 1927; James, [1896] 1931, Lalande, 1899).

But the turn of the century also produced an extreme reaction to this Schopenhauerian critique of Kantian duty, including Nietzsche's ([1901] 1968) 'will to power', and all sorts of ideologies that led to fascism (see Lukács, 1980; Mann, [1939] 1955). Although Nietzsche began his philosophical career as Schopenhauer's disciple (Magee, 1983), he eventually turned on his master with a vengeance, precisely on the issue of compassion and pity (Cartwright, 1984). Compassion is the morality of the weak, Nietzsche ([1901] 1968) claimed, and with that opened the door to authoritarianism. Subsequent theorists have never clearly resolved whether excessive Kantian rationalism or Schopenhauerian irrationalism is to blame for the rise of fascism in the West (see Lukács, 1980). This is an extremely important problem, but its full resolution is clearly beyond the scope of this study. The point of this essay is that from the perspective of a sociology of knowledge, the contemporary social sciences have closed the door to discussions of this sort, and the entire controversy ought to be re-examined.

It is noteworthy that at present, Schopenhauer has been dropped completely from discussions in moral theory, and that Kantianism and rationalism have been revived (Habermas, 1984). It is as if contemporary sociology is unwittingly over-reacting to an excess of 'heart' at the beginning of this century by turning to an excessive preoccupation with the 'mind'. Thus, Parsons (1937) posits something like a straight line from Comte's positivism to present-day social theories, while he completely ignores Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the other irrationalists. Parsons's thought is still highly influential, and in fact, is currently being revived! Contemporary studies of morality in particular betray this one-sidedness and bias in their approach by being informed almost exclusively by Kantian and other utilitarian, formalistic philosophies while completely neglecting Schopenhauer's critique of Kant.

Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kant, while problematic in their own right, expose the epistemological as well as practical limitations of naive rationalism as applied to moral theory. Epistemologically, social scientists must address the question whether neo-Kantianism is capable of sustaining empiricism and anything like Durkheim's quest for a 'science of moral facts'. Schopenhauer, Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim, and many other turn of the century intellectuals argued that deductive, theoretical systems of morality are self-serving abstractions that merely prove what they set out to prove. At present, the social sciences are still caught up in the impasse of cultural relativism brought on by Kant,

that the noumenon or the thing-in-itself is out of reach, and that humankind must be content with a diversity of subjective representations, but no real truths. But Schopenhauer offered a solution to Kant's impasse, that the thing-in-itself, which he renamed the will, is accessible to non-rational and immediate perception, intuition, and imagination. Durkheim followed Schopenhauer's lead in that he felt that morality consisted of moral forces that impose themselves on human consciousness (not the other way around), and that these moral forces could be studied scientifically and empirically. Of course, it is an open question how this can be achieved.

Practically, a resolution must be found to the polemic between Schopenhauer and Kant as to whether morality is to be based on heartfelt compassion versus cold, abstract, rational duty. Durkheim found a *via media* solution in which he kept an empirically-based notion of duty in his understanding of morality, but surrounded it with an aura of sacredness that includes heartfelt respect and desire to be ethical. While Durkheim's solution is not without its problems, it deserves to be taken seriously enough to be studied and debated. It is high time for social scientists to emerge from the limitations of Kantianism, because Schopenhauer and Durkheim, not Kant, had the last word. And I agree with Cartwright (1984: 92) that 'Kant's insistence that a right-thinking person desires to be free from "even the feelings of sympathy and warmhearted fellow-feeling . . . and subject only to law-giving reasons" demonstrates moral pedantry at its worst'

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Feminist social theory needs time. Reflections on the relation between feminist thought, social theory and time as an important parameter in social analysis¹

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Abstract

This paper explores the relation between feminist concerns, social theory and the multiple time aspects of social life. It is suggested that while feminist approaches have been located in classical political philosophy, the same imposed classification has not occurred with respect to social theory perspectives. Rather than seeing this as an academic gap that needs filling, it was taken as an opportunity to take note of the wide variety of feminist approaches to methodological and theoretical issues and to relate these to concerns arising from a focus on the time, temporality, and timing of social life. It is argued that a feminist social theory, as an understanding of the social world through the eyes of women, is not only complemented by such a focus on time but dependent on it for an opportunity to transcend the pervasive vision of the 'founding fathers'.

Introduction: the first attempt

There exists an elusive bond between feminist approaches to social theory and my work on time. I first explored this connection in 1985 in a paper to a multidisciplinary women's colloquium. I did not get very far in that first attempt, where my attention was drawn to the problems of dichotomous and one dimensional analyses in relation to experience and consciousness. A focus on time highlights multiple realities that all bear on social life simultaneously, thus forcing an approach that transcends dualisms and dichotomous thinking. A preoccupation with the time aspects of everyday life necessitates an approach where personal experience, consciousness, existence, and context have to be taken as sources against which rational theories have to be checked. By focusing on just one short

moment of consciousness, I intended to make visible that which we know at a non-discursive level and take most for granted. Mine was one of the last papers and, as the conference progressed, I sensed that despite our overtly different concerns we were speaking the same language, encountering the same conceptual limitations, and seeking common goals. None of this common ground, however, was obvious or explicit, and I could not be sure that the others would feel as I did, after they had listened to my paper. They did. But, like me, they could not formulate the reason, or recognise the source of that which had touched anthropologists, biologists, literary critics, painters, philosophers, poets, psychologists, and sociologists alike. I had promised myself then that I would do more work to try and discover the nature of the bond we experienced during that cross-disciplinary meeting.

Immersing myself once more in feminist literature I found it much easier to isolate what I was not seeking. The different approaches with respect to political philosophy, for example, could be excluded. Not only was there no necessary connection between feminists' political philosophy and their approaches to social theory, but the very exercise of imposing existing categories on a movement that explicitly seeks to transcend them, seemed pointless and even counter-productive. The self-professed preferences for perspectives and methods, on the other hand, proved a far more useful focus. It demonstrated that this association with the perspectives of specific founding fathers was a 'making do', a choice of social theory in the absence of more appropriate frameworks for understanding. I found feminist social scientists aligning themselves with a whole range of perspectives that spanned from structuralism to ethnomethodology. Only the commitment to a critical approach and to action for change was common to all. This radical approach connects with a realisation that the transcendence of present perspectives is a necessary precondition to the feminist goal of overcoming oppression. Feminist scholarship, it is argued by Bowles (1983) and Coyner (1983), must go beyond received perspectives and develop its own theories and methods. Not the goal itself, however, but the implications on the methods that were to achieve that goal, caught my attention. That which feminists identified and defined as 'the problem', led me back to that elusive connection between feminist concerns, my work on time, and social theory.

If one takes as given that feminists see the transcendence of the androcentric world view as one of the necessary conditions for

overcoming women's oppression, and if one then begins to explore what this implies, then one finds a rich source of reflections and intuitions. Thus, not the nature of oppression but feminists' thoughts on overcoming the androcentric world view is the focus in this paper. I want to outline just a few of those visions since it is these that overlap with the implications arising from my work on time.

Feminist social science: ethic and methodology

Science has been identified by feminists as one of the major expressions of this world view, and writing on the nature of science, they have produced a wide-ranging and coherent critique with respect to objectivity, dualisms, the idea of truth, and linear causality. Closely related are thoughts on methods, as they centre around the relation of the observer and the observed. Another feminist focus of interest to this discussion is on knowledge. It deals with reflections on the forms knowledge does, could and should take and it is concerned with the way knowledge is obtained, maintained and furthered; how we know as people and scientists. To Stanley and Wise (1983b: 193) feminism is a way of life that links and permeates their everyday lives, their beliefs, and their research. For others it has become both an ethic and a methodology. The idea that the person is not separable from her biography, her context, her beliefs and values, her needs and her motives, her material condition (and lately even her biology) found expression in many of the writings and has a particularly strong bearing on feminists' attitudes towards the goal of scientific objectivity.²

Many feminist scholars insist first, that this contextual person has an inevitable bearing on her research, that values, motives and material conditions influence choice of topic, the nature of the problem to be researched, methodology, the interaction with the object of her research, and the findings. Second they contend that subject and object are inseparable; that the two have to be understood in terms of an essential interactive relation that cannot be separated or abstracted. Third they understand values as inextricably bound to facts and the activity of scientific research. Experiencing, doing, judging and seeing are all thought to be mutually implicating. As DuBois (1983: 214) writes, 'We experience *and* understand, discover *and* create, judge *and* envision, grasp

and take care of.' To pretend otherwise is to falsify one's work. With this strong emphasis on the personal plus context, the idea of truth takes on a different meaning.³ No longer something fixed, permanent and absolute it comes to be understood as an ongoing process, socially constructed as well as constructing, and open to challenge.

Closely connected to the critique of scientific objectivity, neutrality and truth is the feminist rejection of understanding social life in terms of dichotomies.⁴ Male or female, gender or sex, public or private, rational or intuitive, mind or body, objective or subjective, left or right, right or wrong – none are acceptable as mutually exclusive choices. Refusing to accept traditional dichotomies, it is argued, means re-thinking the distinctions and to hold them up for scrutiny. Ironically, another dualism emerges from the proposed alternatives to dichotomic thinking. Existing dichotomies are either re-conceptualised as genuine dualities, mutually implicating and defining each other or, alternatively, they are understood as a spectrum; as variations along a continuum. Existing dualisms are recognised as unacceptable on several grounds. It is argued that dualisms not only confuse modes of analysis with their content but, as Bleier (1984: 197–201) shows, through their usage we impose a divisive hierarchical order on our reality. Thus male, for example, is not only dichotomically defined in relation to female, but ranked in order of priority. As scientific classifications these dichotomies thus read as objective over subjective, rational over intuitive, mind over matter. To recognise them as imposed classifications, that are employed as aids to understanding, can therefore remove some of their alienating aspects and open up a possibility for their alternative usage. Not only have feminists provided a critique of dichotomous thinking, exposing it as alienating, divisive and hierarchical, but they have also shown it to be falsifying experience (Mies 1983: 111). Dualistic conceptualisations, it is argued and demonstrated, make us lose touch with the infinite complexity of every day experiences. Through them we lose sight of relationships, connections and the continuum of phenomena and events. When social reality is understood as an ongoing, interactive and constitutive process, timeless dichotomies become meaningless.

Feminists ask that theoretical understanding be kept in touch with, and checked against the complexity of ongoing experience and consciousness in their social historical, natural and artifactual context, in other words, all those aspects that make up the totality

of our every day living. This entails that the personal be acknowledged not only as valid but essential. It implies that interconnections, relations, and transactions – all those temporal aspects of social life – are important. It also means that we must take note of the influence of the physical, biological, psychological, technological and historical aspects, whenever we are focusing on a particular aspect of social life.

In terms of approach it constitutes the difference between focus and isolation. When we are focusing the rest of our visual field is not disappearing in the way it does when we are isolating and abstracting some part or event in order to study it. It is the difference between an embedded understanding where both the thinker and the object of understanding remain an integral aspect of a totality, and one that severs those infinite connections. We can only focus, but not isolate ecologically.⁵ Concern with life – in terms of giving, sustaining, preserving, nurturing, and aiding it – necessitates appropriate forms of understanding. Unlike the concern with dead things it needs an approach that is not fragmentary, static, linear and dichotomising, but one that seeks dynamic interrelations where that which is not studied remains, nevertheless implicated in that which is being explicated. The connection between feminist and ecological concerns thus seems an obvious one, and eco-feminism possibly an ideal direction for the future. For social scientists there is, however, a problem with adopting an ecological framework of analysis. This problem, I want to suggest, cannot be overcome until the ecological root metaphor of organism, and the whole issue of holistic, functional and systemic analyses, have been re-addressed and resolved. Functionalism and systems theory are, after all, the only perspectives that none of the feminist scholars whom I have encountered in my research, have identified themselves with. I shall come back to the issue of holism a bit later in the paper.

Feminist social theory: conceptualising the invisible

Hardly any of the above critiques, it must be noted, are unique to feminism. Most of it has been said before; and said better. Taken singly, the critiques do no more than put the emphasis on those aspects that are opposite to the traditional scientific approach. By stressing experience and practice over theory, wholes over parts, ecological interconnectedness over idealised isolation, process

over structure, values and passionate commitment over distanced neutrality, and gender over sex, feminists may be redressing a lost balance, but they are doing it by employing the very approach they seek to transcend. In other words, new dualisms are used to exorcise the traditional ones. If, however, we take the feminist thoughts on science collectively, and in conjunction with their approaches to nature, history, theory, and knowledge, then those intuitions and reflections connect to form a coherent body of thought. What emerges is an approach that can no longer be squeezed into existing marxian, critical, structuralist, symbolic interactionist, phenomenological, or ethnomethodological perspectives.

While those aspects that feminists identify as important can be recognised as a distinct approach, the latter does not yet constitute a social science perspective, or feminist social theory. This overall approach highlights points of departure and areas of concern. Despite its coherence, however, it is as yet no more than a way of sensing and knowing and, as Jagger (1983: 376) observes, it lacks a conceptual framework to give clarity to the vision. What is needed is a theoretical framework that can genuinely connect experience, context, pattern, process and events, one that can simultaneously account for continuity and change, the influence of the past, the visions and intents of the future, and the constitution of the present, without losing sight of social relations of power. For such a perspective feminists need a conceptualisation of the social world that is outside the range of existing social science frames of meaning. Attempts to achieve those very aims have, of course, been made by other, non feminist social scientists.⁶ Their work thus needs to be discussed in any account of the social world that shares these aims.

Emphasising the need for a theoretical framework is, however, fraught with difficulty, since the feminist approach to theory has been a reticent and wary one; even one of denial. Only recently have feminists begun to write about the necessity, inevitability and power of theory.⁷ In these latter writings the emphasis is on praxis, the fusion of theory and practice. Duelli Klein (1983: 95) writes about the realisation that the two cannot be separated, pointing out that 'theory and practice of a woman's experience are not split'. Beyond this classical dictum of German idealism, there is a call for women to become aware of their theories and base assumptions, and the need for these to be continuously checked against experience. This constant checking and sensitising towards

an awareness of the relation between theory, consciousness, and experience, is to prevent what Stanley and Wise (1983: 201) call 'de-corticated theory'. It is this type of theory, they suggest, that is 'essentially speculative and concerned with abstractions, not grounded in living experience', rather than theory as such, that needs to be recognised as the problem. While marxian praxis and experientially based, 'grounded theory' find general approval, they are not the means to overcome what might best be expressed through Gramsci's concept of hegemony. If we accept the feminists' assertion that the social world has, thus far, been viewed through the eyes of men, and consequently understood, conceptualised, and theorised by men; and if we further accept that women are excluded from those conceptualisations, then the problem of theory takes on yet another, far deeper and more fundamental dimension.

Feminists agree not only that any understanding of human beings that excludes women is inaccurate, but also that a feminist social theory will have to overcome this invisibility of women.⁸ There is no faith, however, in the 'add women and stir' recipe, since an understanding of the social world with, and through the eyes of women alters both the method and the vision, the epistemology and the ontology. It invalidates the tradition. Finding a way of learning to see the invisible and to bring to a conscious, reflected, and discursive level those aspects we take most deeply for granted, necessitates phenomenological action. Now we have finally worked our way to the substantive core of that elusive bond between feminist concerns and those arising from my work on time.

Just one moment and invisible times

In contemporary social science both women and most aspects of time form the invisible part of our understanding. Both have been consistently theorised out of existence. Where women have been the object of scientific investigation, they have been neutralised by the very framework through which they were being analysed, just as the temporal world has been stabilised with a science that accords merit in relation to the degree of timelessness that can be achieved. Thus, the challenge for both feminists and sociologists with a focus on the time aspects of social life is not only to do and

make science without recreating dichotomies, abstractions and objectifications, but to learn to see and think in a new way, to re-think thinking, to review seeing, and to achieve understanding through consciousness raising. It is about learning to see and grasp the familiar world as strange and paradoxical

To throw into focus that which is 'disattended' is to break through its taken for granted character. To draw attention to women and to time in conjunction with social theory can thus serve as the starting point for breaking through the seemingly closed circuit of theory and practice, by which existing modes of seeing and understanding are perpetuated. Escape depends further on a conscious effort to doubt, a method highly recommended by Brecht as the only one that can make us envision alternatives to that which seems unalterable in both practice and conceptualisation. Radical humanists too see doubting as a central tool for critical awareness.⁹ Yet, it is not enough to direct doubt at some external 'status quo', without getting to know the tools of understanding and their effects. In other words, we have to extend our doubt to include ourselves, our own understanding, and our own base assumptions.

My own efforts, for example, are channelled towards bringing the deeply taken-for-granted time aspects of every-day life to a conscious level of understanding, as well as seeking a time-infused social theory that can accommodate all the aspects of time that have a bearing on our lives. As an example of such a consciousness raising exercise, of letting the material speak and looking at the familiar with the eyes of the stranger, I would like to give you an account of a short moment of my life. It had been the starting point for the paper I mentioned in the introduction and whose unresolved thinking was the reason for the return to the issues in this paper. I hope that it will serve as a demonstration of those elusive theoretical connections between feminist concerns and those arising from a focus on time, and that it will make them more visible and accessible.

'It is 8.00 am, Thursday, June 2nd, 1985. I am in the kitchen waiting for the water to boil so that I can make our coffee. Jan is keeping an eye on the eggs, Miriam is getting ready for school, Tobias needs to be woken. The news is still focused on the hostage crisis. I am aware of my friend who works behind the scene for the breakfast television team and who provides us with information and experts on the situation in order to keep the

issue alive as an ongoing drama, during a period when there is little official information. I feel guilty for not having been to visit her parents for such a long time.

Miriam says she is late. I tell her she is not. She explains to me how the fact that the bus has consistently been early means that she is late despite the fact that she is early according to the clock and the bus timetable.

I remember that Tobias has asked me to find out about contracts of employment. I am not quite sure where to begin to find out about these things. Has not the Wages Council been abolished recently? I do not like being landed with jobs like that. Yet, I know that he has no means of finding out during working hours.

I am cold. It is meant to be the height of summer and I am still freezing in thick woollen jumpers. My father's ancient rule that allowed us to run barefoot in all the months which have no R in them, and which worked so well when I was little, is completely meaningless here and now. Is my memory faulty? Does the different place matter or has the pattern of the weather really changed? I know that we used to have disputes about this rule in some of the Aprils when it was already sunny and hot, and when my father would insist that the earth had not yet warmed up sufficiently. Cold summers, on the other hand, do not form part of my childhood memory of summers. Woollen jumpers in summer meant holidays on the North or Baltic sea where we felt cold because of the incessant wind that always had a certain edge to it.

While Jan is timing the eggs he is studying his diary. He has such a busy schedule of exam-board meetings, departmental meetings and tutorials. There will be no slack period during which he could bring me home if I too were to go to college but did not want to stay for the whole day. Neither of us likes the train very much because this means twenty minutes walking uphill at the end of the journey. I could drive home myself and then pick him up at the end of the day but that means an hour wasted with driving during the rush hour. If at all, I should go in the afternoon since the morning is always my best time for working.

What would I gain if I came in? It is only the panic of not having found a way of making the link between my work on time and feminist theory that makes me consider going to college in the first place. Talking to people might help, but then I might not find anyone to talk to and I have a feeling that more books

will not tell me anything that I have not already encountered in one way or another in the books that I have here at home. Yet, I am bothered. What is it about feminist theory that makes it so similar, and yet so fundamentally different from my approach? No insights, no solutions, only loose ends without connections. I ought really to stay home and make use of the days before my period which always turn out to be my most creative time. This particular time in my monthly cycle is always full of extremes. It is the time when I am most vulnerable to illness and most emotionally touchy while, simultaneously, being my time of maximum energy and creativity. How can I make use of this energy when the insights are still so far and few between? I will have to stop this random reading and note-taking tonight, and tomorrow I will have to begin to work towards some outline. Something will emerge I am just not able to see it yet. Anyway I should believe myself what I have told Jan last night: 'Only if I have not come up with anything by Sunday is there cause for panic. I think I am staying home.' (Adam, 1985: 2-3)

This account describes a moment which lasted no longer than it took for the exchange of words between Miriam and myself about the bus and being late. In the description of this short moment of consciousness the feminist concerns that I have outlined above are given substance. The feminists' emphasis on experience, consciousness and context, their focus on complexity, totality and interactive processes, and their rejection of dualisms, objectivity and causal analysis, all are relevant to an understanding of that moment.

Those thoughts, feelings, memories, awarenesses, the working knowledge, and the states of consciousness did not happen in sequence. They were present simultaneously. The order in which I have recounted them is irrelevant. Any other sequence would have been equally valid since nothing was causally related. The idea of summer, my father's rule, thinking of my friend working behind the television scenes, the guilt about not having been to see her parents, my unresolved thinking about feminist theory in relation to my work on time, my concern to find out about the legal situation with respect to contracts of employment, my weighing up the potential gains and inconveniences of going to college; this multiplicity of awareness, choices, memories, and considerations were all present at the same time, coexisting within this second of consciousness, that Thursday morning. Yet, despite

this simultaneity there is sequential order. Nothing is jumbled, nothing happened backwards. The coexistence is coherent.

Re-vision

This one moment could be studied and interpreted in many different ways by focusing on one or more of the multitude of aspects. The emphasis could, for example, be on time-budget aspects, on the extent of temporal horizons, or on issues of social time control.¹⁰ If, on the other hand, we disregard those existing social science practices, and focus on time with an open mind, then the process of 'seeing with new eyes' and re-thinking can begin. It then becomes apparent that the whole of that moment needs looking at. Time enters into every tiniest aspect of that moment. It is implicit in waiting, in planning, in contemplating and in guilt; just as it is central to memories, the language structure, and to the speech exchange as it was happening. It is fundamental to contracts of employment, bus timetables, bus driver habits, to the timing of actions, to rhythms – be they body or city traffic ones – to seasons and our relations to them, to the feeling of panic, the reluctance to waste time, and to the knowledge that there are good, bad, and right times for doing things. It also forms an ineradicable aspect of my identity which extends beyond the physical boundaries of my being. Tuning in further, it emerges that the time inherent in that moment is multifaceted. It becomes clear that time has not only something to do with clocks or timing but also with sequential ordering according to priorities, that it relates to irreversible changes, records and identity, to both cyclical, and progressive processes and, last but not least, that it is used and controlled as a resource. Time is simultaneously abstracted and reified, experienced and constituted. All these aspects of time are equally important. None can be excluded if one seeks to understand that moment in its complexity. To isolate one aspect for study without having all the others implicated is to falsify the experience. With a focus on time this generalised feminist insight may become firmly grounded.

Such a time-sensitive focus may also be used as evidence in support against dualisms since to choose one aspect in favour of its opposite, or to rank one above another, would make little sense. I grow older while the rhythmic cycles of day and night, of seasons, of birth and death and of daily routines continue. The experience

of time is neither more nor less important than the abstract resource or its constitution: no new dualisms here to exorcise existing ones! Understanding from a time perspective needs to be ecological. It needs to grasp the world in terms of dynamic and interdependent relations since any other approach would destroy the very quality that is being sought. Yet, this holistic understanding has to be different from the classical one where parts are understood to be causally connected to the whole, and where both the function of the system and its past are thought to determine the future. From contemporary physics and biology in conjunction with Mead's *'The Philosophy of the Present'*, there emerges a time-based holism that is dynamic, historical, non determinist and can accommodate non local, non causal connections.¹¹ It is a holism in which the idea of everything affecting everything else is no longer meaningless because it theorises that very process. It is an understanding that places asymmetry, interactions, transactions, and irreversibility at the centre. In a framework of understanding in which there is no un-doing, not even un-thinking, every tiniest action and every secret thought counts. All leave their irreversible mark on the world. In this holism reality is created in the present – affecting all past and all future. Here dichotic thinking, the language of determinism and parts in isolation do not even need to be refuted. They have no longer any basis for existence.

So far this dynamic holism has not been extended to include the social issues of power and control.¹² There is, however, nothing in its basic framework that would prevent such a necessary inclusion. Again, a non conventional focus on time forces such an extension since the time aspects of power and control are fundamentally related and not divorceable from identity, timing, records or rhythms (Adam 1987). Once we understand the relation between these multiple times, as well as their constitutions, we will be able to encompass relations of power within this time infused ecological holism.

Conclusion

This paper seemed not the place to familiarise you with any of the detail of time theory. Even without that knowledge, I hope, a connection has become apparent between the feminist vision I outlined and a focus on the time aspects of everyday life. Dualisms, functional systems needs, linear causality, isolation into

convenient chunks for study, extraction from context, objectivity, the belief in the past as prime determinant of the future, the idea of truth, the social science practice of excluding all things physical, biological and psychological, they all need to be put up for reassessment. They have become meaningless from this different angle of vision. I was suggesting that a non traditional focus on time blows wide open what is taken for granted and understood as unalterable in social science. For this reason I see time as an ideal vehicle for feminists and like minded scholars to achieve the sort of methods and theories they are unsuccessfully seeking at present.

What this focus will not provide is a better theory of . . . women's oppression, women's role in the labour market, or the social construction of gender. Eventually those theories too would be affected. But feminist theory as an understanding of those issues was neither my focus nor the level of analysis at which I established the connections. I was concentrating on the nature of feminist social theory as it emerged from feminist reflections on science, knowledge, and social science perspectives.

Women and the time aspects of social life were found to share an invisibility within traditional perspectives. Furthermore, only partial aspects are ever studied and presented, as in the case of women as mothers and wives and time as time reckoned by calendars and clocks. With any extension from this basic vision we are forced into choices: clock-time or experience, social or natural time, women as workers or as mothers, as sex objects or as persons. Within existing social science we have no means to escape from those imposed choices, just as we are forced to choose between perspectives since these are mutually exclusive in their assumptions, aims, and methods. To escape this pervasive vision requires therefore not more of the same but an imaginative leap. Time, it seems to me, is waiting to be used as the springboard.

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Notes

- 1 This paper was first presented to the BSA Sociological Theory Group Conference on *Feminist Theory in Sociology*, University of Leeds, September 18–19, 1986. The research has been conducted with the financial support of an ESRC grant.
- 2 For a feminist critique on scientific objectivity see Birke (1986), Bleier (1984), Bowles and Duelli-Klein (eds), (1983) essays by Bowles, Coyner, Duelli-Klein, Du Bois, Stanley and Wise, and Westcott, Jagger (1983), Keohane *et al* (eds).

- (1982) essays by MacKinnon and by Fox Keller, Stanley and Wise (1983), Whitelegg *et al.* (eds), (1982) essays by Arditti and Rose
- 3 For feminist writings on the nature of truth see Bleier (1984) chapter 8, Keohane *et al.* (eds), (1982) especially their introduction, Reinhartz (1983), Spender (1983)
 - 4 For a feminist critique of understanding through dichotomies see Bleier (1984), Bowles and Duelli Klein (eds), (1983) essays by Du Bois, Duelli Klein, Stanley and Wise, Westcott, Capra 1981b and 1982, Ehrenreich and English (1979), Glennon (1979), Leland (1981), Jagger (1983) especially chapter 11, Tuana (1983)
 - 5 For the connection between feminist and ecological concerns see Birke (1986) especially chapters 6 and 7, Caldecott and Leland (eds), (1983), Capra (1982), Daly (1979), Griffin (1982), Leland 1981, Merchant (1982)
 - 6 See especially Giddens (1979), (1981) and (1984), and for example Reason and Rowan (eds), (1981)
 - 7 On feminists' relationship to theory see Bowles and Duelli Klein (eds), (1983) essays by Du Bois, Duelli Klein, Evans, Spender, Stanley and Wise, Jagger (1983) especially chapter 9, Kramarae and Truchler's (1985) entry 'theory'
 - 8 For thoughts on the invisibility of women through their exclusion in theory see Bowles and Duelli Klein (eds), (1983), Daly (1979), Delamont (1980), Ehrenreich and English (1979), Jagger (1983)
 - 9 See for example Fromm's Introduction to Illich (1980)
 - 10 These are the conventional foci for the study of social time. See Adam 1987 chapter 4, the excellent essay by Bergmann (1983), and Elchardus (1988)
 - 11 For evidence of this emergent framework see Adam 1987 and 1988, Capra (1981) and (1982), Bateson (1980), Bohm (1983), Briggs and Peat (1985), Mead (1959), Prigogine and Stengers (1984), Reason and Rowan (eds) (1981), Sheldrake (1983), Zohar (1983)
 - 12 Mead's *The Philosophy of the Present*, does not extend to the social issue of power. Giddens, for whom the social relations of power are central and who recognises the importance of Mead's late work does, however, not build his theory of structuration on the assumptions of this emerging framework. Mead's work could therefore not be extended and developed with Giddens' theory of structuration and the concomitant social theory approach to power

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Residual religiosity on a Hull council estate

Peter G. Forster

Abstract

In the 1960s it was widely assumed that a process of secularisation was taking place and was likely to continue. Recent empirical data about a council estate, which among other things relate religious variables to age, are thought to throw light on such questions. These findings demonstrate that 'religiosity' tends to increase with age, but that for certain purposes important elements of residual religiosity remain. The decline in Sunday School is particularly noteworthy, and suggests a movement in the direction of a 'voluntary' church. Remaining churchgoers have a high level of commitment, suggesting that a move from church to sect can operate in the mainstream church.

The issue of secularisation has been widely discussed among sociologists of religion, and that such a process exists and is likely to continue has been widely assumed. The concept of secularisation has admittedly had its critics; thus Martin (1965: 169–82) has been suspicious of its ideological underpinnings, and Shiner (1967: 510–19) has suggested that it subsumes some different and analytically separable processes. But nobody has really denied the fact that there has been a decline in religion in Britain throughout the twentieth century, whatever criterion of 'secularisation' is taken. More debate has occurred, however, on the matter of predictions for the future. Thus whereas Wilson (1966: esp. Part I) has tended to suggest that religion is definitely on the way out, except as a minority activity, Martin (1967: esp. ch. 2) has preferred to maintain that important elements of 'religiosity' still remain, and that the process is not necessarily irreversible. This debate was conducted in the mid-1960s, and sufficient time has now elapsed to enable the investigator to ascertain whether

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the hypothesis of further secularisation can be verified by empirical data. The data presented here deal with the elements of religion that remain in a situation where the church has become marginalised. They concern a Hull council estate. Since council estates are well known to be areas of religious indifference, it is to be expected that they can provide particularly good evidence of secularisation, if such a process exists. In investigating such a situation, it is also of especial interest to relate 'religiosity' to age. If it can be shown that 'religiosity' increases with age, then such findings can potentially support a hypothesis of secularisation (though as will be indicated, there might be an alternative explanation).

Longhill Estate is on the eastern side of the city and was constructed in the mid to late 1950s. Houses there range in size from two to four bedrooms, in pairs or short terraces, and there are also some low-rise flats. There are two foster-homes and an old people's home. Public spaces include two shopping areas, a library, a playing field and three pubs. There are five schools, but these do not cater for pupils over 13. Longhill appears to be a 'medium demand' estate, and the Hull Housing Department receives few requests for transfers to other estates.

The Estate has an Anglican church, St Margaret's, which was opened in 1959 to serve as a worship centre and a community hall. It constitutes a 'daughter' church to the parish church of St Michael's, on the nearby main road. For 20 years St Margaret's was served by a series of curates and Church Army personnel, but in 1979 the question of the sale of the church and disposal of the buildings was discussed. The then incumbent resisted that proposal, but in 1980 worship ceased, though a Sunday school continued till 1983. In 1984 worship recommenced on the initiative of a small group of laity, encouraged by clergy from neighbouring parishes. Eucharistic worship recommenced in September 1984, on the appointment of a new incumbent at St Michael's. In November 1986 St Margaret's was rededicated, and a mission priest was appointed to Longhill.

Anglicanism is not the only Christian presence on Longhill. There is a Roman Catholic church where mass is said, though part of the building is now used by the YTS. Also, the Salvation Army has a Sunday School.

The survey, whose main results are summarised here, was conducted in 1986, by direct request from church sources, with the aim of providing background information for an Urban Mission

Experiment.¹ A sample of 397 individuals eligible to vote was drawn from the Register of Electors. This constituted 7.9 per cent of the total of slightly over 5,000 adults. A total of 207 questionnaires was completed successfully, the response rate therefore being 52.6 per cent of the sample drawn. This is not a particularly good rate for a survey done by personal interviews. However, surveys of religion in the general population are notoriously difficult to administer, and this result can be seen as reasonably satisfactory. There is some evidence of bias in the sample. There was a better response rate from women (60 per cent) than from men (45.3 per cent). Also, less conclusively, it appears that those who refused to complete the questionnaire were more likely to be hostile to the church and religion than were those who cooperated. This appears to be so since a number of refusals were accompanied by anti-religious remarks. Thus to some unknown degree the results may be biased towards the more 'religious' Estate dwellers. It might therefore turn out that a more representative survey could reveal them as, if anything, less religious than the present findings show.

Before embarking upon religious topics, the survey dealt with some more general issues. It was found that the Estate had built up a fairly stable population. 70.0 per cent of the population had been there over ten years, and only 0.5 per cent for less than one year. Moreover, 52.2 per cent of residents claimed to have a relative living in a house or flat elsewhere on Longhill – quite a high figure for a fairly young community. There was a good deal of satisfaction with the Estate; 81.2 per cent said that they liked living there. Though 35.7 per cent said that the Estate was not safe at night, many who said this stressed that this was a general problem and not something to be blamed upon Longhill.

The recent growth of the Estate is seen in the fact that only 14.0 per cent were brought up on the Estate, and hardly any adults had been born there. However, 78.7 per cent had been born somewhere else in Hull. Examining the age profile, the mean age turns out to be 50.4, ($s = 17.3$) but this disguises the fact that the 31–50 age group are under-represented. Table 1 shows distribution by age and sex.

It was also found that 70.5 per cent were married, and only 11.1 per cent were single. Only 1.9 per cent admitted to cohabiting without marriage. The orthodox nuclear-family pattern is the norm on the Estate; only 3.9 per cent of households had other patterns, such as three-generation households. Only 3.4 per cent

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Table 1

Age	Male		Female		All N
	N	%	N	%	
17-30	21	53.8	18	46.2	39
31-60	40	41.2	57	58.8	97
61 up	33	48.5	35	51.4	68
No answer	2	(66.7)	1	(33.3)	3
Total	96	46.4	111	53.6	207

of households were one-parent families. The norm of the nuclear family is in a sense symbolised on Longhill by the institutional provision for orphans and old people. Family size does not seem to differ from the general British pattern. It was quite common to have 0 to 3 children, but larger numbers than that were much more unusual.

Table 2 shows that the majority of Estate dwellers of all ages had no job.

There is no indication as to what proportion were available for work. It is significant, however, that only 50.8 per cent of males under 61 had a job full-time, with a further 4.9 per cent employed part-time.² Full-time education for most Longhill residents seems in most cases to have ended at the legal minimum age. Only 7.2 per cent had continued beyond the age of 16. Evidence apart from

Table 2

	Male		Female		All N
	N	%	N	%	
No job	56	58.3	71	64.0	127
Job*	0		1	0.9	1
Full-time	36	37.5	13	11.7	49
Part-time	3	3.1	25	22.5	28
No answer	1	1.0	1	0.9	2
Total	96		111		207

* One did not indicate whether full- or part-time

the survey also shows that Longhill is an area of Hull where a high proportion (27 per cent) receive certificated housing benefit, this suggests that for those in employment, low wages are a common problem. It thus appears that if the criteria of low wages and unemployment are taken, Longhill can be seen as a deprived area, but this is not so by other standards, such as shared dwellings, one-parent families, and lack of exclusive use of a bath and inside toilet

With this background information in mind it is appropriate to consider religious attitudes, beliefs and participation for Longhill people. It will be seen that the relationship of these to the age of respondents turns out to be of particular interest.

Respondents were asked, 'Would you say you were a religious person, or not religious?', and the answers are shown in Table 3, in relation to age

Table 3

Age	<i>Considered self 'religious'</i>		<i>Uncertain</i>		<i>Considered self 'not religious'</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All N</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	7	17.9	1	2.6	31	79.5	0		39
31-60	48	49.5	9	9.3	40	41.2	0		97
61 up	42	61.8	6	8.8	19	27.9	1	1.5	68
No answer	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	0		3
	98	47.3	17	8.2	91	44.0	1	0.5	207

Significance (omitting the 'uncertain' and both kinds of 'no answers' $P < 0.005$ $\chi^2 = 26.43$)

This result can be corroborated by inspection of the mean age for the 'religious' and the 'not religious'. This turns out to be 55.7 for the 'religious' ($s = 15.3$) and 44.5 for the 'not religious' ($s = 18.3$) and this difference is highly significant ($z = 4.5$)

Thus the older Estate dwellers are much more likely than the younger to consider themselves 'religious'. A related question is that concerning belief in God. The question for this was phrased 'Some people wonder whether there is a God or not, how do you feel; do you think there is a God, or not?'. It was designed so as to stress that a non-theistic option was available, the results, again cross-tabulated with age, are presented in Table 4.

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Table 4

Age	<i>Theist</i>		<i>Uncertain</i>		<i>Non-theist</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All</i> N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	17	43.6	8	20.5	14	35.9	0		39
31-60	68	70.1	13	13.4	14	14.4	2	2.1	97
61 up	52	76.4	9	13.2	7	10.2	0		68
No answer	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	0		3
	138	66.7	31	15.0	36	17.4	2	1.0	207

Significance (omitting both kinds of no answers) $P < 0.005$ $\chi^2 = 15.43$

Again, the difference in mean age for theists (55.3, $s = 16.5$) and for non-theists and the uncertain combined (45.1, $s = 17.6$) is significant ($z = 3.9$) and corroborates the fact that belief in God increases with age. It is interesting that the big difference is between the 17-30s and the rest. Those who did not believe in God, or who expressed some doubt on the subject, were asked whether they would consider themselves atheists or agnostics. The results are presented in Table 5 in relation to age. The question was worded 'Would you say you were an atheist or agnostic then?'

Omitting the 'no answers', combining atheists and agnostics, and comparing their relationship with age to that of believers, a significant result is obtained ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 27.2$). The mean age of atheists and agnostics taken together is 44.9 ($s = 18.4$), while for all others it is 51.9 ($s = 16.8$). The mean age of atheists and agnostics is seen to be significantly lower than that of other categories ($z = 2.2$, significant at 0.05 level).

It thus appears that slightly less than one-third of Longhill people were at least doubtful about the existence of God, and slightly less than one-fifth considered themselves atheists or agnostics. In all cases, it was particularly those under 31 who were likely to show some scepticism of theistic claims. However, this does not necessarily apply at the declaratory level. When asked for a religious label nearly all Longhill people were prepared to give one, regardless of age. Table 6 shows the answers to the question 'If a hospital or similar institution asked you to write your religion on a form, what would you put down?' There was no meaningful relationship with age for answers to this question.

It was noted that 79.1 per cent of those who did not believe in or

Table 5

Age	Atheist		Agnostic		Total atheist plus agnostic		All others		Grand total N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	7	17.9	9	23.1	16	41.0	23	59.0	39
31-60	5	5.2	6	6.2	11	11.3	86	88.7	97
61 up	3	4.4	6	8.8	9	13.2	59	86.8	68
No answer	0		2	(66.7)	2	(66.7)	1	(33.3)	3
	15	7.2	23	11.1	38	18.4	169	81.6	207

were uncertain of the existence of God would put themselves down as 'Church of England', and this was true of 84.2 per cent of the atheists and agnostics. These results show that public display of scepticism is avoided, even by those who see themselves as atheists and agnostics. One respondent was quite explicit about the matter. He was generally secularistic in his replies to questions on religion, but said 'bloody Christian, I suppose!' in answer to this question.

In view of this support for Christianity at a declaratory level,³ it is useful also to consider respondents' attitudes to Christianity and to some of its central components. The first question of this kind was 'How do you regard Christianity? Can you tell me which of these comes nearest to your opinion?' A card was shown with answers in terms of 'the truest religion', 'as true as any others',

Table 6

	N	All respondents %
Church of England	160	77.3
Methodist	10	4.8
Roman Catholic	19	9.2
Presbyterian	3	1.4
Baptist	2	1.0
Salvation Army	1	0.4
Mormon	1	0.4
Christian	2	1.0
Atheist/agnostic	3	1.4
None/leave blank	4	1.9
No answer to the question	2	1.0

207

'unimportant' and 'rubbish'. Table 7 shows that there was an important relationship between answers to this question and age. Omitting the 'don't knows' and both kinds of 'no answers' these results are statistically significant ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 27.8$). Moreover, the mean age for those saying that Christianity was the truest religion was 57.7 ($s = 16.4$) as opposed to a mean age of 47.1 ($s = 16.6$) for all other answers. This difference is also significant ($t = 4.3$). It can therefore be demonstrated that the younger age-

Table 7

Age	Truest religion		As true as others		Unimportant or rubbish		Don't know		No answer		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17-30	4	10.2	18	46.2	13	33.4	2	5.1	2	5.1	39	
31-60	27	27.8	55	56.7	11	11.4	1	1.0	3	3.1	97	
61 up	33	48.5	28	41.2	5	7.3	1	1.5	1	1.0	68	
No answer	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	0		0		3	
	65	31.4	102	49.3	30	14.5	4	1.9	6	2.9	207	

groups were more likely to be sceptical of Christianity, though even among the 17–30s only about one-third saw it as unimportant or rubbish. Older people were, however, more likely to see Christianity as having unique claims, while younger people more often saw it as one religion among many

A component of attitudes to Christianity which bears a significant relationship to age is the question of the Bible. About three-quarters (76.3 per cent) of the households in which a respondent lived had a Bible. However, 62.0 per cent of respondents said that they never read it. The Bible was typically acquired as a present or prize, during the respondent's youth. It appears that though Bibles were seldom read, they were not discarded. When Longhill people were asked about their *attitude* to the Bible, a significant relationship with age was found. Respondents were asked 'How do you see the Bible?', and a card invited them to choose between alternatives in terms of being 'dictated' by God, 'inspired' by God, 'about God', 'literature' or 'fairy stories'. The results are shown in Table 8

The relationship here is not significant if the 31–60s and the over-61s are considered separately. However, if these two age-groups are combined and then compared with the 17–30s, a significant relationship can be detected. If 'don't knows' and both kinds of 'no answers' are omitted, then $P < 0.05$ and $\chi^2 = 4.0$. Thus it is shown that the over-31s were significantly more likely to subscribe to the idea of some form of divine intervention in the writing of the Bible than were the 17–30s. Moreover, the mean age of those who saw the Bible as inspired or dictated by God was found to be 54.1 ($s = 16.8$), while for those who saw it as being about God, literature or fairy stories, it was 46.6 ($s = 17.3$). This difference is also significant ($z = 3.1$).

Respondents were also asked 'Do you get comfort and strength from religion, or not?' The results are presented in Table 9.

If 'don't knows' and both kinds of 'no answers' are omitted a significant result is obtained ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 5.8$). Thus it is shown that there was a general growth with age of the feeling that religion provided a source of comfort and strength. Moreover the mean age of those who derived such comfort and strength was 55.9 ($s = 15.2$), but was 45.2 ($s = 18.1$) for those who did not do so. This difference is also significant ($z = 4.4$).

So far the concern has been mainly with beliefs and attitudes. It is worthwhile also to look at the question of religious practice, this involves both attendance at normal services and use of the church

Table 8

Age	Inspired or dictated by God		About God/literature/fairy stories		Don't know		No answer		All N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	13	33.3	24	61.5	1	2.6	1	2.6	39
31-60	46	47.4	46	47.4	2	2.1	3	3.1	97
61 up	39	57.3	28	41.2	0		1	1.5	68
No answer	1	(33.3)	2	(66.7)	0		0		3
	99	47.8	100	48.3	3	1.4	5	2.4	207

Table 9

Age	Yes, comfort & strength		No comfort & strength		Don't know		No answer		All N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	8	20.5	28	71.8	1	2.6	2	5.1	39
31-60	44	45.4	46	47.4	4	4.1	3	3.1	97
61 up	39	57.4	22	32.4	5	7.4	2	2.9	68
No answer	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	0		1	(33.3)	3
	92	44.4	97	46.9	10	4.8	8	3.9	207

for rites of passage. In Longhill the former is of very little importance, the latter much more so. First, however, it is of interest to examine private prayer. The relationship with age is shown in Table 10. The question was 'Do you ever pray privately, at home or elsewhere?'

Omitting both kinds of 'no answers', the difference shown here can be seen to be statistically significant ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 16.9$). Moreover, the difference in the mean age of those who claimed to pray (53.8, $s = 15.7$) and those who did not (46.7, $s = 18.7$) is also significant. Once again, the key difference is between the 17-30s and the over-31s. About three-fifths of the over-31s claimed private prayer, but this was true of less than one-quarter of the 17-30s.

Table 10

Age	<i>Pray</i>		<i>Do not pray</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All</i> N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	9	23.1	27	69.2	3	7.7	39
31-60	58	59.8	35	36.1	4	4.1	97
61 up	41	60.3	24	35.3	3	4.4	68
No answer	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	3
	109	52.7	87	42.0	11	5.3	207

On the matter of church attendance, respondents were asked 'Do you ever go to church apart from times such as weddings and funerals?' If yes, they were asked 'How often?' Few reported much activity, only 6.8 per cent said that they attended monthly or more frequently, while a further 22.2 per cent claimed at least some, less frequent attendance. 4.8 per cent did not answer, while the remaining 66.2 per cent said they never attended. An examination was made of the relationship between age and the difference between those who never attended and those who attended at least sometimes. The relationship is presented in Table 11.

This is an interesting departure from the normal pattern of increased 'religiosity' with age. Those who were more likely to declare at least some church attendance tended to come from the

Table 11

Age	<i>Never attend</i>		<i>Attend at least sometimes</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All N</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	31	79.4	7	17.9	1	2.6	39
31-60	54	55.7	34	35.1	9	9.3	97
61 up	50	73.5	18	26.5	0		68
No answer	2	(66.7)	1	(33.3)	0		3
	137	66.2	60	29.0	10	4.8	207

middle age-group rather than from the elderly. These results are, however, not quite significant at the level of $P < 0.05$ (omitting both kinds of 'no answers', $\chi^2 = 5.9$). There is also no significant difference between the mean age of those who never attend and those who attend at least sometimes. Thus it seems that the relationship between age and church attendance is not very strong. However, some claimed that they used to attend, or that they used to attend more often. The question was worded 'Did you ever go to church?' (with the words 'more often' added for those who still reported some attendance). The results for this question are presented in Table 12, showing the relationship with age.

Table 12

Age	<i>Yes, did attend</i>		<i>No, did not attend</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All N</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	20	51.2	18	46.2	1	2.6	39
31-60	77	79.4	16	16.5	4	4.1	97
61 up	54	79.4	7	10.3	7	10.3	68
No answer	2	(66.7)	1	(33.3)	0		3
	153	73.9	42	20.3	12	5.8	207

There is no significant difference in mean age of those who had previously attended church and those who had not. Moreover, Table 11 shows that as large a proportion of the 31-60s had

attended church (more) in the past as of the over-61s. However, if all those over 31 are compared with the 17-30s, then a significant difference emerges (omitting both kinds of 'no answers', $P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 19.1$). Thus although over half in all age-groups reported that they had attended church more in the past, this claim was less commonly made by the 17-30s. None the less, even most of the younger people had had some contact with the church, probably of a compulsory kind, which had been dropped when older. Respondents were asked to give their reasons for ceasing attendance. The commonest answers were that church involvement was a phenomenon of younger years of life, something to be dropped as part of the process of growing up. Often there was indication of some kind of compulsion, from parents, school, the armed forces, or the Scouts and Guides. When these were left behind, churchgoing was too. Other reasons given for ceasing attendance were change of residence, the closure of a particular church, or pressure from work.

But while normal church attendance was very sparse, a different picture emerged with rites of passage. It is well known that non-churchgoers still use the church for such purposes, but it is important to look at each transition separately. Thus *christening* was seen as virtually automatic. Only one respondent claimed not to have been christened, and only 7.6 per cent of those who had children had had none of their children christened. When asked why, respondents typically gave answers in terms of what is 'normal', much less often, some religious reason was given. Christening was seen as so automatic that only rarely was there a suggestion of pressure from kin or spouse. The commonest reason given by the few non-christeners was that the household was religiously mixed and there was uncertainty as to which church to go to.

Marriage, however, was quite different. Here the two alternatives of church and register office were recognised. 60.6 per cent of those ever married had had the church ceremony, while 39.4 per cent had used the register office. (These figures relate to latest marriages only, previous marriages are disregarded.) Since christening was so automatic for most people, the relationship with age could not be usefully investigated, but a different picture emerges in the case of marriage. The relationship between age and place of marriage is shown in Table 13.

A statistically significant result is obtained if both kinds of 'no answers' are excluded, but those who were never married (or

Table 13

Age	Church		Elsewhere		No Answer		Total ever married	Not applicable*
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	N
17-30	7	41.2	9	52.9	1	5.9	17	22
31-60	55	58.2	39	41.5	0		94	3
61 up	44	66.7	20	30.3	2	3.0	66	2
	106	59.6	68	38.8	3	1.7	177	27

* i.e., never married, no answer to whether married, or 'living as married'

those who did not answer the question as to whether they were married) are included. The result is then highly significant ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 82.8$). The mean age of those who married in church is 56.5 ($s = 15.2$), while for the register office it is 48.4 ($s = 15.6$) and this difference is also highly significant ($z = 3.4$).

It can be seen, therefore, that there has been a slow but measurable decline in popularity of church marriage, to the point where, for the 17-30s, marriage outside church has become slightly more popular. However, the situation has never been similar to that found with christenings; the church marriage has never been automatic. None the less, comments on why church marriage was chosen suggest that Longhill people see it as 'proper', although the register office is recognised as an inferior alternative. The 'done' or 'proper' thing was to marry in church. Other reasons were given but much less often; some mentioned the Christian content of the service, while others said there had been pressures from kin, in-laws or the future spouse. Where marriage had taken place in the register office, the overwhelming reason given was financial. Less commonly, the reason was that one partner had been divorced, and some said that speed was important. There seemed to be a general consensus that the church was the 'proper' place to get married; this norm could be suspended at times of financial stringency or social disruption, but remained important. Divorce and pregnancy might also discourage church marriage and the church might refuse to remarry divorcees. A few deviants did, however, express preference for the register office, and there may have been more, who were inhibited by the norm of propriety. Those who preferred the register office tended to say that they wanted to keep the wedding quiet; only two raised religious objections. Those who did not believe in God or who

Residual religiosity on a Hull council estate

Table 14

Age	Christian funeral		No Christian funeral		Don't care		Don't know		No answer		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17-30	22	56.4	0		12	30.8	4	10.3	1	2.6	39	
31-60	76	78.3	5	5.2	8	8.2	4	4.1	4	4.1	97	
61 up	61	89.7	4	1.5	2	2.9	0	.	1	1.5	68	
No answer	2	(66.7)	1	(33.3)	0		0	.	0		3	
	161	77.8	10	4.8	22	10.6	8	3.9	6	2.9	207	

doubted his existence tended to go along with the norm of propriety regarding church weddings (Barker, 1978 56-77, Leonard, 1980. 205-11)

The case of funerals is different again. Here respondents were asked 'When you die, would you want to have a Christian funeral?'. Respondents were therefore expressing their preferences in the knowledge that the actual decision would be made by others. Table 14 shows the relationship between age and form of funeral preferred.

Omitting both kinds of 'no answers', and combining those who do not want a Christian funeral with the 'don't knows', a significant difference can be observed ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 17.1$). Moreover, the mean age of those who wanted a Christian funeral was found to be 52.9 ($s = 16.7$) while that of all others who answered the question was 41.2 ($s = 17.1$) and this difference is also significant ($z = 3.9$). Thus it is demonstrated that there is a clear increase in interest in a Christian funeral as death becomes nearer, though the majority in all age-groups preferred such an arrangement. The 17-30s were most likely to be indifferent to the arrangements for such a remote event, rather than insisting upon a non-Christian funeral. It is interesting that unlike the cases of marriage and christening, religious belief did seem to make a difference here. Thus whereas 90.6 per cent of those who had said they believed in God said that they *would* want a Christian funeral, this was true of only 53.7 per cent of those who had expressed at least some doubt about God's existence. Respondents were not very articulate on reasons for having a Christian funeral. Some appealed to what is 'normal', as with christenings, though some kind of religious reason was more likely to be given for funerals than for christenings and weddings. It thus appears that death does give rise to a certain amount of thought about religious questions.

It has sometimes been noted that those who are themselves indifferent to religion none the less see the church as having some part to play in the socialisation of children. Several questions were therefore included to throw light upon this matter. Respondents who had children of any age were asked whether their children attended Sunday School or had attended in the past. The results are shown in Table 15.

To ensure statistical significance, those who sent at least some of their children to Sunday School have to be contrasted with all the others who had children. When this is done, a highly significant

Table 15

(Percentages are out of total who had children)							
Age (respondent's)	<i>All or some children go/went</i>		<i>None go/went</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All with children</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
17-30	2	11.8	13	76.5	2	11.8	17
31-60	66	71.0	22	23.7	5	5.4	93
61 up	46	76.7	11	18.3	3	5.0	60
No answer	0		0		0		0
	114	67.1	46	27.1	10	5.9	170

relationship obtains between the respondent's age and the sending of children to Sunday School ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 26.7$). Moreover, the mean age of those parents who sent their children to Sunday School was 57.4 ($s = 12.3$) while for those who did not it was 42.5 ($s = 16.3$) and this difference is also highly significant ($z = 5.5$). Further questions also revealed that 60.6 per cent of respondents with children thought that Sunday School was a beneficial influence on children, those who doubted or denied the existence of God were somewhat less enthusiastic, but the difference was not statistically significant. There is, none the less, clear evidence of a slow but measurable trend away from Sunday School. This can be demonstrated even more strongly by an examination of respondents' own reports of Sunday School attendance. The question was 'When you were younger, did you go to Sunday School?', and the results appear in Table 16.

Table 16

Age	<i>Yes, did attend</i>		<i>No, did not attend</i>		<i>No answer</i>		<i>All</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
17-30	24	61.5	13	33.3	2	5.1	39
31-60	79	81.4	14	14.4	4	4.1	97
61 up	63	92.6	3	4.4	2	2.9	68
No answer	2	(66.7)	1	(33.3)	0		3
	168	81.2	31	15.0	8	3.9	207

Omitting both kinds of 'no answers', the difference here is statistically significant ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 17.1$). There is also a major difference between the mean age of those who had attended Sunday School (53.4, $s = 18.5$) and those who had not (34.0, $s = 20.8$), with $z = 4.5$. It is clear that for the over-61s (born 1925 or earlier) it would have been deviant *not* to go to Sunday School in one's youth. This norm had declined by the time the 31-60s were growing up, though Sunday School was still very popular.⁴ It remained quite popular for the 17-30s, but for them it was no longer deviant not to attend. But for those growing up on the Estate, it has now become very deviant to attend. It needs to be remembered, however, that for all respondents Sunday School only rarely led to regular adult attendance at church. For some, it terminated with confirmation, and the extent of respondents' own confirmation is shown in Table 17 (those with a Free Church background were asked about full membership).

Omitting the 'don't knows' and both kinds of 'no answers', the relationship can be seen to be significant ($P < 0.01$, $\chi^2 = 10.0$). The mean age of the confirmed was found to be 56.4 ($s = 14.9$), while for those not confirmed it was 48.6 ($s = 17.4$), and this difference is also significant ($z = 3.3$). But although there has been a marked decline in confirmation, it should be remembered that less than half are confirmed even in the oldest age-group. Thus while, as Table 6 shows, acceptance of a Christian designation of some kind is widespread, any stronger commitment is much less common. What seems to have happened is that in the past there was a norm of propriety with regard to confirmation, but that this has now disappeared. Respondents were not asked about confirmation of their own children, but its decline can safely be assumed given the decline in Sunday School.

Children also hear about religion in ordinary schools. This has always been a politically controversial subject, and respondents' attitudes were therefore examined. The issue is not about whether religion should be taught in school; 90.3 per cent wanted some form of religious education. But there can be important areas of debate as to, firstly, whether such education should be comparative or should concentrate on Christianity; and, secondly, whether the conclusion of the exercise should be that Christianity is true. The question 'Should it (religious education) be mainly about Christianity or should it compare different religions' obtained the response presented in Table 18.

If attention is concentrated on those who wanted mainly

Table 17

Age	Confirmed		Not Confirmed		Don't know		No answer		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17-30	5	12.8	27	69.2	5	12.8	2	5.1	39	
31-60	30	30.9	62	63.9	3	3.1	2	2.1	97	
61 up	32	47.1	35	51.5	1	1.5	0		68	
No answer	0		1	(33.3)	2	(66.7)	0		3	
	67	32.4	125	60.4	11	5.3	4	1.9	207	

Table 18

Age	Wanted mainly Christian RE		Wanted comparative RE		Don't know		No answer		Wanted no RE		A	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17-30	2	5.1	26	66.7	5	12.8	3	7.7	3	7.7	39	
31-60	26	26.8	61	62.9	2	2.1	4	4.1	4	4.1	97	
61 up	30	44.1	31	45.6	3	4.4	1	1.5	3	4.4	68	
No answer	0		3	(100.0)	0		0		0		3	
	58	26.0	121	50.5	10	4.0	8	3.0	10	3.0	207	

Table 19

Age	Yes, declare true		Do not declare true		Don't know		No answer		Wanted no RE		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17-30	15	38.4	4	10.3	14	35.9	3	7.7	3	7.7	39	
31-60	51	52.6	17	17.5	14	14.4	11	11.3	4	4.1	97	
61 up	49	72.1	6	8.8	6	8.8	4	5.9	3	4.4	68	
No answer	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	1	(33.3)	0		0		3	
	116	56.0	28	13.5	35	16.9	18	8.7	10	4.8	207	

Christian religious education and those who wanted comparative content, and the 'no answers' for age are also omitted, the relationship with age can be seen to be statistically significant ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 16.0$). The difference in the mean age of those who wanted a mainly Christian content (59.3, $s = 13.6$) and those who wanted comparative R.E. (47.4, $s = 16.9$) is also significant ($z = 5.0$).

Respondents were also asked 'Should children be taught that Christianity is true', and the answers appear in Table 19.

Here the 'don't knows' are quite numerous, and can be included in a test, those who wanted no R.E. and both kinds of 'no answers' are excluded. The result is highly significant ($P < 0.005$, $\chi^2 = 19.3$). The mean age of those who wanted Christianity declared true was 53.9 ($s = 17.1$) while for those who did not want this it was 46.6 ($s = 15.2$). A t test reveals a significant difference ($P < 0.025$, $t = 2.0$).

The results on religious education in schools confirm what has already been reported with regard to attitudes to Christianity. Older people saw Christianity as having some form of exclusive claim, while younger people saw it more as one religion among many. The elimination of R.E. from school would not be popular with those of any age-group, but there was a strong preference in the younger age-groups for non-dogmatic and comparative teaching. Thus three-quarters of the 17-30 age-group wanted a comparative approach, while less than half of the over-61s preferred this. On the matter of declaring Christianity true, the difference was even more marked. Thus only about two-fifths of those under 31 wanted Christianity to be declared true, while nearly three-quarters of the over-61s had that expectation. Clearly, the younger favoured much more 'open' presentation of the subject, where things would not be presented as cut-and-dried, but the opposite was true of the older among Longhill people.

Finally, and in view of the more voluntaristic approach to Christianity that young people seemed to favour, it was thought useful to examine the question of the profile adopted by the vicar in pastoral visitation. Table 20 shows the relationship between approval of visiting by vicars, in relation to age. Table 21 relates to the question of whether vicars should do *more* visiting.

For Table 20, the relationship with age is only just statistically significant. A χ^2 test concentrating only on those who gave a definite answer as to whether vicars should or should not visit, and combining the 31-60s with the over-61s, and omitting those who

Table 20

Age	Should visit		Should not visit		Don't know		No answer		All N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
17-30	21	53.8	10	25.6	6	15.4	2	5.1	39
31-60	74	76.3	13	13.4	8	8.2	2	5.1	97
61 up	49	72.1	13	19.1	5	7.4	1	1.5	68
No answer	2	(66.3)	1	(33.3)	0		0		3
	146	70.5	37	17.9	19	9.2	5	2.4	207

did not answer about their age, gives a score of $\chi^2 = 3.7$, just short of significance at $P < 0.05$. The differences of mean ages of the two groups also fell just short of significance at the same level. For Table 21, a relationship with age can be ascertained if those who favoured more visiting are contrasted with those who did not combined with those uncertain on the subject. Again, the 17-30s have to be contrasted with all the rest, and both kinds of 'no answer' are here omitted. The difference can be shown to be significant ($P < 0.05$, $\chi^2 = 4.4$). The difference in mean ages between these two groups was not however significant.

Although the association is not particularly strong, it can be seen that there is a marked gap between the 17-30s and all those over 31 on the question of visiting by vicars. The 17-30s were less enthusiastic about visiting by vicars than were the rest, whether at the present level of activity or more than this. Over half of the 17-30s did, however, favour visiting, though less than one-third wanted more. For the over-31s, by contrast, about three-quarters favoured visiting by vicars, and over one-half wanted more. Some also commented that the vicar should come only on request, except possibly in the case of the elderly and house-bound.

Vicars were seen primarily as being helpful with personal problems; about 76.8 per cent took this view. Family problems were the main area where vicars were seen to be useful. Bereavement was also mentioned, and problems of the elderly, ill and lonely. Social problems were much less commonly seen as matters for the vicar. A suggestion that lay visitors could be involved in similar kinds of work met with a much more lukewarm response; only 53.6 per cent favoured this idea, and 28.5 per cent were opposed.

By way of conclusion, it is worth examining the general pattern

Table 21

Age	More visiting		Not more visiting		Don't know		No answer		No visiting		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17-30	11	28.2	3	7.7	10	25.6	3	7.7	12	30.8	39	
31-60	50	51.5	6	6.2	24	24.7	2	2.1	15	15.5	97	
61 up	38	55.9	3	4.4	7	10.3	6	8.8	14	20.6	68	
No answer	1	(33.3)	0		1	(33.3)	0		1	33.3	3	
	100	48.3	12	5.8	42	20.3	11	5.3	42	20.3	207	

of 'religiosity' in Longhill, and then considering likely future developments, given the tendency of the young to be less religious than the old. An attempt will then be made to explain such developments.

One way of looking at the general picture is to acknowledge the fact that certain important residues of religiosity remain. Religion has for most Longhill people an important safety-net function. It is significant that remarkably few wished to put themselves beyond the pale of the church, nearly half were prepared to describe themselves as 'religious' when confronted with a choice of otherwise saying that they were not religious. Moreover, some kind of denominational preference would nearly always be forthcoming from respondents, if asked to provide this. About two-thirds believed in God. Religiously authenticated rites concerning birth, marriage and death were the norm, though in the case of marriage there was a substantial deviation from this norm. Over one-half of respondents maintained that their children went or had gone to Sunday School, and the influence of this institution was seen as salutary. Children were expected to hear about religion comparatively at school, but over half felt that the conclusion should be presentation of Christianity as true. Overwhelmingly, respondents had said that they attended church more in the past, but that mobility and the process of growing up had interfered with this. Even more said they used to go to Sunday School. Three-quarters of households had a Bible. The vicar was felt to be useful in helping with personal problems. Over half reported private prayer, and nearly half saw religion as a source of comfort and strength. Directly antagonistic attitudes to Christianity were uncommon. Even those sceptical in matters of personal belief tended to be willing to declare a denominational label and to use the church for rites of passage.

There is, however, another side to this coin. Less than half were confirmed, weekly church attendance was reported by only about one in twenty (and by comparison with actual congregations, this was obviously an exaggeration). Religiously authenticated rites of passage were performed, but much more because they were 'normal' or 'proper' than because of religious considerations. It was seen as appropriate to expose children to religious practice, but with the expectation that this would be outgrown. Less than half had been confirmed. The church, then (and its representative, the vicar), was most commonly viewed by Longhill people as a community facility, to be used as the necessity arose, this was

particularly the case for rites of passage. Christianity was also seen as part of the English heritage, into which children needed to be inducted. The church was seen as having something valuable to say on personal, especially family relationships. The vicar could help here, as a professional, but as with other professionals it was the client who was to take the initiative.

This position for the church in no way amounted to a secularist commitment, which was uncommon on Longhill. Most sceptics still saw Christianity as part of the social framework, they expected, and were expected, to perform lip-service as the necessity arose. There is no reason to suppose that sceptics were necessarily secretive about their beliefs, but it would be definitely deviant for them to let their scepticism affect such secular action as would normally be couched in a religious framework (Leonard, 1980: 220, 34). It is only infrequently that the appropriate lip-service would be required, and few seem to find it irksome.

The question might be legitimately asked however as to how long this process is likely to continue. The survey of Longhill clearly shows that the younger people, especially the 17-30s, were on most items less 'religious' than their elders. They were much less likely to see themselves as 'religious', and over half of the under-31s had at least some doubt as to the existence of God. About two-fifths of them were prepared to say they were atheists or agnostics (but again, not on an official form). They were more likely to be sceptical of Christianity, though this amounts more to denial of any exclusive claims, rather than hostility. Only one-fifth saw religion as a source of comfort and strength. Only about one-quarter prayed privately as opposed to about three-fifths of their elders. They still nearly all wanted to christen their children, though there was some evidence of decline in church marriage.

The really big difference is with regard to Sunday School. The decline of the practice of sending children to Sunday School has been slow but steady. The change has been over a long period, but the big change has been with the 17-30s. Only about one-fifth of the over-61s and about one-quarter of the 31-60s did *not* send their children to Sunday School, but for the 17-30s this jumps to three-quarters. Respondents themselves were also less likely to have experienced Sunday School, the younger they were, though again the big difference is found with the 17-30s. For those over 31, it will still have been quite deviant not to attend. These results are consistent with the tendency of younger Estate dwellers to see Christianity as an option but not binding.

It is of interest that the relationship between age and adult church attendance is not very close. It must be remembered that the urban working classes have never attended church in large numbers, (Inglis, 1963), and thus the survey results do not show a close relationship with age. On the matter of previous church attendance, the under-31s were less likely to report this, though they might have been including Sunday School here. For all age-groups the attitude that one outgrows church attendance seems to prevail.

There are two possible interpretations of these findings. On the one hand it could be argued that they are clear evidence of a secularisation process, no matter what dimension of religiosity one takes, the young seem invariably less 'religious' than the old. On the other hand, there is the alternative explanation that religious scepticism mellows with age. Religious sympathies, it could be argued, may grow (and deviant attitudes be toned down) as people pass to the stage in the life cycle where marital and familial responsibilities are taken on. Only a study over a long period could reveal whether such is the case. But a major change that cannot be accounted for in this way is the decline in the importance of the church and religion in the socialisation of children. Sunday School is no longer the norm, and religion in schools forms part of the general educational process rather than being specifically concerned with the inculcation of Christianity. Those for whom the church does not have its previous role in the socialisation process are likely to have a different attitude to Christianity. This does not necessarily imply an *unfavourable* attitude, but a greater awareness of alternatives means that fewer will see Christianity as having exclusive or mandatory claims. Decline in religion as a part of socialisation may have implications for future contact with the church; for instance, lack of familiarity with church buildings and with the appropriate conduct within them might lead to decline in the importance of the norm of propriety regarding church marriages (Leonard 1980: 211).

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the process of change has been a gradual one. The old people on Longhill Estate were never deeply religious; nor are the young people militantly atheistic or anti-clerical. There has never been more than a light veneer of religiosity in working-class communities in England, whether long-established or recently-built. Decline has been from this low level, thus few Longhill people have found the power and the position of the church to be irksome. As a consequence, few are militantly opposed to the church.

Furthermore, the process of change has been intensified for most Longhill people by the fact that they will have moved to a new area where a community has had to be developed from the beginning. Although it appears that the Estate has now developed a stable population, for the older people this will none the less stand in sharp contrast with the communities in which they themselves were socialised. A fairly large proportion of the older people on Longhill will have come from relatively close-knit working-class communities. The change in environment will have had a considerable impact upon their view of the world. Young and Willmott have documented the implications of such a change for family cohesion and consumption patterns (Young and Willmott, 1957). In the case of Hull, O'Neill has shown the difference between the culture of high-density traditional working-class housing areas and the culture of the council estate (in this case Greatfield) (O'Neill, 1982: esp. ch. 2). O'Neill found that authoritarianism was characteristic of the culture of traditional working-class areas; whereas those on the council estates in question were found to be more libertarian; moreover their views were more consistent and they were more responsive to new ideas. Attitudes to religion did not differ very greatly, and few seemed to have any strong feelings on the subject. But the difference between the two local cultures under consideration will have important implications for people's religious attitudes. The older people on Longhill will have been socialised in long-established, close-knit working-class communities, and such a culture will have supported a firm set of ideas about right and wrong. Both in the family and in the wider society, such a culture-system places a high value upon authority, obedience and discipline. In such an environment, even those who are not active churchgoers in adult life will welcome the church's contribution to the overall problem of social control, and will see the church as particularly important in the socialisation of children. However, the church of the council estate can support different assumptions. As O'Neill points out, coming to terms with the unfamiliar entails not merely a deviation from traditional norms, but also a creation of new norms (O'Neill, 1982: 46).

It is true that the church has waned in its impact on the wider society generally, and not merely on relatively new estates. But there are particular problems for the church arising from the recent foundation of an estate such as Longhill. A new church such as St Margaret's, Longhill, could in its time have served as a new community facility, as a focus for reintegration. Where new norms

are created some might even attend church who did not do so previously. But a much more likely reaction is that those who did attend previously could now decide to stop. No doubt many of the older people exaggerated claims regarding their activity in the past; but it is still known to be the case that a change of residence is a common reason for cessation of church attendance. Moreover, different attitudes to authority in the family on a new estate may make parental insistence upon Sunday School attendance by their children less likely. Attitudes and beliefs may be more resilient, but even here changes can be noted. The young display strong support for comparative, non-dogmatic teaching of religion in schools. This is so despite the virtual absence of non-Christian religious profession on the Estate, and the relatively young age at which full-time education had been completed. It is also of interest that, even within the Christian framework, the younger Estate dwellers were reluctant to accept firm dogmas.

It needs to be added that, since the Urban Mission Experiment began, the level of commitment expected of and obtained from the present St Margaret's congregation has been high. It is significant, for instance, that the majority of the congregation attend at least one of the weekday services as well as on Sunday. There has also been an increasing emphasis on Eucharistic services and an expectation that churchgoers should also follow courses of Christian instruction.⁵

In conclusion, it appears that there has been a movement in the direction of a 'voluntary' church on Longhill Estate. Ordinary Longhill people no longer see church involvement as an appropriate part of the proper socialisation of children. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, the church is still seen as part of the overall culture of English people. Any challenge to this position would be seen as deviant, and conscientious objection to occasional lip-service to Christianity would conflict with accepted norms. But so, for that matter, might be the case of active church involvement.⁶ Those who continue to attend the Anglican church are those sufficiently committed to be unaffected by secularising trends in the wider society. The developments at St Margaret's and on the Estate generally seem therefore to confirm the suggestion by Wilson that the sectarian type is more durable in a secularised society.⁷ Anglicanism is normally regarded as representing the 'church' type. But both sect and church are logical developments of Christianity, and may be present together in a given empirical situation. Much research has been done upon sects which have

become more like churches; (Troeltsch, 1931: 331–3, 338–41, Niebuhr, 1929; Wilson, 1961; Wilson, 1967; Chamberlayne, 1964) but it can also be suggested that there are circumstances when a church becomes more like a sect, and this process has occurred with St Margaret's to some extent

This development has taken place in a situation where firm, committed views on religious matters are seen as suspect. It is unfortunate that more data were not collected on attitudes of non-churchgoers to churchpeople. For most Longhill people, it seems that religion in the form of Christianity is a potentially unsettling force that has been successfully neutralised

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Notes

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This report should be seen as preliminary to a full study *Church and People on Longhill Estate*, published as Occasional Paper No. 5 of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology of Hull University.

- 2 Other evidence suggests that there is a certain bias towards the unemployed in the survey results.
- 3 cf. G. Ahern and G. Davie, *Inner City God*, p. 71. 'It is quite clear that a very large number of people in this country say that they believe in God but do not belong to a church as normally conceived. On the other hand, precisely these individuals when asked for information about church membership on an official form of one kind or another will respond actively rather than negatively, and would not be pleased if this membership was challenged.'
- 4 A Gallup Poll survey reported in the *News Chronicle*, 15–17 April 1957, found 92 per cent of respondents saying that children should go to Sunday School (a higher figure than the proportion who favoured baptism (82 per cent)).
- 5 More details of the mission will be presented in the full study, *Church and People on Longhill Estate*.
- 6 cf. Ahern and Davie, *op. cit.*, p. 102. 'There was also some feeling that it was "not quite the done thing" for a man to go to church (unless perhaps a Catholic). A woman who had been in a "nerve" hospital said that the reason most people do not go to church is fear of what the neighbours would say (others also suggested this).' But contrast B. D. Reed (1978), where reference is made (p. 54) to 'representative oscillation', where some members of a community are reported to be reassured that others go to church 'as it were on their behalf'.
- 7 Wilson, (1966), p. 233. 'It may be, that in response to the growing institutionalism, impersonality, and bureaucracy of modern society, religion will

find new functions to perform – but that perhaps, would be not the religion which accepts the values of the new institutionalism, the religion of ecumenism, but the religion of the sect

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Research from within: blurring boundaries and developing new methods

B.N. Ong

Abstract

For many social scientists the transition from academic research to research within a policy and practice setting is riddled with theoretical difficulties. Research models and the role of the researcher have to be re-examined and re-defined. In discussing the work carried out within one Health Authority particular difficulties will be addressed and the need to develop new models emphasized.

Introduction

The debate about the distinction between theoretical research and policy-oriented research has always been a central concern of social scientists and has gained renewed attention with the changing political climate in the 1980s. On the one hand this new climate has created a questioning about the locus of research, and on the other hand it has posed clear limitations on research funding for social scientists.

From recent publications within sociology the concern with the above problems becomes clear (see for example the series *Contemporary Social Research*, under the editorship of M. Bulmer). It is exemplified in the increasing research done in 'practical' fields, such as housing, social work and nursing. These trends serve to further stimulate the call for 'applied research', 'action research' or 'policy research'. This article will address important questions related to the debate.

Precisely because of the changing political climate with the dominance of Thatcherism in all areas of private and public life, social scientists have to reconsider not only the areas in which they

can and want to do research, but also the methods they employ. Thus, social scientists are increasingly drawn into new fields of operation, notably having to translate research findings directly into policy and planning. The immediate implication of the changing context is a questioning of methods previously used: notably the researcher as (a relative) outsider, concerned simply with the development and testing of theory. This can no longer be the main researcher rôle. More uncomfortably perhaps, the researcher finds it more difficult to disengage from the application of the research findings.

This article will discuss my own experience of being employed within the National Health Service as a permanent researcher. It will reflect upon the questions that I have been forced to consider after making the transition from academic research to research as an integral part of health service planning. These questions relate to the context of research and the relationship with management, employees of the NHS and users of the service. In grappling with the problem of a new context I have had to consider a whole 'new agenda' of research questions. These questions are both theoretical and political in nature, but also personal, because they pose the dilemma of working within the State versus the relative independence, but also insecurity, of short term contracts within academia.

The research context

The implementation of general management in the NHS (Griffiths, 1983) has, among other things, posed questions about the process of planning services. One of the most important changes in the implementation of the Griffiths recommendations was making planning a generic process weakening professional power, breaking down demarcations and bringing planning and management under one leadership. Therefore, planning can no longer mainly rely on consensus, and the management approach has to seek a different basis for its planning process. It has become clear that more research based planning will have to replace previous methods, if it is to be capable of forecasting need, integrating services and developing multi-disciplinary team work – all key elements of the new style management.

In some forward looking units the above debate has already been taken further and research posts are being created. In South

Sefton (Merseyside) Health Authority a Research and Development Officer, working directly to the Unit General Manager (UGM) of the Priority and Community Care Unit, has been in post since August 1987. This new post has as its main element the provision of research for planning, overseeing all research activities in the District and creating generally a more conducive research climate. The development aspect of the post is to generate processes of change, yet, there is no direct service provision element. In many ways the researcher operates as a 'mini think tank' and has a certain independence in that there is no link to any one professional group. As the postholder is directly accountable to the UGM she is structurally tied-in with management and therefore has a high degree of credibility because the implementation of research results can be initiated from the highest level. On the other hand, the relationship with grass roots staff can be distorted precisely because of the link with management. The ambiguity in the relationship will become further apparent when later outlining a particular case.

This situation is different from other research contexts, because the researcher is both an integral part of the structure and at the same time studying the structure, the people and practices within it. Furthermore, the researcher is also in a position to monitor and influence the translation of research findings into policy and planning.

When comparing the above situation with available research literature some key issues emerge:

* In anthropological research being an integral part of a structure is a crucial element, and the problems of being an insider have been extensively discussed (Whyte, 1955; Bowen, 1964; Mead, 1977). In the field of development studies this role has been taken further, into advocacy for the groups one does research upon (Nichter, 1984; Salmon, 1987), whilst action-research translates this role into the research process itself (Lces and Smith, 1977).

* Policy oriented research has struggled with the problem of implementation, because most researchers have been in the position of being commissioned and therefore having to 'hand over' the research findings. The 'sceptics' have argued that their work can be used to maintain the status quo (Wenger, 1987). This has recently been fuelled by the debate around the DHSS asking their commissioned researchers to sign contracts

which limit their freedom to publish research results (Medical Sociology Newsletter, 1988).

The above two issues are pertinent to my situation as they manifest themselves in ways that are both similar to the experiences of other researchers but also very different. Like anthropologists I am an insider. However, I am an explicit insider, being employed by the organisation that I am studying. My political commitment, as with action researchers here and in developing countries, is with the grass roots, which in my case are the workers involved in direct client care and the clients themselves. On the other hand, I am also part of the management structure, and as such cannot wholly make the advocacy role my own.

The way in which I can resolve this dilemma is firmly established within the present context of the NHS. As a result of 'Griffiths', management focuses on change within the organisation. Change is done on the basis of developing services that people need, rather than providing services on the basis of tradition and professional power. Thus, in many ways the new management approach in itself has emancipatory elements that can be used by the researcher. This means that I am able to research the management of change.

The issue of control over research findings is clearly important when they are directly translated into policies. Being a permanent employee of the organization and being part of the management structure allows me to 'keep a finger on the pulse'. Yet, there is no guarantee that my operationalisation of findings is necessarily the same as the way they are perceived by other managers. From the case discussed below the discrepancies will become clear.

Apart from the above mentioned issues the peculiarity of my position can also be seen in the following ways:

- * My position in the management structure is indeterminate. on the one hand I am, like other managers, directly accountable to the UGM, on the other hand I am not in charge of any services and therefore do not share concerns about staffing, budgets etc. The 'free floating spirit' image can be counter productive when instigating change.
- * I am the only social science researcher in the District and therefore seen as a scarce resource and holder of esoteric knowledge. Clarifying my role and my work is important,

especially to people unaccustomed to this approach and way of thinking.

- * Contrary to academic research the pressure on the delivery of results is very high. These are expected within weeks rather than months and never in years! Also, the 'end' product has to be an implementable proposal and the limitations of the service in terms of resources and systems have to be built into the research. Yet at the same time, such research gives an enormous power to change processes and attitudes

In discussing the case of restructuring community services I hope to explore a number of issues: first, in researching the management of change where does my allegiance lie, and how can I negotiate the relationships with management and grass roots, second, who controls the research process and its findings, how does one deal with confidentiality within a management context, third, the perceptions of the role of the researcher differ between managers and staff, also within those groups which all influence the way I can operate, fourth, the pressure on delivery creates its own particular methodological problems as well as posing questions about the relationships the researcher is able to develop

Restructuring community service; the background

Since the implementation of 'Griffiths' in 1983 the general management function has been developed from unit level upwards. The struggles around diminishing professional power continue to be fought as the distinction between management and professional expertise has not been widely accepted. Concretely, this has meant that many districts are still operating a dual system of general management at the top with professional management below. The various professional groups are therefore maintaining their own structure of accountability and interprofessional divisions and rivalries.

At the end of 1987 the Government issued the White Paper *Promoting better health* and the circular *Nursing teams and Primary Health Care Teams* which underlined the need to review the management of community services in the light of strengthening the build up of multi-disciplinary teams and nursing teams.

In order to further develop general management, and its philosophy of making services more responsive to client need, and

to follow Government guidelines, asking for a review of services, the Priority and Community Care Unit (South Sefton (Merseyside) Health Authority) embarked on a community services project around Christmas 1987. We began by studying the relevant literature, visiting other Health Authorities who had already developed new structures for community services and studied three Health Centres in our own District.

The latter study focused on two issues, the extent and nature of multi-disciplinary team work and if and how the present management structure stimulated this. We interviewed all staff in the Health Centres, the nurses, the administration, paramedical and medical staff, independent contractors such as the GPs and Local Authority staff including social workers. From the experiential accounts of the various groups we formulated certain key problem areas to tackle. Any multi-disciplinary work happens *ad hoc*, based on personalities rather than on structured approaches. Professional groups have little understanding of each other's work and therefore reinforce barriers and prejudices. These are just two examples of the problems discovered.

As a result of studying relevant literature, comparing models of good practice combined with the focused study of the three Health Centres, we formulated outline ideas which served as a point of departure for the development of a model of management for community services.

Up to this point the role of researcher was reasonably straightforward. Like most social science researchers I was exploring a particular area using the normal methods of literature study and interviewing. The policy angle was represented by the study of models of good practice which simultaneously threw up philosophical and theoretical questions about the nature of management and the process of change. By visiting other Health Authorities who were experiencing the complex structural and professional problems of reorganisation, highlighted by interpersonal difficulties, we discovered new issues surrounding the problem of putting theory into practice. The importance of 'opening up' the research process right from the start became very clear in order to engage all parties in a process of decision-making and creating a baseline for consensus. This last issue set us on a road which differed from conventional research.

Research and development: managing change

In studying the models developed in other Health Authorities we also studied their experiences in implementing new structures. Broadly, the general management approach opens up two possibilities: change from the highest level downwards by imposing a new structure through managerial dictat or involving staff in the process through discussion under managerial guidance. We decided to utilise the latter approach.

Discussion meetings

Following the formulation of some initial outline ideas for change a wide consultative process was set in motion. The researcher was given the role of presenting the outline to all staff groups within the District with a view to develop and modify the ideas into a model of management through the consultative process. Thus, the research and development approach were merged into a single process with a single person being made responsible. The outline ideas were discussed in small staff groups led by the researcher. Her secretary played a key role in recording all the feedback from those meetings and providing support to the researcher by critically reflecting on the discussion process.

The main issues to be confronted at this stage concerned credibility. In this particular case the researcher had almost *carte blanche* from the UGM to set up the project in the way she thought best. There was full support from the UGM and the DGM (District General Manager) for the principles of devolving general management through multi-disciplinary teams under the leadership of a locality manager. As a consequence the researcher was seen as someone of influence, as she was clearly supported by the most senior managers. Conversely, this meant that she was perceived as having a primary allegiance to management. It was therefore important to convey that as a researcher, her main role was to facilitate the process by involving all staff at whatever level in a debate about future services, as part of a collective effort. Research could help this process by providing the knowledge base from which to argue, and in opening up the research process through shared debate, the formulation of models could become a consciousness-raising and democratic effort.

It was obvious in the meetings with staff that the above idea was not shared or understood by the majority of staff. They felt that there was no genuine democratic process, and that decisions about the future structure had already been made. Many saw the exercise as one in which the researcher had a personal stake, because they defined the outline ideas as *her* ideas, rather than as point of departure for fundamental debate. This perception was based on history as the Health Service generally had not operated a style of management which asked for participation from the grass roots, and many people felt that in the past their ideas were not considered or valued. Thus, what we were trying to do was not only unconventional, but also unprecedented.

Resolving a longstanding suspicion is not easy, and our approach could not yield immediate results. By creating processes which allowed maximum participation of all parties involved through discussion meetings, workshops, personal availability of the researcher to anyone, and by constantly stressing that the ideas were open to modification, we could only hope for small and slow in-roads into this historical lack of confidence in management. Wherever possible we demonstrated how our ideas had changed as a result of discussion e.g. we listened to the District Nursing night staff who explained that their needs were such that they could not be divided up between localities because of the size of the staff group and the type of work. We altered our structure to maintain them as being centrally managed from one locality.

The second problem was confidentiality. In certain cases staff did trust the researcher and confided in her by talking about their experiences with their managers. In one particular case it became clear that the whole staff group was unhappy with their line-manager and something needed urgently to be done. When doing normal research, action is not part of the research agenda. Here, not only the researcher's credibility was at stake, but as a senior member of staff she had a responsibility to respond to a crisis in service provision. The researcher immediately reported the situation to the UGM who took the appropriate action.

In conventional research confidentiality is often clearly defined and relatively unproblematic. In action-research confidentiality can easily become an excuse for inaction. If one is to show solidarity with the group one does research with, confidentiality can become secondary to the need for change. Furthermore, the question of control over research results becomes more complex. In this case, the staff group asked for something to be done, and

not to use their information as passive data. The researcher felt that they had the right to request action

Workshops

After a series of discussion meetings with all staff, the compiled comments (both verbal and written) were circulated, and presented at a series of workshops. The first workshop was for elected members of grass roots staff who were asked to study the outline ideas, the feedback, and through discussions and experimental exercises, to formulate a first model of management. The workshops were interdisciplinary, drawing together Health Authority staff, Local Authority staff and GPs. They were led by a team consisting of the researcher, the Training and Staff Development Officer, the Deputy Administrator of the FPC and the secretary.

The workshop was seen as the next step in the consultation process, in which the formulation of future models was done in multi-disciplinary ways, using the research evidence as its basis. In the workshops many issues about professional divisions and prejudices could be addressed, and indeed, were addressed. The debates became extremely heated, even hostile, between groups and towards the workshop leaders. Again, the issue of credibility emerged with participants expressing doubts about the purpose of the project as a whole: 'it is a cost-cutting exercise', and 'you have it all decided, anyway'.

The role of the researcher came under closer scrutiny, and it became more difficult to be the 'outsider'. I, indeed, should confess certain interests, as I felt that this approach was the best way for formulating models that reflect both the needs of clients and staff, and therefore would best secure commitment. Perhaps inevitably, in the workshop the role shifted further away from research into development and facilitating. The problem of blurred boundaries are most apparent here where there is an immediate application of research findings into the development process, which is led by the researcher herself. The 'luxury' of sitting back and reflecting on results, handing them over to a third party in charge of implementing those results is not possible here. Reflection and reaction take place almost simultaneously and there is no separation of roles and processes.

The same problems emerged at the following workshop where

middle managers had to discuss the first model as defined by the grass roots staff and refine it. The hostility and distrust were greater here, which can be readily explained by the fact that this group of staff had more to lose with the introduction of general management principles. Their professional power, their managerial responsibility for their own staff group was brought into question, and thus they perceived the researcher as the person initiating the erosion of their power. The researcher was clearly perceived as being allied to senior managers, which on the one hand diminished her credibility as an independent person and on the other hand established her as a person of influence. The proposed ideas themselves however, were still seen as well-researched ideas that could not be dismissed.

These workshops were followed by one for senior managers, who had to listen to representatives from the two previous workshops and further develop the models into a clear proposal and philosophy of care. This would then go back to all staff groups for final amendments before being presented to the District Health Authority. Only after this process of full consultation had been completed would the process of implementation begin.

In principle full consultation is essential for major change, but not all structures, or more pertinently the personnel within, are able to respond to the consultative process. The need to think creatively, to take responsibility for decisions and in particular to shed fears and prejudices in favour of rational argument was not always recognised. In many ways those lower down the hierarchy were most capable of thinking outside the established frameworks, which is not surprising, as they have less vested interest in traditional power structures.

Apart from the workshops for staff the Unions were also involved in the discussions. Other agencies such as FPC and the Local Authority were represented on a Steering Group, over-viewing the whole process. The cooperation of these agencies needed to be secured because change in the Health Service has repercussions on working relationships within these agencies, and the success of change also depends on their understanding of the rationale for change and its effect on client care. Thus, the forums created for discussion with these groups were of a more permanent nature and planned to run from the start of the process until all structures were fully operational.

Conclusions

Research from within as described in the case study, calls for a different approach than traditional research. The methods of action research and feminist research are helpful in formulating a new approach, incorporating experiences, contradictions, openness, democracy and shared decision-making. Yet, none of the methods as described in the research literature have addressed the problems related to merging research with development, and to being a researcher and a senior member of staff at the same time.

The main issues for further exploration are:

- * The relationship between research and the management of change. In my situation research was directly linked to the management of change, and was also carried out by the same person. This immediately commits the research to translating findings into action, and the question of allegiance becomes problematic. Research is not maintaining the status quo, neither is it purely serving an advocacy role. Research is used to implement change that is defined by both researcher and all the parties involved, and therefore needs to reconcile within it the various (contradictory) interests. One way of keeping 'a hold' on the process is by documenting it in detail by keeping records and agreeing them with participants, and in a research diary.
- * Control over the research has to be shared when it is so closely linked with development. By opening up the research process, control is logically shared, yet, at the same time, senior managers are strongly guiding the process. This seems to be a contradiction, as ultimately the UGM and DGM have the power of veto. However, it is in their interest to stimulate a genuinely democratic process because this can secure maximum commitment by the involvement of staff in the creation of a new structure. Furthermore, it is consistent with the Griffiths approach of bringing services closer to the consumer, with grass roots staff being closest in touch with consumer needs.
- * In this particular case the researcher has had full support from senior managers for a project that is central to the Health Authority's policy. This support is essential for the success of the project as it has to be visible in order to give the

researcher sufficient credibility in the difficult task of initiating change

- * Pressure on delivery is a problem in itself. From an academic point of view, research within a service context requiring quick answers appears to be shallow. Obviously, it is not possible to explore issues in-depth. Yet, one can utilise traditional methods such as literature study and interviewing. Adaptations are made in terms of focus: first, by comparing models of good practice, research questions emerge sooner than through one's own research design; second, interviews focus on a few selected areas, capable of being translated into action. Furthermore, the participatory approach accelerates formulation of proposals and decision-making by developing research findings earlier.

In our search for new models of research within the field of 'applied' or 'action' oriented research, theoretical purity is hard to find, and we are constantly developing models in response to the actual pressures of policy-making and planning. I have been less concerned with theoretical closure and paradigmatic development, rather than providing one example of how emerging research contexts call for the eclectic use of research methodologies.

In the above examples I have developed a case study approach, which had to incorporate various methods in order to respond to the dynamics of health service provision within a political climate of urgency. This, of necessity, means a blurring of boundaries and redefinition of the role of researcher. In spite of this example being specific to the Health Service, the questions about research within a policy setting have relevance outside of its confines. By virtue of being located in a policy and practice context research has become applied and action oriented. The more difficult problems are those of boundaries to the research activity: who has responsibility for implementation, what relationships does the researcher engage in, how does one evaluate the research as research, does quick delivery mean sacrificing quality? These questions are new, but hopefully through an analysis of examples as the one above we can generate more understanding of how research models change within a changing political climate.

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Rejoinder

Weber, Simmel and culture: a reply to Lawrence Scaff

Charles Turner

Abstract

Lawrence Scaff (*Sociological Review* Vol. 36, no. 1) proposes a 'sociology of culture' as the site for a comparison between Weber and Simmel's responses to 'modernity'. It is suggested that in so doing Scaff neglects important differences and similarities between Weber and Simmel's accounts of culture and selfhood. I argue that these are as much a product of specific analytical commitments as of intellectual-historical milieu.

The problems created for the commentator by the volume and character of Max Weber's corpus are such that at times the best way of making that corpus accessible is through a comparison between Weber and one of his contemporaries, or near contemporaries.¹ The danger of such an approach is that the play of identity and difference to which it is subject leads the commentator into a labyrinth he/she mistakes for a symmetrical maze at whose centre lies the 'problematic' which is to justify the comparison. I treat Lawrence Scaff's article 'Weber, Simmel and the Sociology of Culture' (*Sociological Review*, February, 1988) as an example of precisely this problem, and in doing so offer a number of remarks which call into question some of his claims, and with it his approach to comparative intellectual history. My main objection to his approach is that it is almost wholly 'normative', locating Weber's and Simmel's 'stance' in the midst of what are often purely analytical writings. The effect of this is that the axis on which Scaff's analysis turns becomes the question of the affirmation or negation of 'the modern', or 'modernity'. I will leave aside the

question of the relationship between theory and practice which immediately follows formulations of this sort, a question which, in my discussion of Weber's work, is likely to prove embarrassing, together with that of the criteria according to which Scaff proposes to identify 'the modern'. Instead, I will concentrate on two main themes.

- i) Weber and Simmel's concept of 'culture'
- ii) Weber and Simmel's concept of the self

That the relation between these themes is an intimate one – so much so that their separation is already troublesome – is illustrated by Simmel's 'The Concept and Tragedy of Culture',² and by Weber's 'Zwischenbetrachtung'.³ I refer to these essays because Scaff will argue that the difference between Simmel and Weber is that while for Simmel 'culture' is 'tragic', for Weber it is 'burdened with guilt'.⁴ It is in these essays that these positions are apparently formulated.

Simmel defines culture initially not as a stable entity, in the sense which warrants talk of 'our' culture and 'other' cultures, but as a process leading from an original natural state to one of 'cultivation'. The natural state defines a potentiality which may or may not be actualized, the 'indigenous drive' of the soul. In order for that potentiality to be actualized it is not sufficient that the soul, in the process of its maturation, traverse a path which leads from itself more or less directly to itself. Rather, cultivation depends on the assimilation of those external objects which Simmel formulates in Hegelian terms as 'objective spiritual products'. The process of culture is 'the way that leads from the closed unity through the unfolded multiplicity to the unfolded unity'.⁵ In other words, the uniqueness of the self, or personality, is defined by Simmel not in terms of a fixed, central core, but in terms of a unique *combination* of qualities. These qualities are such that, left to themselves, they would constitute nothing more than 'isolated perfections'. In order to make this claim Simmel distinguishes between the indigenous meaning or value of a spiritual product and its cultural meaning or value, and argues that what neo-Kantianism would call 'provinces of culture' – art, religion, politics, economics, science – operate within a logic of objective form as well as within a logic of cultivation. That the relationship between them is not isomorphic is shown by the phenomenon of specialization.

'A work of art is supposed to be perfect in terms of artistic norms . . . Religion exhausts its meaning with the salvation which it brings to the soul. The economic product wishes to be economically perfect . . . All these sequences operate within the confines of purely internal laws' ⁶

This latter insight is a product of Simmel's *Lebensphilosophie*, which he articulated fully only towards the end of his career. The life process is that which the individual cannot help but live. It is a process which constantly produces 'more-life', but at the same time 'more-than-life', or form. And insofar as it produces form, it produces its opposite. The conflict between life, as a principle of movement, of growth, decay and renewal, and form, as stasis and rigidity, is not a conflict of modern culture,⁷ but rather a problem to which the concept of culture is held to be a solution. And since the development of subjectivity is only possible in the soul's encounter with the non-psychic, since the idea of autonomous *development* is a contradiction for Simmel, we can call 'culture' the site of that encounter. But the distinction between subject and object is not abolished by their cultural mediation (though it might be abolished argumentatively by epistemological mediation, which for Simmel, despite the Hegelian character of some of his formulations, is a separate issue). 'Once certain themes of law, of art, of morals have been created – even if they have been created by most individual and innermost spontaneity – we cannot control the directions in which they will develop' ⁸ Culture, as a process of reassimilation of objective spiritual products, is tragic not simply because those products develop their own laws and confront the individual in their full externality, but because those products are products of the activity of the very being they threaten. The tragedy of culture is its necessity, and the title 'the concept and tragedy of culture' contains a false opposition.

We must note immediately that Simmel's discussion of tragedy has no immediate bearing on the problem of 'modernity'. Scaff takes to be the concern of both Weber and Simmel. Firstly, because the distinctive feature of modern culture, or the modern problem of culture, is simply the rapid growth in the supply of objectified spirit, of cultural elements which can neither be ignored nor reassimilated, the virtual disappearance of that type of individual capable of the harmonious integration of cultural values, and the increasing importance of the specialist. And secondly, because the discussion so far makes it clear that Simmel

s using the term 'tragedy' in a technical, and not a normative sense 'The tragedy of culture' is not the expression of a judgement of the modern⁹

Now, any comparison of the 'views' of Weber and Simmel on 'culture', like any other comparison, presupposes that their *concepts* of culture are themselves comparable. The context in which Weber refers to the 'guilt ridden' character of culture is his intermediate reflections in the sociology of religion. But a cursory glance at this, in many ways the most difficult and obscure of Weber's writings, will show that the claim that 'culture' is guilt-ridden is not Weber's own, but is characterised by Weber as the conclusion arrived at from the point of view of a Christian ethic of brotherliness, a point of view which, if the attribution of points of view is at all appropriate here, Weber himself did not adopt. The essay's central theme is the tensions that develop, not between 'the various spheres of values' in 'modern culture', as so many commentators claim,¹⁰ but between absolutist ethics generated by salvation religions and the spheres of the natural, politics, economics, the aesthetic, the erotic and the intellectual. That is, tensions between cultural value spheres are examined from the point of view of religious ethics whose rationale is a potential 'unity of culture' in which such tensions are resolved¹¹ (The English translation of section 12 of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* is misleading here, as it renders 'Kulturreligionen' as 'great religions') Weber remarks that 'the rationalization and the conscious sublimation of man's relations to the various spheres of values, external and internal, as well as religious and secular, have pressed towards *making conscious* the internal and lawful autonomy of the individual spheres'¹² (my emphasis). This autonomy is not a peculiarly 'modern' phenomenon – the tension between the ethical demands of a world-rejecting salvation religion and the 'world' is as old as salvation itself – but rather is formulated by Weber in triumphalist terms. The lawful autonomy of value spheres is merely *made conscious* through 'the development of inner- and other-worldly values towards sublimation by *knowledge*'

In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, 'the absolute imperfection of this world has been firmly established as an ethical postulate'.¹³ And even a Calvinist activist ethic of world mastery – which depends on an 'acceptance' of this imperfection – is faced with the fact that death overtakes 'good men and good works, as well as evil ones'.¹⁴ And although one response to the problem posed by

the inescapability of death is to assert the timelessly valid character of the values of this world and to consecrate them as 'culture',¹⁵ those values themselves could in turn be condemned as guilt-ridden. For

they have proved to be bound to the charisma of the mind or of taste. Their cultivation has seemed inevitably to presuppose modes of existence which run counter to the demand for brotherliness . . . Religious guilt could now appear not only as an occasional concomitant, but as an integral part of all culture.¹⁶

Thus, for Weber, the claim that culture is guilt-ridden rests on an *ethical* presupposition of human solidarity, and the insight that 'all culture values' have 'created an aristocracy based on the possession of rational culture and independent of all personal ethical qualities of man'.¹⁷ This is in direct contrast to Simmel, whose claim that culture is 'tragic' follows from a problem of individual cultivation, a problem which is in a sense already aristocratic.

If Scaff wishes to claim that Weber himself takes culture to be guilt-ridden, he must, on Weber's terms, show that Weber endorses an ethic of brotherliness. (It is only from such a 'normative' position that the judgement of guilt can be conferred.) That he will not be able to do so is shown in Weber's asides on brotherliness in his scientific and political writings, in the fact that science and politics were the cultural values which dominated his life, and in the fact that under 'the world dominion of unbrotherliness' and 'a culture that is rationally organized for a vocational workaday life',¹⁸ the cultivation of brotherliness is possible only for strata who are economically independent, that is, only for an aristocracy. In other words, the only setting in which brotherliness, and hence the judgement that all culture is guilt-ridden, might be cultivated, would be one subject to its own ethical condemnation.¹⁹ Scaff's claim that 'Weber's stance, unlike Simmel's, was *against* the spirit of the age, *against* the times',²⁰ is consistent with his earlier claim that Weber judged culture to be guilt-ridden, since such a judgement depends on a 'pre-modern' insight. But both these claims are false. If Weber's 'stance' towards the spirit of his age is identifiable at all, I think we need to look elsewhere than the ethic of brotherliness. When we do so Weber's ambivalence will become clear.

I think this is best illustrated by Weber's own commitment to science, a science which, despite the fact that it is unable to ground itself,²¹ 'in the name of "intellectual integrity", has come forward with the claim of representing the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world'.²² Weber's numerous references to 'intellectual integrity' and the need to face the 'workaday world' suggest that if Scaff wishes to read the intermediate reflections normatively, this provides the framework within which to do so. And indeed, Scaff acknowledges this by quoting a letter in which Weber describes his own 'inner need' as 'intellectual integrity', an integrity incommensurate with an ethic of brotherliness. On the other hand, Marianne's references to Weber as her 'iron knight', his own frequent description of himself as a Don Quixote, and his references to *Ritterlichkeit* in 'Politics as a Vocation' do seem to lend support to Scaff's claim, at least as he states it. Weber reserved some of his most pointed remarks for those who would defend political action, and especially violent political action, by an appeal to ethical maxims. In doing so he appeals to a version of heroism which appears at times antedeluvian. It cannot be argued that Weber's frequent references to the contemporary limits of moral argument, and his defence of the non-ethical, amount to an advocacy of plain matter-of-factness in accordance with the conditions of rational culture. His work does contain numerous lamentary references to the passing of premodern forms of association. I do not believe this ambiguity, between regret at the historical inappropriateness of such forms, and the fact that that inappropriateness is made visible by history understood as (modern) science, is capable of resolution. It is simply one of the many tensions which constitute the workaday world of Weber's writings, and which render the identification of 'stances' so problematic. The ambiguity of Weber's commitment to science, for instance, is elided by Scaff in his remark on the Freiburg address of 1895, which he describes as an attack on eudemonism, on the belief in the possibility of an achieved 'happiness'. But I think that the hermeneutic (and political) challenge this text presents would be better met by describing it as an attack not on the idea of eudaemonia *per se*, the enduring qualities of which Weber cannot have underestimated, but on the idea that eudaemonia can be made to depend on science. By proceeding in this manner we can 'enter the strength' of Weber's concept of intellectual integrity without elevating (or relegating) it to the status of a 'stance'. We might say that as Weber's inner need it

depends on the assimilation of the objective spiritual product whose 'intrinsic' logic is that of scientific inquiry, inquiry tied to an unbrotherly aristocracy for whom responsibility for the promotion of 'happiness' is an impossible demand.

On the basis of his distinction between Weber and Simmel's concepts of culture Scaff proposes a further concomitant distinction between their concepts of self. While Weber represents Calvinism's assertion of the unity of a life, Simmel embodies 'the ahistorical self actualized in a world of limitless possibilities',²³ 'the self as a recording of possibilities and intangibles'.²⁴ But once again, this is a false opposition. Our discussion of Simmel's concept of culture has shown it to be linked to a theory of individual development in which cultivation consists in the moulding of a diversity of experiences and activities into a coherent whole, into a biography describable as the 'unity of a life'. The claim that Simmel 'himself' was an 'ahistorical self' is misleading, on the one hand because it assumes that Simmel's insistence that cultivation is the cultivation of a 'natural' potentiality denies historicity, and on the other because the number of possibilities to which Simmel himself was open was relatively restricted – at least, Simmel is no more of an exemplar of the 'cultivated man' than Weber. Towards the end of the intermediate reflections Weber makes a thinly veiled reference to Simmel's concept of culture, and notes that 'the purely inner-worldly perfection of self of a man of culture, hence the ultimate value to which "culture" has seemed to be reducible, is meaningless for religious thought'²⁵ (my emphasis). Since the perfectibility of man is in principle an infinite process, the inescapability and accidental character of death can render it meaningless. In addition, Weber repeats Simmel's remark that as a result of the (modern) proliferation of objective form and type of the 'cultivated man' recedes further into the distance. In the face of this, the unity of a life can still, of course, be secured. If 'the "culture" of the individual certainly does not consist of the *quantity* of 'cultural values' which he amasses', but 'consists of an articulated *selection* of cultural values',²⁶ the criteria of selectivity can be narrowed, if necessary to the point which occupies the opposite end of the spectrum of selfhood – specialization. Specialization is the permanently available modern safety valve for those incapable of achieving what Nietzsche called 'wholeness in manifoldness'. Note here that from the Nietzschean perspective Scaff sees as crucial to both Weber and Simmel, specialization could still be regarded as a form of cultivatedness, since it could entail the reassimilation of an

objective spiritual product as a cultural value, just as a single individual could pursue economics, politics, art, religion according to the logic of objective form alone. The normative content of specialization for Weber would consist in devotion to a task which could supply one's 'inner needs', a devotion to be distinguished from the blind acceptance of 'duty' (The concept of 'duty' as I employ it here is as pertinent to the artist as to the bureaucrat, for the artist too may pursue art as an objective form and not as a cultural value.) While devotion to a task implies individual development, acceptance of duty is a surrender to the logic of objective form, the arrest of biography. But devotion to a task or cause, perhaps the only meaning left to the concept of vocation,²⁷ must also be distinguished from the retreat into subjectivism criticised by Nietzsche,²⁸ Weber and Simmel.

Thus, we might say that for both Weber and Simmel individuality is threatened by the subjectivism of pure experience and the objectivism of duty, and that *both* treat culture as the site of a mediation between subject and object. Scaff's essay approaches this position in his discussion of their joint attempt to have the problem of 'culture' accorded a central place in the German Sociological Association – though towards the beginning of his essay he misleadingly describes 'culture' as a 'sphere of value' – but occasionally founders on his insistence on constructing unhelpful comparisons between the two, and on foreshortening the perspective from which they could be compared. I do not think the latter problem can be circumvented by Scaff's insistence that 'we move our investigation explicitly beyond the level of methodological comparison', and enter into their dialogue '... in relation to a sociology of culture',²⁹ since the irreducibility of value spheres is a thesis germane to (some) neo-Kantian theories of culture. The attempt to do so is buttressed by the assertion that the source of Weber and Simmel's early mutual influence was a confrontation with Nietzsche, a confrontation which, according to Scaff, 'had little to do with "methodology" or "epistemology", and everything to do with an "ethical atmosphere" created by questions about the "transvaluation of values", the meaning of "ascetic ideals", and the emergence of feminism'.³⁰ This almost actively forgets a) that the question of the meaning of ascetic ideals is formulated in *The Genealogy of Morals*, an essay described by Weber as brilliant not only for the concrete insight it contained but also, I believe, for the clarity with which the 'doctrine' of perspectivism is presented, a perspectivism which found its way to

the heart of Weber's methodological writings;³¹ and b) that Simmel's early concern with epistemology and methodology is reflected in the appearance in 1892 of the first edition of his *Problems of the Philosophy of History*, only the second, much revised 1905 edition of which Scaff cites in his bibliography.

I do not think it pedantic to insist that the biographical weight Scaff wishes to lend to his argument be supplemented by a greater sensitivity to the role of methodological reflection in understanding the relationship between Weber and Simmel. For the alternative is Scaff's at times rather vague formulation of that relationship and of individual features of their work, and his tendency to treat statements about scientific procedure as statements about 'modernity'. Two of Scaff's formulations combine these shortcomings. The first occurs in his treatment of Weber's rejection of life-philosophy, and with it, by implication, of Simmel. He describes what he takes to be life-philosophy's 'apparent lack of judgement, or, what is the same thing, its passive acquiescence to the "modern"' ³² But the lack of judgement which distinguishes neo-Kantian value philosophy, the Rickertian version of which perhaps lies closest to Weber's own, from Nietzschean life-philosophy, is an unavoidably epistemological concept. For neo-Kantianism, the judgement is that by means of which content is subsumed under form through value-relatedness. As such, it is a technical term for the manner in which a scientific object domain is constituted, and has nothing to do with the question of the affirmation or negation of the 'modern'. Indeed, the 'modern' here cannot be treated as a given, characterised by 'irreversible fragmentation', waiting to be 'judged', since as the object of a science it would only be constituted *through* judgement understood in neo-Kantian terms.

The second is his erroneous claim that the problem of the difference between the logical and psychological consequences of a religious doctrine is peculiar to Calvinism, and that the followers of Nietzsche claimed a positive ethical significance for the doctrine of the eternal return 'for psychological reasons similar to those found in Calvinism' ³³ In fact, at numerous points in his writings on the sociology of religion Weber makes it clear that the difference between the content of religious ideas and the psychological premiums which are, in fact, placed on action, is a 'universal' methodological *principle*, and not a (modern) *phenomenon*. Since Scaff at no point suggests that he believes, as Tenbruck does, that this difference is no longer respected in

Weber's later writings, that Weber appeals implicitly to an inherent logic of ideational historical development, and that therefore this difference is only adhered to in the early version of the *Protestant Ethic*, I can only assume that Scaff's restriction of this difference to Calvinism is the product of an oversight.³⁴

Scaff described his essay as the first contribution to a comparative analysis of Weber and Simmel's sociology of culture. I have tried to point out some of the unintended consequences of such a project, consequences the pointing out of which perhaps has a (modern?) fragmentary character. Nevertheless, I think the difficulties Scaff encounters can, paradoxically, be traced to a single source – his 'Weberian' approach to the texts. By selecting from Weber's (almost infinite) and Simmel's corpus those parts which suit his purposes, and neglecting methodological issues in particular, his essay accentuates the reality of that corpus one-sidedly. He makes this clear in specifying the sociology of culture as the site for their comparison. But the concept of 'culture' is simply not intelligible apart from epistemological and methodological reflection. I would suggest that this holistic demand is far more pressing for intellectual history than for that of social institutions. An understanding of economic action in relation to purely religious factors is a legitimate piece of historical sociology, legitimate precisely because it does not undermine the investigation of such action in relation to other factors. The legitimacy of understanding Weber and Simmel's concepts of culture in relation to purely, or almost purely biographical factors, is less easily guaranteed. Put another way, while the boundaries between spheres of culture can be analytically maintained without hermeneutic loss, that between constituents of the concept of culture cannot.

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Notes

- 1 See for instance Antonio and Glassman, Eden, Loewith, Merquior, Mommsen and Osterhammel, Parsons, Scaff (1988) and Wiley.
- 2 In Simmel, 1968, pp. 27–46.
- 3 In Weber, 1920, pp. 536–73 (in English in Weber, 1970, pp. 323–59).
- 4 Scaff, 1988, p. 9. See also Scaff, 1987, p. 745 for another rehearsal of this position.
- 5 Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–9.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 7 *Cf.* Simmel, 1971, pp. 375–93.

- 8 Simmel, 1968, p. 39
- 9 This is not to deny that the concept of the 'tragedy of culture' takes on a heightened significance in view of the dual growth of psychologistic accounts of subjectivity and the availability of 'objective spiritual products'. Scaff himself (Scaff, 1987) has dealt sensitively with the forms of 'escape' generated by this proliferation
- 10 The most notable here is Habermas, 1984, pp. 143-271
- 11 A point made well in Scaff, 1987, p. 744
- 12 Weber, 1948, p. 328
- 13 Ibid., p. 354
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 This is a veiled reference to Rickert's response to the problem of scientific objectivity, a problem he attempted to solve through a 'systematically articulated concept of culture'. See Rickert, 1962, p. 140
- 16 Weber, 1948, p. 354
- 17 Ibid., p. 355
- 18 Ibid., p. 357
- 19 Scaff (1987, p. 745) recognises this, but insists, wrongly in my view, that Weber's commitment to the 'intellectual aristocracy' of science entails his acceptance of the Tolstoyan judgement that scientific activity is thereby guilt-ridden
- 20 Scaff, 1988, p. 6
- 21 Weber's view that science is an *ascetic* ideal, is found in section 3 of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*, an essay the contents of which are of far greater significance for Weber's work, especially in the sociology of religion, than most commentators are, even now, willing to accept
- 22 Weber, 1948, p. 355
- 23 Scaff, p. 7
- 24 Ibid., p. 9
- 25 Weber, 1948, p. 356
- 26 Ibid., p. 356
- 27 See Weber, 1949, pp. 5-6
- 28 See Nietzsche, 1983, pp. 57-123
- 29 Scaff, 1988, p. 3
- 30 Ibid., p. 8
- 31 Compare, for instance, Nietzsche, 1967, essay III section 12, and Weber, 1949, p. 71
- 32 Scaff, 1988, p. 9
- 33 Scaff, 1988, p. 9
- 34 See Tenbrunck, 1980, p. 333

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Rejoinder

The philosophical bogeyman: misunderstanding the relation of theory and method

Derek Layder

Abstract

When my article 'The relation of theory and method: causal relatedness, historical contingency and beyond' appeared in *The Sociological Review* August 1988, it was followed by two critical responses in the same issue by Platt and Bulmer. In my opinion both of these responses seriously misrepresent and profoundly misunderstand my arguments. In what follows I identify the more salient of these errors and attempt to rectify them.

I will not dwell on all the points Platt deals with in response to my article because many of the points on which she claims I misrepresent her are rather pedantic, and I do not want to perpetuate a tedious (and potentially endless) argument about what was 'really meant'. Anyway, most of these points of difference are quite unimportant to my central arguments. My main concern was to use her discussion as a vehicle for my own thinking about the relation of theory and method.

However, before getting to the major misunderstandings there are some gross misrepresentations of my own article which need to be cleared up. Platt repeats an accusation (point 1, p. 465 and point 4, p. 466) which both disfigures my original meaning and at the same time betrays an ignorance of material with which, at the time, I assumed readers in general might be familiar. On both those points Platt says that my assertion that survey analysis in general and Gross *et al*'s *Exploration in Role Analysis* in particular display inattention to, or a disregard for actors' meanings, is without foundation. In fact she says the reverse is the case on the basis that 'the focus of the whole study is on actors'.

expectations and definitions of the situation'! Of course, here I was referring to the well-rehearsed phenomenological critique of conventional (positivist) methods. At the time of writing my original article this seemed such an obvious and well-documented point that I did not think to repeat it. However, since it has led to such a gross misrepresentation by Platt I feel driven to elucidate further.

Of course survey analyses including Gross *et al*'s often focus on actors' 'expectations' and 'definitions of the situation' but the whole point of the phenomenological critique is that these are arrived at in a manner which denatures the emergent and dynamic nature of social activity. The very notion of role in Gross *et al*'s analysis is conceived of in a 'static' rather than a 'dynamic' way, and depicts the relevant actors as empty-headed 'marionettes' who purportedly act according to the *researchers'* definitions of their expectations in a mechanistic way. This is the brunt of Naegeles's (1960) famous criticism of the (positivistic) scientism of Gross's study in that it treats human beings as if they did not have minds of their own. The difference between positivist versions of role theory as against interactionist versions has been extensively documented (Keat and Urry, 1975, Cicourel, 1973, Turner, 1962, 1985). The methodological differences between the survey analysis of actors' meanings, as impositions of researchers' meanings (or definitions 'by fiat') has also been extensively analysed in Cicourel's *Method and Measurement in Sociology*. His contention is that fixed-choice questionnaire surveys impose deterministic grids on the possible responses of human actors and thus, do not do justice to the emergent nature of actors' expectations and definitions. Nor do they reflect the problematic or situation-specific character of everyday life.

Platt (point 2, p. 465) also twists my uncontentious statement that there is a 'compatibility' between survey research and hypothetico-deductive forms of theorising into the completely unfounded charge that I claim that hypothetico-deductive theorising is *incompatible* with experiments! I say nothing of the sort. In fact I say the opposite on p. 458 stating that such theorising was shared not only by functionalists and non-functionalists but by psychologists and social psychologists. Surely it cannot have escaped Platt's notice that the *experimental* method has been dominant in psychology for some time now. Platt also accuses me of suggesting that surveys are *inevitably* accompanied by hypothetico-deductive forms of theorising. Again, I say nothing of the sort. What I do say

is that they are commonly in each other's company. A world of difference, I think

Platt grossly misrepresents my argument when she says (p 466 point 3) that I 'assert a rational connection between functionalism and the survey'. This interpretation is totally inconsistent with my whole thesis about a distinction between an implicate and an explicate order, Platt clearly ignores my statement on p. 449 when I argue that there are no *necessary* rational connections between particular theoretical discourses and methods at an *ontological level*! The diagram at the top of the page indicates clearly that I include what I term methodological protocols (or research theory, an example of which is middle-range theory) at the ontological level. Indeed this is why I say on p 449 that 'In *that sense and at that level* Platt is right to suggest that what rational connections do exist between theories and methods are ones of 'mere affinity' or 'tendencies to be associated'

What I go on to say, and what Platt clearly *confuses* is that this lack of rational connection at the ontological level does not preclude the indirect or submerged rational connections at the *epistemological level*. Platt may *wish* to think that I am asserting a simple rational connection between functionalism and the survey but *in fact* I am suggesting a much more subtle argument in which the distinctions between ontology and epistemology and the implicate and explicate orders are of paramount importance

A more charitable reading of my whole argument with careful attention to these pivotal distinctions may have averted such an outright misrepresentation. In connection with this, in her footnote (p. 469) Platt's statement that I *assume* 'that functionalism is compatible with *any* middle-range theory derived from particular data' (my emphasis), must be challenged on the grounds of its complete disregard for the truth of my actual arguments. I am at a loss to know how she arrives at this, but since the footnote occurs in the context of the misrepresentation I have just dealt with, I assume that this erroneous assertion must be part of her general confusion over this point.

This misrepresentation is carried through into Platt's subsequent admission that she does not understand my general argument about 'rational connections' and this leads her again (p 467) to repeat the same mistake about my argument concerning the specific relation between functionalism and the survey. To properly understand the notion of rational connections one has to

have some grasp of the philosophical debate between empiricism and rationalism. For reasons of restricted space I had to condense my argument in the *Sociological Review*, and assumed the reader's familiarity with certain debates. However, for those unfamiliar with these debates I would recommend John Cottingham's *Rationalism* as well as my own *The Realist Image in Social Science*. The confusion about the term 'rationalism' is well-evidenced in Platt's use of the term 'irrationality' (p. 468) as an implied 'counter' to rationalism. There are various technical usages and meanings of the term rationalism (including general *a priori*ism, innatism and necessitarianism), but none of these *theories of knowledge* (that is, explanations of the nature, scope and origins of knowledge), must be confused with non-technical (that is, non-epistemological) usages which refer to a person's actions or behaviour as being 'rational' as opposed to 'irrational'.

I find Platt's arguments on p. 468 at best obscure, but at one point she does impute to me a patently erroneous position when she says 'he appears to think that ideas have people, rather than people having ideas!' I cannot, in all honesty, fathom the logical basis for this assertion, and similarly, I am at a loss to find any evidence in my article which even remotely suggests that I would believe such an absurdity. Again, I think her confusion must stem from her incorrect conflation of rationalism as a theory of knowledge, and the rationality or irrationality of people's behaviour. Of course, people (and researchers in particular) acquire ideas through social influence; it is people who have ideas. But where do they come from? My answer is that they come from prevailing climates of 'social influence' and they get modified or changed through people imagining and trying out alternative possibilities. But this does not alter the fact that general bodies of ideas in themselves have a relative independence from particular instances of practice. Rational interlocks occur at the level of the conceptual integration of clusterings of such bodies of ideas (including 'theories' see Hesse, 1974, Thomas, 1979).

Again, Platt completely ignores the totality and subtlety of my argument by claiming, quite fallaciously, that I assume that rational connections are 'automatically translated into practice, because of the rationality'. I say no such thing nor imply any such thing. What I do is challenge her assertion that what actors say they are doing is the most reliable way of evaluating their practice and to use this as seemingly incontrovertible evidence for the absence of a link of any kind (epistemological or empirical).

between functionalism and the survey. Here, she ignores a whole chunk of my argument on pp. 455–6 where I discuss why actors' accounts may not be reliable (Platt does not even appear to conceive of this as a possibility), and therefore must be supplemented by analysis of epistemological commitments that are contained in their work and research practices.

So to Bulmer's piece. He begins by saying that his major disagreement is with my assertion that specific methods 'are always saturated with theoretical assumptions'. He then proceeds to say, (as if it were logically entailed in my assertion, which it quite patently is not), that there is 'no necessary connection between the use of a particular method and a particular methodological standpoint'. This is exactly the same mistake as Platt. Bulmer has not taken into consideration the central distinctions I make between epistemological and ontological elements nor between the implicate and explicate orders. I'm afraid that I have to point out once again that I do *not* make the claim imputed to me by Bulmer, and thus, the same comments I made in relation to Platt's fallacious claims about my 'asserting a rational connection between functionalism and the survey' apply equally to Bulmer.

It is also instructive to note that Bulmer's 'central disagreement' about the theory saturation of methods is transposed into the principal contradiction in his later comments. On p. 472 he states 'it would be more plausible to argue that the most fundamental characteristic of empirical sociological inquiry is its embeddedness in theory'. Not only does Bulmer speak of this 'revelation' as if it were his unique discovery (which it is not), but he seems blissfully unaware that the statement is entirely consonant with the theory saturation of methods that I argue for, and with which he insists he disagrees. I fear he must be disagreeing with himself for otherwise he would have to commit himself to the absurd position that acquiring and looking through the lens of a particular method magically obliterates the 'theory embeddedness' of 'empirical sociological inquiry'.

If I may be permitted a soupçon of immodesty, I do feel that my article goes well beyond bland comments about 'theory-ladenness' by trying to specify in some detail the exact nature of certain aspects of this problem. Not least of these is trying to unpack the variant meanings, levels and functions of *theoretical* presuppositions, which both Platt and Bulmer seem to view, wrongly in my opinion, as entirely unproblematic. Also, Bulmer's view that I say 'very little about the problematic relationship between theory and

evidence' seems rather arrogant in the light of what I take to be the quite modest intention of my article which was to clear some of the necessary ground-work for tackling this problem. (However, for more direct confrontations with this problem, see Layder, 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1989.)

Bulmer's second disagreement is in the form of a quaint but sermonising lecture on my supposed misuse of the term empiricism. Actually, my mistake was to *assume* colleagues' knowledge of issues and problems where in fact, ignorance prevailed. My first mistaken assumption was to assume familiarity with the philosophical debate between empiricism and rationalism. Anyone familiar with this debate would be aware that there are various forms of empiricism just as there are of rationalism. In my own work 1985, 1986 and 1989 I employ a distinction between naive and sophisticated empiricism, and although I would not claim that this exhausts the possibilities, it certainly goes beyond Bulmer's complacent and bland assumption that empiricism *per se* has been banished simply because social scientists have finally woken up to the myth of theory-neutral observation and/or data. Bulmer appears to be entirely ignorant of the fact that the debate is no longer (and has never been in philosophical circles), whether or not empiricism (in whatever form) does or does not exist, it is rather about the respective truth claims of empiricism *in relation* to rationalism.

I have not the space to develop arguments concerning theories of object-reference and truth-claims which are implicit in the empiricist-rationalist debate but they do underlie the arguments that I developed in my original argument and which I have discussed in detail elsewhere (1989). Similarly, Bulmer's statement that the term 'positivism' is vacuous is a stunning betrayal of ignorance of the voluminous philosophical (not to say sociological) literature on the subject. 'Vacuity indeed!'

The sad truth of the orthodox 'let's get to the facts and forget about the philosophical speculation' school of thought which Bulmer represents, is that it perpetuates the state of ignorance from which it stems. There are two common and pernicious mistakes which result from this line of thought. The first is that the kind of arguments I have set forward are in *direct competition* with historical or empirical analysis in general. There is nothing in my article which justifies this kind of wild misrepresentation. My intention in this respect is clear throughout, that this kind of philosophical analysis and historical/empirical research are

complementary, with two important caveats, that the relationship between them is a complex one, and that the historical/empirical dimension is neither privileged nor autonomous.

The second pernicious and scare-mongering tactic typical of the 'philosophy is a bogeyman' school is the one employed by Bulmer (pp 471–7) in accusing me of adopting a position which insists on what amounts to an *extreme* coherence theory of truth which denies the validity of an external empirical object world against which certain theories, hypotheses statements can be checked or validated. In everything I have published I have vehemently opposed the extreme coherence theory. What I have tried to do is avoid the dismissal of *all* forms of coherence theories by the dogmatic assertion of naive correspondence theories and simplistic falsificationist schemas which do not do justice to the diversity of phenomena subject to social inquiry, and to the diversity of explanatory forms and methods of inquiry that exist in the practices of sociology today – uncomfortable as this may be to those of Bulmer's ilk.

This brings me to the final point. Bulmer accuses me of 'destructive' and 'pernicious' tendencies because he claims (quite wrongly) that I contribute to 'a sociological Babel' which is connected with 'the relatively poor scholarly and academic standing of sociology in Britain's wider intellectual community'. What a spectacular own goal! Bulmer's ignorance of important theoretical and philosophical issues is so profound that it beggars the imagination! But the witch-hunt element is clear here. Bulmer's is a warning (fatuous as this may be), that if you don't think like 'us', then 'we' will have to attempt to discredit your ideas by contorting them beyond recognition.

But I do sympathise with the 'little-boy-lost' element of Bulmer's hyper-defensiveness. It reminds me of the Peter Pan wish to remain in a perpetual child-like state, which provides comforting support for all the naive myths about the real grown-up world of uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. Let's keep it simple, let's close our eyes and imagine that the world is the way we would wish it to be. Let's pretend that the unsettling and perhaps frightening complexity of reality does not exist, then we can live in a continuous state of self-delusion. In this respect, the most pernicious element of Bulmer's tears and defensiveness is that they are expressed in a professional journal as a form of attack on constructive dialogue and freedom of thought.

Anyone who could realistically claim to know anything about

the nature of my work thus far should not have failed to notice that my intention has always been to strengthen the empirical and methodological basis of sociology by tackling problems (such as the nature of theoretical presuppositions and their effects on different levels of practice) to which many like Bulmer have turned a blind-eye. The whole thrust of my work has been to uproot the dogmatic assertions of closed-minded defenders of 'orthodoxy' whatever its forms. A corollary of this has been an effort to expose the wooliness of thinking and utter complacency of those who wish to suppress certain forms of inquiry and to close down the possibilities of interdisciplinary dialogue and co-operation.

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Research note

The business cycle and industrial injuries in British manufacturing over a quarter of a century: continuities in industrial injury research

Theo Nichols

Abstract

Constructs a time-series for fatalities in British manufacturing for 1960-85. Examines the relation between the business cycle and industrial injury rate and finds this to be pro-cyclical whether tested against a rate for employees or for total operative hours at risk. Points to the possible contribution of changes in the engagement rate, employment-output ratio, capacity utilisation, vintage of machinery.

An earlier paper (Nichols 1986) discussed whether the business cycle is likely to have a positive effect on industrial injury rates (with upturns in the business cycle being associated with increases in injury rate and downturns with decreases) or a negative one (cyclical upturns being associated with decreases in injury rate, downturns with increases). It was suggested that both pro- and counter-cyclical associations might exist. But when that paper was published no time series existed for British industrial injuries which covered a sufficient run of years to resolve the matter one way or the other. Nor, it should be said, had the writer been aware of the existence of an American study which had provided strongly suggestive evidence for a pro-cyclical relation in that country over half a century earlier – some of which evidence its author held to have been ‘generally accepted by safety engineers’ even at that time (Kossoris, 1938: 581).

In what follows my own previous speculations about the possible cyclical variation of industrial injury rates are first briefly set down. Then Kossoris’s observations are introduced. Then a time series for industrial injuries is introduced which is used to assess the

direction of the effect of the business cycle on industrial injuries in Britain over the quarter of a century 1960–1985

Earlier arguments

In the earlier paper (Nichols, 1986) it was suggested with special reference to British manufacturing in the 1980s that exposure to certain 'structures of vulnerability' was particularly likely to induce a deterioration in work safety. Such structures were characterised by employment in small establishments, low wages and weak or non-existent trade unions. Subsequently, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has conducted research on the question of size of establishment and concluded that smaller establishments (i.e. those which employ less than 100 employees) are significantly more dangerous than larger ones (HSE, 1987: 47–57). In addition, Dawson *et al.* have attempted to test the structures of vulnerability idea by means of multiple regression analysis. Their results, which are based on HSE data for major and fatal injuries in manufacturing 1981–4, suggest that where 'size is small, unionisation weak, wages low and productivity increases [are] high, there may be more risk' (1988: 41–2, 283–5). No further research appears to have been conducted on the possible effect of the business cycle on injury rate variation however. This is especially unfortunate because, as noted above, the two arguments that were sketched out in my 1986 paper actually pointed in opposite directions.

According to the *first argument* sketched in the previous paper the general tendency would be for labour to become more vulnerable in downswings, essentially because of reduced job security. There would therefore be less resistance to unsafe working practices than hitherto and less resistance to management attempts to intensify labour or to cut corners. Matters would work out the other way round in upturns. Labour would then be in a better position to resist and would be better protected. This first argument derived from what was called an 'intensification model' of injury rate variation. In short, the idea was, weakening of labour → increased incidence of injuries, strengthening of labour → decreased incidence. In advancing this argument it was cautioned that the relative strength of capital and labour is not only a function of short term fluctuations of the business cycle type but that longer term movements in the economy have to be taken into account too. It was cautioned further that factors other than

economic ones, including amongst others the role of the State, entered into the determination of the relative strengths of labour and capital. It is important not to lose sight of these qualifications. But the key point to keep in mind about this first argument here is that it did suggest, on an all things being equal basis, that a counter-cyclical association would be found between the business cycle and the variation of industrial injury rates.

The *second argument* pointed in the opposite direction. According to the second argument, in a downswing employers were likely to fail to lay off labour fast enough to retain the previous employment-output ratio. As a consequence of this, a decline in labour intensity would occur, and, with this, a decline in injury rate. In an upswing, by contrast, matters would operate the other way round. The failure of employers to recruit new labour fast enough to match rising order books at the previous employment-output ratio would increase the rate of work of those employed and, with this, their exposure to risk and consequently the injury rate.

Since the implications of the second argument were just as surely pro-cyclical as those of the first argument were counter-cyclical, and since, in reality, both sets of forces might operate at the same time, the question arises of which set of forces might predominate. No evidence was adduced to indicate which might generally predominate in the earlier paper nor were some other factors considered that might also have cyclical effects on injury rates. The work of Kossoris promises something in both these respects and is considered next.

Yet earlier arguments

Kossoris first investigated the relation between industrial injuries in manufacturing and the business cycle with special reference to the inter-war depression years in America. At the start of his enquiry he noted that 'in many instances safety activities were discontinued or severely curtailed as economy measures' and he noted further that, as a consequence of this, 'it would be in order to anticipate rising frequency rates rather than falling rates during depression periods' (1938: 581). This hypothesis might be considered to be in line with the first argument set out above. At the least it points to a firmly counter-cyclical conclusion. But this hypothesis

was not in fact confirmed by Kossoris's own data. Looking at the years 1929–1935 Kossoris discovered that disabling injuries per million man hours had *not* been rising as the business cycle declined, as he had first anticipated would be the case. On the contrary, for the most part, injury rates had fallen as the cycle declined.

Kossoris advanced three reasons to explain such an outcome. *One*, as the depression deepened, labour forces were cut. Workers who had been hired most recently tended to be laid off first. This generally left a greater proportion of workers in employment who had longer years of service, 'usually, those of the skilled or semi-skilled types which management wanted to retain as a nucleus for subsequent expansion'. Such workers were familiar with job hazards and had, Kossoris assumed, developed good safety habits. *Two*, in the early stages of depression, lay-offs tended to lag behind reductions in operation, with the result that the total number of man hours worked exceeded those which would ordinarily have been required. 'Coupled with decreased numbers of injuries, attributable to a general slowing down in operating tempo, the swollen man hours total resulted in a lowering of the frequency rate'. *Three*, as business conditions became worse, management shifted toward the use of the most efficient equipment, which generally meant the most modern equipment. Such equipment, as a general rule, was also the safest. Kossoris held that this factor in itself 'would be sufficient to reduce the frequency rate' (1938: 581).

It is not difficult, given the main bones of the above interpretation, to surmise why an upturn in the business cycle would be associated with rising injury rates. Everything would operate the other way round and such a consequence would arise from an increase in the employment of less experienced workers, from an increase in operating tempo and from new engagements tending to lag behind increases in production, and from the bringing into use of older, less efficient machinery in order to meet increased demand.

Of course the arguments invoked by Kossoris to explain the fluctuations in the US accident frequency rate during the inter-war depression may require some qualification when applied to other times and other places. The principle of last-in-first-out, which figures in his first argument, might be more highly developed in the US than the UK for example. Then again, it cannot be assumed that the propensity of manufacturers to hire labour (or to hoard labour) is consistent in each and every downturn and upturn of the

business cycle, even in the same country. Generally, though, Kossoris does provide us with a checklist of at least three possible cyclically-induced forms of variation in injury rate. These relate to variations that stem from differences in the learnt safety habits of the workforce, to those which stem from the changing relationship between 'man hours worked [and] those which would ordinarily have been required', and to those consequences induced by changes in capacity utilisation; increased capacity bringing into use more hitherto 'surplus', and presumably more dangerous, machinery, reductions in capacity utilisation having the opposite effect (Kossoris, 1938: 581).

Kossoris's argument that in downturns 'swollen man hours' would result, compared to those that would ordinarily have been required, and that lay-offs lagged behind reductions in operation, is entirely compatible with the pro-cyclical argument in my earlier paper. As has been seen, however, this is only *one* of three arguments that Kossoris advanced which support a pro-cyclical view. His further arguments about the greater vulnerability of new entrants and a greater danger of using older machinery add force to this, and, overall, the effect of his work is clearly to make us expect a positive relation between the operation of the business cycle and the manufacturing injury rate. Later research, also conducted by Kossoris, strengthens this expectation further. For in a subsequent publication (Kossoris 1943: 951) he proposed other pro-cyclical processes. He argued that 'crowding and congestion' would occur as output climbed and that this would make workplaces more dangerous. He also suggested that longer working hours led to 'a disproportionate increase in work injuries', a view that has in fact been borne out by much more recent research (Schuster and Rhodes, 1985).

As we have seen, Kossoris's enquiries related to two distinctive periods of twentieth-century American economic history. The first referred to the years 1929–1935, and thus covered the period of the inter-war slump. The second referred to 1936–1941, and thus was concerned with injury rates in the context of the rapid growth in manufacturing output and employment induced by the early years of World War Two. On the basis of his evidence, though, it does seem advisable, when turning to the British situation, to expect to find a procyclical pattern. It also seems that the idea that the balance of power between capital and labour plays a significant role in the cyclical fluctuation of injury rates – downturns weakening labour and upturns strengthening it, hence increases

and decreases in safety – is one which is unlikely to be confirmed by the empirical evidence. We shall see


More recent experience

The above discussion strongly suggests that we should expect to find a positive relation between the business cycle and injury rates. But a difficulty stands in the way of examining whether the business cycle actually has had such an effect. In order to examine this matter a time series is required that spans several business cycles, say two decades or more. No such consistent official time series for British manufacturing exists. This is probably part of the reason why, to the best of my knowledge, this question has not been researched before. Back in 1925 Thomas – who did much to pioneer in Britain the analysis of possible cyclical effects on virtually everything ‘social’ – had expressed the hope that ‘the sociologist of 50 years hence will have at his disposal statistical records so complete and accurate, and methods so refined that he may evolve a really conclusive estimate of social influences of the business cycle’ (Thomas, 1925 viii). In the case of industrial injury statistics, which she did not study, she would doubtless conclude that there has been an appalling lack of progress since.¹

In an attempt to avoid the inconsistencies and other problems that beset official series for injuries in manufacturing in Britain, a fatality rate for employees in manufacturing has been constructed for the quarter of a century 1960–1985. This rate is based on Factory Inspectorate (and latterly HSE) data for the annual number of fatalities in manufacturing as a whole.² It uses as its denominator the official series for employees employed in manufacturing. As a fatality rate it is relatively free from two common sources of distortion to which some other sorts of injury rate may be subject, each of which may limit their validity as indicators of safety. First, it is improbable that it is distorted by inconsistencies in reporting on the part of employers. Deaths tend to be reported accurately. Second, it is not of course affected by the propensity of employees to take time off for injuries.

The general course taken by this fatality rate in British manufacturing 1960–1985 can be seen from the trend in Figure 1. But what is specifically at issue here is not the general tendency. It is how the rate may have been led to deviate from any underlying trend by the fluctuations of the business cycle. In order to examine

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Five year moving average 1962 = 100.

Figure 1 *Trend of employee fatality rate*

this, annual percentage deviations from trend of the fatality rate have been calculated. These deviations from trend are plotted alongside those for the engagement rate in Figure 2. The annual engagement rate trend deviations are presented because they happen to tally very well with the conventional periodicisation of the business cycle (see Table 1). The plots in Figure 2 thus provide a useful visual depiction of how deviations from trend in the fatality data fluctuate with the business cycle.

It should be noted that the data in Figure 2 like those in Figure 1, are not derived from a rate for fatal *incidents*. As already stated, they derive from a rate for fatalities to employees. Because the actual number of manufacturing fatalities is, thankfully, relatively small, this means that annual rates can therefore be affected by single dangerous incidents that cost many lives, occasional big fires, chemical explosions etc. Despite this, the pattern revealed in Figure 2 is an obvious if not perfect pro-cyclical one.¹

Up to this point, however, no account has been taken of hours worked. In practice, overtime will generally increase in upturns,

Table 1
CYCLICAL INDICATORS

		<i>Britton 1986</i>	<i>Engagement rate</i>
1st cycle	(P)	Spring 1960	
	(T)	Winter 1962-63	1963
	(P)	End 1964	1965
2nd cycle	(P)	End 1964	1965
	(T)	Summer 1967	1967
	(P)	Spring 1969	1969
3rd cycle	(P)	Spring 1969	1969
	(T)	Early 1972	1972
	(P)	Summer 1973	1973
4th cycle	(P)	Summer 1973	1973
	(T)	Late 1975	1975
	(P)	Summer 1979	1979
5th cycle	(P)	Summer 1979	1979
	(T)	Early 1981	1981
	(P)		




Figure 2 *Employee fatality and engagement rates: deviations from trend 1960-85*

when there will also be the likelihood of reductions in short time working. Changes in the opposite direction will be likely in downturns. Hours worked will therefore fluctuate positively with the business cycle, and this alone should guarantee a pro-cyclical relation between the business cycle and the industrial injury rate. Consequently, some attempt must be made to take account of differences in hours worked (as Kossoris himself recognised).

Figure 3 plots the deviations from trend for two different fatality rates. It does so for the employee fatality rate (the one that has been introduced already, and which will now be referred to as Rate A) and for a rate which has as its denominator total annual hours worked (Rate B). This latter measure is more closely targeted on the category of employee most at risk since it relates not to all employees but to operatives only. In addition to making allowance for overtime and short time hours, Rate B also makes some allowance for part-time work. The most notable effect of making these allowances for hours worked by operatives is to qualify the extent of the improvement in industrial safety that occurred over the 1960s and 1970s. At its low point in 1980 Rate A had fallen to half what it had been in 1960; over the same period Rate B fell less, to about two thirds of what it had been in 1960.⁴




Figure 3 *Fatality rates: deviations from trend 1960-1985*

But as can be seen from Figure 3, when deviations from trend were calculated a similar pattern emerged with the Rate B measure to the one that emerged for Rate A.

Conclusion

The above inspection of data for British manufacturing over two and a half decades suggests that the business cycle does have an effect on the fatality rate; that this remains after operative hours at risk are taken into account; and that the association is a pro-cyclical one. In view of this, it would seem to follow that any counter-cyclical effect which stemmed from short-term changes in the balance of power between capital and labour was more than cancelled out by the operation of the sort of pro-cyclical factors to which Kossoris pointed in America many decades ago – the employment-output ratio; the engagement rate, the degree of capacity utilisation, resort to machinery of different vintage etc.

Two further points are to be noted however. First of course, it does *not* follow that the level of safety in factories is unaffected by the balance of power between capital and labour or by the extent to which the state protects, or attacks, labour (which is itself in part a function of this balance and which in part affects it).⁵ What is being said in this connection is that either it is unlikely that any balance of power effects on safety have followed the short-term counter-cyclical pattern sketched in one of my earlier arguments – i.e. weakening of labour in downturns → increase in fatality rate and vice versa. or, if any such processes have operated, they have had less effect than other pro-cyclical ones.

Second, it should be noted that the balance of power may have a pro-cyclical effect on rates for *minor* injuries. Minor injury rates are not always good indicators of *safety*. Indeed, it is for this very reason that they may have a pro-cyclical association with fluctuations in the strengths and confidence of labour. This is another possibility of which Kossoris himself had been aware. He found that minor injuries constituted a smaller percentage of all injuries in cyclical downturns, and a higher percentage of all injuries in upturns, and he argued that the explanation for this was not that work was becoming more or less dangerous. Rather, Kossoris attributed these short-term variations to workers' propensity to carry injuries/take time off (1938: 581, 593–4).

Adequate data are lacking to test this idea in British manufacturing. On the other hand, there is nothing new about the supposition that minor injury rates have been influenced by longer term changes in workers' confidence and by alterations in the thresholds at which workers decide to take time off work for injuries.⁶ A Report published by the Factory Inspectorate in 1965 had noted that whereas minor injuries had risen, the trend for fatalities continued to be downward. It had asked 'whether or not a change in social outlook or in financial circumstance [has led] to an increased influence of factors other than the degree of injury leading to absence?' (1964 Report: 70). A very similar line of enquiry had been opened-up even earlier, by the Chief Inspector of Factories in 1945. Finding the number of reported non fatal injuries to be higher than expected when compared to 1939, but that the proportion of fatal injuries was falling, he had surmised that those injured now felt 'more justified in taking time off for recovery' and that 'the economic urge to return to work after injury is not now so powerful a factor as formerly' (1945 Report: 8). Hereby lies a tale however. For a full third of a century after this Chief Inspector had made his comments, a British social scientist was to assert that, prior to the work of Baldamus in the late 1960s, the British Factory Inspectorate had been 'intellectually incapable' of grasping that workers' propensity to take time off for minor injuries might indicate something other than the level of safety (Wilson, 1978: 107, Baldamus, 1969a, Baldamus, 1969b). Such a statement is further testimony, if any be now needed, of the need for greater continuity in what little social scientific research into industrial injury rates there has been in Britain. For the moment it has at least been (re-)discovered that there is a positive association between industrial safety and the fluctuation of the business cycle.

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Notes

- 1 No HSE data are consistent before and after 1985

In the years before 1985 there are major problems with the data for *three day and over injuries*, including changes in the basis of reporting and the lack of any information for certain years. Data for '*major*' injuries for 1981-5 form a different series than that for '*serious*' injuries, which in any case only produced for a short span of years prior to 1981. Data for *fatalities* are presented for employees in some years and for operatives in others.

In recent years all rates, of whatever degree of severity, have only been published on an annual basis

The only *frequency rate* published by the Factory Inspectorate ceased to appear many years ago, and even then depended on voluntary returns from employers. As late as 1985 the HSE was still only making the promise that 'Future consideration will be given as to the best way of counting full and part-time employees' (HSE, 1988: 34 para 47a)

2 Fatality data for 1981-5 are from HSE 1988, Table 21A

3 It is of course the direction of any effect of the business cycle on safety that is investigated in this paper, i.e. whether it is positive or negative. In view of the points made above an attempt to draw conclusions about the precise extent of this association should be avoided. For the deviation from trend of the engagement rate and of the employee fatality rate $r = 0.52$. Note though that the engagement rate data has not been used here in the belief that variations in the proportions of newly engaged workers necessarily constitute the major cyclical effect on short-term fluctuations in the fatality rate. Rather the engagement rate has been used because it provides a directly intelligible illustration of the periodicisation of the business cycle 1960-85

4 These differences, and other matters of detail which arise from the present paper, are considered further in on-going work into the possible effects of the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act on safety in the 1970s and into the deterioration that has taken place in the 1980s

5 Such ideas would be most difficult to sustain given either an historical review of changes in working conditions in British factories or a contemporary comparison of conditions in Britain and, say, Hong Kong (Bryson 1988)

6 An investigation into certified sickness absence (which is not of course confined to absence because of work injuries) found that this increased some ten to fifteen years after the introduction of the NHS, its author concluding 'attitudes change slowly' (Whitehead 1971: 21). An enquiry by the present author considered two different sorts of claim for industrial injury benefit over the 1960s to 1970s: those for sprains and strains and those for fractures. The former claims, which would be more likely to be affected by changes in worker confidence, grew disproportionately in the early to mid 1960s (see Nichols 1989, Figure 1). It was the claims for fractures which seemed to best follow the oscillation of the business cycle

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Book reviews

Handbook of Sociology

Neil J. Smelser (ed.), Sage Publications, London, 1988, £75.00, 824pp

The great Polish sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck once argued that, while the journal literature represented tentative knowledge, the handbook expressed the genuine, impersonal and substantiated knowledge of a scientific community, regarded as a social community with a definite thought-style. In sociology, the production of a handbook necessarily faces acute intellectual problems, given the currently fissiparous character of the sociology community. Neil Smelser in his sensitive introduction is clearly aware of these editorial issues. Taking Talcott Parsons's address on 'Some problems confronting sociology as a profession' (1959) as the benchmark of relative consensus within an academic profession which was becoming increasingly established, Smelser notes that the following three decades were characterized by mounting internal criticism of structural-functionalism (or more correctly action-systems theory) by symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology and neo-marxism, and by mounting external criticism in the Reagan-Stockman attempt to cut back government support for the social sciences. Smelser's *Handbook* reflects the unresolved methodological, theoretical and metatheoretical diversity of an academic discipline in the context of a global transformation of the higher education system.

The *Handbook* is divided into four major sections, theoretical and methodological issues; bases of inequality, major institutional settings; and social processes and change. In short, sociology is defined as the scientific analysis of social structure and social change. Given the uniformly high quality of the contributions, it

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is somewhat invidious to select any particular chapter for comment. However, sociologists who are committed to the achievement of some theoretical coherence within the discipline (that is an end to what Parsons referred to as the 'warring schools') will find Jeffrey Alexander's contribution on 'the new theoretical movement' particularly challenging in its attempt to provide analytical solutions to the problems which have traditionally surrounded the action/structure and micro/macro issues in the 'post-functionalist phase' of sociology. Against an almost exclusive emphasis on structuralist explanations in the post-war period, Alexander observes an increasingly important turn towards culturalist sociology and culture as a topic of analysis. A similar theme can be detected in Robert Wuthnow's excellent overview of the sociology of religion. Noting the irrelevance of the once fashionable secularization thesis, he concentrates on religious movements, popular religion, fundamentalism and civil religion with special reference to church-state relations. Wuthnow laments the current theoretical fragmentation of the sub-discipline and its isolation from the main body of sociology. Andrew Scull in 'deviance and social control' also observes that the once dominant paradigm (labelling and social reaction theory) has been replaced by 'bickering and disputes', but the current interest in the sociology of social control has brought about important inter-disciplinary co-operation between historians, criminologists and sociologists. This theme – the fragmentation of core paradigms and the quest for new lines of cohesive development – dominates the *Handbook*.

Editors of handbooks and dictionaries are faced by fundamental choices of exclusion and inclusion. Smelser will undoubtedly be criticized for failing to include chapters on the sociology of war and militarism, the sociology of consumption and economic sociology, the sociology of art, the sociology of culture, urban and rural sociology, and the sociology of the emotions. The *Handbook* may be criticized for its understatement of the importance of historical and comparative sociology, and for the absence of any systematic attention to sociology's global location and development. Smelser does provide a justification for the fact that 'the volume is, however, predominantly a book on sociology as it stands in the United States' (p. 15), but many reviewers may well find that the justification for this decision is unsatisfactory. In recognizing these limitations, it is important to give credit to Smelser's inclusions. The decision to allocate an entire chapter to the sociology of

science, while not necessarily the most obvious choice, turns out to be one of the most successful contributions. The sociology of science is one of the few areas of contemporary sociology in which, starting with the work of Robert K. Merton and Bernard Barber, there has been genuine theory cumulation (Turner 1989). Harriet Zuckerman's chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the debates which have surrounded the study of normal science, Kuhnian paradigm-shifts, scientific innovation, patronage systems and branching theory. The other area of sociology where theoretical development, knowledge cumulation and social applications have been achieved is the field of medical sociology. It is perhaps fitting that as William Cockerham's contribution implies, Parsons's conceptualization of the sick role and the professions in the 1950s represents a measure of the advances within this subdiscipline. The inclusion of a chapter on ageing (by Matilda Riley, Anne Foner and Joan Waring) is also a welcome editorial decision, because, although ageing as a social process was largely neglected by classical sociology, it has become central to the major interests of both empirical and theoretical sociology.

Smelser's *Handbook* is exceptionally rich in its coverage of fields of sociological specialization, data sources, bibliographical material and theoretical expositions. It will without doubt be challenged for its substantive lacunae, its (explicitly) American view of sociology, and its failure to address the diverse ideological underpinnings of modern sociology. It has however established a standard of academic excellence which all subsequent handbooks will have to confront.

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Culture and Agency. the place of culture in social theory

Margaret S. Archer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, £27.50, xxvii + 343 pp

Sociology has long recognised the dichotomy of structure and agency. Sociological investigations may be divided between

approaches which emphasize the constraining power of social structure and those which interpret society through the cumulative effects of individual actions. The best known contemporary writings are Giddens's examinations of the concept of 'structuration' but the articulation of the forces of agency and structure has proven enormously contentious. Giddens's effort is hardly the last word. To a debate in which her own work is prominent Margaret Archer now contributes an analysis which at first blush extends its scope but which actually attempts to resolve the familiar conundrum. The welcome move to bring culture to theoretical centre stage prompts Archer's argument that the problem of culture and agency runs parallel to the problem of structure and agency, and can be resolved by the same analytic framework.

The analytic problem centres on what Giddens calls the *duality* of structure, social structures both being constituted by human agency and being the very medium of their constitution. Giddens seeks to transcend the division by, for example, seeing structure as implicated in power relations and power relations as implicated in structure (and there is a problem here in pursuing the idea empirically; see Brewer, 1988). Archer counterposes a 'morpho-genetic' perspective to Giddens's 'structuration', emphasising the discontinuity between initial interactions and the complex system which is their product. Her analytical *dualism* can accommodate sequentiality, the idea that all subsequent interaction will differ from earlier action because it is informed by the structural consequences of the earlier action.

While Archer's promise to resolve the problem of culture and agency in a treatment parallel to the problem of structure and agency is enormously enticing, there are other reasons to bring culture to greater prominence. One is the opportunity to learn from studies in contemporary culture, cultures of resistance and so on, which have remained at the margin of all but marxian theorizing. Another is to challenge the dismissive assertion that culture concerns only the ephemeral world of thoughts and feelings with little bearing on action, patterns of observable behaviour being reductionalistically cast as the real source of ideas (Wuthnow, 1984).

Despite her main thesis that structure/agency and culture/agency raise identical difficulties and are susceptible to an identical resolution, Archer regards these domains as substantively different and relatively autonomous. She plainly states that she does not intend to collapse the one into the other. She sees cultural analysis

as lagging far behind structural analysis. There is a lack of *descriptive* cultural 'units', and, as to explanation, culture oscillates from being a supremely independent variable to a totally passive dependent variable. Yet there is the same tension between our feeling free to choose components from a fund of ideas and the fact that 'our sensed freedoms can be more a matter of manipulated feelings than of genuine liberty' (p. xi). Taking this as her problematic Archer self-avowedly 'travels light' and one should not look here for summaries of major cultural theories.

Archer asserts that in discussing either structure/agency or culture/agency the two poles remain distinct and are not co-existent through time. To argue otherwise precludes examining their interplay over time. Chapters two, three and four explore the different versions in cultural analysis of the 'Fallacy of Conflation', in each, the elision of the two elements robs at least one of its autonomy. The application of 'analytical dualism' to cultural analysis is pursued by a critique of the 'myth of cultural integration'. By perpetuating an image of culture as a coherent pattern the 'myth' obviated any concept of 'cultural contradiction' (equivalent to structural contradiction). It is ironic that Archer finds an apparatus to negotiate this deficiency in Durkheim. Archer's analysis is heavily guided by Lockwood on 'system integration'. To resolve the complaint that the dividing line between 'parts' and 'people' is imprecise, chapter five argues that the 'Cultural System' comprises only the sub-set of culture which is propositional, i.e., subject to the law of contradiction. Archer is humble about this resolution, aware that it depends on accepting the universality of the law of contradiction, and frank that her argument came from a hunch about the applicability of Lockwood.

Distinguishing the logical relations pertinent to the cultural system from the causal ones pertinent to socio-cultural interaction makes their interface the next issue. Chapters seven and eight examine 'how contradictory or complementary relations between "parts" of the Cultural System map onto orderly or conflictual relationships between "people" at the Socio-cultural level which determine whether the outcome is cultural stability or change. This means that we need to specify, first, which systemic relations impinge upon agency and how they do so, and, second, which social relations affect how agents respond to and react back on the Cultural System' (p. xix). With this apparatus in place Archer moves to the case for the application of the morphogenetic approach to cultural analysis. The strength of morphogenesis is its

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incorporation of time as a theoretical variable (rather than a medium for events) in such a way that we can assess the relative influence of the parts of the dichotomy instead of resting with a semi-mystical insistence on their unknowable co-incidence. In the last chapters Archer sketches a research programme to advance this approach to culture (and structure) and presents a skeletal theory of their unification based on their influence on one another. There she argues that particular configurations (of morphogenesis and morphostasis in structure and culture) relate to reciprocal influences while others make either structure or culture dominant.

Archer's wish to render a theorization which is readily tested does not mean she gives appropriate data to support the whole of her analysis. She concedes that much of the work is abstract and in places purely speculative. Nor does her preoccupation with the central problem of duality/dualism prevent her from sharp criticism of much cultural analysis. Her project prevents her from acknowledging nuances which contradict her reading of their main thrust, and she will consequently antagonise many, especially in anthropology. Whether or not we concede her claim to the 'theoretical unification' of the structural and cultural fields, the book is a timely and sophisticated treatment which serves to pull culture back into the mainstream.

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Nigel Fielding

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Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations

Diego Gambetta (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, £27.50, 246pp.

Social life has three essential constituents: agency, dependency and time. One person's scope for action is conditioned by the expected future actions of others who are nevertheless free to act differently. That is to say, it depends on trust. The quality of trust

must therefore lie at the heart of sociality. One could hardly claim that the terrain covered by this concept has been little explored. On the contrary, practically everything that has ever been written on the subject of human society touches on it in one way or another. For that very reason, the nature of trust, and the conditions under which it emerges or breaks down, have remained singularly elusive. In the literature of the social sciences trust always appears refracted, under the guise of something else, depending on the disciplinary background and theoretical proclivity of the author. It requires an interdisciplinary effort to discover the unity that lies behind these several refractions. This book represents just such an effort, and to the best of my knowledge it is the first attempt of its kind. The thirteen essays that make it up were originally presented as a series of seminars on the topic of trust held in King's College, Cambridge, during 1985–86. The enterprise is truly interdisciplinary, in that the contributors include, besides the editor, a philosopher (Williams), a biologist (Bateson), a social psychologist (Good), two economists (Dasgupta, Lorenz), a political scientist (Dunn), a historian (Pagden), two sociologists (Luhmann, Hawthorn), and two social anthropologists (Gellner, Hart).

As Gambetta remarks in his foreword, scholars drawn to interdisciplinary debate by a sense of the narrowness of their own subject are inclined to recoil at what they perceive as the even more constricted vision of neighbouring disciplines. There is no lack of such tension in this book, above all between those who purport to derive the conditions and properties of trust by formal deduction from first principles, and those who would situate them in the concrete historical circumstances of social life. This is given explicit recognition by a division of the book into two parts, on 'trust considered' and 'trust observed'. Contributors to the first part are much given to a logical calculus couched in the idiom of the theory of games, in which both the players and the predicaments in which they are caught (such as the notorious Prisoner's Dilemma) are purely artifacts of the analytic imagination. Thus Dasgupta tells a long story about car salesmen. He has not studied them, and we need know nothing about how salesmen actually operate to understand his story. For the salesman is merely an exemplar of the timeless, abstract individual. This does not prevent social psychologists, as reported by Good, from imposing their artificial scenarios on real human subjects. The distressing effects of these experiments on their 'victims' only go to show that

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real people are not at all like what economists and many philosophers imagine them to be

If there is a central theme in the contributions to the second part of the book, it is that an understanding of trust must be sensitive to the changing quality of interpersonal relations and their institutionalization in particular times and places. Thus Pagden shows how the contrast between the mores of trust and honour underwrites the interpretation by certain eighteenth-century political economists of the disastrous impact of Spanish rule. Gellner relates the presence of trust, and its absence, to the opposition in traditional Muslim society between tribe and city. And in a brilliant discussion, Hart argues that trust inheres in relations of friendship, as distinct on the one hand from those of kinship where personal autonomy is compromised by traditional obligations of status, and on the other hand from those of contract, where freedom of association is won at the expense of the depersonalisation and isolation of the individual. Frafra migrants in Accra, caught between the traditional certainties of their society of origin and the fluctuating probabilities of urban life and the market economy, turn to friendship as a way of realizing their autonomy that is nevertheless grounded in a community of affect and shared experience.

It is impossible, in the space of a brief review, to summarize all the issues raised in this book. Gambetta does this job admirably in his concluding chapter whose title, 'Can we trust trust?', is nevertheless symptomatic of a tendency for serious analysis to degenerate, at times, into highly sophisticated but ultimately facile word-play. 'I see no reason to trust trust just as trust', writes Hawthorn (p. 115); to which Good rejoins that in many societies, 'trust is remarkably robust' (p. 46). Hawthorn's point is that trust cannot normally be expected to work unless it is generated as a by-product of actions directed towards other ends. Like faith, with which trust shares a common etymological root in the Latin *fides*, trust surely cannot simply be willed into existence by rational strategists who see it in their mutual interest to co-operate. Moreover, as Gambetta shows in the case of the Italian mafia, the rational pursuit of self-interest can lead equally well to the endless perpetuation of *distrust* and to 'collective disaster' (p. 173). Yet Lorenz's study of subcontracting in French industry points to a different conclusion: 'trust can be created intentionally' (p. 209), and need not be grounded in personal friendship.

The crucial issue here concerns the relative priority of trust and

co-operation. Bateson, in a lucid presentation of biological theories of the evolution of co-operation in animals, points out that for the biologist the question of motivation is quite unimportant: thus honey-bees can co-operate more or less by instinct, without having to trust one another. But the biologists' sense of co-operation is a specialized and limited one, and is not shared by humanists for whom – as Williams in this volume – co-operation can only be explained by the presence, in intentional agents, of 'motives to co-operate' (p. 7). If such motives must be based in trust, we have to account for the emergence of trust before we can explain co-operation. A second leading issue concerns the relation between trust and risk. Almost all the contributors agree that an element of risk, the possibility that persons will choose *not* to do what we expect of them, is inherent in the very notion of trust. But as Luhmann observes, trust should be distinguished from confidence. It is the latter that enables us to get by in a world full of unforeseen and unconsidered dangers. Trusting someone or something, on the other hand, presupposes an active prior engagement on our part, and this is what makes it risky. Hence the contrast between risk and danger parallels that between trust and confidence. A third major issue in the book has to do with the political role of trust. This theme is central to the chapter by Dunn. Taking his cue from John Locke, he argues that politics is fundamentally about 'the construction, reproduction and repair of structures of well-founded mutual trust' (p. 89). Yet the centralization of political control is inclined to have precisely the opposite effect. No central agency can create trust, Pagden observes, but effectively constituted agencies can certainly destroy it. Likewise Gellner presents us with the paradox 'that anarchy engenders trust and government destroys it' (p. 143). Among the governed, coercion replaces trust as the means of effecting co-operation.

This is a book that stimulates rather than informs. Even in the more substantively oriented chapters the empirical material is presented in broad brush strokes rather than fine detail. The best way to read it is to imagine yourself as a fortunate participant in the seminar, and to think how – had you been invited to contribute a paper dealing with your own particular interests – you would have presented it, and how your contribution would fit into the debate. It is an exercise I would strongly recommend to every serious student of human social life.

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Tim Ingold

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Global Restructuring and Territorial Development

Jeffrey Henderson and Manuel Castells (eds), Sage Publications, London, 1987, £8.95, xii + 256pp

The new buzz-word in certain quarters is 'global restructuring', just as we have had 'accumulation crisis' a decade ago, and 'fiscal crisis' before that. It would appear that after reeling from crisis to crisis, capitalist economies appear now to be more successful, on their own terms, than ever before. Global restructuring, leading to territorial reshaping of industrialism, can surely not be read as yet another global crisis tantalizingly evoking socialism. However, most of the contributors to this volume are undaunted: unable to cry wolf at present, they wistfully announce the imminence of new occasions to do so. The problem now is that the structure of their argument and analysis appears to have lost the unity, conviction and focus it possessed in the earlier decade of marxist urban analysis. This is all the more evident because there is no attempt to examine the errors of past results of applied 'political economy'. Many of the old practices of casually using concepts like 'surplus value', 'class-struggle', 'labour-process', 'proletarianization', etc continue.

Consider the issue of whether global restructuring is the dominant capitalist response to the inflexion of growth and economic depression of the mid and late seventies. The papers by Richard Child Hill, Dieter Ernst and Saskia Sassen-Koob all directly consider global restructuring, but there is relatively little convergence of results. Hill, quite rightly, shows that the example of the automobile industry does *not* support unitary theories such as that advanced around a new international division of labour: the Japanese have been successful with spatially concentrated production systems around 'company towns', but Americans have used the 'global factory' strategy. Such differences can be found in comparing different giant companies from the same country. He finds cross-penetration between developed capitalist countries the dominant trend.

Looking at the high-technology electronics industry Dieter Ernst finds that the crucial competitive battles have been won by those manufacturing firms embedded in vertically integrated multi-nationals, as against those firms manufacturing semi-conductors for open market sales. A degree of strategic cooperation is emerging between American and Japanese winning companies – but in this case, actual manufacturing of microchips and wafers *has*

been left to manufacturing establishments in Pacific Asia. But this appears to be the result of Japanese and South Korean success in global oligopolistic competition rather than any *restructuring* or *relocation* by American capitalist concerns. Naturally, strategic cooperation for mutual gains between successful giant American and Japanese corporations is underway. Ernst concludes by pointing to *hierarchical integration* with very high and rising levels of capital concentration as the coming scenario.

Sassen-Koob follows up an older theme of Marxist political economy: the dependence of the periphery and the dominance of the core economies, by examining labour migration. She concludes by noting growing cross-penetration of labour-force composition and utilization in both the core economy of the United States and the periphery economies of its manufacturing multinationals. Instead of a one-way process of restructuring we have opposite waves: a diffusionist, re-locational wave, followed by an inverse process of re-concentration in the core economies, but this time with Third World labour transferred to First World locations. She predicts growing class-consciousness in this new workforce – but fails to explore the relation of class to ethnicity. It is quite correct, as she ably demonstrates, that the new labour force is concentrated in a few 'global cities', and that there has been an increase in low-paid employment in the most dynamic growth-oriented sectors. But it is not evident why that diagnosis, of a racially and culturally bifurcated and hierarchically structured labour force with, presumably, higher paid non-manufacturing employment for the local white segment of the total wage-labour force, should lead to a prognosis of sharpened class-struggle. One must consider the possibility of the electorally sanctioned entrenchment of an increasingly racist and self-consciously 'Western' *majority* against a correspondingly ghettoised and politically contained 'non-Western' underclass.

These theoretically inquisitive and documented papers are followed by a less relevant piece on varieties of immigration control by Robin Cohen, which reads like a summary spin-off from his recently published book on migrant labour, and a paper documenting the creation of a gender-segmented new proletariat in the electronics industry in Malaysia.

The next segment has papers on dependent and less-dependent types of regional development in Mexico under the shadow of United States multi-nationals' strategic decisions, and on the situation of Malaysia in the international division of labour in the

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electronics industry, where the authors argue deliberate and active state policy as the source of the current pattern of integration of Malaysia into world-wide market economic flows. Both these papers are of the 'bringing the state back in' school, pointing to the relevant decision-space for state policies and, thus, national politics

Finally, there is a cautious but very informative paper by Nigel Thrift on the internationalization of the productive financial services sector of Western, primarily United Kingdom, economies. This gives us a good idea of the upper-end, of the new re-organized capitalism in terms of incomes and profits. This is the pivot around which the neo-conservatives have so successfully woven electoral majorities. The book ends with a limp paper on the expected forms of political struggle in United States cities resulting from 'global structuring' and 'immigrant labour-forces'. The implicit and explicit theoretical assumptions of this paper sits uneasily with the scepticism, and only partially analyzed complexities, of the first three papers

This is a stimulating collection but one misses any attempt by the contributors to reassess and revise their own papers in the light of the evidence, arguments and criticisms in the other papers. Too many conference proceedings are published without any attention to the supposed ostensible purpose of conferences: mutual influence and cross-fertilization.

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Pradeep Bandyopadhyay

Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity?

R. Miles, Tavistock, London, 1987, £25.00, paper £10.95, iv + 250pp.

Multi-Racist Britain

P. Cohen and H.S. Bains, (eds), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £25.00, paper £7.95, vi + 262pp.

Racism is a major feature of contemporary British capitalism. Together these books are useful in exploring two related questions about racism: how did the situation arise? What can be done about it? For both Miles and Cohen (in a lengthy introduction to the edited collection of essays) racism is seen as constitutive of 'the British way of life'. Whereas Cohen and Bains's text mainly explores the ideological, political and educational ramifications of

this in contemporary Britain, Miles's study focuses on the historical continuity of forms of unfree labour (such as slavery, indentured and contract labour). Indeed, Miles argues that racism can be considered as 'a social relation of production, an ideological intervention which inheres in the productive process' (p 188).

Capitalism and Unfree Labour is organised around three questions, which are posed in the introduction. why does capitalism *not* systematically sweep away forms of non-wage or unfree labour? What would constitute a proper understanding of the relationship between migration and capitalism? How has the process of 'racialization' ('in which human beings are categorized into "races" by reference to real or imagined phenotypical or genetic differences', p 7) articulated with production relations? Miles seeks to demonstrate that any account of the historical development of capitalism is necessarily incomplete if 'it is divorced from an understanding of either migration or processes of racialization' (p. 14). At the same time he remains critical of studies of 'race' or 'ethnic' relations (à la John Rex) because they either give credence to an ideological concept ('race') or obscure 'the universal dimension of the material dynamic by which populations are incorporated into relations structured by the capitalist mode of production and its articulation with other modes of production' (p. 224). In short, Miles argues that 'an adequate explanation for unfree relations of production (which includes racism) is best sought in the context of a general theory of capitalist development . . . rather than in the formation of an intellectual sub-discipline of 'race relations' which is necessarily ideological' (p 225).

The first part of the book deals with some theoretical issues – capitalism as a mode of production, accumulation and articulation, and the concepts of 'free' and 'unfree labour' (labour which is non-commodified or only formally commodified in contrast to 'free' labour which 'exists where the individual retains access to his/her labour power as private property and can freely dispose of it within a labour market' p. 173). Various lacunae in Marxist and non-Marxist accounts of capitalist development are noted and Miles is particularly critical of the Eurocentricism of the so-called 'Founding Fathers'. The rise of capitalism in England, for example, was dependent upon trade with other, non-capitalist, modes of production and the rise of the slave mode of production in the Caribbean and North America.

The second part of the book consists of four case studies of

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instances of the coexistence of unfree labour with the development of capitalist relations of production – in the Caribbean, Australia, South Africa and Western Europe. Historical analysis leads Miles to the conclusion that what happened, for example, in the Caribbean to promote slavery was not part of some 'grand design' but rather the result of a series of ad hoc responses to particular circumstances (p. 81). English colonizers did not bring with them an established body of law and tradition concerning slavery. Instead the legal category 'slave' was created to ensure a controlled labour force. In a chapter on Western Europe Miles attempts to show how the conditions for unfree labour are not confined to the distant past. He argues that a significant proportion of the migrant workers involved in migration flows within and into Western Europe since 1945 have constituted another form of unfree labour. The contract labour system, by which migrant workers entered France, West Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, and, arguably, Britain, during this period can be seen as the most recent form of unfree wage labour needed to ensure the reproduction of these capitalist economies.

In part three Miles attempts to pull the theoretical argument and historical analysis together. Is unfree labour an anomaly or a necessity to the development of capitalist modes of production? Having identified six variants of 'unfree labour', in parallel with the emergence and reproduction of free wage labour in four cases, it is perhaps surprising that he does not draw the second conclusion. Instead Miles suggests that unfree labour should be seen as an 'anomalous necessity' (pp. 196ff.). Unfree labour is anomalous 'when viewed in relation to the tendency for the emergence and increasing dominance of free wage labour' and yet is 'necessarily introduced and reproduced because historical conditions obstruct the universalization of wage relations of production' (pp. 197–8). Miles thus argues against Wallerstein for an analysis which leaves open for question the precise impact of capitalist development in specific conditions.

If Miles provides a wide ranging and historical argument for recognising the continuity of unfree labour/racism, the collection edited by Cohen and Bains in the Macmillan 'Youth Questions' series poses, from a range of political and ideological viewpoints, some of the issues involved in trying to combat racism in education, training and youth work in contemporary British society. Again the book is divided into three parts. Parts two and three consist of essays and interviews relating to the politics of

anti-racism, the British state and institutional racism, and various aspects of youth work practice. Despite the fact that these were written several years before the long essay in part one ('The Perversions of Inheritance' by Philip Cohen) and therefore have a certain 'dated' feeling, they provide some interesting insights into developments in the 1980s.

If the aim is to demonstrate the complexity of tackling racism through teaching, training or other forms of youth work, this is certainly achieved in Cohen's fascinating, if overlong, essay. He argues that it is necessary for those engaged in such projects to adopt a critical appreciation of the underlying premises of both anti-racist policies in schools and 'roots radicalism'. He provides a historical analysis of the growth of different racist ideologies in Britain and how elements of these underpin educational and youth work discourse. He also warns against the unintended consequences of policies designed to promote anti-racist awareness. Anti-racist policies in schools, for example, may merely signal another aspect of classroom discipline to ethnic majority pupils and parents and thus promote a series of resistances and unintended counter-effects, even though the intention was to signal to ethnic minority pupils a commitment to fight racism and injustice. With respect to 'roots radicalism' (the term Cohen uses to describe a genre of histories of ethnic minorities which have recently become available), whilst these may provide 'positive images' and for ethnic minority groups, 'a history', they may also produce a decontextualised view of ethnic minority-ethnic majority relationships.

Cohen argues that academic theorists, such as Miles, have offered 'structural-functional' accounts of racism, which have been couched at a level of generality that does not help sufficiently in the explanation of specific types of racist ideology (or 'racisms'). Nor are these approaches useful in understanding the particular moment of the construction and dissemination of such beliefs. He proposes that a solution might be a division of intellectual labour between 'structural' accounts and those which concern themselves with racism as an ideological 'discourse' (p. 45). It seems to me, however, that Miles's latest account, emphasising historically contingent material conditions, does enable one to recognise the possibility of a plurality of racisms. The argument, however, between 'political economists' and 'Weberians' over 'race relations' does not seem likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Perhaps in the light of the material circumstances and daily experiences of racism which ethnic minority members face in

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contemporary Britain its resolution might not be seen as the number one priority.

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The Free Economy and the Strong State. the Politics of Thatcherism
Andrew Gamble, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £25.00, paper
£7.95, xii + 263pp.

A survey of Britain after ten years of Margaret Thatcher in charge would strongly suggest that some irreversible changes have occurred. Privatisation, increased home ownership and the growth of non-public service provision for starters. All of these changes and many others have occurred on the back of a policy argument which decries the efficiency and the morality of both the pre-existing situation and the post-war social democratic consensus on which it was based. Despite all these changes there have been surprisingly few attempts to provide a comprehensive account of these transformations.

The Free Economy and the Strong State is an ambitious attempt to provide such an account. At the beginning Gamble accedes there 'are few things more difficult than trying to make sense of contemporary political events and the direction in which they are moving'. The book, well written and accessible, is subtitled 'The Politics of Thatcherism', a term with which we are all familiar, but one on which there is little agreement within the Left, Right and Centre as to its status as an analytical concept. The essential question it confronts is whether the dominant 'ism' of the 1980s is just a label applied to contemporary conservative statecraft, or mainly an accumulation strategy and thus essentially interpretable through class analysis or, and this is Gamble's position, a coherent ideological, political and economic strategy with specific means and ends: what Gamble calls a 'hegemonic project'.

In substance Gamble attempts to show that to understand Thatcherism solely in terms of class or statecraft is to ignore some glaring anomalies. He argues early on that Thatcherism initially 'signified especially an intense ideological struggle, but it also involved from the first, political calculation aimed at winning and maintaining support, as well as a programme of policies for reorganising the state, improving economic performance and

reversing British decline' (p. 24). In this case the means are, as the title suggests, through an unregulated economy and a strong state. The objective of such a state being to revitalise a moribund economy and create a new consensus which recognises the many failures and inherent dangers of post war social democracy and supports a culture of enterprise.

The first part of the book summarises the breakdown of the world market in the 70s, the demise of US dominance in the economic and political spheres and how certain elements of social democracy have come to be discredited. The elected resolution to these problems were the radical Right programmes of Thatcher and Reagan, which undertook to restore the breakdown of authority and stability in the world system and in national politics. For Gamble Thatcherism is a complex and contradictory political phenomenon, and 'whatever coherence it possesses has had to be constantly reasserted and re-forged' (p. 23). As such an understanding of what gives it its coherence in this case means understanding the character of Thatcherism as one particular variant of New Right thought. The New Right disparate as it is, is united in its conception that the preservation of a free society and a free economy necessitates the restoration of the authority of the state. The discourse of Thatcherism, it is argued, prefers regulation from the property conscious market of Liberal economics to the inefficient, oppressive and centralised forces of collectivism. Combined with the view that the only way to resist creeping socialism is to restore the power of governing to the government, these two often incompatible positions come together to form a broad hegemonic project rather than a pure doctrinal cause.

As an attempt to understand the complexities of Thatcherism *The Free Economy and the Strong State* provides a concise overview of the Thatcher years and is a valuable contribution to the current literature. The text sweeps fleetingly over the main contributions to the debate on Thatcherism and eclectically uses them to show the complexity of the analysis and their individual limitations if used in isolation. Part of the problem with trying to cover as much as Gamble does in one volume is that there are inevitably many unanswered questions. Two issues in particular remain unclear in my mind after reading this book. First, the whole question of the notion of Thatcherism as a 'hegemonic project' is not analysed in sufficient detail. Second, he does not fully explain the evidence which shows many of Thatcher's policies to be 'unpopular' despite her electoral successes. These gaps

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indicate that there is much about Thatcherism that we still do not understand.

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Ross Coomber

The New Right Politics, Markets and Citizenship

Desmond King, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987, £25.00, paper £7 96, x + 220pp.

In this volume, King has set himself four tasks. First, he seeks to locate, historically, the theoretical underpinnings of both monetarist and supply-side economic theories. Secondly, by providing a critical evaluation of these theories, he simultaneously furnishes both a critique of classical economic liberalism and moral conservatism in which New Right theories have their genesis. Thirdly, by employing T H Marshall's triadic concept of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship, King has demonstrated that, by shifting priorities away from social welfare expenditure (health, education, unemployment benefits and old-age pensions) towards defence and law and order, both the Thatcher and Reagan governments have significantly eroded social rights. Both administrations have attempted to return their economies to pre-war and pre-Keynesian economic conservatism. Finally, King argues that financial reallocations have not been as dramatic as both governments originally desired or in public claim to have achieved. He concludes that the social rights of citizenship cannot be easily diminished, although such contractions will be differentially expedited. (For example, it would be much more difficult for a Swedish or Norwegian government to diminish social welfare rights than it is in Britain and America) King finally argues that the durability of social rights will resuscitate a future version of Keynesianism but this time built on key elements of New Right liberalism, such as the continuity of market allocative mechanisms.

In his first three tasks, King has provided for non-economists an accessible appraisal of the key assumptions of orthodox liberal and conservative economic theories, which includes an account of how their apparent dichotomies (the contradiction between the liberal belief in a free market and limited government and the conservative notion of a strong authoritarian state) are resolved in contemporary political practice. King provides a review of the literature critical

of New Right theorists, particularly F.A. Hayek and M. Friedman. In chapter six, there is a particularly valuable discussion of rational choice theory which is depicted as a variant of New Right theory. However, a brief discussion of pluralism and elite theories would have been a useful addition because it is often not made clear to students of political economy that these theories are themselves responses to the inadequacies of orthodox economic theory.

King has made an innovative theoretical connection between the empirical changes in government expenditure and the conceptual apparatus provided by Marshall showing the decline in the social rights of citizenship. However, neither monetarism nor supply-side economics can unilaterally destroy the basis of welfare-state institutions. In other words, Keynesian welfare services cannot regress indefinitely from their present position as hard-won, indispensable rights back to their erstwhile form as passive privileges. Daniel Bell's account of this transformation in his fiscal sociology would be well included in any future discussion of this issue.

The main criticism of this thesis is the uncritical acceptance of the narrow national bias in Marshall's account of citizenship. King's prognosis of economic revival is constructed entirely within a national economic framework. This scant recognition of the globalisation of economic forces is surprising given that the EEC is premised on the post-Keynesian phenomenon of the internationalisation of economic forces. Further, the growing discrepancy between the internationalisation of capital and the national configuration of political forces (both state administrations and labour organisations) renders impractical a set of policy proposals based on a national framework. For example, the acceptance by unions of an incomes policy in return for an incomes-redistribution scheme and increased industrial democracy must assume that governments can and will attempt to incorporate capital into a profit-sharing solution. However, there is little evidence to suggest that either international corporations or British and American governments could or would seek a neo-corporatist arrangement based upon such co-operation.

Indeed, the construction of economic trading communities is an attempt to contain the lawless nature of global capital movements. Further, King's enthusiasm for the economic programme of the economist, M. Nuti, for a rentable surplus labour-force ignores a fundamental implication of the social rights of citizenship. Marshall

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did not specify the notion of self-determination, but it is a fundamental precursor to the modern idea of social rights. Self-determination means the right to a secure economic future, but that also includes the right to participate in decisions about the conditions of social existence. An authoritarian allocation of labour denies the basis of this right. Such arbitrary power would meet with apathy and/or concerted opposition on the part of labour, and justly so.

The value of this book lies not in its prognosis for a revival of Keynesianism based on a form of nationalist neo-corporatism. That era has surely passed. However, it does merit recognition in providing non-economists with a critical assessment of the values and assumptions of classical and contemporary economics; it is precisely against such misplaced assumptions that political economy and sociology stridently take their departure.

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Karen L. Lane

The Politics of Local Government

Gerry Stoker, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £25.00, paper £7.95, xvii + 294pp.

This is a substantial, wide-ranging survey of local government. It will provide a good introduction for anyone, especially undergraduates, approaching the area for the first time. Necessarily in a work of this nature, in which so much ground is covered in such a limited space, some issues are dealt with only summarily.

This is true particularly of the chapter where theories of local government and politics are considered. As a theoretical perspective on the local state is crucial to understanding local government and local politics, both the number of theories considered and the space devoted to them is disappointingly small. Moreover, as local state theory is dealt with in fairly cursory fashion in most textbooks this is an area where a gap could have been filled.

Stoker takes up a number of issues of specific interest to sociologists. Perhaps the most important of these concerns the social context within which local government policy-making takes place. Stoker clearly disagrees with those arguments which stress that local government is simply influenced and dominated by business interests. He convincingly shows that the relationship

between local councils and 'interest groups' varies according to the political aims of the local council. Hence in some new urban left councils community groups, women's groups, gay and lesbian groups, trade unions and groups of black activists have had a fairly big input into council activities. But, while he accepts the importance of structural, and in particular economic, constraints on what local authorities can achieve, Stoker underplays the crucial importance of these factors. If private investment is to come to particular local authority areas, local authorities must adopt acceptable policies. No local authority can afford to antagonise private capital for a long period if the local economy is not to suffer. Hence, while the open influence of different groups is important, the covert, structural influence different groups and classes can bring to bear is more important.

None of which is to suggest it makes no difference who is elected to run local councils. The point being made is that local councils will be constrained in what they can do by structural factors endemic to advanced capitalist societies, unless they can mobilise mass support and action capable of producing radical changes in the capitalist social order.

Within local government, Stoker argues that influence does not lie solely with a tight group of leading councillors and senior council officers. For him the ruling party group on the council, lower level council officers and ward councillors can all exercise influence. However, Stoker does not deny the crucial role played by senior officers in all councils and their unrivalled dominance in many.

For Stoker central government has not been totally successful in its efforts to control local government, and especially new left councils, since 1979. However, he probably underestimates the extent to which the room for manoeuvre of local councils has been very severely limited by central government action over the past nine years.

Stoker is generally excellent in putting developments in local government into a social and historical perspective. He shows, convincingly, that low pay in local government is widespread and not only an issue of class but also a question of gender as the majority of low paid workers in local government are women. His views on how local government might, and should, develop are also thought provoking and unusual in a work of this sort.

In considering the growth of non elected local government, and its implications for elected local government, Stoker's analysis is

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particularly topical. Non elected local government has developed a pace in recent years, with the process pushed along by central government efforts to find ways of getting its policies implemented despite obstruction from local councils – the establishment of UDCs is a prime example of this. But local councils themselves have helped the process along through the introduction of Enterprise Boards and the privatisation of services. Proposals in the Great Education Reform Act, the Local Government Act and the Housing Act, will extend the process still further.

Building on past work, the chapter on the urban left is informative. Interesting issues about the relationship between the left councils and the council trade unions and particularly NALGO are raised. The issue of the role of trade unions in the process of socialist change in local government and whether the interests of trade unions and the users of council services are the same are considered. Such questions have implications far beyond local government, affecting the whole debate about the relationship between trade union practice and socialist politics and the way in which public services should be organised.

While industrial relations in local government is given some consideration in the work, it is a pity that Stoker did not examine this issue in more detail. This is a vital subject in understanding local government and one which has been largely neglected in textbooks.

Another area worthy of more consideration is the development of the new right in local government. The effect which Conservative central government policy and attitudes are having on Conservative local government would have been a fascinating issue to examine.

Despite my reservations I have to say that this book is to be recommended for its qualities as a survey of the field. I am sure the book will make an excellent and stimulating introductory text.

University of Sheffield

Peter McLaverty

J. Baudrillard, Selected Writings

edited and introduced by Mark Poster, Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £8.50, 219pp.

Baudrillard's work is now widely hailed as the major sociological contribution to postmodernism, perhaps even in postmodern social theory. Until recently few of his works were available and

these not published by mainstream publishers. This selection, to be followed by others, is thus timely. Poster has selected from the career of Baudrillard in chronological order from 1968, and has contributed a brief eight page introduction.

Poster's opinion, in my view highly debatable, is that the intellectual career of Baudrillard has been dominated by Marx, Saussure and Freud. The first period of writing elaborated a neo-marxist analysis of capitalist consumerism, which was followed by a 'social critique of language', a rejection of Marxism (as a mirror of capitalism), an attempt to develop an historical account of 'sign structures'. The next phase (1976), says Poster, draws the 'bleak' conclusion that only death 'escapes' the post '68 social code, is followed by a 'post-structuralist' critique of truth (1979), the 'post-modernist' notion of 'hyperreality' (1981), and the adoption of 'fatal strategy' (1983) – the point of view of the object itself. The way out says Baudrillard (according to Poster) is the 'silence' of the masses. Poster ends with some brief but overwhelmingly damning criticisms. Baudrillard does not define his terms, avoids systematic analysis, overstretches his claims, ignores evidence, ignores the beneficial side of changes which have 'changed society forever, probably for the good', in other words Baudrillard is almost completely wrong.

What can a sociologist make of this? Is it necessary or even possible for a sociologist to read Baudrillard at all? I think sociologists will need considerably more help than Poster provides, but it is possible for although Baudrillard's writings present formidable conceptual difficulties, they owe far more to sociology than Poster allows. Indeed this is even evident from the selection on offer. From the first Baudrillard's so-called 'neo-marxism' was more a structural shell for sociological hosts. The 'over determined' social totality of Baudrillard's work in 1968–72 housed Durkheim, Mauss, Levi-Strauss, Veblen, Galbraith, McLuhan, Reisman, etc. A totality, then, quite different from that of Althusser. In 1976 Baudrillard was quite explicit, 'Saussure's anagrams and Marcel Mauss's gift-exchange will serve as more radical hypotheses than those of Freud and Marx' (p. 119). In a series of dramatic moves, Baudrillard announced that the a-humanism and post-structuralism of Althusser and Derrida and others, could be seen to identify, precisely, the nature of the new post '68 world, in opposition to the previous world where transcendence and social alienation had a meaning, the new world was 'imploding', its high-tech mass culture was now one of endless screen reflections (simulacra).

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transcendence (revolution) rendered obsolete. This new post-alienation 'hyperreal' world was to be read through the Freudian-Saussurean Durkheimians (Bataille, Caillois, Barthes), McLuhanite media theory fused with French Nietzschean poststructuralist anti-epistemology (Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard). In 1978 he was to say that sociology itself, like Marxism, can only understand an expanding universe: his own thought, therefore, was 'exactly the reverse of a "sociological" understanding' ¹

Here we arrive at the threshold. those who wish to follow Baudrillard into postmodernism have to accept a different order of things. Certainly there is a new vocabulary: hyperreality, simulation, seduction, fatal strategy, panic, social implosion. Even the old terms (mass, terrorism) are said not to have any empirical referent, but are to be understood in a new way appropriate to a world without Other. This world has become truly, if sullenly and resentfully, one-dimensional since the masses have taken up as their specific form of 'strategic resistance' a complete infantilism, hyperconformity, passivity, overacceptance. The complement to this: political evil, terrorism. A Nietzschean elitism is never far away in Baudrillard's postmodernism.

It may well appear that this is unknown or unrecognisable territory to sociologists. Not so to those who remember Durkheim's analysis of particular rituals. Baudrillard's analyses, unlike Durkheim's, became a post-sociological poetic, a set of magical incantations applied to, but mirroring, a dying (but not parturient) world so that its tormented soul may be put to rest. Ironically, Baudrillard's essays may end up as the epitaph to a great period of French social thought, glamorised in glossy art magazines – since this magic is also recognised as the perfect – if lurid – ideology of a current in the (post) modern art hypermarket.

University of Loughborough

Mike Gane

Note

1 *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities*, (1983, orig. 1978), *Semiotexte*, p. 4

Science, Technology and Social Change

Steven Yearley, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988, £25.00, paper £8 95, vii + 199pp.

This is a well-written and highly readable text. Steven Yearley continually shifts between the empirical and the theoretical, developing persuasive, if not always overwhelming, arguments. The author states that his aims are two-fold: first, to provide a review of the principal ways in which science and technology currently relate to social change, and second, to distinguish a general theoretical basis on which to build sociological analyses of science, technology and social change (p. v).

The first of these two aims is met fairly competently; the review succeeds in highlighting the need for sociological and political study of the worlds of science and technology. In meeting the second of these aims, Yearley argues for a constructionist approach to the sociological study of scientific decision-making, arguing that such an approach – based upon the claim that ‘there is inevitably an element of social construction in all decision-making’ (p. 185) – is preferred to the more ‘restricted’ political economy approach which apparently maintains that technical decisions may, in principle at least, be asocial. The apparent conflict between these interpretations of science and technology is a central concern of the book.

Chapter one, which deals with particular disputes in, and aspects of, science, provides a critique of rationalist views of scientific knowledge. In chapter two, concerned with the nature of science in general, Yearley considers the emergence and success of science as a social movement to be based upon three factors: resort to robust and flexible ideological resources, institutional strength, and the suitability of science as a legitimatory ideology.

On this last point, Yearley notes the ability of science to ‘naturalise’ social, political or cultural differences, stating that ‘scientific authority could be enlisted in support of social change or in the cause of the status quo’ (p. 65). In this quotation, the main problem of the text becomes apparent. The implication here, and in Yearley’s subsequent rejection of a political economy approach to science in favour of a social constructionist view, is that scientific knowledge and authority are resources that can be used, or phenomena to be socially constructed, towards an infinite number of ends, in the pursuit of aims of any kind. Yet surely there are limits upon the extent to which, and the ends towards

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which, such authority can be used as a tool, and these limits can be related precisely to the political economy within which such authority exists or is exercised. This is not to resort to any form of determinism; it is simply to recognise that a complete (as opposed to a relative) autonomy for science is illusory.

In chapter three, Yearley considers science as a form of work, endorsing the view that the lot of 'technical workers' is becoming more akin to that of manual workers (subject to deskilling, fragmentation and routinisation of tasks, and increasingly alienating). Such a view is rejected as inappropriate, however, as a characterisation of the work of those involved in 'basic research', where, it is claimed, despite increased dependence on State funding, there remains considerable flexibility and discretion on the part of scientific workers.

The concerns of chapter four are with two aspects of the relationships between science, technology, and economic success: on the one hand, justifications for state involvement in science and technology funding – 'market failure' arguments – are considered and criticised; on the other hand, the linear model of innovation, according to which technology derives from science, is rejected.

Chapter five seeks to illustrate the weaknesses of a political economy view and strengths of a social constructionist view of science through a consideration of decision-making in the context of military technology. It is argued that 'social considerations enter into the evaluation of technical criteria even in the case of military technology where the direction of improvement would seem to be particularly straightforward' (p. 143). That is, an 'internal' sociology of technical decision-making is required.

Chapter six attempts to apply the arguments developed about science and technology to the case of the underdeveloped world, considering technology transfer and technological dependency. Many of the arguments here are familiar ones, a more interesting point concerning the role of international debt in perpetuating dependence in a new form is noted but not really explored.

In his concluding chapter, Yearley seems – albeit obliquely – to take account of the more problematic implications of his rejection of a political economy approach, as his case becomes one for a 'Moderate Constructionism'. Thus while it is claimed that 'when an issue is subject to technical decision-making, the outcome will be under-determined by the evidence at hand', so that 'alternative interpretations of the outcome are always possible', this position is moderated by, and sits slightly in tension with, the statement that,

'Science and technology are not mere social constructions, but constructions they are all the same' (p. 184) What, precisely, is a social construction?

Nevertheless, while the validity of his conclusion can be questioned, the practical implications drawn by Yearley need not be dissented from, namely, that scientific experts must be subject to public scrutiny. At a time when concern with at least some consequences of scientific and technological hubris have emerged on local, national, and international political agendas, this conclusion should be the watchword of popular struggles at each of these levels.

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Steve Tombs

The Culture of Capital: Art, Power and The Nineteenth-Century Middle Class

Janet Wolff and John Seed (eds), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988, £35.00, 236pp

Cultural criticism expressed in terms of the decline of the nation has a long and diverse history. Sociology and economics now provide the vocabulary of decay, rather than politics and religion; but the formula remains the same, in that a presently-perceived predicament is treated as the historical outcome of a process with a determinate origin. The process is articulated these days as one of failed or blocked modernisation, sociology and economics are called upon to identify the source of this obstruction. Arguments of this kind have been popular with respect to Russia in 1917, to Germany after 1933, or to Japan in 1945. In each of these cases social and political upheaval has been attributed to a lack of harmony in the social, political and economic processes of industrialisation and modernisation. While Russia was backwards on virtually every indicator, it has frequently been argued that Germany was an advanced industrial nation with a semi-feudal socio-political structure. Elsewhere, it was implied, things had been managed better. For example, in nineteenth-century Britain.

Today, as the editors of this collection of essays point out, the wheel has come full circle: nineteenth-century Britain is identified as the past origin of present British decline. The failure of modernisation in Britain is argued to have a social basis: the

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option of the new Victorian bourgeoisie for aristocratic and hence anti-industrial values, and its rejection of industrial and commercial virtues. Simon Gunn in his contribution to this collection outlines this line of argument as represented by the work of W.D. Rubinstein and Martin Wiener, and makes some telling criticisms of their oft-repeated nostrums. He alludes to the fact that one of Wiener's errors is his failure to notice that the contemporary French and German bourgeoisie were subjected to identical criticisms. In fact Max Weber never ceased complaining about the lack of class consciousness on the part of the German bourgeoisie, their preference for incorporation into obsolete aristocratic orders rather than the development of modern forms of social and political citizenship; but since the subsequent history of Europe has been dominated by the political and economic might of Germany this 'failure' of the German bourgeoisie has since been called upon to explain a predicament quite different to that passed on by the Victorian middle class.

These essays, then, along with a growing body of recent urban cultural history, take issue with the idea that there was some kind of historic 'failure' on the part of the British nineteenth-century bourgeoisie – that there arose, according to Rubinstein, a divide in the later nineteenth-century between the new, northern, industrial class of entrepreneurs on the one hand, and on the other those commercial, financial and professional classes that concentrated themselves around London. The essay by Alan White on mid-century attempts in Sheffield to form linked cultural-educational institutions for the working and middle classes respectively highlights furthermore how important Dissent was for the definition of local politics, religious factors sometimes cutting across more conventional party-political and class affiliations.

The importance of Dissent in forming a basis for radical bourgeois politics in early nineteenth-century Britain has long been recognised, especially with respect to the development of Manchester's economic liberalism. But this was not an isolated phenomenon – it played an important role in the development of municipal politics and culture up and down the country through the course of the nineteenth century. The contributors to this volume realised at an early stage in their joint research that it would in principle be possible to develop an analysis of the 'cultural revolution' (p. 9) in the North on a broad front – embracing brass bands, the formation of the Hallé Orchestra, local writing, even the urban architectural fabric. More realistically,

however, they have here chiefly confined their attention to the visual arts

As with all such collaborative work there are gaps and at times a need for a heavy editorial hand to force through the general themes in the midst of detail. It is a pity too that in a highly-priced book devoted principally to the visual arts the publisher has chosen to place all the (regrettably) poor-quality illustrations in a single bunch – not only does this hamper the reading of text and image, some important details are obscure, and in one or two cases the illustrations have been cropped to exclude features referred to in the text. Despite this, Caroline Arscott provides a fascinating account of the relation between the commissioning and conception of Holman Hunt's *The Awakening Conscience*, in which the relation between Fairbairn, a Manchester-based engineer, the artist and contemporary taste are well juxtaposed. Fairbairn's apprehension of an image in terms both of moral and economic values, as husband and as employer, is related to Hunt's own conceptions in creating a thematic series of paintings, which are then in turn appraised publicly in exhibition and criticism.

This social aspect of the visual image is evident in the remaining contributions – by John Seed on art patronage in Manchester, by Caroline Arscott on Polytechnic Exhibitions in Leeds, and by Arscott, Wolff and Pollock on the visual representation of the industrial city. As emphasised in the introduction, this is a study in middle-class culture and at the same time a contribution to our knowledge of the Victorian middle classes. These classes have left a wealth of material for historians – their activities and proclivities literally shaped the new industrial towns and cities. A new social history of the bourgeoisie is in the making, and this book is a useful contribution to a better understanding of the cultural impact of industrialisation.

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Keith Tribe

Microcircuits of Capital 'Sunrise' Industry and Uneven Development

Kevin Morgan and Andrew Sayer, Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £35.00, xi + 321pp.

This analysis of the electronics industry's political economy is lucid, timely and welcome. It is an outstanding example of the

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cross-fertilizing insights on economic change emerging from sociology, geography and economics. It is also refreshing for its reflexive approach to influential radical conceptualisations of industrial change, constantly confronting these theories with the full complexity of empirical evidence. The result is an exceptionally informative study which debunks the optimistic hype around IT and electronics whilst simultaneously challenging simple one-dimensional radical interpretations. Their analysis of Britain's electronics industry is generally one of qualified pessimism, though the impact of foreign investment in Britain is portrayed in subtly varying shades of grey. Their account of the centrality of state involvement in the various arms of the electronics industry is not unfamiliar but it is excellently documented, and the concomitant conclusions on current Thatcherite policy are trenchantly drawn.

The structure of the book is wide-ranging; the heart of it lies in an empirical overview of the global electronics industry as the context for detailed accounts of its structure and impact in South Wales and in the M4 Corridor. Scotland is also discussed in some detail. In each of these areas the industry is broken down into its highly distinct sectors: semiconductors, electronics, computer systems and telecommunications. Their analysis combines concerns for the economic determinants of market stability and instability, for explaining location decisions and for tracing changes in the labour process. In each of these they argue for multi-dimensional explanations, criticising simpler hypotheses deriving from the radical/Marxist perspective within which they locate themselves. The authors regard generalisations about the globalization of production and the new international division of labour with doubt. These are too sweeping and too focused on worst cases (such as Free Trade Zones) as exemplars of current change. They are insistent that in sophisticated, product-innovating industries there are many determinants at work besides the polarisation and deskilling of labour. Firms will vary greatly on how far they can fragment the production process and globalise it, much of electronics outside the mass consumer sector is tightly tied to its specialist markets – above all to the state. The authors are perhaps over-insistent in their denials of crude Bravermania; they do not address current debates about 'post-Fordism' and 'flexible specialisation'.

In their detailed aggregation of information on British regions their focus on uneven development is illuminating. They stress inequalities within and across regions, partly dispelling optimism

about the industry's impact on Scotland and South Wales. They do not deny growth and development but they do illustrate its highly uneven character, not only in employment terms (where they are sensitive to skill and gender issues), but also in terms of changing management styles and union strategies. Again, they emphasise how debilitating it is to explain strategic economic decisions primarily in terms of the capital-labour relation, neglecting relations to other firms and to the state.

The theoretical discussions which open and close the book do less to convince the reader than its detailed substance. Assertions about capital and its subjection to 'the law of value' are made at such a level of generality that they look gestural rather than profoundly explanatory. But there is good discussion of the ideology and myth surrounding electronics, and of the significance of spatial analysis. Certainly, non-Marxist readers should not fear that the book's analysis is vitiated by its professed theoretical roots. The authors' emphasis on uneven development, with its sensitive account of economic strategies and their unintended effects, is one that should have wide appeal and influence. It demonstrates the constructive potential in cross-disciplinary accounts of economic change. It will be interesting to relate this material to that from the ESRC Economic Life initiative. This book amplifies the case for an industrial policy more constructive than neo-liberalism.

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and Technology*

Kevin Bonnett

The Economics of Television: The UK Case

Richard Collins, Nicholas Garnham, Gareth Locksley. Sage Publications, London, 1987, £16.95 viii + 136pp

This is a study of present and future proposals for the financing of television in the United Kingdom. It was inspired by the publication in 1986 of the Peacock Report and commissioned by the Greater London Council in its final days. Five chapters overall examine the domestic and international broadcasting markets (in as much detail as is made imperfectly available) as well as the unique features of the broadcasting commodity (which does not yield itself to orthodox economic theory). The authors concur with

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Peacock that the present UK system is riddled by 'self-perpetuating privilege exercised by insiders in their own rather than the public interest' (p. 113). They agree that any broadcasting system should be based on the 'robust championship of the sovereign consumer' (p. 114). Further, they assert that the notion of a passive and vulnerable consumer (as described by the Pilkington Report in 1962) has been created primarily by (upper) class-biased, elitist and patronising senior civil servants and broadcasters for whom the concept serves mainly to gratify their own self-interests at the expense of a discerning and participating audience.

The question remains: what kind of system can offer diversity and quality? The authors make the critical point, in contradistinction to Peacock, that choice among channels is not always the same as program diversity. Further, the viability of each broadcaster (public or private) is premised upon their capacity to offer audiences a complete range of program styles. It follows from this that 'ghettoisation' of the BBC would severely damage consumer choice. The Peacock Committee adopted Jay's model of the perfectly competitive publishing market, which assumes that audience sovereignty can be achieved through greater competition. Market competitiveness can be created through more channels, and more channels can be delivered through new fibre optics. Thus, for Peacock, more channels are equated with greater program diversity. *The Economics of Television* argues against this Peacock assumption. First, the printing and newspaper industries are not perfectly competitive. Indeed, they are characterised by oligopolistic tendencies. Second, the market for information and cultural goods (that is, broadcasting) has been and always will be imperfect, because signalling devices between sovereign consumers and producers will always be imperfect. The Peacock proposal would create a hugely expensive technological infrastructure so that minority groups might then exercise choice amongst an infinite number of channels. Yet this solution has proved unsuccessful in the United States in relation to cable networks and it proved unsatisfactory in the UK with regard to basic telephony. Although the authors admit that the existing terrestrial system is far from adequate, it has achieved some successes, such as a positive balance of trade; institutions strong enough to annoy government and other centres of power; greater diversity of programming than the US and other European public-service systems (despite a greater choice among channels in Europe and the US); a reasonable level of advertising, and, finally, 1

has offered 'moments of astonishing originality and power' (pp. 123-4).

The essential point of the argument is that alleviation of spectrum scarcity will not introduce more choice, only more channels. Peacock and post-Peacock policies which allow for more domestic and internationally-based channels will merely exert downward pressure on revenues and costs. In the long-term, audiences should expect to view cheaper imported programs, more repeats and more in-house series requiring lower budgets (such as quiz shows and cooking demonstrations). Research suggests that a choice in *minority* programming will be offered only if twenty channels compete in a given television market. Although the Peacock projection could easily achieve that density, the massive costs involved would far exceed the costs and the benefits of modifying (through new political institutions) the existing, but flawed terrestrial system. The exact nature of these institutions is not explained. Presumably, they would correct present tax evasion practices and redirect those funds towards the production of specialist program categories. These productions might then satisfy those social groups currently dispossessed of representation within the broadcasting system.

One can highly recommend this book. It applies to policies well beyond the Peacock era, and is directed towards both non-economists and economists. Although it is specifically aimed at the UK case, the book raises issues which have, within the economics of communication, global importance. As such, it makes an indispensable companion-piece for political and sociological approaches to broadcasting and communication issues.

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Teenagers and Teenpics: The Juvenilization of American Movies in the 1950s

Thomas Doherty, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988, £28.00, paper £8.95, xi + 275pp.

It is not often that one picks up a study of cinema which opens with a quote from Joan Collins – especially when the quote is meant to be read as a perceptive comment on the film industry. None the less,

this is how Thomas Doherty opens his study of the teenpic. This is significant because it illustrates that Doherty is rarely embarrassed when handling materials which many others would either regard as unworthy of their attention, or as purely ideological objects from which to distance themselves. Thus, Doherty takes the teenpic seriously, identifying many of the economic and social struggles which shaped it, and he attempts to define the teenpic as a form of genre. This does present problems though, because the teenpic is not defined by its form, but by the audience to which it is directed. As a result, the teenpic has drawn on most other genre forms such as the crime thriller, the musical, horror, and science fiction. However, Doherty's reason for defining the teenpic as a genre is that the concept of genre acknowledges that the individual film is a member of a 'wider filmic community' (p. 11). His claim is that this allows an analytical movement between the general and the particular which enables him to identify relations between a number of different films.

However, the main strength of Doherty's argument is that he does not set out a specific formal definition of the teenpic as genre. Instead he refers the teenpic to its social and economic history, charting its development in relation to the decline of the cinema audience and the rise of the teenager as a subculture. His argument therefore avoids the formalism which is so pervasive in film criticism in particular and in genre criticism in general:

One useful change in perspective probes the development, not the definition, of genres. It begins with a recognition that anomalies and double entries are endemic to the very concept and proceeds to address the problem by sidestepping it. The standard genre questions of classification, of ideal form, even of meaning are subordinated to the primary question of inception: where do genres – for the present purpose, where do teenpics – come from? (p. 13)

With this question in mind, Doherty provides a history of the decline of the cinema audience, in which he discusses the impact of suburbanization and the rise of independent films. This involves a discussion both of Hollywood's fear of the television and of the loosening of its hold over the process of exhibition, and it includes some amusing accounts of the way in which Hollywood responded to these threats with gimmicks which offered forms of content or

technology with which television could not compete, including stinkers such as 'AromaRama' and 'smellovision'.

Doherty's argument is that with the decline in cinema attendance, Hollywood became preoccupied with the audience for the first time in its history, and that it began to become aware of the importance of teenagers as a group. However, it is in Doherty's account of this group that he is at his weakest, and this is related to the term 'subculture', which he uses to describe teenagers as a group. Thus, while he argues that teenagers were feared as a violent and subversive group, he also acknowledges that they were nurtured by American consumer culture. The problem is really that while the forms of generational identification within the teenage group were important, they allow Doherty to largely ignore the distinctions of class, race, gender, and region which were also involved.

None the less, the majority of Doherty's book is concerned with the ways in which Hollywood came to identify teenagers as an audience which was vital to its economic future, and developed ways of attracting them into the cinemas. This involves a series of studies which look at Rock 'n' Roll films, films about juvenile delinquency, horror movies, and the 'clean' teenpics. In these studies, his argument is that these forms arise out of continual struggle between the teenage audience, the film industry, and other groups in American society. For example, he argues that the 'clean' teenpics represented a reaction against the more subversive forms of the 1950s, though he maintains that the mid-1960s saw teenagers dictating the terms of their films once more. However, it is in his assessment of the period from the mid-1960s onwards that Doherty seems most unclear. Thus, while he seems to champion teenpic film-makers like John Hughes in reaction against the art-house Europhilia which spawns filmmakers like Merchant-Ivory – in a manner to which I am sympathetic – he also seems to suggest that the critical edge of the teenpic has been blunted by both parental liberalism and the erosion of the boundaries between the subculture and the mainstream. In fact, he maintains that in most contemporary teenpics the main threat to the protagonists are other teenagers. This lack of clarity may be related to a kind of 1950s nostalgia which is also visible in his distinction between the environmentalism of Warner Brothers in the 1930s and 1940s, and the Freudianism of the teenpic in the 1950s. Thus, for largely unjustified reasons, Doherty rejects this supposed 'environmentalism' in favour of Freudianism.

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The Freudian temper of the 1950s offered no escape as convenient as Warner Brothers environmentalism. Departing from values held even by the reputedly "subversive" gangster films, they imply there is something very wrong with the American family – or, more precisely, American parents . . . This tack turns the moral universe of classical Hollywood cinema upside-down. (pp. 124–5)

However, this conclusion does not necessarily follow. Instead this Freudianism can be linked to the denials of social conflict which were a feature of 1950s America, where subversion was often defined in terms of individual or group pathology, and this can be related to Doherty's own comments on the conversion of the gangster from a contradictory, tragic hero in the 1930s and 1940s, to malevolent psychopath of the 1950s.

None the less, Doherty's book is a witty, readable study which at least tries to analyse films in relation to their social history, rather than through a formalist stencil.

University of Keele

Mark Jancovich

The Abolitionists. The Family and Marriage Under Attack

Ronald Fletcher, Routledge, London, 1988, £25 00, paper £8 95, x + 230pp

I should begin this review by declaring an interest. Almost fifteen years ago I published a book which dealt with several of the texts referred to in this volume; in particular, the works of feminists such as Millett, Freidan, Mitchell and Greer as well as with the writings of Laing *et al.* in so far as all these works had relevance for theories of the family. I happen to think that it was, although dated in some respects, a better book than *The Abolitionists*; it was certainly more balanced in its assessments. *Social Theory and The Family* appears in the list of further reading at the back of his 'companion' volume, *The Shaking of the Foundations* but there is no further referencing. So possibly this present review is biased.

The Abolitionists is subtitled 'The Family and Marriage Under Attack'. If any doubts as to the aim of the book still exist, these are removed in the first sentence where he states it as being, '... to take issue with those criticisms of the past twenty years which have advocated (or in some cases, have *seemed* to advocate) the

abolition of the family and marriage . . . ' (p. 1. his emphasis) The qualification is important for, by the end of the book, Fletcher has argued convincingly that most of the works under critical examination did *not*, in fact, advocate the abolition of the family in any straightforward sense. What, then, is all the fuss about?

He considers five alleged sources of attack: the well-known or notorious few sentences in Leach's 1967 Reith Lectures, the writings of Laing, Esterson and Cooper; some 'New Left' interpretations of Marx and Engels (mostly Robin Blackburn and Juliet Mitchell); the 'New Feminists' and the commune movement. Simply to outline such a list of contents is, in 1988/9 and the tenth year of Thatcherism, to sound like an exercise in nostalgia. There is a case for a book which provides a sober re-analysis of these texts and their possible influences, placed in a historical context, but this is not that book. At its worst, when for example the author refers to 'Women's Libbers', the book seems like a somewhat disagreeable settling of old scores.

The chapter on feminism is the longest one in the book and one which clearly demonstrates the dated quality of this book. Here the attack is directed against Friedan (at least, the early version), Greer (early and late models) and Millett with approving references to Elaine Morgan. Since part of Fletcher's objections to such writings is that the 'New Feminism' has inappropriately imported American ideas into a British context, it is curious that there are no references to, let alone sustained discussions of, the work of more recent British feminist sociologists. We would expect, for example, some reference to Oakley (perhaps the most outstanding omission) and to Backett, Barrett and McIntosh, Burgoyne, Finch, Graham, Land, Leonard, Jan Pahl and Smart – the list could be extended. Similarly I fail to find discussion or even mention of male sociologists such as Allen, Bell, Bernardes, Edgell, Harris and Ray Pahl (etc.) all of whom, in different ways, feel that feminism has had something to contribute to our understanding of the family and society. Given Fletcher's clear approval of Young and Willmott's *The Symmetrical Family*, it might be reasonable to expect some treatment of those studies which have come to rather different conclusions. Similarly again, in turning to the chapter on communes, one where the author complains about the relative paucity of material, we find no reference of what is perhaps the major study in this area, that of Abrams and McCulloch. It is all, to use one of Fletcher's favourite expressions, rather 'half-baked'.

In the course of this vigorously worded polemic, Fletcher does raise some interesting issues and make some telling criticisms. The brief discussion of the impact of war on the writings of Lawrence, Miller and Mailer (in the section on Millett), for example, suggests themes worth developing. But overall the discussion suffers from the kind of excess of which Fletcher often accuses his subjects. The detailed way in which he quotes the obscenities used by Millett and Greer only in order to condemn them is somewhat reminiscent of our popular Sunday newspapers. More important perhaps, there is a lack of any kind of rigorous discussion of the range of meanings and understandings of the term 'family', ideologically, professionally and in everyday life. What many, if not all, critics of 'the family' are arguing about is not so much any thing-like institution but rather certain ideological constructions or mystifications. This is surely the point of the passage from 'The Communist Manifesto' which Fletcher examines in some detail.

The author reminds his readers that this book is 'in the fullest sense' a companion to his other book, *The Shaking of the Foundations, Family and Society* (Routledge 1988). This other volume, in part an up-dating of his very influential Penguins, is a more substantial book (although not without its excesses) in relation to which this work under review can only be seen as a petulant appendix.

University of Manchester

David H.J. Morgan

Problems of Childhood and Adolescence

Michael Kerfoot and Alan Butler, Macmillan Education, London, 1988, £20.00, paper £6.95, viii + 159 pp.

This is a volume in a series published in collaboration with the British Association of Social Workers. The series covers a wide range of topics many of which (for example, those on child abuse, sexual abuse, youth work, child care and children and the courts) are also relevant to childhood and adolescence. The series arose from a survey of social workers which discovered those areas which practitioners felt were most in need of new literature. The declared aim is to fill these gaps with short but coherent text which will inform practitioners and stimulate discussion.

This particular volume focuses on 'the problems of childhoo

and adolescence' within the context of 'normal development' and 'the influence of the family and wider environmental factors'. It draws primarily on child psychiatry using research and opinion to discuss the underlying 'causal factors' and suggest lines of intervention. The book opens with a sketch of the social work context, which briefly examines the organisation of services and the options of intervention (which in this account include individual casework, behaviour therapy, marital therapy, family therapy, and group therapy). The following chapters each discuss specific problems, such as eating and sleeping difficulties, school attendance, drug and substance abuse and attempted suicide. The chapters follow a set pattern. Each problem is defined and an assessment of its prevalence made. This is followed with an account of current theoretical perspectives and a discussion of the options for social workers. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points and a number of brief case studies showing how principles were put into practice and problems (successfully or otherwise) handled.

In reviewing such a book for a sociological journal two different questions are pertinent. They are, does the book meet its own aims, and is its sociological content adequate? The book seems to work as a popular summary of recent thinking in child psychiatry. It is clear, concise and tailored for the audience to whom it is addressed. In these terms it meets the first aim of the series. Whether it will stimulate discussion seems to me to be more doubtful. In part this is because the summary of current research and theories often veers too close to recipe knowledge. There is little discussion of the uncertainties of knowledge in the field and more effort could have been made to involve readers in the dilemmas confronting social workers. Suggested further reading is scant and hardly calculated to take the reader into the complexities of the topics it covers.

The authors' selection of 'problems' seems to me to be a conservative one. Any short introductory book would, of course, have to make a selection – but what criteria should be used? The authors choose the 'problems' which they say are most commonly presented to health and welfare professionals. It is perhaps this which means the focus is almost exclusively on individual behavioural problems as seen from an adult perspective. Issues such as sexism, racism and the impact of poverty on children are hardly mentioned. The definition of problems from an adult perspective seems to exclude children's own definition of what

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constitutes a problem. This is odd since the focus of welfare agencies seems to have been moving in this direction with, for example, the introduction of children's telephone helplines. These would suggest that issues such as sexual abuse, bullying and personal relationships deserve more than the passing attention which they receive. For these reasons I think the book is unlikely to open up any new perspectives, although it may be a useful summary of the 'state of the art' in individual casework.

The sociological content of the book is slight. This is surprising given the amount of work which exists on issues such as substance abuse and schooling, much of which is relevant to the topics discussed. Where social research is mentioned it is somewhat dated (for example, in the section on drug abuse only two references, one from the 1950s, the other from the 1970s are mentioned). In relation to school attendance the perspective which focuses on how disaffection is produced within the schooling system is mentioned but not developed. On the whole when 'social factors' are introduced into the discussion they appear as possible 'causal' variables within the situation. There is little attempt to examine the construction of social meaning by and for children and young people – again a surprising omission given the extensive literature on youth subcultures.

Of course the book is not intended as a sociological one, but in that case I would have liked to see the actual orientation of the book, which is largely a child and family psychiatry one, more clearly acknowledged and explained. The title may also have been more carefully considered since that chosen implies a wider perspective than that actually employed. Finally, if there were more cross referencing to other titles in the series these deficiencies may have been mitigated. As it stands the book is one of the less interesting contributions to the series of which it forms a part.

South Bank Polytechnic

Alan Prout

Within School Walls: the Role of Discipline, Sexuality and the Curriculum

Ann Marie Wolpe, Routledge, London, 1988, £7.95, vii + 295pp

This book is an ambitious attempt to explore the ways in which female gender roles and gender identity are constructed and reinforced in the secondary school. It stands out from some other

in some ways similar books, because it is both theoretically informed (although at times the insistence on almost all chapters beginning with a rapid gallop through previous theories becomes tedious) and challenges some of the accepted wisdom on what happens to girls at school, particularly the notion that all girls undergo similar experiences and emerge in similar ways. Based on a longitudinal observation and interview study of a comprehensive school begun in 1972, it utilises qualitative data obtained over quite a long period of time, including interviews with former pupils after they had left school. Although Wolpe is particularly concerned with exploring what happens to female and male pupils in the classroom and after they leave, she also tries to emphasise the structural as well as ideological influences on gender identity, focusing primarily on the school. There is also some attempt to take account of what happens outside educational institutions. Within the school, her particular concern is with three aspects of schooling – the disciplinary control applied to pupils, the ways in which sexuality arises in school and the moral code pupils are expected to adhere to and finally the curriculum. The theoretical orientation of the book is within a Marxist feminist framework, although the concern with discipline leads to an early and potentially interesting excursion into Foucault, which unfortunately does not surface very much again after the first three chapters.

The best part of the book is to be found in the early chapters, where Wolpe looks carefully at how discipline and control are administered in the classroom and takes apart the idea that girls' and boys' classroom experiences are only determined by gender considerations, pointing out that many other factors contribute to those experiences, including forms of control used inside and outside the school, race and ethnicity (although these two influences are not adequately explored by her account), class, peer culture and family. Wolpe's statement on page twenty that 'Discipline does not recognize gender or other differences' is not fully supported by her subsequent analysis, especially the sections looking at the influence of sexuality on pupils and teachers. However, Wolpe is able to point out that girls are not uniformly passive in school and boys overwhelmingly disruptive and noisy – both sexes are capable of a range of behaviours – and she also shows that whilst most teachers in the research school held stereotypical views about the two genders, they were not always consistent in those beliefs and hence, for instance, sometimes overlooked incidences of noisy and disruptive behaviour by girls.

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Wolpe's rich data from her pupil interviews also shows clearly that girls do not just conform to gender stereotypes, an important qualifier to some of the other research on gender and education and she further suggests that mixed secondary schools are not just places where boys sexually harass girls, although the datedness of her research makes this finding less useful than it might otherwise be. The chapters on sexuality also make interesting reading, especially the description of sex education, currently a topical issue because of the 1986 Education Act requirement for school governors to ensure that such education takes account of 'family life'. There is also good material on how sexuality intrudes into school experiences as adolescent pupils became more aware of their developing sexual identity, for girls this is particularly important as it appears often to distract them from their studies at a key point in their educational careers.

The most disappointing section of the book is that part which deals with the curriculum. The same old material on sexism in the curriculum so worked over in the gender and education literature is dragged out and although Wolpe does emphasise the important point that working-class girls are no more and no less likely to be academic achievers or to acquire vocationally relevant skills than their male counterparts, so much has happened and continues to happen in the school curriculum since the data was collected, that this part of the book looks particularly dated. Her data show the limited horizons and post school achievements of many of the pupils but this point has now been made so much more strongly by so many more recently conducted studies that her own dated evidence adds little new to our knowledge. Despite Wolpe's frequent assertions throughout the book that structural factors are key determinants of what happens to boys and girls in schools, the overwhelming emphasis in the study seems to be on blaming schools and teachers for what happens to their working-class pupils. This is particularly inappropriate at a time when teachers and the educational system are under heavy attack from all quarters and shows Wolpe's inability to empathise with the conditions under which teachers as well as their pupils work. Nevertheless, some of Wolpe's findings do challenge accepted wisdom in the field of gender and education and this plus her exploration of discipline and sexuality within the school, make the book well worth reading, although it is a pity that the study took so long to see the light of day.

The Open University

Rosemary Deem

Education, Training and the New Vocationalism

Andrew Pollard, June Purvis and Geoffrey Walford (eds), Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988, £25.00, paper £9.95, 206pp

This book is based on papers given at a conference, in 1986, of researchers using ethnographic and interactionist approaches. Under this general heading, the eleven papers collected here provide a varied and extremely illuminating set of studies of 'the new vocationalism'.

The papers are presented in three sections representing 'the teacher's experience', the 'young people's experience' and 'ethnography and social policy'. The last contains a single, extremely interesting paper by Janet Finch which, together with the first two papers in the volume (by the editors and by Maurice Holt and William Reid) are not themselves studies but, rather, provocative reviews of the issues raised by both the Conference's topic and its participants' method. Together with the varied range of settings in which the New Vocationalism is studied, this combination makes for an exceptionally interesting book.

Holt and Reid, in a wide ranging and informative paper, consider the effect of '14-18 rhetoric' upon the '11-16 curriculum' within the context of a discussion of instrumentalism and education. When considering the issue of 'balance' between liberal and vocational elements in the curriculum, they suggest that this is really 'a question of rethinking liberal education so that it can be offered in an engaging and morally defensible way to all pupils' (p. 29). The *educational* possibilities within the New Vocationalism will not be realised until we 'reject the delusions of vocationalism' (p. 30). These 'delusions' are well represented in the studies which follow.

The problems revealed reflect the complexities inherent within the situations examined. They have to do with attempting to match expectations (of pupils, parents and teachers) and the promises which innovative courses seem to offer with the real possibilities actually open to young people.

An issue which occurs in a number of papers is well summarised by Hustler: for pupils and parents, 'the category 'school' is tied to the activity 'proper learning' (p. 85). Although many young people will positively appreciate the differences between these new regimes and conventional schooling, they may not acknowledge what they are doing as 'proper learning', even when they have not especially enjoyed 'proper learning' or gained much from it.

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Innovations can violate 'deeply rooted notions as to what constitutes a recognisable learning experience' (*loc cit*). As a result teachers will (as Evans and Davies suggest) often find their innovative courses pushed back into 'reproductive' rather than 'transformative' forms.

There is a dual problem for teachers, here. While the pupils/trainees often reject the 'educational' aspects of courses as not 'proper learning', they also, on the basis of their own class experience, reject the 'vocational' dimension as not reflecting what 'the world of work' is *really* about. Shilling, for instance, shows students operating with a very different notion of 'teamwork' from that being formally presented. It had to do with 'helping your mates out' (e.g. if they were skiving) rather than 'working longer hours for a piece of piss for someone else.' (p. 105). Ironically, at the end of a 'Factories and Industry' course, a large proportion of the students no longer wanted to work in large factories (p. 106)!

Such contradictions and tensions abound and represent the mismatch which can occur between the knowledge which is formally permissible in courses and the realities of the labour market and production. As Buswell points out, 'the secondary labour market is organised on the basis of low commitment, high turnover, and dependency, while education and training assumes high commitment, career orientation, self-fulfilment and individual choice' (p. 181). Unfortunately, these unrealistically positive representations of work are often associated with equally unreal, but *negative*, models of the young people themselves. Mac An Ghail notes how both male and female teachers 'systematically ignored the wealth of experience that young women acquire within the context of the family' (p. 124). The New Vocationalism too often constructs deficit models of young people which deny the knowledge, skills and competencies they in fact possess and offers instead alternatives which have no real relevance to the actual conditions of working life.

The challenge for the type of liberal education advocated by Holt and Reid is to be able to acknowledge, accommodate and extend the real knowledge that pupils actually possess. To a large extent this must involve engagement with the *active* decision-making processes which Holland's paper on girls and occupational choice illustrates. An extremely welcome feature of the papers as a whole is their strong presentation of pupils as *active* which is reflected in attempts by Rosie, and other contributors, to construe

classifications of the positional structures and orientations which emerge within the different types of settings studied.

Burgess's paper on Newsom and the New Vocationalism raises the issue of qualitative change – is the New Vocationalism really *new*? It is through the kind of detailed presentation of *complexities* that these papers exhibit that answers to this question could be attempted. By the same token they indicate the problems in realising the new liberal education suggested by Holt and Reid and support Finch's view of how ethnography can effectively support policy debates.

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Robert Moore

The Sociology of Old Age

Graham Fennell, Chris Phillipson and Helen Evers, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988, £25 00, paper £8 95, 200pp

Over the last decade, there has been a steady growth in academic interest in social gerontological issues. Fennell, Phillipson and Evers have moved this process one stage further with their excellent new book *The Sociology of Old Age*. Such a book has taken a long time to arrive. As the authors point out, they have produced the first book in the United Kingdom with a title explicitly linking sociology and old age.

The book is organised into three main parts. Part one starts by making a general argument for developing a sociology of old age which will critically address diversity in later life rather than just 'welfarising' or 'pathologising' the poorest and the frailest. Following chapters in this section look at the history of old age, social theory and old age, and researching old age. The history chapter illustrates the need to reject images of a golden past where the family cared more than now and where older people were venerated. The social theory chapter offers a critique of functionalist theories of ageing with their emphasis upon the naturalness of disengagement by elderly people from the rest of society. This is compared to the advantages of pursuing a political economy approach which emphasises the social construction of old age as 'a product of a particular division of labour and structure of inequality rather than a natural concomitant of the ageing process' (p. 53).

Part two of the book reflects the sensitivity of the authors to

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issues of gender and race as well as class. Separate chapters look at men and retirement, women and old age, and race, ethnicity and old age. An excellent feature of all three chapters is the clever use of pen portraits that illustrate the diversity of experiences and situations in later life. The final part of the book looks at the 'welfare' end of ageing by providing separate chapters on old age in special settings and on death and dying. The authors argue in their concluding chapter that 'people actively construct their lives with the resources at their disposal' (p. 172). One task of a sociology of old age is to explore the processes that define this differential allocation of resources and how these are used creatively by older people. Another central task is to discourage 'moral panics' about the implications of an ageing population by offering a 'rigorous and dispassionate analysis of the circumstances and implications of data which highlight mass "problems", whether of or for elderly people or those who care for them' (p. 175).

The book has many strengths. It provides a wealth of information about later life in an unfussy and easily accessible style. It is an excellent introductory textbook for sociologists interested in exploring sociological issues in old age. And it provides evidence to gerontologists of the need for them to develop a sociological imagination in the pursuit of their interest in elderly people. This book will eliminate the excuse that social science degree courses have to ignore older people because of the lack of suitable up-to-date textbooks. Readers of the book will learn much about the relationship of discrimination through old age to discrimination on the basis of class, gender and race.

There are some weaknesses in the book, three of which will be mentioned briefly. First, a very wide range of issues in later life are addressed and at times this leads to an over-compression of the argument. For example, two pages on geriatric hospitals in the special settings chapter means an element of superficiality in the treatment of relevant issues. Second, the authors stress the desire to explore 'normality' as well as problems in later life, but this is only partially achieved. Various hints about emerging lifestyles are provided but these are not fully followed through. Future cohorts of older people will contain sizeable numbers with considerable disposable income through occupational pension and considerable capital assets in terms of their own occupied homes. More sociological investigation needs to be directed at those elderly people who are neither very poor nor extremely rich.

The third weakness concerns the failure of the authors to implement fully their stated commitment to draw widely on sociological theory and research as well as previous social gerontological work. For example, few links are made with recent labour market research, realist debates about how best to link structure and agency, or research on privatisation and the growth of owner occupation. A sociological approach which emphasises the social construction of old age needs to engage fully with these mainstream debates about how best to understand social and economic change in British society.

But these are thoughts stimulated by a highly enjoyable book which should ensure that future cohorts of social scientists will appreciate that the study of old age is both exciting and of great importance. This is a major step forward.

University of Bristol

Robin Means

Joining Forces: Police Training, Socialization and Occupational Competence

Nigel G. Fielding, Routledge, London, 1988, £14.50, x + 228pp

The police are a pivotal institution because they function right at the junction of state-society relations, but for a long time they were ignored by sociologists in Britain, with one or two notable exceptions. However, changes in the nature of British society and in police practice, as well as the inevitable diffusion from American sociology, have made the 'sociology of policing' into a thriving sub-discipline. It is now possible to take degrees in police science (that is, the scientific study of the police, rather than training in how to make police practice more scientific), and many leading publishers have a special police list. Sociologists came to police studies from one of four more long-established and respected traditions in British sociology – the sociology of organizations, ethnographic and qualitative sociology, social policy, and the sociology of crime and deviance. This lineage still reflects in the dominant concerns of the field.

A major focus is on matters of organization and management, including patterns of hierarchy and authority, training, and the control of internal deviance. Another interest is in police policy and operation, especially in the context of the changing needs of society, deteriorating relations with the public, notably in the

inner cities, and concern over the rising crime rate. It is this which locates all the attention given to the shift in policy toward community policing. But the focus which is perhaps most closely identified with the sociology of policing is the in-depth case-study approach to police behaviour and practice. There are numerous detailed and micro studies of police-public encounters, the occupational culture in the station, police patrol work, and of the 'cognitive map' of policemen and women – the interpretive processes they use to accomplish routine police work, and the conceptualizations they have of their role, the area in which they work and the people who live in it.

These are not hermetic topics and Fielding's new volume merges some of them into a neatly argued and valuable account of the process of police training in the Derbyshire force. Fielding is one of Britain's leading exponents of what Robert Walker calls 'applied qualitative research', and *Joining Forces* is deliberately intended to have an in-put to policy making on the important question of police training, which he correctly says lies at the heart of many initiatives for police reform. The research reported was a longitudinal study of 125 male and female recruits, following them through training, probation and the first year of service. Research methods were both qualitative and quantitative, and it is worth noting how sophisticated field research is becoming, for Fielding's research design exemplifies well how wrong it is to abuse this style as the casual hanging-around-on-street-corners mode of earlier ethnographic research, although in doing this the Chicago sociologists also hoped to influence policy.

Training cuts across many of the concerns in the sociology of policing. Formal training occurs within the bureaucratic structure of the force, and imparts what Fielding calls 'the official line', whereas informal training takes place within the occupational culture of the station and is learned from contact with existing members while on the job. Shifts in police policy, attitude and practice often show themselves first in the training of new recruits. The process of becoming a policeman and woman, therefore, involves analysis of policy, organizational goals and effectiveness networks of socialization in the station, as well as the pre conceptions and experiences members bring with them to the training school. It requires a focus on features of management and the recruits themselves, showing how individual constables make sense of their experiences in school and on the streets. Fielding blends these issues in an excellent manner and, with th

ethnographer's eye for detail, he documents the changes recruits undergo as they encounter the hard realities of police work on the streets

A particular interest is in formal and informal evaluations of police competence. But it is not just the mix of elements of formal organization and occupational culture which makes the question of competence so fascinating, for it also links managerial perspectives with those of the public. As Fielding shows, focusing on competence forces us to be explicit about what the police should and should not do, and how this hinges on the negotiation of managerial requirements and public expectations. A consideration of police competence therefore places attention on the relationships between constables and citizens and how the police conduct themselves sensitively in interaction with the public. Training thus opens up a Pandora's box for the sociologist of the police and the police manager, and to his credit Fielding tackles most of these issues and gives pointers to how policy makers should respond, making the volume a very useful one indeed.

*The Queen's University of Belfast
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John D. Brewer

The Regulation of Madness: The Origins of Incarceration in France
Robert Castel, Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £29.50, 297pp

Robert Castel's *The Regulation of Madness*, first published in France in 1976, makes a welcome if rather belated appearance in English translation. The ideas Castel develops in this book have already had an impact on a number of Anglo-Saxon writers on psychiatry who look to French historiography for new ideas and insights and who have provided us with a secondhand account of the substance of the book. It is good that we can now find out for ourselves rather more easily and directly what Castel himself had to say (albeit via a translation that seems at times somewhat laboured).

The Regulation of Madness takes up where Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilisation* ended and focuses on French psychiatry over the period from the Revolution through to the 1860s – the period in which psychiatry was installed and sustained as the official authority over madness, securing a monopoly over its formal care and treatment. Castel calls this the 'golden age' of

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psychiatry – golden ‘because of that happiness, born of a good conscience, in having a duty to perform, and encountering only technical problems in carrying it out’ (p 171) However, though it may have been a golden age for the newly established psychiatric profession, Castel’s central concern, as the title of the book suggests, is with the techniques of domination by means of which the mad were controlled. He argues that the period was one in which the medical experts, with their newly acquired powers over madness, maintained control by means of authoritarian and coercive techniques – processes of control in which the ‘totalitarian’ institution of the asylum, designed specifically for mad persons, played a central part. Prior to this, under the *Ancien Regime*, madness was controlled via royal and judicial authority and the mad were confined alongside other deviants – vagrants, criminals and the sick. The golden age was itself followed, after a period of transition in the 1860s, by the *aggiornamento* or period of modernisation, in which the means of domination of madness came to involve what Castel calls ‘soft’ techniques of manipulation and persuasion that, although not directly coercive, none the less represented a tightening of control and a multiplication of powers. Psychiatry moved outside the asylum and, through its concern with prevention, became more pervasive and less visible. Castel sees this form of power as especially dangerous for, echoing Thomas Szasz, he asserts ‘the power grows because it remains concealed’ (p 242)

Castel’s explanation of the emergence of the golden age hinges on the development of bourgeois society – a society governed by the idea of contract in which the legitimacy of the old means of controlling the mad is undermined. In such a society, Castel contends, the mad stand out and need to be given special treatment, even though – a point he emphasises – numerically they are a relatively small and insignificant group (narrow economic motives cannot, therefore, account for their treatment since their potential contribution to the labour market is small). Where social relations are typically governed by contract the mad can no longer be grouped with other deviants such as vagrants and criminals from whom they must now be clearly differentiated: ‘Unreasonable, he is not amenable to law; irresponsible, he cannot be the object of punishment; incapable of work or “being useful”, he does not enter the regulated round of exchanges, that “free” circulation of goods and men for which the new bourgeois legality serves as the blueprint’ (p. 12).

Castel is a sociologist whose work has been influenced by the scholarship of Michel Foucault, and what he offers is not a systematic, descriptive history of the period from 1790 through to the 1860s in the traditional mould. Rather, as my description of his characterisation of the key periods in the development of French psychiatry suggests, he provides both an account of its history which, following Foucault's insights, focuses on changing techniques of domination and control, and a distinctive explanation of the changes. The account of psychiatry's golden age is both stimulating and provocative and, at its best, illuminating and convincing. For example, Castel skilfully analyses the contradictions and alliances on which psychiatric practice was founded, such as the alliance within the asylums between medicine and administration. He also examines the alliance between the social and organic facets of medicine which resulted in a distinctive 'social medicine' characteristic of psychiatry thinking of the period – a form of medical thinking that he suggests was already outdated. Powerful, too, is his analysis of the precise forms of control exercised over madness – an analysis which, he is at pains to point out, does not reject the humanism of the motivations of those involved in developing the new asylums; nor does it deny the possibility that the situation of the mad was actually improved by the move to specialised institutions.

Rather less convincing, in my view, is his explanation of the emergence of the new authority of psychiatry in terms of the development of the contractual relations governing bourgeois society. Much of the problem comes from the way in which he seems to suggest that the French Revolution heralded the rather sudden emergence of a bourgeois society governed by relations of contract, without examining in any detail their growth either before or after this symbolic event. Indeed Castel tends merely to assert that the changes in the legal sphere and the issue of legitimacy were the key factor accounting for the developments he outlines rather than to provide a more thorough consideration of the evidence. Moreover, what is sadly missing from his argument, and suprisingly so given that he is a sociologist, is any examination of other relevant social and economic changes over this period.

The influence of Castel's study of Anglo-Saxon writers on psychiatry will no doubt be heightened by the publication of this English translation. The elaboration and development of some of the ideas raised by Foucault's earlier work, and their application to nineteenth-century French psychiatry in a clear and forceful

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manner, makes it easy to see why this book has already influenced a number of scholars. The study of the history of psychiatry draws its inspiration from provocative and single-minded formulations like this

University of Essex

Joan Busfield

'Am I that Name?' Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in History

Denise Riley, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, £27.50, paper £8.95, vi + 126pp

Denise Riley's book is one of a series, *Language, Discourse and Society*, which is basically interdisciplinary in its intention, and this is reflected in the approach taken here which examines the category, 'woman', as it has changed from the seventeenth century until the present day. The author's main contention is that both a concentration on and a refusal of the identity of 'woman' are essential to feminism and this is demonstrated throughout its history. Moreover, the category, 'woman', does not stand on its own, but is enmeshed with the histories of other categories too, including those of 'the social' and 'the body'. In developing these ideas the reader is led from a consideration of writings of women in the middle ages, through notable women writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all of which questioned contemporary views on women. These views, by trapping women in the category of nature, excluded them from humanity.

During the nineteenth century the belief in a gap between women and humanity continued, as women were still seen as inherently different, a difference which was ultimately physiological but which also rested on a belief that men and women occupied, intrinsically and permanently, different spheres. This abyss between being 'women' and being truly human is revealed very clearly in the suffrage struggle, since the rejection of the demand for the vote was based on this belief in an essential and indeed unchanging difference between men and women. The suffrage feminists were forced therefore to take account of these arguments, used not only by male politicians like Gladstone, but also in the notorious anti-suffrage statement published in the *Nineteenth Century* in 1889 by Mrs Humphrey Ward and a group of like-minded women. Although many suffrage supporters argued that men and women

were fundamentally more alike than different, and the differences that existed were largely artificially created, others accepted that there was a real rather than an artificial difference, but argued that this difference in itself was a justification for giving women the vote. The gradual feminization of the category, 'the social', during the nineteenth century was used by these feminists as the basis for what the author calls a sociological feminism, which women could use to their advantage, but which also trapped them into aspects of the social which were founded ultimately on domesticity and on women as mothers rather than persons

Denise Riley goes on to argue that during its history feminism has oscillated between women as equal and women as different, and these different emphases continue to divide modern feminism. Indeed, the years after political emancipation saw something of a crisis in feminism as feminists themselves could not resolve the issue of sexual differences and their implication for feminism. Women had needed to play down their difference in order to be fully accepted into humanity but a denial that there were gender differences was to ignore the extent to which women still had special needs. Some modern feminists have sought to escape this dilemma by grounding feminism specifically in difference, and have sought for some underlying unity in being a woman, using for example women's experience, or women's bodies to achieve this unity. Denise Riley however points out that these categories are themselves just as ambiguous as the category, 'women', and just as historically mutable. The answer, she suggests, is that feminism must accept the indeterminacy of the category, 'women', and build a feminist theory, taking this ambiguity into account.

This oscillation that she describes between equality and difference is indeed very characteristic of the history of feminism and is one that I have remarked myself, and it is interesting to see it made use of from an entirely different perspective from mine. Although making use of historical sources, the start of the analysis in her book is philosophical rather than sociological, and in particular is seen from the standpoint of the history of ideas. At the same time, the work is also very obviously grounded in modern theories of language, an approach which gives the book its special perspective.

Although I am convinced that the analysis is basically a correct one, the book as a whole does raise certain problems, particularly perhaps for those readers who are primarily sociologists, since the sociological implications of the argument are not fully developed.

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At the same time, the style is a forbidding one and necessitates careful and indeed patient reading if the argument is to be fully understood. Another problem arises from the large scope of the work, which ranges from mediæval thinkers to the latest ideas in modern feminism. This inevitably leads to a certain superficiality in the presenting of evidence. On the other hand the analysis, even where it is sketchy, is acute and often very stimulating. My main disappointment was with her failure to bring out in more detail some of the implications of her argument. She tells us, on the back cover, that a recognition of the ambiguity of the category, 'women', is a condition for an effective feminist political philosophy but fails to tell us, except very briefly, what such a philosophy might look like. Perhaps this is going to be another book.

Olive Banks

Nonsexist Research Methods a Practical Guide

Margrit Eichler, Allen and Unwin, London, 1988, £18.00, paper £5.95, x + 183pp.

Nonsexist Research Methods is an extremely interesting book which has two principal aims: firstly to make the intellectual point that sexism is multidimensional and not unidimensional, and secondly to make the pragmatic point that systematic application of a series of reflexive questions can help to remove gender bias from research design. My own judgement is that the first endeavour is more successful, and possibly more useful, than the second. Intellectual argument seems more likely to challenge people's categories of thought than a checklist, though many may appreciate the availability of such a 'how to' guide.

Eichler begins by identifying seven types of sexism, four of which are primary and three derived. The latter represent instances of sexism in academic work which, whilst traceable back to one of the four primary types, are so common as to warrant separate treatment. The primary types are detailed as follows (pp. 5-7):

1) *Androcentricity*, which represents 'a view of the world from a male perspective'. Two extreme examples are given, gynopia (female invisibility) and misogyny (hatred of women).

- 2) *Overgeneralisation*, which 'occurs when a study deals with only one sex but presents itself as if applicable to both sexes '
- 3) *Gender insensitivity*, which 'consists of ignoring sex as a socially important variable.'
- 4) *Double standards*, which involve 'evaluating, treating or measuring identical behaviours, traits or situations by different means'.

The three derived types of sexism are then identified as follows (pp. 8-9).

- 1) Sex appropriateness, which is a particular instance of a double standard,
- 2) Familism, which is a particular instance of gender insensitivity,
- 3) Sexual dichotomisation, which is another subaspect of a double standard, and not a 'cure' for gender insensitivity

What then follows is a treatment through example of each of the primary types, and a briefer treatment of the derived types

I found my personal responses to the examples to be highly instructive, and doubtless responses will vary between readers. Some instances required, for me, more than one reading to identify the sexist error, whilst other examples seemed either so shocking or confused as to defy belief. Thus, in the first category came the discussion of early hominid evolution which specified the advantages of group cohesion, 'predisposing genetically related individuals to band together beyond, say, the extended family' Where is the sexism here? As Eichler points out (p 24) 'the concept of group cohesion applies only to males and not females, since typically females would join, for mating purposes, a group other than the one into which they were born.' Thus 'the group is conceptualised as consisting of males who have assorted wives who have no effect whatsoever on group cohesion and solidarity' (p 25).

More overtly outrageous, for me, is the discussion of various theories on the sexual abuse of children, although here the evidence is from comment on such theories rather than first hand examples. The conclusion in this comment (quoted on page 38) is an indictment of the mother on three counts: 'first, she failed to perform her marital duties, second, she, not the father, forced the daughter to take her rightful place; and third, she knew about, tolerated, or in some cases actively enjoyed the incest.' Eichler's judgement here is that 'women suddenly emerge as active rather than passive, just at the moment when blame is being assigned for the sexual mistreatment of children' (p. 38).

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In the category of total confusion come examples which either ignored sex as socially significant, or collected data on the basis of gender but did not feature gender in analysis, or where gender seemed to be highly relevant to the analysis executed but was not made explicit in the discussion of the results. Thus aspects of a study of migration to and from Newfoundland appear to be rendered almost useless; some of the data suggests that gender differences will be highly significant, whilst other material is not broken down by sex at all (p. 70).

So extreme are some of the examples of sexism cited that one might begin to doubt the methods of the author, and assume a determined effort to select the most damning and idiosyncratic cases. But Eichler's methods are clearly stated in the introduction: 'I simply went into a library and picked up whatever recent issue of journals from different disciplines was lying on top in the journal pigeon holes' (p. 10). We learn that in fact the majority of examples were taken from recent issues, and mostly from 1985, and that there was no shortage of examples of sexism.

In one sense the book works well. It is coherent, interesting and very readable. There are, however, limitations imposed by the nature of the exercise. The intellectual insights which informed the structure of the book seem to have a potential that could not be realised though a series of chapters virtually identical in form, and relatively self-contained, rather than developmental. My stronger reservations, however, relate to the implied optimism of the author in supplying a check list to correct sexist bias. Eichler begins her book with a reference to an imagined conversation with the King of a one-dimensional land:

'If I cannot tell your right side from your left, I fear that no words of mine can make my meaning clear to you. But surely you cannot be ignorant of so simple a distinction.'

To which the King replies:

'I do not in the least understand you.'

Similarly, the correction of sexist thought requires a more fundamental shift in thinking than implied by a checklist, but reading this book would seem to offer a good start.

University of Durham

Lydia Morn

Doing Research in Organisations

Alan Bryman (ed.), Routledge, London, 1988, £25.00, paper £8.95, xii + 180pp

This book is a collection of papers mostly by well-known authors much of whose research work has been in organisations. Most of the contributors are old hands (for example, Beynon, Dunkerley, Hickson, Pugh, and Barry Turner). Evidently the authors have been asked to reflect on their experiences of research in organisations and to write about it in a general way. There is actually very little new research reported in the book, indeed, it looks very much as if presentation and discussion of any substantive findings have been deliberately and strictly limited. The result is a number of papers giving background and contextual information about research, much of which is already known in its published versions. The book will thus be of interest to anyone who is already familiar with work in the field of organisation studies for the additional information given about the process of research. It might be added that, one way and another, the details given and the way that they are presented by the authors, are also very revealing about the researchers themselves. Mainly for this reason I found the book compelling reading.

The rationale for the book is that it contributes to the growing genre in the social sciences, in which writers give 'realistic' or insider accounts of the work they have done. Potentially this approach is very valuable indeed because it involves the development of a new kind of evaluation and testing of research. The authors of research are uniquely placed to know what actually happened, what compromises they made and what their effects were. In the event, the range and variety of stances adopted by authors towards their own research is surprisingly diverse. Each is preoccupied by making their experience exemplify a particular general point. Somewhat predictably, Huw Beynon has written about the difficulties posed by the political machinations of groups, and particularly management, in trying to co-opt, control or manipulate research and researchers. Again somewhat predictably, Derek Pugh and David Hickson have written about the contingencies that affected the birth and development of the what we now call the contingency approach to organisations and Peter Lawrence writes notes on the special problems posed by cross-cultural research.

Some elements of critical self-analysis do enter but in a rather

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limited way. The nearest thing to a common theme in these papers is that most writers discuss the way in which they secured some kind of results from their work despite the contingencies (often labelled with what is calculated to be disarming frankness as 'mess') surrounding the research process. Few have actually taken the line that heroic efforts were required to overcome capricious difficulties. On the contrary, the emphasis, as in management and much else these days, is on the need for flexibility. Buchanan, Boddy and McCalman and several other writers point to the need to adapt to changing circumstances. Much of this writing suggests that it is actually dangerous to rely on procedures and routines in organisational research because insisting on doing things in a particular order in a particular way, may actually prevent anything being done at all. The dangers of this thesis if pushed too far, although fairly obvious, seem to have passed without much comment. Few seem to be aware that emphasising the importance of adapting to unique circumstances tends to make organisational research dependent on intuitive skills that cannot be readily taught. More seriously such an emphasis can irredeemably blur an all important distinction between finding something out despite difficulties and reporting something as true on the basis of inadequate evidence. This is the distinction between making do and making up - cosmetically and otherwise - in research. Although methodological rules may be difficult to live with and increasingly difficult to justify, they were not invented simply to make life difficult. They draw a firm line between what is acceptable in the use of evidence and what is not. It is perhaps incumbent on us to reflect why these firm lines seem impossibly rigid to us now.

Other contributors to the collection - I would cite in particular Barry Turner and David Dunkerley - display more awareness of the question of how to produce adequate knowledge about organisations. Turner's answer depends on the idea that observations should be copiously recorded (in notebooks) and subsequently compiled according to more conceptual criteria on index cards. There are no guarantees however that insightful accounts of organisational life will emerge. (For that, as Turner correctly suggests, you need social acuity as well as notes.) He records the case - apparently without embarrassment - of two researchers who were following his prescriptions and who wrote to him asking when to stop filling in their cards: between them they had more than a thousand and wanted to know what to do next. It might well

be argued against him that if his prescriptions were widely followed the main effect would be to substitute a new form of ritualism (filling in all those cards) for the kinds of ritualism that are now widely being questioned (filling in all those questionnaires)

However, at least Turner and one or two others are consciously grappling with real problems for contemporary organisational research, and are using the device of disclosure to help them reach some conclusion. Others are telling (almost) all with less obviously useful or valuable ends in view. Some of the papers, though of interest in many ways, are only incidentally concerned with organisations and the special problems and opportunities of organisational research. Much sociology of work, industry, professions, welfare, social class etc involves work in organisations, but it is not therefore automatically organizational research. Other papers, despite the historic importance of the organisational research to which they allude, are now mainly of historical interest only. Hence despite its fascination to the cognoscente, this is not a book that can be recommended to the general reader interested to know how to do useful organisational research. Hopefully, its readership will be restricted to postgraduate students and established researchers interested in diversion.

University of Lancaster

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Restructuring structuration theory

Nicos Mouzelis

Abstract

The article looks critically at Giddens's duality of structure notion which is at the centre of his structuration theory. It argues that the concept of subject/object dualism, which is not seriously considered by structuration theory, is as essential as the concept of duality for an understanding of how actors orient themselves to rules and resources as a virtual order, as well as to sets of interactions in time and space.

Introduction

Anthony Giddens's work is not only influential generally, but in my opinion, in contrast to that of certain overcritical commentators, it is also of theoretic significance. The reason for this is very simple. While there are many sociologists today who are interested in theory *per se*, very few have made any marked contribution to the theory of sociology proper. In fact, by over-reacting to the theoretical provincialism of the early post-war period, Anglo-Saxon sociologists today are so much absorbed, not to say obsessed and overpowered, by theoretical developments in other disciplines (epistemology, moral philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, psychoanalysis, etc.), that they have failed to translate the insights generated in such neighbouring fields into appropriate sociological concepts. The theoretical cosmopolitanism that has succeeded the introverted, sociology-centred theory of the early fifties and sixties has failed to provide any systematically useful concepts for sociologists interested in theoretically oriented empirical work. One of the few theorists who have seriously tried to fill this gap is Anthony Giddens. In that sense Giddens can be rightly seen as

continuing in the important tradition of sociological theorising as this has been upheld not only by Parsons, but also by such theorists as Merton, Gouldner and in this country, Lockwood

Giddens's structuration theory has certain fundamental weaknesses, however, which detract from its usefulness as a tool for empirical research. The aim of this article is to identify these weaknesses and to indicate ways of overcoming them. In other words, as the title suggests, my purpose is reconstructive rather than 'deconstructive'.

Core elements of structuration theory

At the centre of structuration theory lie the concepts of *structure* and *social system*. Giddens's idea of structure is nearer to linguistics than to conventional sociology. Structure consists of rules and resources which, like Saussure's *langue*, exist outside time and space. It is conceptualised as a virtual system that is recursively instantiated as agents draw from it in their day-to-day social existence. In consequence, structure pertains to the paradigmatic, whereas social systems as a set of interactions are concerned with the concrete practices of human subjects as these unfold syntagmatically in time and space. Social systems, therefore, are not structures, they rather embody structures or structural properties.¹

If we now ask how structures link with social systems, we encounter the idea of structuration:

To study the structuration of a social system is to study the ways in which that system, via the application of generative rules and resources, and in the context of the unintended outcomes, is produced and reproduced in interaction . . . [So structuration refers to] the conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structures and therefore the reproduction of systems.²

What is important for Giddens in the above conceptualisation is that it manages to transcend the subject/object *dualism*, a dualism that has led conventional sociology into sterile and interminable battles between 'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' views of the social. Giddens replaces the subject/object dualism with the central notion of the *duality of structure*, a notion that lies at the very heart

of structuration theory. Structure in Giddens's theory being a set of rules and resources, it is both the medium and outcome of the conduct that it recursively organises – a medium because it is through its use that social conduct is produced, and an outcome because it is through the production of this conduct that rules and resources are reproduced in time and space. In the same way as language rules help me to utter a sentence while at the same time this utterance contributes to the reproduction of language, so this same medium/outcome duality is to be found in all institutional spheres. In fact, institutional orders are all routinely reproduced through the duality of structure, through agents making use of and therefore reproducing sets of rules and resources.

With this, the dualism between agency and structures disappears. The structure organising human conduct are not outside the agent, but in certain fundamental ways part and parcel of his/her conduct, and chronically implicated in the production and reproduction of that conduct:

Structure is not 'external' to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more 'internal' than exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense.³

In contrast to this, conventional sociology sees agency and structure as clearly separate. The agent (as subject) is constantly confronted with a structure (a social object) which, to use Durkheimian terminology, is both constraining and external to the actor. As Giddens argues, structures in conventional sociology are like the walls of a room: they set limits to action, but tell us nothing about the ways in which actors, within such limits, are going to conduct themselves. In structuration theory, on the other hand, structures – as rules and resources chronically implicated in the production and reproduction of social systems – are not only constraining but also enabling. They not only set limits, they at the same time provide the fundamental means for interaction and social construction in general.

Duality and dualism on the paradigmatic level

The major difficulty with Giddens's notion of duality of structure is that the agency-structure relationship that it implies by no means

exhausts the type of orientations actors can and do have *vis-à-vis* rules and resources. In so far as the duality-of-structure scheme simply draws attention to the fact that all social conduct presupposes structures, and that all structures are in turn reproduced through social conduct, there can be no objection. But as a substantive theory this is rather truistic, and as a conceptual framework for suggesting useful ways of looking at agent-structure relationships it is quite limiting. This becomes obvious if one leaves the highly abstract philosophical-anthropological level at which discussions about subject-object relations are usually couched for a more concrete level of analysis, to examine how agents, in highly differentiated social contexts, actually relate to rules and resources. True enough, actors do draw routinely on rules and resources in their daily conduct. It is also true that the type of processes involved in Giddens's duality-of-structure notion are fundamental for understanding the reproduction of social systems. But this orientation to rules and resources is neither exclusive nor always predominant. Actors often distance themselves from rules and resources, in order to question them, or in order to build theories about them, or – even more importantly – in order to devise strategies for either their maintenance or their transformation. In none of these cases can the actors' relationship to rules and resources be accounted for properly on the basis of the duality-of-structure scheme.

A. Let me illustrate this fundamental point by looking first at language, an area from which Giddens has primarily derived his duality-of-structure notion. Even here there are orientations to structures that do not fit well into the duality-of-structure scheme. Consider for instance the way in which linguists and philosophers of language view rules and resources pertaining to language. Their orientation in the course of their research is far more theoretical than practical. Their main concern is to understand how language works, not how to use it for routine communication. Here, therefore, Giddens's medium/outcome formula is obviously not at all apposite. The linguist as a subject is not implicated in the reproduction of rules and resources in the same way as a lay speaker is. There is in this case a greater distance, a marked separation, at least in analytical terms, between subject (the linguist) and social object (the structure to be explored) – a distance that diminishes dramatically when the orientation to language rules is primarily practical in nature.

The difference here is not between practical and discursive

knowledge of rules.⁴ It is rather the difference between an orientation to rules which is *primarily* 'natural/performative',⁵ where the rules that are used are unquestioned and taken for granted as means for communication; and an orientation which views rules not so much as a resource but as a topic for exploration and analysis. In the former case, *irrespective of whether the subject is practically or discursively knowledgeable*, theoretical concerns are either non-existent or peripheral.⁶ Where rules are a topic for analysis, the opposite is true: practical considerations give way to a clear *dualism* between the structure (rules and resources) and a subject whose implication in the reproduction of the structure is more indirect, or at any rate radically different. The point about the theoretical orientation to rules becomes even more pertinent when one takes into account that it is not only language specialists who, at times, bracket practical considerations pertaining to Giddens's medium/outcome idea. Lay persons do exactly the same when, for instance, they are learning their grammar and syntax at school. On those occasions, at any rate for short periods, subjects deliberately distance themselves from language rules in order to look at them in a more theoretical manner.

The above distinction between practical and theoretical orientations to structures can be formulated by using Giddens' *double hermeneutic* idea.⁷ If it is true that social-science orientations based on metalanguages or 'second-order' concepts coexist and interpenetrate with lay persons' orientations based on first-order concepts, then it may be argued that, by and large, the duality-of-structure scheme applies more when agents use first-order rather than second-order concepts. When specialists or lay-persons use metalanguages, their orientations to rules and resources can be understood better in terms of a subject/object dualism than in terms of duality.

B. The duality-of-structure notion has an even more restricted application if one takes into account a third orientation to rules and resources. For lack of a better term I shall call this orientation strategic/monitoring (using the term somewhat differently from either Giddens's concept of strategic conduct or his concept of the reflexive monitoring of action).⁸ In this case, actors' orientations to structures are primarily concerned with measures that aim at either maintaining/repairing or at transforming rules and resources. Here the strategic/monitoring concerns with the overall state of a set of rules and resources displace (without ever quite eliminating) practical and/or theoretical orientations towards

them. Such concerns are, of course, particularly acute when certain features of a specific institution are being challenged for one reason or another. Although language rules do not often become the object of strategic/monitoring orientations, it is not difficult to think of examples where they do. Attempts at reviving dying dialects, or at 'purifying' or purging a living language from foreign accretions, readily provide instances where practical or theoretical orientations give way to strategic/monitoring ones, i.e. to orientations aimed at the maintenance, repair, or transformation of linguistic structures.

Of course Giddens is very well aware that actors adopt theoretical and/or strategic/monitoring orientations *vis-à-vis* language rules. As a matter of fact he explicitly makes the distinction between the reproduction of language as the unintended consequence of ordinary linguistic practices and intentional attempts to keep a language alive. What I want to argue is that the orientations underlying intentional attempts at language revival cannot be accounted for in terms of the duality of structure scheme; that strategic/monitoring orientations clearly imply subject/object dualism rather than duality: here actors as subjects take up a certain distance from the rules in order to view them as social objects requiring strategic intervention.

C. I think that the above considerations make it abundantly clear that Giddens's duality-of-structure notion cannot in itself provide an adequate basis for establishing how structures contribute to the constitution and reproduction of social systems. For this one must always take seriously into account that actors not only reproduce rules and resources via their practical use (via the medium/outcome schema), they also do so by distancing themselves from such rules and resources in order to understand them better, or in order to devise strategies aimed at their maintenance or transformation. When the former orientation prevails, the duality notion seems quite appropriate. When it is the latter that predominates, then a better explanation of the processes involved seems to be given by a 'subject-object' dualism.

It might well be argued that in the great majority of cases lay persons in their daily routine are *primarily*⁹ oriented to rules and resources in a practical way, with neither time nor inclination to theorise about rules and resources, nor the power to affect the overall state of an institutional order via strategic intervention. But if it is true that lay persons tend to bracket theoretical and strategic/monitoring orientations towards rules and resources in

their day-to-day existence, it is also true that as the focus of analysis shifts from individual to collective action, then, if not theoretical, at least strategic/monitoring preoccupations come increasingly to the fore.

Let me be more concrete. Husbands and wives, in their daily conjugal conduct, draw on rules and resources pertaining to the institution of marriage. The duality-of-structure theory stresses that as millions of people do so on a routine, recursive basis, marriage rules are reproduced or transformed. Now the point I am trying to make is that the reproduction or transformation of marriage rules cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the medium/outcome scheme that is implied by the duality-of-structure theory. For a full explanation one must also take into account theoretical and strategic/monitoring orientations to marriage structures – orientations that clearly point to a subject/object dualism. These orientations become particularly salient as one moves from the partners of individual marriages to collective actors who, in a variety of ways, are concerned with the maintenance or transformation of marriage rules and resources. I have in mind here feminist groups championing women's rights, religious leaders trying to boost traditional family values, legislators wishing to transform the rules that apply to divorce or abortion, finance ministers considering the rules on inheritance, etc. All the above, and many other strategic/monitoring orientations and concerns, are as crucial for understanding the reproduction and transformation of marriage rules and resources as are the day-to-day routine activities of husbands and wives.

Let me say it once more: the latter practices and orientations can be accounted for in terms of the duality-of-structure notion, whereas the former can not. If therefore one insists, as Giddens seems to do, on banning the subject/object dualism from sociological discourse, one ends up by giving a very truncated account of how institutional orders are reproduced and transformed. This is rather like trying to account for the construction of a complex edifice by focusing exclusively on the routine activities of individual bricklayers, and ignoring the key contributions of architects, engineers, construction managers, trade-union leaders, etc.

Of course, Giddens is very aware both of collective actors and theoretical and strategic/monitoring orientations to rules and resources. This is quite clear in his more empirically oriented work, where collective-action concepts are often used for the explanation of long-term institutional transformations, as well as

in his theoretical writings when, for instance, he stresses the importance of strategically placed actors seeking to 'reflexively regulate the overall conditions of system reproduction either to keep things as they are or to change them';¹⁰ or when he sees social movements as collective enterprises trying to establish 'a new order of life'.¹¹

But what is crucial to point out here is that neither Giddens's macro-historical analyses nor his more theoretical statements about reflexive monitoring fit well with his structuration theory, and particularly with the duality-of-structure idea that lies at its core. In that sense there is a fundamental contradiction in his work, a contradiction which, as I shall try to show, renders other key concepts of his theory quite problematic.

Social and system integration

Consider for instance the system and social-integration concepts. These were first formulated by David Lockwood in a seminal article which has played a crucial role in subsequent debates on agency and structure.¹² Giddens has incorporated these concepts into his structuration theory, but radically changed their initial meaning. In Lockwood's work the social/system-integration distinction pointed the distinction between an approach focusing on the ways in which *actors* relate to each other (social integration), and an approach focusing on the way in which the institutionalised 'parts' of a social system are compatible or incompatible with each other (system integration).¹³ This distinction was applicable whether one looked at whole societies or at less inclusive social systems.

In Giddens's formulation, the social/system-integration distinction is supposed to replace the less satisfactory micro/macro-distinction in sociology, to which he has two objections. *First*, social scientists, because of the misleading subjectivism-versus-objectivism debate, tend to view the micro-approach as focusing on the 'subjective' aspects of social life and therefore as being *antithetical* to the macro-approach, which is supposed to focus on 'objective' social structures. *Second*, there is also a marked tendency to identify micro-approach with 'free-agency', and macro-approach with 'structural constraints'.

Let me begin by saying that I do not find Giddens's objections

to the micro/macro-distinction very persuasive. If there is an emerging consensus in sociology today, it is that the micro/macro-approaches are not mutually exclusive but complementary¹⁴ Moreover, the crude identification of free agency with micro-sociology, and of structural determination with macro-analysis, is neither typical of serious 'ethnographic' studies (such as Giddens describes and uses extensively in his *The Constitution of Society*)¹⁵ nor, for instance, of the burgeoning field of macro-historical sociology whose major representatives (e.g. B. Moore, T. Skocpol, M. Mann) can by no means be accused of ignoring collective-agency issues

Now let us look more closely at how Giddens reformulates Lockwood's distinction. For Giddens, social integration refers to 'reciprocity of practices between actors in circumstances of co-presence, understood as continuities in and disjunctions of encounters', whereas system integration refers to 'reciprocity between actors or collectivities across extended time-space, outside conditions of co-presence'.¹⁶ The *physical co-presence* of actors, therefore, or the lack of it, seems to be the major criterion for distinguishing system from social integration. At the same time there is a clear link between lack of co-presence and 'large-scale' analysis (i.e. reciprocal practices extending widely in time/space); and, by implication, co-presence refers to practices extending less widely in time/space. It is, after all, exactly because Giddens makes this link that he contends that in structuration theory the system/social-integration distinction adequately replaces the more problematic micro-macro one.¹⁷

Now it seems to me that what this formulation ignores is that face-to-face encounters (or situations of co-presence) may directly involve very large-scale processes, i.e. reciprocal practices that extend widely in time and space. Consider for example the following 'strips of interaction', all of which imply co-presence:

- (a) a routine encounter between pupils and teacher in the classroom of a specific school;
- (b) a meeting between the school's headmaster and representatives of teachers, pupils, and pupils' parents;
- (c) a face-to-face meeting between officials from the Ministry of Education and representatives of the National Union of Teachers,
- (d) a meeting of EC education ministers aiming to devise common policies for improving education standards in the Community.

All four cases are situations of co-presence, but they involve radically different processes with respect to affecting time and space. Quite obviously (a) and (b) refer to micro-processes of interaction with extremely limited time/space impact; cases (c) and (d) on the other hand entail face-to-face interactions with extensive consequences.

The reason why Giddens, in his structuration theory, does not seem to take seriously into account the *qualitative differences* between the above four cases, the reason why he tends to link co-presence with reciprocity in micro-contexts, is that his duality-of-structure theory does not fit well with the idea of collective actors and their monitoring/strategic orientations to rules and resources.

Institutional analysis and strategic conduct

This fundamental drawback in structuration theory becomes even more apparent if one considers the ways in which Giddens uses another fundamental distinction, closely related to that of social/system integration: the analytic distinction between institutional analysis and strategic conduct. In institutional analysis, considerations related to the practical or discursive 'knowledgeability' of actors are bracketed, and the focus is on structural properties conceptualised as chronically reproduced features of social systems. In the analysis of strategic conduct, on the other hand, it is the ways in which institutional complexes relate to each other that are bracketed, and the

focus is placed upon modes in which actors draw upon structural properties in the constitution of social relations. Since this is a difference of emphasis, there is no clear-cut line that can be drawn between these, and each crucially has to be in principle rounded out by a concentration upon the duality of structure.¹⁸

What I shall try to show here is that it is precisely the 'concentration upon the duality of structure' that renders this otherwise useful distinction problematic. Let us start by looking, for instance, at how Giddens examines, from an institutional-analysis point of view, some fundamental structural features of modern capitalist societies.

At the highest level of abstraction, studying the overall institutional order of a social system is to focus on structural

principles of organisation that can account for the 'overall institutional alignment of a society or type of society'.¹⁹ According to Giddens, such very general organising principles can be studied on a lower level of abstraction, by focusing on *structural sets* which refer to 'clusterings of transformation/mediation relations implied in the designation of structural principles. Structural sets are formed by the mutual convertibility of the rules and resources implicated in social reproduction.'²⁰ In Marx's analysis of private property, for example (a structural principle crucial for the reproduction of capitalism), the following structural set can be derived: private property : money : capital : labour contract : profit. Another structural set, which links directly with education (an institutional area from which Giddens primarily draws his examples in his major theoretical work) is: private property : money : educational advantage : occupational position.²¹

Moving from one cluster of relations to the next, one can work out precisely how each implies or leads to the one following it in the overall set. What Giddens emphasises here is that when one focuses on structural sets – when, for instance, one spells out the structural relations linking private property to money, educational advantage, and eventually to privileged occupational position – considerations of strategic conduct are bracketed. This does not mean, says Giddens, that we can ignore actors, or simply consider them, as Marx did intermittently and Althusser systematically, as mere supports of structural relations. (Were we to do so we would, sooner or later, have to resort to functionalist/teleological explanations.) Giddens contends that if one takes the 'knowledgeability' of actors seriously, one realises that, in order to account for the constitution and reproduction of structural sets, the research strategy must be shifted from institutional to strategic-conduct analysis. The way to do this is through the duality of structure:

The reintroduction of the duality of structure means leaving the virtual time-space of institutional analysis, thereby re-entering 'history'. All institutional properties of social systems, to repeat a leading theme of structuration theory, are the medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors.²²

Given that this shift from institutional analysis operates through the duality of structure, we come again to the identification of agency with *individual subjects* which, by the routine use of rules

and resources, contribute to the reproduction of the institutional order. Collective action is again neglected – both the type of collective action that results from the incumbency of authority positions (e.g. the minister of education formulating a specific policy), as well as that which results from the variable ability of individual subjects to group together in order to defend, maintain, or transform rules and resources.

Giddens provides a concrete example to illustrate how structural sets are reproduced via the duality-of-structure notion. He examines Paul Willis's ethnographic study that analyses the counter-culture developed by a group of working-class children in a Birmingham school.²³ Whereas conformist pupils were accepting the values and orientations provided by the teachers and school authorities, other pupils (the 'lads'), drawing on aspects of the wider working-class culture they were in contact with in their homes and neighbourhoods, developed a distinct oppositional subculture. This subculture rejected official norms and objectives, and actively encouraged a systematic sabotage of the teachers' authority, a hostility to academic work, indifference to academic achievement, and a desire to leave the school as soon as possible.

For Willis and Giddens, these attitudes developed at school were very favourable for the reproduction of 'abstract labour power'. The lads' indifference as to the type of work they would be doing after they left school, as well as their willingness to enter the unskilled labour market, fit in perfectly well with the 'conditions of the exchange ability of labour power structurally involved in the capitalist labour contract'.²⁴ The lads' school practices, therefore, contributed through the complex meshing of intended and unintended consequences to both the reproduction of capitalism, and the type of educational inequality that capitalist societies portray. In other words the lads, as knowledgeable agents pursuing their day-to-day activities within the school context, were contributing to the reproduction of both the school's counter-culture and of the structural sets mentioned above.

Now Giddens is careful to point out that 'the situated activities of the "lads" . . . [is] only one tiny corner of a massively complex overall process of institutional reproduction'.²⁵ But what he does not make clear is, that in order to understand how one cluster of relations within any structural set leads into the next, or in order to understand the overall reproduction of a structural set, one needs to take into account not only the type of orientation portrayed by the 'lads' activities', but also other, *qualitatively different* types of

strategic conduct: those involving collective actors who adopt strategic/monitoring rather than practical orientations to rules and resources, orientations pertaining to subject/object dualism rather than to duality.

In other words, if the lads' activities constitute only a tiny part of a massively complex overall process, the other parts of this process are not simply more of the same. They involve activities at different levels of collective action, activities the intended or unintended consequences of which extend more or less widely in time and space. If we take again the example of the four 'strips of interaction' mentioned in the previous section, it becomes obvious that, as far as strategic conduct is concerned, the overall reproduction of structural sets does not involve merely interactions of type (a), but also of types (b), (c), and (d). It also becomes obvious that if we want to examine, for instance, how the mechanisms translating money into educational advantage change or fail to change in the long term, the lads' activities, although relevant, can by no means constitute the main focus of analysis. This would have to be primarily on key collective interventions – e.g. on acts of parliament, governmental policies concerning educational opportunities, collective struggles over the shape of the curriculum, over the amount of resources allocated to education, etc. These types of practice are never stressed when Giddens sets out to show how strategic conduct is related to the reproduction of structural sets.

Duality and dualism on the syntagmatic level

In what has gone before I have argued that the notions of duality and dualism are *both* indispensable if one wants to understand how subjects orient themselves to structures. The duality-of-structure notion is quite apposite when one focuses on practical orientations to rules and resources, whereas when one focuses on theoretical and on strategic/monitoring orientations the idea of subject/object dualism is more relevant. I have also argued that as one moves from the individual to various levels of collective action, strategic/monitoring orientations become both more prevalent and more instrumental in bringing about an overall transformation of structures.

Another major point I would like to develop is that the duality/

dualism distinction is not only relevant when one considers, on the *paradigmatic* level, the way in which actors orient themselves to structures (rules and resources) as a virtual order that is timeless and spaceless. The distinction is also relevant when one looks *syntagmatically* at the relationship between situated actors and what Giddens calls the structural properties of a social system (or what to conventional sociologists are social structures).

Let me make this clear by a hypothetical example. As a university teacher responsible for a weekly graduate seminar on development, I routinely draw on rules and resources in the course of teaching my students. Rules and resources relevant to this type of teaching, *viewed as a virtual order*, then constitute both medium and outcome – in the sense that by using them I contribute to their reproduction/transformation. Here we have duality on the *paradigmatic* level, which for convenience shall be called *paradigmatic duality*. At the same time, as a sociologist with an interest in education, I may occasionally distance myself from the above rules and resources in order to see the difference between them and other types of teaching-rules and resources; or, when in a more structuralist mood, in order to discover the 'hidden grammar' underlying them. This is *paradigmatic dualism*.

On the syntagmatic level now, the specific seminar group in which I am involved can be regarded as a social system involving 'the patterning of social relations across time-space'.²⁶ Furthermore, to continue with Giddens's terminology, this particular social system has various structural properties. Let us suppose that one of its major structural features is that the majority of the students are passive recipients rather than active participants in the seminar, and that this has predominantly to do with my style of teaching.

The hypothetical college where this particular seminar group is operating can be viewed as a large social system portraying its own specific structural features – one of these being a highly centralised authority structure that allows the college director and his administrative staff to take all major decisions concerning key academic issues. One could, of course, move further up and out and conceptualise the social system of the college as embedded in larger social systems (e.g. the university as a system of colleges).

The point I would like to make here is that the low-participation structural feature of my seminar group, as a social object, is not really external to me as a subject,²⁷ given that:

- (a) it *emerged* through my direct interaction with the students;
- (b) I contributed *directly* and *considerably* to its constitution and weekly reproduction by, for instance, consciously adopting a 'monologic', authoritarian style of teaching,
- (c) it is within my capabilities to change the situation – for instance by making a conscious effort to let other people talk as well.

In fact, the relation between subject and object here is 'internal', in the sense that the latter (the specific structural property of the seminar group) could not exist independently of the former (my style of teaching).²⁸ Hence one is justified to talk about an object/subject duality on the syntagmatic level. However, if I relate my practices, as a subject, to the structural features not of my seminar group but of larger social systems of which my seminar group forms a part, then syntagmatic duality gives way to syntagmatic dualism. For instance, the authoritarian structural features of the college or university as a whole are clearly much more external to me as a situated subject; they probably existed before I became a teacher, and my contribution to their reproduction is not as direct or as significant as my contribution to the reproduction of the seminar group's structural feature. Moreover, my chances, as one individual teacher, of transforming them decrease dramatically as the focus is on more inclusive social systems.

However, macro-structural properties that for me are out there and unchangeable are less so for actors who occupy positions of authority higher up on the scale of what Giddens calls 'vertical regionalisation'. For what for me is external and outside my transformative capacities (and therefore pertains to syntagmatic dualism) can be much less external and more easily and directly malleable for actors whose location enables them to take decisions which extend more widely in time and space (e.g. the college director, university vice-chancellor, minister of education). In so far as the internal/external distinction simply indicates the obvious fact that actors' contributions to the reproduction/transformation of social systems are *variable*, there can be absolutely no objection to the notion of externality. A social system is *more* external *vis-à-vis* a situated actor when his/her participation does not dramatically affect its structural features; and it is *less* external when his/her participation does have a considerable impact on it.²⁹

Conclusion

My major argument has been that the notions of duality and dualism are both of them necessary for distinguishing, on the paradigmatic level, how actors orient themselves to rules and resources as a virtual order. They are equally necessary on the syntagmatic level, for stressing the asymmetrical, differential contribution of actors to the reproduction and transformation of a social system's structural properties. So if paradigmatic dualism points to the ability of subjects to *distance* themselves from structures, syntagmatic dualism pertains to a situation where subjects rightly perceive structural properties (as social objects) as external, in the sense that, as *single individuals*, they have neither contributed significantly to their reproduction, nor can they transform them without radically changing their present power position (e.g. through individual advancement or collective organisation). Neither of these two types of subject/object relationship can be reduced to or derived from the notion of duality.

In a more general way, given the *hierarchical* character of social organisation and the often 'onion' like character of social systems (i.e. the fact that, as with the college organisation, there are subordinate and superordinate systems),³⁰ subjects always face structural properties as social objects in a manner which pertains to both syntagmatic duality *and* dualism. This is to say that they are implicated in social systems that have structural properties to the reproduction of which they directly and significantly contribute, they are also implicated in larger social systems whose structural features are completely unaffected by their participation as single individuals. In the former case the distinction between subject (as situated actor) and object (a social system's structural properties) is blurred,³¹ and one can profitably use the notion of syntagmatic duality; in the latter case the subject/object distinction is very clear-cut, and one has to employ the notion of syntagmatic dualism. Any attempt to disregard the latter unavoidably leads to systematic neglect of the hierarchical, asymmetrical character of social life, and must result in an unrealistically flattened picture of the social world. *Although Giddens's more empirical work does not systematically neglect considerations pertaining to hierarchy and asymmetry, his structuration theory does.*

As I have been trying to show, it is through the notions of paradigmatic and syntagmatic dualism that one comes to

appreciate the crucial importance that social hierarchies, and the different levels of collective action, have for an understanding of how agents relate to structures and to social systems. Since Giddens's duality-of-structure scheme bans dualism from social analysis, he underemphasises collective action and its key relevance for social reproduction and transformation. Hence the criticism that structuration theory basically equates agency with the empirical human subject,³² and that it fails to relate agency with 'patterns of institutional conflict which may change routines quickly and dramatically'.³³ From this point of view structuration theory fails to achieve one of its main goals, which is to provide a balanced synthesis between micro-oriented interpretative and macro-structural sociological traditions; its exclusive emphasis on the notion of duality systematically privileges the former at the expense of the latter. It unavoidably leads to a neglect of hierarchically organised collective actors and their differential contribution to the reproduction and transformation of social systems.

In a short but penetrating critique of structuration theory, John Urry pointed out some time ago that Giddens never explains (whether theoretically or by providing concrete examples) precisely how structures generate social systems.³⁴ Giddens replied by admitting that Urry had a point, although he thought that his criticism did not provide 'any serious sources of difficulty for the general framework that I try to establish'.³⁵ What I have tried to show in this paper is that, as far as Giddens insists on conceptualising subject/object relations exclusively on the basis of the duality-of-structure notion, this does become a very serious, if not insurmountable, difficulty for the further development of structuration theory. This is the case because without the notions of both duality and dualism – on the paradigmatic as well as the syntagmatic level – it is impossible to show in theoretically coherent manner the linkages connecting structures and social systems.

To be more specific: explaining how a social system (like the seminar group referred to above) is constituted and reproduced requires taking into account radically different types of relation between subjects and social objects. These are relations (of practical, theoretical, or strategic/monitoring type) with a virtual order of rules and resources, relations with emergent social forms on the level of routine face-to-face interactions, and relations with more encompassing and enduring social systems and their

structural properties. To give a systematic account of all these subject/order relationships means that the duality-of-structure scheme must be complemented with the notion of dualism.

In fact, these intricate connections between duality and dualism on the paradigmatic and syntagmatic levels should be a major task of a reconstructed structuration theory. This is particularly so if one recalls that one of Giddens's major projects is the theoretical integration of structural, interpretative, and structuralist sociologies. From this perspective the four-fold distinction proposed above (i.e. the notions of subject-object duality and dualism on both the paradigmatic and syntagmatic levels) constitutes a more adequate starting point for such a synthesis than Giddens's highly restrictive duality-of-structure notion. It is quite obvious that structural/functional sociologies, following the Durkheimian/Parsonian tradition, are *primarily* based on a subject-object dualism on the syntagmatic level; whereas interpretative sociologies, by focusing on social forms emerging out of intersubjective understandings, are based on a subject-object syntagmatic duality. Finally, Saussurian/Levi-Straussian structuralism, by de-centering the subject, and by viewing structures as hidden codes that both enable and constrain social practices, bases itself (like Giddens's structuration theory) on subject-object duality on the paradigmatic level. Any attempt to disregard subject/object dualism, or to reductively derive it from an all-encompassing notion of paradigmatic duality, creates insurmountable obstacles to an effective theoretical synthesis.

Postscript: degrees of constraint/enablement

The idea that structures not merely constrain but also enable, and that structural sociology has systematically neglected this second feature, is a recurrent theme in all of Giddens's writings. Critics have on the whole accepted the usefulness of this point, but have noted that, by conflating subject and object and insisting that structure is not external to the subject, structuration theory fails to take into account that structures create *variable* degrees of freedom and constraint for individual actors. In consequence, structuration theory cannot raise questions about degrees of voluntarism/determinism, about variations in the number of options available to actors, etc.³⁶ In response to such criticism Giddens has pointed out that his concept of a system's *structural properties* as well as his concept of *structural constraints* can deal

quite adequately with the fact that social forms or institutions seem to be external to a situated actor (in the sense that he or she might not be able to change them, as well as in the sense that institutions may pre-exist and outlast specific actors):

To emphasise that individuals are contextually situated within social relations of greater or lesser span is similarly only to identify a source of constraint if it is shown how this limits their capabilities. In each case *constraint stems from the 'objective' existence of structural properties that the individual agent is unable to change*. As with the constraining qualities of sanctions, it is best described as *placing limits upon the range of options open to an actor, or plurality of actors*, in a given circumstance or type of circumstance.³⁷ (my italics)

Elsewhere Giddens points out:

Of course, any particular situated agent confronts a diversity of social forms that exist quite independently of whatever that agent may do, since *they stretch away across time-space* according to their institutional 'embeddedness'.³⁸ (my italics)

The above quotations show that whereas critics – complaining that structuration theory does not allow for degrees of enablement/constraint – focus on the concept of *structure*, Giddens, in rejecting their criticisms, points to the concept of *social system*. But this defence creates certain difficulties. First of all, the subject-object dualism that structuration theory is supposed to ban from social analysis slips in again by the back door. Talk about the 'objective' existence of structural properties or social forms 'stretching away across *time-space* independently of whatever the agent might do', and limiting the capabilities of contextually situated individuals, clearly brings us up against the type of dualism that is so common in structural sociology and that Giddens wishes to transcend.

Giddens could point out, of course, that in his theory structure and a system with structural properties, although interrelated, are analytically quite distinct concepts. Fair enough. But one would then have to spell out, much more clearly than Giddens does, the actual connections between structure on the one hand, and system with its structural properties on the other. To be more specific, Giddens in several parts of *The Constitution of Society* refers to

structures and structural properties as both being enabling as well as constraining. If this were the case, then what is the difference between constraints/possibilities generated by structures as a virtual order, and those generated by a system portraying specific structural properties and extending across time-space? To go back to Willis's case study: in so far as restrictive linguistic codes (on the paradigmatic level), *as well as* the hierarchical organisation of the school (syntagmatic level), constraint/enable the lads in their everyday conduct, what difference is there between the former and latter constraints/enablers? In so far as Giddens distinguishes between three types of constraint (material constraints, constraints associated with sanctions, and structural constraints),³⁹ how are these constraints related to the constraining aspects of structures?

I think that Giddens cannot easily answer such questions. He cannot, because of his exclusive emphasis on the duality-of-structure scheme, because of his refusal to consider that, on the paradigmatic as well as on the syntagmatic level, one needs both the concepts of duality and dualism.

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Notes

- 1 A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan, 1979, p. 66
- 2 *ibid.*, p. 66
- 3 A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (hereafter *TCS*), Oxford, Polity Press, 1984, p. 25
- 4 On the distinction between practical and discursive consciousness, see *TCS*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–5
- 5 For the notion of natural-performative attitudes in contrast to theoretical or 'hypothetical-reflective' ones, see J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, London, Heinemann, 1984, pp. 80–1 and 122–3
- 6 Some 'theorising' or reflexive accounting is present in all social conduct, of course. As ethno-methodologists have rightly pointed out, social actors' accounts of what goes on in various social contexts do not simply describe or explain the social world, in certain fundamental ways they constitute it as well. But this type of continuous theorising or accounting is quite different from what I have called a theoretical orientation to rules and resources. A brief explanation of the difference is to argue that in the former case theorising is a means to an end (getting on with everyday life), in the latter case, theorisation/explanation of rules is an end in itself.

Another possible objection to the distinction between practical and theoretical orientations to language is to point out that the theorist, in trying to achieve his or her goal (which is the analysis of, say, grammatical rules), is obliged to use language in a taken for granted manner as a *means* to his/her projects. Therefore the linguist relates to language rules as means according to the duality of structure scheme and to rules as a topic in terms of a subject/object dualism.

On the other hand the layperson's orientation to rules can also be accounted in terms of both dualism and duality. For in so far as a person has a minimal awareness of the rules he or she uses in everyday routine communications, his or her orientation to rules pertains to both duality and dualism. But whereas in the linguist's case dualism predominates in the layperson's case it is object/subject duality which is dominant. Therefore, even if one wants to formulate the problem in this more complex manner, it is clear that we need both the duality and dualism notions in order to account for actors' orientations to rules and resources.

- 7 See *TCS*, *op cit* pp 284 ff
- 8 *ibid.*, pp 5–6 and 288–93
- 9 I say *primarily*, because I want to stress once more that the mode in which subjects relate to rules and resources always involve a mixture of practical, theoretical, and strategic/monitoring orientations – one of these being dominant at any given time. Needless to say, this dominance can change in accordance with the context. When, for instance, I more or less unconsciously use grammatical rules in everyday conversation, my orientation to linguistic structures is predominantly practical. When I attend an English grammar seminar, my orientation is predominantly theoretical. Finally, when I join a 'Save the English Language' society, my orientation to language might be predominantly strategic/monitoring.
- 10 *TCS*, *op cit* pp 27–8
- 11 *ibid.*, p 204
- 12 D. Lockwood, 'Social integration and system integration', in G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds), *Explorations in Social Change*, London, Routledge, p 194
- 13 *ibid.*, p 371. On the problematic way in which Lockwood conceptualises system 'parts', see N. Mouzelis, 'Social and system integration: Some reflections on a fundamental distinction', *British Journal of Sociology*, no. 4, 1974
- 14 See on this theme J. C. Alexander *et al* (eds), *The Micro-macro Link*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1987, K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel (eds), *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Towards an Integration of Micro and Macro Sociologies*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, and N. C. Fielding (ed.), *Actions and Structures: Research Method and Social Theory*, London, Sage, 1988
- 15 *TCS*, *op cit*, pp 289–309
- 16 *ibid.*, pp. 376–7
- 17 If he does not make this assumption, i.e. if co-presence does not imply small scale, then I do not see how his social/system-integration distinction can claim to replace adequately the micro/macro-distinction. Consider the following passage: 'We can define social integration as concerned with *systemness on the level of face-to-face interaction*, system integration as concerned with *systemness on the level of relations between social systems or collectivities*. This

distinction is the nearest I shall come in this book to admitting the usefulness of a differentiation between "micro-" and "macro-sociological" studies', *Central Problems in Social Theory*, *op. cit.*, pp 76-7

Here I would also like to stress that the way in which Giddens distinguishes social from system integration changes from one context to the next. For instance, in *Central Problems in Social Theory*, as the above quotation clearly indicates, social integration refers to *face-to-face interaction* whereas system integration refers to relations between *social systems or collectivities* (definition A). On the same page he also links system integration with 'reciprocity between *groups and collectivities*' – see p. 77, figure 2.3, my italics (definition B). Finally in *TCS* social integration refers to 'reciprocity of practices between actors in circumstances of co-presence', whereas system integration implies 'reciprocity between actors or collectivities across extended time-space, outside conditions of co-presence' – pp. 376 and 377 (definition C).

This terminological confusion increases further when Giddens links social integration with conflict and system integration with the notion of contradiction. 'It is worth emphasising that the social integration/social conflict and system integration/system contradiction distinctions are not just opposites, or the "poles" of two dimensions. The conceptualisation I intend is a more dialectical one than this. Contradiction only occurs *through* system integration, since the very notion of contradiction, as I have formulated it, involves that of system integration', (*Central Problems in Social Theory*, p. 144).

Here Giddens seems to follow Lockwood's definition of system and social integration, since the latter, as already mentioned, links social integration with social conflict (between individual or collective actors) and system integration with contradictions between system parts, where *system parts* refer to institutional complexes. Giddens seems to go along with Lockwood since he defines contradiction as '*an opposition or disjunction of structural principles of social systems, where those principles operate in terms of each other but at the same time contravene one another*'. Capitalism is intrinsically contradictory because the very operation of the capitalist mode of production (private appropriation) *presumes* a structural principle which negates it (socialised production)', (*Central Problems*, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-2).

This approach to system integration/contradiction does not fit at all well with Giddens definition B of system integration as reciprocity between groups

18 *TCS*, *op. cit.*, p. 288

19 *ibid.*, p. 376

20 *ibid.*, p. 186

21 *ibid.*, p. 186

22 *ibid.*, p. 191.

23 P. Willis, *Learning to Labour*, Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977. See also *TCS*, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-309.

24 *TCS*, *op. cit.*, p. 303

25 *ibid.*, p. 303

26 *ibid.*, p. 25.

27 I am seeing this as a subject-object rather than as a subject-subject relationship, because the focus of analysis is not on how the social actor relates to concrete persons, but on how he or she reacts to a social system portraying specific structural features.

28 'A relation R_{AB} may be defined as *internal* if A would not be what it essentially

- is unless B is related to it in the way that it is ' R Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism*, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1979
- 29 Of course, critics of the externality concept ascribe to its users grotesque notions about subjects constituted outside social contexts, or societies existing completely independently from agents Such criticism is simply a matter of building straw-men
- 30 T Parsons has tried to theorise the systems-within-systems nature of social organisation in his *The Social System*, Glencoe Illinois, Free Press, 1951.
- 31 In the sense that the object cannot exist without the decisive contribution of the subject
- 32 See J Smith and B Turner, 'Constructing social theory and constituting society', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol 3, no 2, p 129
- I agree with this criticism only in so far as one argues that the duality of structure leads to an underemphasis of collective actors' strategic/monitoring orientations *vis-à-vis* rules As already mentioned, Giddens's work is full of references to collective agencies (e g formal organisations, social movements), but such references, I would argue, are not compatible with Giddens's exclusive focus on the duality notion
- 33 N Thrift, 'Bear and mouse or bear and tree? Anthony Giddens' reconstitution of social theory', *Sociology*, vol 19, no 4
- 34 John Urry, 'Duality of structure Some critical issues', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol 1, no 2, p 102
- 35 A Giddens, 'A reply to my critics', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol 1, no 2, p 110
- 36 See M Archer, 'Morphogenesis versus structuration On combining structure and action', *British Journal of Sociology*, Dec 1982
- 37 TCS, *op cit*, pp 176-7
- 38 A Giddens, 'Marx's correct views on everything', *Theory, Culture and Society*, March 1985, p 168
- 39 TCS, *op cit*, pp 174-9

Reflexivity, recursion and social life: elements for a postmodern sociology

Robert Platt

Abstract

The paper examines, and seeks to develop, the sociological concept of reflexivity. It identifies two senses of reflexivity, one associated with ethnomethodological accounts of members' practical reasoning, the other with a more philosophical sense of conscious self-referencing, and analyses their relationship. The paper argues that the development of this form of analysis leads to a form of propositional undecidability which makes it typically 'postmodern'. The development is linked to ideas of recursion, as these are expounded in computer science and mathematics, and to Derrida's interpretation of 'textual fold' – this also being used to ground the association of reflexivity with postmodernism. The analysis 'returns to the social' by considering aspects of Niklas Luhmann's explication of social reflexivity. It concludes by examining the understanding that a postmodern sociology might have of a postmodern society in which the grounds for social order have become undecidable.

If one were to construct a genealogy of reflexivity as a sociological concept, its present line would be most strongly represented in ethnography and ethnomethodology. There are also reasons for suggesting that, at least in a technical sense, the naming and conceptualisation of reflexivity as an essential quality in human interaction was originated within ethnomethodology. If no development of the concept has occurred outside the body of thought which originated it, one might conclude that the concept has led nowhere; that it is, in fact, moribund.

If this is the concept's present status, brought about – one may suppose – by the way in which the sociological tradition has evolved, this paper will argue that its resurrection is needed.

It will do so by attempting to show that the view of social life and of human being that reflexivity warrants remains open to development. The suggestion is made that the possibility of development emerges because the genealogy is uncompleted: the concept is underdeveloped. There are also reasons, it will be argued, for believing that other intellectual fields – mathematics, biology and deconstruction – have developed explanations of phenomena which are akin to reflexivity and which could be used to inform it. The idea of recursion, and of what Derrida calls ‘the fold’, currently being explored in mathematics and deconstruction respectively, constitute possible directions for conceptual development. It is the particular association of Derrida’s thought with postmodernism – an analysis of which is not itself included within the scope of this paper – which gives grounds for supposing that here might lie ‘elements for a postmodern sociology’.

Nevertheless, while postmodernism is not discussed in detail in what follows, some indication of what will be understood to characterise it is needed. In its broadest sense it is interpreted here as implying the questioning – or more strongly, the deconstruction – of all forms of representation and signification. That is, it questions the basis for all theories, methods, assessments of correspondence. Starting from the analysis of texts, Derrida’s deconstruction questions the possibility of correspondence, within the linguistic sign, between signifier and signified by arguing that these two categories are interchangeable. Deconstruction has the appearance of a sort of textual relativism comparable with that relativism of the sociology of knowledge established in the tenet that knowledge is bound by its social context. But this is only an appearance, since a thorough-going deconstruction would seek to question the idea of relativism, particularly in its relation to ‘absolutism’. Deconstruction seeks to avoid a final propositional commitment because its interest is to show the play that exists between conceptual terms paired in opposition. For this reason, it does not, and constitutionally cannot, ‘decide’ anything. If one wished to be ironic, one might think of deconstruction – and through it, of the essential character of postmodernism – as decided only upon the undecidability of the propositions within all texts.

These considerations have relevance for sociology in at least two ways. This can be established, first, in the substitution of ‘text’ for (social) ‘con-text’. Just as the text is the field of operations and

investigation for the deconstructionist, the social context is so for the sociologist. Indeed, it is this substitutability which lends the appearance of comparability to deconstruction and the sociology of knowledge.¹ Second, sociological propositions are themselves textualised in journal articles, books, reports, etc. Hence, they are available for deconstruction. Durkheim's analysis of suicide rates as comprising or signifying a social fact would stand as a good example of a highly 'deconstructible' sociology. Indeed, sociological critiques which question the methodology used by Durkheim or, more specifically, the notion of 'facticity' as this emerges in Durkheim's text, are already engaged in deconstructing it. Even so, such critiques would have the character of the postmodern – as the term is used here – only if, at the same time, they questioned the facticity of their own representations of Durkheim's analysis.

A sociology, or any other sort of account, which questions its own assumptions and statements will be considered, by virtue of that practice, to be reflexive. But there is, in what follows, an analysis of two senses of reflexivity. Ethnomethodology's understanding of reflexivity as routine self-accounting behaviour, accomplished through members' capacity for practical reasoning, is one of these; the other, which is associated with Gouldner's plea for the creation of a reflexive sociology, examines reflexivity as an act of conscious self-referencing. It is in the second sense – or, more accurately, in the belonging-together of both senses – that it may be said that a sociology so influenced broaches the postmodern. It does so, it will be argued, because reflexivity conceived thus generates that undecidability which the paper associates with postmodernism.

It is apparent, however, that a sociology such as this stands in danger of giving itself up to the abyss of *reductio ad absurdum*, to the infinite looping of a reflexive, but unattached, consciousness. But in computer science, mathematics and physics, 'recursion' is the name given to a relationship of self-reference in which related parts are embedded in, or stacked upon, each other in a form that may be either infinitely self-reproducing or not. The infinitely self-reproductive capacity of 'recursive networks' may be identified with infinite reflexivity. In what follows, 'mimesis' and 'repetition' will be interpreted as conditions for both. 'Recursion' will also be used, therefore, as a name synonymous with infinite reflexivity, where this is conceived not as the 'actual' infinity of the number system, but as the *possibility* of infinity for reflexive consciousness.

In this way, an examination of recursion, as conceived within the disciplines named above, may also create a conceptual space within which the possibility of infinite reflexivity becomes *sociologically* interesting. It is suggested that an understanding of how sociology may be related to postmodernism therefore requires an orientation to the recursively-generated undecidability of members' accounts.

The organisation of the paper reflects this perception of the concept of reflexivity. First, by examining the concept's problematic character and by associating Schutz's analysis of scientific adequacy with Garfinkel's development of the concept, its current meaning is inspected. Second, related concepts in other fields, specifically the ideas of textual fold and of recursion, are examined. Third, the implications of a highly developed use of the concept are examined with reference to aspects of Niklas Luhmann's analysis of social reflexivity. In conclusion, the sorts of consequences which accrue to a sociology defined by its postmodernism are examined in particular relation to the problem of social order.

Conceptual problematics of reflexivity

Of course what reflexivity conceptualises is a practice. In Garfinkel's ethnomethodology the practice is conceived as the constant accounting for, and reporting of, the actions of members of society by themselves. self-accounting and self-reporting as the routine accomplishment of practical reasoning² But the relationship between reflexivity as a concept and as a practice is the source of a problem. What happens when ethnomethodology's naming and conceptualisation of reflexivity makes it the subject of an account? One might argue that the practice is simply reproduced, re-practised, in the account that is given of it. But this would not be adequate, since naming and conceptualisation pre-suppose a *consciousness* of practice which is not a necessary condition of reflexivity as Garfinkel understands it. Garfinkel interprets reflexivity as an essential condition of social life. But the practical reasoning involved in giving accounts may be unconscious. Self-conscious performances may produce the least convincing sorts of accounts or, expressed conversely, the most obviously sincere performances may well occur, as Goffman asserts, when the actor

appears to be unconsciously responsive to the demands of a situation.³

While it would be much simpler to argue that ethnomethodology's account practises the reflexivity that it discovers to be an essential feature of all practical reasoning, an analysis of the concept's genealogy would need to inquire about the affects of *self-consciousness* upon reflexive practice.

It is the case, though, that there is already a version of reflexivity which insists that self-consciousness is of the essence. In this version, reflexivity is not routine or practical in Garfinkel's sense, on the contrary, it is a quality to be achieved. Rather than being a necessary condition of social life, reflexivity conceived thus has an immanent character: a human potential which one might seek to fulfil. It is a version which is well-captured in the idea of a 'reflexive sociology'. Of this, Gouldner writes

A Reflexive Sociology means that we sociologists must – at the very least – acquire the ingrained *habit* of viewing our own beliefs as we now view those held by others. (Gouldner 1970: 490).

Presumably, one of the tasks of a sociology such as this – and which had made reflexivity its topic – would be to show how the conceptual and practical, or 'lived', character of reflexivity are related. Even so, a reflexive sociology need not have reflexivity as its topic or use its name. Nevertheless, it is a contention of ethnomethodology – and one that has been judged to distinguish it from other forms of sociological conception – that the researcher needs to 'treat activities as reflexively accountable' (Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 38).

At the centre of the ethnomethodological project is the commitment that a fully-grounded sociology needs to account for the reflexive practices of members: reflexivity in the first sense. The question is how it could accomplish this in Gouldner's sense.

What this question raises is the need for, but problem of, a reflexivity of reflexivity. A response to the question by way of the development of a such a reflexivity would need both to distinguish between the two versions of reflexivity and to establish their identity. If reflexivity was not a characteristic of social life ethnomethodology would have nothing to reflect upon, nothing to be reflexive about; but equally, just because it is a characteristic, ethnomethodology is inevitably an accounting practice.

The reflexive attitude seems, therefore, to obey two principles: the differentiation of thought from its object; the identification of thought with its object. The first principle authorises the detached contemplation, by an observer, of members' practices in constituting social life; the second requires detached contemplation to be one of those practices.

With the metaphor of a genealogy in mind, one might inspect not only the conceptual development of reflexivity but of the sociological field as a whole. A concern with its tradition, which is what this amounts to, is inherent to sociology. Interestingly, this itself might provide the basis for claiming that sociology is a reflexive discipline. However this may be, an inspection of the tradition would probably make it possible to decide that particular forms of interpretation were more or less responsible for influencing the conceptual development of reflexivity. As a matter of principle, it can also be claimed that reflexive sociologies which have not topicalised reflexivity may have influenced the development of the concept. An illustration of this sort of influence would be in the affect that Mannheim's theory of the socially-unattached intelligentsia (which, even if wrong, constitutes an account of the possibility of its own production) may have had upon Garfinkel's use, taken over from Mannheim, of the documentary method.

But an analysis of this sort would have to be inexhaustible, for both the conceptual and practised, 'lived' antecedents of reflexivity – in their origin – are probably Greek. It would also be so general as to diminish the concept's technically specific location in ethnomethodology. More manageable would be an analysis of the concept's contemporary sociological reference. Such an analysis would be made easier by the simple, if crude, technique of isolating those bodies of sociological conceptualisation which neither topicalise reflexivity nor appear to be reflexive, and by considering how their pre-suppositions would be alien to these concerns. This would be to make the now familiar distinction between 'interpretive sociology' and various species of functionalism, structuralism and Marxism. It is the distinction which, referring to Durkheim's and Parsons's work, Giddens asserts involves the reduction of human agency to the 'internalization of values'.⁴ Nevertheless, it is noted that even though forms of interpretive sociology may become the focus of enquiry for a consideration of the current conceptual status of reflexivity, whether they are themselves reflexive is to be questioned.

Reflexivity and the postulate of adequacy

One orientation towards reflexive practice within an interpretive account is illustrated in Alfred Schutz's methodological criticism of Weber's analysis of meaningful behaviour.⁵ This criticism points to the manner in which human volition gets reduced to objectively ascertainable phenomena, putative elements for a causal science of society. The alternative offered by Schutz relies upon differentiating between members' first-order constructs, which are generated from a foundation of common-sense knowledge, and the logically consistent second-order constructs of scientific theory. Like Weber, Schutz sets himself the task of scientifically explaining how social life and the understandings of human agents are related. But this task is made problematic since common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge are taken to be different in kind. The resolution that Schutz attempts is formulated as a postulate of adequacy in which scientific knowledge is required to be capable of translation back into the common sense knowledge of members' first-order constructs.

While the postulate of adequacy makes a principle of the ideas of accounting and accountability, it tends to confine the reflexive capacity to it. Reflexivity becomes the reflective turn in which the adequacy of scientific knowledge measures its authenticity against members first-order constructs. But whether reflexivity is identical with adequation is questionable. If it were, there would be no reason for suggesting that scientific and common-sense knowledge are different, since both would consist in 'the reflective turn'. In other words, the postulate of adequacy fails to make the distinction between first- and second-order constructs, for which Schutz employs it. This would remain so up to the point that Schutz was prepared to assert that, in fact, members' accounts of their own behaviour are scientifically inadequate. But accepting this would lead to the conclusion that, since members' accounting is the practice in which (inter)subjectively understood meaning is realised, a scientific explanation must avoid giving an account of this sort. That is, the postulate of adequacy produces the interpretation that scientific explanation must somehow avoid its own (inter)subjective quality. By it so doing, Schutz's sociology is not reflexive in Gouldner's sense for it treats intersubjectivity as an objective phenomenon, where objectivity is a function of scientific adequacy. In the interpretation that meaning is:

the result of my explication of past lived experiences which are grasped reflectively from an actual now and from an actually valid reference schema (and which) . . . first become meaningful, then, when they are explicated *post hoc*. (Schutz and Luckman 1974: 15–16)

Schutz's sociology is reflexive solely in the sense that its meaning is entirely confined to a retrospective accounting. A fully literal reading of the above extract would then define the sociology. What it would not do is show the reader how Schutz could know what he claims to know in the extract.

Garfinkel's analysis of reflexivity develops Schutz's concept of the reflective turn in two ways: through an interpretation of the substitutability of objective for indexical expressions and in the contention that meaning and understanding are generated prospectively as well as retrospectively.

The sort of distinction that Schutz makes between the first-order constructs of common sense and their second-order scientific formulation becomes subject to Garfinkel's consideration of the substitutability of objective for indexical expressions. According to Garfinkel, objective expressions have the purpose of generalising the particular events and demonstrations to which they refer; it is their power of generalisation which makes objective expressions scientific. But examinations of the way in which the meaning of such expressions is understood indicates that this depends upon the contexts in which they were produced and received. If objective expressions are context-bound, they can hardly be used as substitutes for expressions which, because they refer to unique particulars, are recognizably indexical. It is for this reason that Garfinkel contends that the substitutability of objective expressions makes objectivity, on any and every occasion when it is expressed, promissory and programmatic. It is these, rather than the capacity for adequate transfer back into the context which an objective expression supposedly generalises, which are features of objective expressions. Adequacy is no longer a measure of the correspondence between first and second order constructs, but would be an attribute of the objectivity promised in every generalising account of a particular scientific demonstration because particular demonstrations are inevitably indices of the contexts in which they occur. Adequacy and objectivity are therefore features of the language used to describe particularities.

Taking Garfinkel's analysis seriously reduces the postulate of

adequacy to a common-sense accounting; the privilege of science is removed. In accomplishing this, reflexivity as an essentially 'uninteresting', routine practice is re-affirmed. But the character of this common-sense reflexivity remains undecided. It could be constituted either as the shared practical reasoning which makes actual situations reportable and accountable, or as a form of self-consciousness in which the member's account also addresses the possibility of its own production. If the difference between first- and second-order constructs, the difference between common sense and scientific thought, is no longer sustainable (because of the substitutability of objective for indexical expressions), reflexivity may take either one of these forms. In consequence of its doing so, a question is posed about the nature of human being. The question pertains to whether human being is reflexive only in the sense that actions are made reportable and accountable or in the sense that accounts can be the conscious and intentional application of their own denotative content to themselves.

Garfinkel himself develops the grounds upon which this question may be asked by identifying a retrospective-prospective sense of occurrence. In experimental situations, members used their knowledge of what they were led to believe were answers to their questions by assuming future answers.⁶ Garfinkel's description of the Et Cetera Principle outlines the ways in which speakers make assumptions that their unstated but intended meanings can be filled in by hearers and hearers assume that speakers will later clarify vague utterances. For both speakers and hearers, conversation consists in an anticipation of meaning depending in turn upon a constant interpretation of those parts of the conversation which have already been spoken. Equally, such interpretation depends upon the anticipatory force of current talk. Hence, the Et Cetera Principle describes the operation of what Cicourel called an interpretive procedure. The anticipation of meaning also incorporates an intentional act – an act which is oriented towards the future when some object or event will have become known to the speaker/hearer.

In this way, each moment of conversation is oriented both to the past and the future. The whole conversation is 'contained' in each and every moment, which also fosters particular anticipations of future development. The idea that conversation is contained in each of its moments questions the understanding that human reflexivity is defined either by the capacity to make actions accountable or to make accounts self-referential. The distinction

becomes redundant, for it would have to be both. To conceive of reflexivity in any other way and without further development, invokes the classical idealism of a hierarchy in which there are things in themselves, mental pictures or re-presentations of them, and opinions which we have in respect of these re-presentations. An expansion of the concept of reflexivity could not be satisfied by generating a picture of it which claimed to be closer to the thing itself, not least because what is called the thing itself might only be a reflection. Or rather, and since simple reflection itself implies the presence of the thing, an expansion of the concept needs to take seriously the possibility of infinite reflection. Reflexivity as the possibility of infinite reflection engages two aspects of it: mimesis and repetition.

Derrida's conception of 'the fold'

Mimesis and repetition are conceptual constituents of the figure that Derrida has called 'the fold', or 'hymen' In *The Double Session*, the fold is both the topic of Derrida's writing and the organisation of its structure. The writing is 'folded', and in a multiplicity of ways. Expressed as a distinction between form and content, and which therefore no doubt would seem to Derrida to be unduly metaphysical, one might assert that the fold is the content of an analysis whose form duplicates (mimics and repeats) it. This is one sense in which the writing constitutes a double session. But since both 'form' and 'content' are doubled or folded into each other in this way, Derrida finds necessary their erasure as conceptual terms. The erasure of binary oppositions and the deconstruction of the metaphysical ideation with which their use is associated – certainly since Plato – makes it apparent that the history of metaphysics is marked, like stitches in layers of fold, by repeated and mimetic binaries. In an altogether different expectation of the act of reading, Derrida's writing draws the reader into a collusive mirroring of the text's unfolding interpretations, as Derrida himself is drawn by his reading of Mallarmé's writing.

Mimesis and repetition are the threads which Derrida uses to relate the writings of Plato and Mallarmé. *The Double Session* juxtaposes Plato's *Philebus* and Mallarmé's *Mimique*. *Mimique* itself mimics mimicry both in the story that it tells and in its relation to intellectual and literary antecedents; in turn, the folds

of the Mallarméan text generate an infinity of other and related interpretations, including Derrida's own.

Plato and Mallarmé are related by a history, to ask about the meaning, or the truth, of this history is to realise that 'The very concept of history has lived only upon the possibility of meaning' (Derrida 1981: 184). Hence, to search for the historical thread which links Plato and Mallarmé is to re-inscribe the relationship of history to meaning and truth: a relationship originally told in the *Philebus*.

Derrida identifies four facets to the history of meaning as represented in the *Philebus*. First, Plato's interpretation that the human soul is constituted as a dialogue or dialectic gives it the character of the book. Our spontaneously arising opinion or feeling (*doxa*) that appears to us as the truth of something, when proffered aloud to another, becomes discourse (*logos*). With discourse, however, there arises the possibility that the subject, when alone, may become involved in self-address. It is the subject's private, internal discourse that makes the soul like a book.

'It seems to me that . . . our soul is like a book . . . the conjunction of memory with sensations, together with the feelings consequent on memory and sensation, may be said as it were, to write words in our souls. And when this experience writes what is true, the result is that true opinion and true assertions spring up in us, while when the internal scribe that I have suggested writes what is false, we get the opposite sort of opinions and assertions.' (Plato, the *Philebus*, quoted by Derrida 1981: 175)

But for Derrida the discourse that is represented here is a deficient dialogue, a dialogue that has 'lost its voice'. It is a form of expression which exists only because of the absence or loss of the other and, as such, it is a substitute for what is absent. The need for the book arises because of this absence or loss. The history of writing, 'until Mallarmé', is marked by an assignment of the metaphorical characteristics of the book to it.

The second facet that Derrida finds in the *Philebus* is the contention that the truth of the book is decidable. Truth is the element within which the soul's and the book's dialogue occurs, so that the truthfulness – and therefore also the falsity – of assertions can be measured against the book's and soul's own standards. In

Plato's estimation, the soul is a reflexive entity which accounts to itself for itself and can do so 'truly' or 'falsely'

Third, because Plato accepts that the book is an inscribed copy of prior internal discourse, Derrida identifies the Platonic assessment of the book as one which sees no intrinsic value in it. It is for this reason that writing in general is treated as mimesis. But Plato's interpretation of the relationship between mimesis and truth is itself paradoxical. The contention that the ideal is the real, that the visible or physical world contains only imperfect imitations of the real, leads to the conclusion that imperfection constitutes the untruth of imitation or representation. At the same time, imperfection is required never to be so imperfect that it fails to imitate the real or to provide an image of it.

Mimesis is lined up alongside the truth: either it hinders the unveiling of the thing itself by substituting a copy or double for what is; or else it works in the service of truth through the double's resemblance. (Derrida 1981. 187)

Finally, and for the reasons outlined above, Plato gives the book the character of the imaginal or imaginary in general. Book, soul and thing are given a relation of likeness in which each images the other,

the book then reproduces the *logos*, and the whole is organized by this relation of repetition, resemblance . . . , doubling, duplication, this sort of specular process and play of reflections where things . . . , speech, and writing come to repeat and mirror each other. (Derrida 1981. 188)

Derrida emphasises that the play of mimesis involves repetition. Furthermore, repetition is potentially limitless 'What announces itself here is an internal division within *mimesis*, a self-duplication of repetition itself; *ad infinitum*, since this movement feeds its own proliferation' (Derrida 1981. 191). But this cannot mean that simple copies are indefinitely reproduced. Repetition is not the infinitely repeated production of copies governed by a relationship of simple identity; it is not of the sort that we have in mind when we say, for instance, that two coins are identical. The relationship is metaphorical, and in the sense that Derrida intends when he shows that Plato makes the book a metaphor for the internal discourse of the soul. In the metaphor, as with all forms of

mimesis, the way in which the imaginal is *only* a semblance of something else is essential to it. In the infinite mirroring of semblances, the *difference* of each semblance – as well as the likeness of all – constitutes it as semblance.

This idea that mimesis and repetition breed difference as well as likeness is going to be essential to the arguments which follow, for the name of this process is recursion. In turn, the perpetuation of difference indicates that reflexivity can never be solely constituted by either the practice of making actions accountable or making accounts self-referential. Similarly, the retrospective-prospective structure of conversations could never be such as to make possible the re-creation of their topics' essential meaning in an undiluted form, since the mimesis that an account aims to achieve simultaneously produces something different. For Derrida, the eternal replication of difference, the holding sway of '*différance*', makes claims for the revelation of essential meaning 'undecidable'. Undecidability is as much a mathematical phenomenon as a textual one.

An undecidable proposition, as Godel demonstrated in 1931, is a proposition which, given a set of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to those axioms. (Derrida 1981: 219)

Sociologically, the undecidability of the meaning of accounts might be conceived as the condition and necessity for Otherness. That is, 'society' is a product of the undecidability of the meaning of individual accounts.

It is for the reason that philosophy has traditionally understood the concept of reflexivity as a process of self-conscious reflection – comprehending and deciding upon all it contemplates – that Derrida questions it as anything more than a fictive operation tied to the need for self-adequation. He associates this sense of reflexivity with 'the motion of consciousness or self-presence that plays such a determining role in Hegel's speculative logic and dialectic' (Derrida 1981: 270). The structure of Hegelian reflexivity presents, for Derrida, the same problems of undecidability that he encounters in hermeneutic philosophy. Both of these share the difficulties that can be associated with that form of phenomenology which, through the phenomenological reduction, aims to isolate both the contents and the intentional structure of

the consciousness of a self. Derrida avers that phenomenology achieves only the idealization of the thing contemplated and of the self contemplating, and that this idealization is given expression through the pneumatological effects upon writing of silent, internally-directed speech.⁷ It is in this sense that Plato's interpretation of the human soul makes it a reflexive entity and which, in doing so, constitutes the metaphysics which governs Hegelian logic, as well as phenomenology and hermeneutic philosophy. All of these, that is, are different forms of the need for self-adequation and hence are antagonistic towards the undecidability of which Derrida and Godel write.

Rather than the metaphysical concept of reflexivity, Derrida wishes to follow and elaborate the contours of the Mallarméan fold, for 'the fold is not a form of reflexivity' (Derrida 1981: 270). The operation is one of 'Dissemination into the folds of the hymen' (Derrida 1981: 271). Here, there is no circling path back to a first point, nothing that develops into something more complex or which moves from a beginning to an end. Therefore, 'infinity' or 'totalization', conceived as the endless circling back of consciousness into itself in an act of self-relation, can not be defended. There is simply the act of dissemination.

The idea that textual dissemination creates a polysemic universe in which terms are infinitely substitutable breaches the Hegelian notion of infinity as the thinking of totality. The infinite substitutability of terms and of texts makes conclusions undecidable. Because infinite substitution cannot be a self-confirming process, the expanse that it opens up also seems to be bottomless. It is for this reason that the alternative view of infinity, 'according to a non-Hegelian identity', may conceive of it as having an abyssal structure.

According to Rodolphe Gashé,

It is undoubtedly correct to note that Derrida has often described this sort of infinity in terms of what Andre Gide, in his *Journal*, called '*mise en abyme*' . . . This expression, originally from heraldry, designates a structure in which the whole is represented in miniature in one of its parts by placing a small escutcheon in the middle of a larger one, and which thus conveys a sense of spurious infinity. (Gashé 1986: 296)

Derrida is suspicious, however, about explanation which appeals to the *mise en abyme* because of the confidence that its

representational power inspires. In *The Double Session*, it is the structure of the fold, not the abyss, which conveys the sense of infinity as infinite substitutability. If reflexivity is generally susceptible to the criticisms that Derrida levels at its formulation by Hegel – the infinite capacity of consciousness, and reason, to circle back into itself in an act of self-adequation – then the structure of the fold would seem to obviate these. The structure of the fold is the same as that of recursion.

The structure of recursion

Hofstadter shows how recursive structures are embedded in the music of Bach, the drawings of Escher and the mathematics of Gödel.⁸ Recursion is a term also widely used in computer science. Here, it refers to structures or networks which define themselves, but always in progressively simpler terms. A recursive network is therefore one in which distinctions of level can be made on the basis of repeated, but nevertheless more or less complex, self-referencing operations. Levels are said to be 'nested' and 'stacked' within recursive networks. 'Nested loops', in which sets of instructions are included in one another, are used in the writing of computer programmes. According to Hofstadter, the real skill in writing these is to be able to simplify or 'modularise' instructions so that complex procedures are broken down into simple, but repeated, ones. Nested loops 'perform some series of related steps over and over again, and abort the process when specific conditions are met' (Hofstadter 1980: 149). He emphasises that the same operation is repeated but at several *different* levels at once. Nesting instructions inside others therefore mimic and repeat them, but in such a way that the difference of each repetition cumulatively produces something new. *The Welcome Guide to the BBC Microcomputer System* confirms that 'The real power of computers comes from their ability to repeat instructions. This can transform trivial programs so that they produce very impressive results' (1986: 70).

The converse of this process of breaking down complex operations into simple but repeated ones is that complexity may be understood as the product of simple repetition. This is the conclusion reached by William Poundstone, as well as Hofstadter. Poundstone's examination of recursion is directed at the physics of matter from the subatomic particle to the cosmos. He argues that

the protean complexity of the universe can be explained in terms of the interaction of four forces – forces which also control the existence of particles. The search by physicists for a Grand Unified Theory (GUT) involves an understanding of how gravity, electromagnetic force, and what physicists know as the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forces combine to produce both quanta and galaxies. ‘There is ample reason to believe that all the complexity of our world can be encompassed by a simple unified physical theory’ (Poundstone 1985: 126) which is produced recursively. At the same time, ‘Abstract recursive systems suggest that it may be difficult to predict the consequences of simple rules’ (Poundstone 1985: 127).

Poundstone affirms that uncertainty, in a methodological sense, is an inevitable condition of the attempt of empirical science to predict the future state of a system which is developing recursively. The more complex the system, the more uncertain of its state an observer necessarily must be. Poundstone illustrates this point by showing how Heisenberg reached the conclusion that uncertainty is a necessary correlate of the observation of quanta with regard to simultaneous measurement of a particle’s position and velocity, so that the more exact the measurement of one variable, the more uncertain the other. The name that Poundstone gives to the uncertainty that inevitably occurs as a result of growing complexity is ‘entropy’. In thermodynamics, entropy is associated with heat, for heat is defined as the aggregate of random atomic motion in a body, and entropy is a measure of the disorder caused by this randomness. The disorder of a system or body, associated with its atomic randomness, makes prediction of a future state inherently uncertain, and hence entropic. Entropy increases with the number, and therefore the complexity, of operations that are stacked in a process or system.

Entropy varies directly with complexity and complexity is produced by the repetition of simple operations. Repetition occurs through the process of nesting, or of infinite looping. The organisation of infinite loops seems to equate with the *mise en abyme*. With reference to philosophical thought, it is akin to the Hegelian interpretation of reflexivity as the infinite capacity of consciousness to circle back into itself. But, at least from Derrida’s viewpoint, the function of Hegel’s conceptualisation of reflexivity is the securing of self-adequation. In order to assess the degree to which social scientific accounts of social action can be translated back into common sense formulations, Schutz also conceives of a

principle of adequation: a principle which becomes one of self-adequation when it is associated with Schutz's own accounts of social action. If the structure of reflexive self-adequation is identical to the *mise en abyme*, it is so because, on Derrida's interpretation, it, too, provides a confidence and a certainty – embodied in the self's representational power – the grounds for which remain undecidable. The point at issue is whether recursive structure, particularly when consciousness is examined in relation to it, avoids self-adequation.

Hofstadter's analysis of consciousness, which he treats synonymously with 'the self', focuses upon brain functioning. The analysis describes a hierarchy of operations which are recursively related. The passage of ions through the nervous system is controlled by nerve cells, or neurons, and specifically the synapses and axon of each cell. Neurons 'fire' in response to the volume of inputs to them, so that a new level of brain operation is stimulated when a 'threshold' is passed. This new level is the operation of symbols. Symbols become activated, like neurons, as a consequence of repetition beyond a threshold. However the repeated operation of symbols is judged not to generate a new hierarchical level because consciousness is taken to be only the operation of symbols upon themselves. In effect, consciousness has 'symbols for symbols'. Consequently, it is understood to be a brain subsystem which monitors symbolisation while being independent of general mental activity. The self is hence considered to be relatively autonomous and explanations of social life are reduced to materialist assumptions of brain isomorphism.

Hofstadter refers to Goffman's analysis of framing devices,⁹ such as the 'false starts' that advertisers use to make their advertisements 'naturalistic', in order to argue that the effort to 'jump out of the (self) system', despite the impossibility of this happening, pervades all human interaction. For Hofstadter, only jumping between brain subsystems within the system of the self is possible. Analogously, 'A computer programme can modify itself, but it cannot violate its own instructions – it can at best change some parts of itself by *obeying* its own instructions' (Hofstadter 1980: 478).

But materialist assumptions about the originating affects of brain isomorphism for social structure are not sustainable in the light of Gödel's conclusions. Hofstadter formulates one of Gödel's propositions as: 'All consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions' (Hofstadter 1980: 17).

When this proposition's range of references is extended, it leads to the conclusion that the consistent application of any theory, or of any interpretation, includes claims that the theory's 'axiomatic formulations' cannot be used to decide. Expressed differently, theories generate propositions which are not definable in their own terms. Hofstadter's theory includes the proposition that consciousness is a brain subsystem which can operate independently of other brain functions but which depends upon a shared system of symbolization. But how this proposition could be defined in terms of the theory which includes it cannot be decided.

Social structure and recursion

For Niklas Luhmann, undecidability is a consequence of the process of social transformation since the differentiation which is part of that process inevitably throws up problems of procedure. These problems occur when the procedures or conventions which codify social conduct are made – or are discovered to be – self-referential.

Luhmann's analysis is built upon a semantics in which the *seseme* is the unit of codified conventions. Like Hofstadter's interpretation of symbol activity, and under the same conditions of self-referential mimesis and repetition, the *seseme* recursively generates differentiated codes. Furthermore, the semantics has to be an historical one because differentiation is a temporal phenomenon. From this point of view there would appear to be a certain comparability between Luhmann's method and Foucault's 'archaeology'. While Luhmann admits to having in common with Foucault a post-humanistic perspective, necessitated by humanism's exhausting of itself 'in its exaltation of the subject' (Luhmann 1986: 4), he questions an approach which he judges to commit itself to an analysis of power divorced from considerations of social structure and which, hence, overestimates the empirical nature of the power of discourse. Luhmann accepts, therefore, that 'The dominant semantics of a given period becomes plausible only by virtue of its compatibility with the social structure' (Luhmann 1986: 4–5).

Codes are generated, then, under a *structural* necessity. For Luhmann, the complexity of modern social life is, above all else, a structural quality. Functional differentiation of structure, occasioned by the self-referencing of codified convention, is the

way in which structure becomes more complex. So while there may be more or less rapid transformations of structure, there is never absence of structure.

Logically then, the validity of a programme depends on its own execution. The execution of the programme becomes a condition of the execution of the programme. Hang the man if – and only if – you hang him. This instruction, of course, *would make issues undecidable*. (Luhmann 1988: 160, my emphasis)

Undecidability is a product of the paradoxical self-referencing of codified conventions the 'remedy' for which can only be 'deparadoxification' by new sets of procedure, and these constitute potentially revolutionary social transformations. Hence, transformation is a structurally necessary feature of the discovery of paradox in legal codes, for which *the possibility of being undecided* is the hidden, but motivating, spring.

So Luhmann interprets differentiation as a functional condition for transformation within modern society. It is seen as an evolutionary variable which generates profoundly complex and rapidly changing social structures and meanings. With regard to his analysis of the historical semantics of passionate love, structural differentiation is associated with the systematic communication of information. He draws upon 'interdisciplinary research on a cybernetics of self-referential orders, on general systems theory, on autopoiesis and on information and communication' (Luhmann 1985: 3). His, then, is an analysis which applies to a representation of social structure conceptions of machine – particularly computer – logic and its recursive (autopoietic) functions together with (Parsonian) interpretations which view the rapid communication of information as the basis for system maintenance. Hence, society may be treated as a system consisting entirely of communications 'and therefore as a system that can only reproduce communications by means of communications. This also includes communications by the society about itself (in particular: theories of society)' (Luhmann 1986: 4). So the evolving code which represents love as passion, made interpretable by a special historical semantics, is itself a 'special generalized symbolic medium of communication' establishing a structural pattern for society.

As with developments in the law, literary codifications of the conventions of love are faced with problems of how to respond when the codes are treated self-referentially. At the same time, it

is because the response is experienced as a problem that the codes, and the relationships to which they refer, are rapidly transformed. Faced, for instance, with questions about the moral rectitude of accepting letters from an admirer, women had to consider whether doing so would encourage heightened interest. On the other hand, the 'tactics of seduction' depended entirely on exploiting these signs as the promise of something greater, so that relationships became marked by a sensitivity to these nuances. Over time, the social reflexivity of the relationship makes it self-perpetuating.

Luhmann's work points to ways in which the protean complexity of modern social life can be treated as a topic for analysis. It provides an account of the generation of complexity which accords with the idea of recursive proliferation. As indicated, proliferation is essentially a structural phenomenon which is occasioned by the need to accommodate self-referentially produced uncertainties.

Questions of the place of human agency arise for analyses, like Luhmann's, which accept the givenness and universality of social structure.¹⁰ One could use Hofstadter's interpretation of the self as a remedy for the 'sociological excesses' of Luhmann's account and, thereby, for an authentication of the structure of human agency. But it is important to note that doing this would offer no remedies for 'structuralist excesses', since both accounts rely heavily upon assumptions about the apriority of structure. Indeed, both accounts are committed to the idea of recursive structural development according to a cybernetic principle. What is significant is that the same sort of arguments are used to support two versions of structure which their authors would presumably find mutually exclusive. In relating the two versions to each other, one's questioning may be more directed by inquiring whether either version could, through the process of functional differentiation, theoretically generate the other.

Luhmann writes widely about the relationship between individuality and society. Where two individuals are attached by a shared passionate love, this relationship is particularly poignant, for a love of this sort is marked both by a mutual absorption which differentiates the couple from 'society', and by its codified conventionality. But the difference between a close, even private, world and an anonymous impersonal one is a structural necessity, since it is only 'by virtue of this difference that individuals can channel the flow of the information they receive' (Luhmann

1986: 16). Individuality turns out to be defined, then, in terms of a feedback mechanism through which social affirmation of personal inner experience can be received. Or rather, individuality has to be two things: interiority of private experience and the mechanism for receiving positive feedback. So passionate love is a special case of the relationship in which the individual's private feeling is expressed in such a way that it may be socially affirmed. The attachment to the beloved is, at one and the same time, an expression of private and intimate feeling, and – through the couple's mutual absorption – the cause of a differentiation, or 'detachment', from society which will create conditions for the channeling of social affirmation

But this structural relationship is itself subject to constant change. Empassioned love becomes intensified and enhanced by the reflexivity of the couple's relationship to the social code which affirms their relationship to each other. Intensification and enhancement in turn produce an exaggeration of feeling which results either in idealization or paradoxicalization. The code for *amour passion* itself represents the excess and finiteness of the behaviour which it codifies, for this reason, as the inner impossibility of maintaining empassioned love. The code is hence differentiated from the code for marriage. And yet the social conventions through which interpersonal relationships may be affirmed view marriage as an outcome of and for empassioned love. It does so, however, solely on condition that the couple *learn* that empassioned love is changeable. Consciousness of the problem of preserving a love which is beginning to be experienced as impossible makes marriage viable.

The analysis of empassioned love does, then, identify individuality. This occurs, at one level, in 'the couple', whose mutual absorption constitutes it as a unit detached from society. At another level, individuality is represented by 'the self'. In the empassioned relationship, self-presentation, or self-portrayal, occurs through the network of communicative action which structures the social system as a whole. Hence, Luhmann's work analyses individuality as selfhood, but treats it as a code, recursively related to societal structure.

At the same time, the self becomes individuated in proportion to the uncertainty of establishing mutually congruent expectations with the other. Self-reference here becomes the system which ensures the interpretability of self's utterances, so that reflexivity would be associated, again, with self-adequation.

Self-referential systematization increases in direct proportion to the improbability of communicative success and the uncertain fate of the social relationship. The more uncertain one is of how the other will adapt to expectations, the more indispensable it becomes to a system within which one can interpret one's own utterances and the ensuing reactions to them. (Luhmann 1986: 29–30)

So, for Luhmann, uncertainty (or 'undecidability' in this paper's terminology) is reduced by 'self-referential systematization'. Reflexivity becomes the remedy for undecidability; it excludes possibilities for the ambiguity of the other's gestures and utterances since the self is now the source of reference for meaning.

When the self experiences uncertainty by developing particular expectations of the other, uncertainty can be assuaged in the semantics of the code which polarises 'true' and 'false' love. So false love would be that form of attachment in which the other fails to meet self's expectations, thereby occasioning 'self-referential systematisation'; true love would be the attachment in which the other confirms the self, or rather, the relationship in which each confirms the other, to the exclusion of others. It is a relationship in which, more intimately than in any other, the validation of self-portrayal can be secured. The other becomes loved because love's source in the self activates the self in relation to the other. The other's being-loved is occasioned by the energising power of a love whose source is in the self, as the need for self-portrayal. To this end 'one sees what is most important to everyday life: being able to act as the Self of one's own ego, as the source of one's own love' (Luhmann 1986: 166).

It is in this context that the instability of passion is realised. Because love enables action 'as the Self of one's own ego', the couple's mutual absorption becomes unstable: the preservation of 'true love' becomes a problem. Transformation of the relationship occurs when partners learn that the problem of preservation makes marriage viable. Such learning occurs in the context of a 'programme of understanding' which relates observations of the 'environmental system' to the processing of information so that the necessity of self-portrayal becomes postulated. Marriage is codified as a resolution of the problem of preserving empassioned love, at the same time as it is made viable by the partners' acceptance of the necessity of self-presentation.

It is apparent that, in Luhmann's estimation, uncertainty

(undecidability) is an essential component of social action and structure. It is important to recognise, though, that reflexivity is associated, in the structure of selfhood, with a systematisation of meanings which, on those occasions when other fails to satisfy self's expectations, purposefully excludes the other's influence. Reflexivity becomes the guarantor of self-adequation rather than the self-reference which this paper has represented as the generative condition for undecidability. And yet Luhmann also treats reflexivity as the origin of paradoxicalisation, such that marriage is judged to be codified as both the resolution of the problem of preserving passionate love and the transformation of love into a form that legitimises the validity of self-presentation. Similarly in the sociology of law, paradox is interpreted as the source of creative change in the law as it attempts to eradicate contradictions founded, for instance, on the law's sanctification of the rights to equality and to property ownership.¹¹ So what remains at issue is whether Luhmann believes that uncertainty is reduced by the propagation of structure, or that – despite increasing structural complexity – uncertainty is endemic.

In one sense, these choices are not alternatives. This is so because Luhmann accepts that structural diversification occurs only as a result of uncertainty. Therefore increasing structural complexity does not indicate that, generically, uncertainty is somehow being eradicated. It does, however, indicate that a particular uncertainty (an ambiguity or paradox within the prescriptions of a law, for instance) can be eradicated. But such eradication is liable to create conditions in which new uncertainties arise.

Expressed differently, the structural relationship is one which incorporates both closedness and openness. With respect to the study of empassioned love, the couple are tied by a bond which is closed to others and which detaches the couple from society; love, self-referentially enhancing itself in the lovers, affirms self-presentation. At the same time, empassioned love is given its social being by an openness to, and availability for, conventionalisation and codification; by its openness to the transformation which makes marriage viable. Historical change in the semantics of *amour passion* are associated with 'a peculiar combination of circular closedness and an openness towards anything that might enrich love' (Luhmann 1986: 140).

More than any other feature, it seems to be the complementarity of openness and closedness which characterises Luhmann's notion

of structure. It is the opposition of openness and closedness which makes it possible for them to come together in the generation of structural transformation.

At one level, the complementarity of openness and closedness is unproblematic. The structure of social systems enable forms of interaction which are proper to them and, one might say, these are properties to which the system is 'open'. Equally, structures prohibit other forms of interaction which are not included among their properties and to which they are therefore 'closed'. But the purpose of this paper has been to indicate how the repetition and mimesis of interaction recursively generates differentiation; that is, how systems which are closed to some properties become open to them, and how systems which are open to their own properties become closed to them. Fundamentally, this is a question about how change and perpetuation in the *identity* of social systems is to be understood

Equally, it is a question about human agency – which implies more than the idea that human beings represent structural relationships. It is in the moment of transformation, the moment in which openness and closedness are the same, that matters are undecidable; and it is then that agency means more than the human representation of structural properties, for it is precisely structure which is undecidable. The idea of 'social entropy' might be used to inspect what seems to be involved

Conclusion

It was indicated above that Poundstone gives the name 'entropy' to the uncertainty that inevitably accompanies growing complexity. In thermodynamics, entropy is a measure of heat increase in relation to initial temperature and is defined as the aggregate of random atomic motion in a body. Randomness is associated with both disorder and uncertainty. The term is derived from the Greek word for 'a transformation', and was used by physicists to describe the 'transformability' of energy in a body or system. Entropy rises when the useful energy in a body (that is, the energy that can be converted into work) becomes transformed into heat in an irreversible way. The Second Law of Thermodynamics asserts that the capacity for doing useful work itself diminishes since the probabilities of the occurrence of ordered arrangements of

molecules are very much less than those for random arrangements. Orderliness tends to degenerate into disorderliness as energy becomes transformed into the molecular randomness of heat

The concept of entropy has also been associated with information theory and, here, its relevance to Luhmann's analysis of the structuring of the social system by and through the communication of information is apparent. Information is defined with reference to the range of possible messages produced in any communication. Entropy is conceived as a measure of the lack of information about the structure of a system and increases in proportion to the number and variety of elements, or sub-systems, within the structure. As elements increase in number and diversity they become randomised like molecules whose movement heat makes random. There is an inverse relationship between the complexity of the elements of a system and the information that one can have of them. So entropy describes a process in which the loss of information about the elements of a system accompanies increasing complexity.

Because Luhmann's sociology of law is a social structural analysis, a concept of *social* entropy can be derived from it. While the analysis claims that increases in the complexity of the law generate the particular uncertainties (ambiguities, paradoxes) that may be resolved by legislative reform, it also suggests that – in general – uncertainty is endemic. A question arises as to whether this growth in complexity is simply a function of numerical addition to the body of legal convention or whether growth occurs at an increasing rate. It seems clear that Luhmann accepts that the complexity of bodies of convention, whether legal or romantic, grows by a recursive process of self-referential enhancement. In this case, the rate of growth of complexity can only be unpredictable, as can its direction. In the face of endemic uncertainty, one may only believe that recursive growth occurs at an increasingly rapid rate. If so, one may also argue that uncertainty, metaphorised as social entropy, varies directly with it.

It is on this basis that an increase of social entropy may be hypothesised. The metaphorsation of uncertainty as social entropy becomes thinkable only in response to the growing complexity of social structure, as the realisation of growing complexity depends upon the incidence of uncertainty.

The conjunction of increasing complexity with social entropy forges a different means for conceiving the (sociological) problem of social order. If the sociological theorisation of social order has

depended upon the binary opposition of two generic models of society, one committed to notions of the transcendent imposition of structural forces, the other to a structure made immanent by members' interactional production of social meanings, the concept of social entropy deconstructs it. This occurs because social entropy is a consequence of the growing complexity of social structure, which is attendant upon the imposition of order. An increased striving for the organised and rational resolution of undecidables generates them, because order and undecidability are the recursive products of each other. The recursive relationship evades a historical accounting, as though order and undecidability progress in an evolutionary or dialectical fashion. And yet the contention that there are grounds for believing that the rate of growth in structural complexity is increasing would appear to require historical evidence to support it. But, as in thermodynamics, the concept of entropy applied to social structure needs to address the question of whether increasing complexity and social entropy are irreversible. In thermodynamics, irreversibility came to be questioned because it was judged that the separation of molecules (upon which would depend processes of orderly systematisation) should occur as frequently as mixing processes. The suggestion was made that mixing and separating processes must be cyclical and that, rather than the universe succumbing to 'heat-death', there is a constant movement towards thermodynamic equilibrium.

An examination of social structure, as with thermodynamics, can provide no certainty that increasing complexity and entropy are irreversible. There is no way of knowing whether social transformation occurs only in accordance with an overriding propensity towards a state in which order and uncertainty are in equilibrium. But to entertain the notion that these matters are undecidable supports the contention that there is an increasingly complex regulation of social order, since the recursive condition for that process is undecidability itself. The symbiosis of the relationship between undecidability and social order ensures that only belief, never knowledge, is possible.

If this orientation to the production of social order provides the impulse for a postmodern sociology, the form of social order to which it belongs, and which belongs to it, should be elaborated. Certainly, Bauman's belief that a sociology of the postmodern can remain immune from the concerns of a postmodern sociology could not be sustained. Accepting this, undecidability presumably

releases a multiplicity of diverse cultures. Entropic transformations of social structure generate a world of differentiated, undecidable belief systems

This is indeed the vision of postmodernism held by Bauman, for it is instanced in his judgement that postmodern art's abrogation of artistic canons and hierarchies makes reality plural. On the same basis, postmodern sociology is attracted to Schutz's analysis since it can be used to confirm a 'dissolution of systemic order into a plethora of multiple realities and universes of meaning' (Bauman 1988: 804), despite the absence of a 'self-adaption to the transformed object of study' (Bauman 1988: 805). So the suggestion is that the character of postmodern sociology (like postmodern art and postmodern culture) is given by a randomness and relativism which is unreflexively differentiated from the sociological tradition by its proponents. Hence, 'the postmodern sociology does not have the concept of postmodernity' (Bauman 1988: 805), but only signifies it through mimesis

In this sense, postmodern sociology is part of postmodern culture and bears the same relation to a sociology of the postmodern. Bauman examines the possibility that a culture grounded on consumer conduct makes postmodern society a viable theme for a sociology of the postmodern. But viability would have to depend on whether it could be shown that the randomness of postmodern culture somehow becomes systematised. Bauman's point is that consumerism replaces 'work (which) served as the link holding together individual motivation, social integration and systemic reproduction' and 'fastens together the life-worlds of the individual agents and purposeful rationality of the system' (Bauman 1988: 807–8). Understood thus, postmodernism is the name for a new social order, but one which is associated with the randomness of a culture in which art knows neither a synchronic nor diachronic order; a culture which postmodern sociology mimetically signifies without ever conceptualising.

Bauman's conceptualisation of the new order interprets 'seduction' and 'the market' as the principle ways in which diversity and order are made compatible. Seduction replaces repression as the dominant form of control, so that the individual is persuaded that consumption is a duty, but one that is tied to the pursuit of pleasure. Nevertheless, cultural diversity is a condition for the success of the market, but only 'once the consumer choice has been entrenched as the point in which systemic reproduction, social integration and individual life-world are co-ordinated and

harmonised' (Bauman 1988: 810). Accordingly, the dominance of the market must be realised prior to widespread cultural differentiation, although how the social transformation, which substitutes the market principle for the work principle occurs is not explained. Presumably, this would have to depend entirely upon processes of seduction.

The emphasis upon order throws the burden of explanation not onto the diversity with which postmodernism was originally associated, but onto the reasons for the universal ascendancy of the market. In turn, such an explanation would seem to require a political economy which examined the evolution of capitalism. Bauman's analysis does indeed refer to developments in capitalism, although from this vantage point postmodernism would be no more or less than a stage in that process. But as *political* economy, an explanation of this sort would need to address the ways in which postmodernism was instigated, if not controlled, through political power. Bauman asserts that market forces are the only alternative support to 'political powers' who have lost 'all interest in universally binding standards' (Bauman 1988: 810), but this formulation suggests that the market is only an instrument of policy instead of the fate of capitalist economy.

While the problem of the relationship between market autarky and political power is unresolved, how randomness is compatible with order remains questionable. The grounds for a sociology of the postmodern, as conceived, would have to rest entirely in *its* ordering of the diversity of postmodern consumerist culture as 'the purposeful rationality of the system'. If not this, what remains is the understanding that postmodern sociology and a sociology of the postmodern belong together, in a relation which has the same structure as randomness and order. Nevertheless, this understanding may mark no more than a return to 'the orthodox area of sociological investigation (though the area itself is now structured in an unorthodox way)'? (Bauman 1988: 812).

So the problem is to think out how 'randomness', 'social levelling', 'diversity', 'atomisation' constitute properties of (the new social) *order*. And it could be that this would involve no more than a return to that orthodox area of social investigation which examines the relationship of consensus and conflict, identity and difference: the oldest of sociology's problems, as well as philosophy's.

This has, indeed, been the problem addressed in this paper: recursion was identified as the process or relationship which makes

it possible to conceive of the generation of difference from mimetic repetition. (Maybe this is also the way in which a postmodern sociology becomes a sociology of the postmodern.) But the generation of difference must also be associated with undecidability, since neither the nature of that which is different, nor difference itself, can be predicted on the basis of simple repetition. Reflexivity was associated with recursion in that, while reflexivity may repeatedly secure self-adequation (in Luhmann's terminology, 'enhancement' and 'idealisation') it is also the source of a 'paradoxicalisation' in which the orderliness of social structure becomes problematic and potentially creates the need for structural re-ordering. Seen in this way, postmodern society would be such a re-ordering predicated on the reflexively generated contradictions embodied in the 'old order' that had systematised a cultural homogeneity centred on work. The analysis of how this re-ordering has taken place in contemporary Britain would involve examining how a 'politics of the market' had become so ascendant. It would involve, that is, an analysis of Thatcherism expressed in terms of the authoritative overriding of what had been undecidable, or of the substitution of undecidability for market-centred action. One might suspect that, in the political context of the new order, research which theorises undecidability is liable to be chastened by 'an iron maiden in whose secure embrace scholarship is trapped' (Maturana and Varela 1972: 64).¹² Equally, the analysis of Thatcherism prefigured here – itself beyond the scope of this paper – would be pre-disposed to search for the undecidables belonging to the order in whose embrace it lies.

The paper has argued that it is the idea of recursion, developing from a particular interpretation of reflexivity, which releases undecidability and social entropy as self-expressive modes of questioning. The process was related to the structure of a social order identified as postmodernism, an order which calls for both a sociology of postmodernism and a postmodern sociology in one.

It was suggested that recursive change depended upon a repetition in which repeated events and relationships were folded into each other. For instance, if Hofstadter's account of brain functioning was incorporated into a recursive analysis of social life, 'society' would be one level in a stack of recursive operations or networks which would include: neuron, symbol, consciousness, the self. 'Society' would be stacked onto this series if this term were used to refer to a structure which hierarchically transforms what would have been undecidable for a self. Postmodern society

would be the contemporary form of social order which has structured that transformation

The operation of each level in the stack depends upon a looping which repeats itself until the volume of repetition reaches a threshold beyond which a new level hierarchically transforms it. This is how Hofstadter considers that neural becomes symbolic activity and it is how Luhmann thinks self-portrayal becomes socially codified. Understood as the movement of self-adequation, reflexivity would itself be a self-referential looping which, at the same time, hierarchically aimed to affirm its own adequacy. But the hierarchical organization of the stack also indicates the essential incompleteness of any level within it. It points to the manner in which self-referential looping creates the conditions in which reflexivity cannot know itself in itself. The self-adequation that reflexive thought seems to generate is a 'proposition' which cannot be decided by a consistent application of reflexivity. Adequation can only be given by something other, which reflexivity itself is not. And yet it is self-reference, reflexivity itself, which originates the power of mimicry and repetition and, hence, recursive development.

For these reasons, any notion of a development, genealogical or otherwise, of the concept of reflexivity must be partial and incomplete. qualities which appear to be necessary correlates of undecidability. It was suggested that, in sociological terms, the repeated acts of self-portrayal that constitute accounting practice transform undecidable components into the reality of social life; that social life transmogrifies those components. This implies that reflexivity is both the limit of self-portrayal and the cause of, or at least occasion for, its own transmutation. It also implies, therefore, that recursive development can only be understood reflexively. The genealogical development of the concept of reflexivity therefore creates the conditions in which its future development can be imagined, but only in terms of the language and thought which describes reflexivity in its present mode.

The question of how the notion of recursive development still lies within the domain of the concept of reflexivity is therefore crucial. If reflexive self-adequation is breached by the idea of recursion, it is so only to the degree that this idea, conceivable through reflexive thought, is itself non-adequated. In other words, an interpretation which stacks reflexivity and recursion in the manner presented here itself generates propositions which the interpretation cannot be used to decide. At one and the same

time, the decidability and undecidability of undecidability – the fold within the fold – seem to have been produced

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Notes

- 1 The recent publication of *Knowledge and Reflexivity New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Steve Woolgar (ed), Sage Publications, 1988), might persuade its reader that this comparison between the sociology of knowledge and deconstructive criticism is even closer than outlined here
- 2 See particularly Garfinkel, H (1967) *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall
- 3 See Goffman, E (1971) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, London, Pelican
- 4 See Giddens, A (1979) *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan, p 22, pp 51–2, 86–7, 253–4
- 5 See Schutz, A (1972) *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, London, Heinemann, pp 86–96
- 6 See Garfinkel (1967) pp 80–5
- 7 See Derrida, J (1973) *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press Derrida argues that 'the silent voice' which forms this inner speech is expressed through the pneumatological character of writing
- 8 See Hofstadter, R (1980) *Godel, Escher, Bach an Eternal Golden Braid*, London, Penguin
- 9 See Goffman, E (1975) *Frame Analysis*, London, Penguin
- 10 See Milovanovic, D (August, 1988) *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, vol 16, no 3
- 11 See Luhmann, N (Summer, 1988) 'The third question the creative use of paradoxes in law and legal history', *Journal of Law and Society* vol 15, no 2
- 12 Admittedly, the context from which this quotation was taken (Stafford Beer's Preface to the second part (*Autopoiesis*) of Maturana and Varela's book) was nothing to do with the use of political power, but rather the organisation and structure of the contemporary university

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Social order, cultural capital and citizenship*

An essay concerning educational status and educational power versus comprehensiveness of elementary schools

Jan C.C. Rupp and Rob de Lange

Abstract

The question of whether education should be seen as an instrument of social order is an old topic in the social sciences. There exist several theories concerning this question. Two of these rival theories are dealt with in this paper. On the basis of each, historical data have been looked at anew and empirical research has been carried out into the prevailing conditions in the Netherlands.

On the basis of the first theory, which was inspired by Bourdieu and which concerns economic, cultural (including educational) and social capital, data on the Dutch history between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries have been reanalysed with respect to the attitude of the diverse sections of the dominant class towards culture in general and the university in particular. Dutch history can be regarded as a national variant of the universal tensions between 'culture' and 'knowledge' and between 'culture' and 'economics' in human societies. On the basis of Bourdieu's theory it is assumed that under the prevailing social conditions elementary schools will differ in 'educational status' in the schools market. Empirical investigation confirms this hypothesis. The 'educational status' of elementary schools mediates (reproduces) almost all of the influence of the childrens' social background on their school career, and reinforces this influence.

On the basis of the second theory, which is based on the work of Meyer, Boli and Ramirez, data on the Dutch history in the Enlightenment period have been reanalysed with respect to the rise of mass education. These historical data give substantial evidence to the theory that the construction of the nation-state is of decisive importance for the rise of mass education. Our empirical investigation, however, does not confirm the hypothesis that in the actual situation elementary schools differ in 'comprehensiveness'. Neither schools nor parents are oriented

towards integration. Rather, the contrasts seem to be getting sharper in the 1980s and the schools as well as the social classes seem to be distancing themselves further from each other. Various sections of the dominant class are busy strengthening their position of power in education. In short, the use of schools to constitute citizens does not lessen the pressure towards differentiation.

Thus, the theory of Boli and Ramirez explains the rise of mass education, but cannot explain its social class bound form, a fact that can be explained very well by Bourdieu's theory. Therefore the theories of both Bourdieu and Boli and Ramirez should be regarded not as rivalizing, but as complementary.

Theoretical considerations and historical evidence Bourdieu's metatheory on economic, cultural and social capital

Introduction

How societies persist through time is an old question. One well-known view holds that every society searches for means to maintain social order, to control social change and to create bonds with its members by requiring them to conform to norms, expectations and forms of behaviour that prevail in that society. One of those means is education.

This view exists in various theoretical variants and Bourdieu is one of the researchers who has given it theoretical as well as empirical substance. According to his theory the reproduction of social classes or sections of social classes and the relationships (of power and inequality) between them form the central mechanism of social control and education is seen as an important institutionalized vehicle of reproduction.

A central proposition in Bourdieu's heuristic concerns different forms of capital: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital (Bourdieu 1969, 1979; Brubaker 1985). Individuals and groups compete with each other not only on the economic level ('the material conditions of existence') with economic means, but also on the cultural terrain with cultural means. Pedagogics, i.e. education and family upbringing, are besides religion important fields of the cultural contest. The cultural sphere is neither to be seen as an epiphenomenon of the economic sphere (economism) nor as a charismatic characteristic of persons or groups, as often

has been stated especially in the case of art (culturalism). The cultural terrain has its own logic, which resembles economic logic insofar as can be spoken of a cultural market, but also has its own regularities concerning the production, the appropriation and the reproduction of cultural goods. Cultural power is exerted in much the same way as economic power, but has also its own ways of dominating and its own legitimizations (cf. Bourdieu 1980).

Bourdieu's theory of capital is a very important elaboration of the theory that was first outlined by Marx and, subsequently, by Weber. The latter broke through Marx's economic views and showed the multifariousness of the phenomenon of power (Weber 1922; cf. Turner 1981). In addition to the power hidden in the possession and control of economic goods (i.e. knowing how to maximize their value) Weber also points to academic and other protected titles as sources of income. Furthermore there is the status inherent in the lifestyle of the highest social class and, lastly, power in the narrower sense, namely, political power. Weber, moreover, has called attention to ideal (symbolic) goods and interests in his sociology of religion (Brubaker 1985: 747–9). Bourdieu has elaborated his theory in three ways:

- a. Besides economic capital he distinguishes between cultural (artistic and academic) and social capital;
- b. Within each social class a distinction can be made between sections that are mainly interested in economic 'capital' and those that are mainly interested in cultural 'capital'.
- c. And within the concept of capital Bourdieu makes a distinction between resources and power.

With respect to *resources* Bourdieu differentiates between economic resources (sources of income); resources of knowledge and culture [knowledge in the sense of competence, qualifications and experience; culture in terms of taste, aesthetic dispositions, possession of cultural goods (books, maps, works of art, instruments, buildings and the like) and in terms of participation in culture], social resources (relations inside and outside the family, including political relations, which can be resorted to). The level of capital resources determines to a large extent the level of status associated with lifestyle and the level of control over the means of capital reproduction (Ganzeboom 1987).

Bourdieu speaks of the lifestyle of the working class in terms of 'necessity'. He implies with this notion that for members of the

working class the time spent on other activities besides work constitutes necessary time (e.g. allotment gardens are necessary as sources of food), which contradicts the essence of 'culture'. In other words, members of the working class have no time for Culture.

The 'petite bourgeoisie' forms the class of social climbers who will not accept a drop in status. Their lifestyle and habits are geared to achieving Culture (*la bonne volonté culturelle*). It is the class that takes the legitimatised culture most seriously and does not recognise its elements of bluff and impudence. They try to increase the little cultural capital they possess.

Differences in class habitus are explained by differences in conditions of existence. These are characterized as different degrees of 'distance from economic necessity' at the one hand and 'distance from centre(s) of cultural values (concentrations of intelligentsia) and from cultural facilities' at the other.

Thus the aesthetic disposition of the bourgeoisie, or, more generally, its 'distant, detached or casual disposition towards the world or other people,' has as its social structural prerequisite the 'suspension and removal of economic necessity and the objective and subjective distance from practical urgencies'. These variations in distance from the material constraints and temporal urgencies of the world are explained by differences in volume and composition of 'capital,' seen as the 'set of actually usable resources and powers.' (Brubaker 1985: 765; cf Robertson 1988; Bourdieu 1984: 171, Figure 8.)

Different groups in society not only differ in possession of and access to these different forms of capital, but they also differ in the power to determine what is valuable capital and what is not. It is for instance the power to define what is highly esteemed Art and Knowledge, and what is less valuable, popular culture. It is the kind of power that is involved in important appointments, like for instance in who is going to be the new conductor of the Royal Opera House in London, or the director of the Museum of Modern Art in Amsterdam, a member of Le Collège de France in Paris, or a professor at the university. It is the control that these people have over crucial definitions and decisions. Groups within the middle class sometimes try to gain acknowledgement for segments of knowledge and culture as new parts of the standard

and thereby to become part of the élite themselves. The culture domain is the scene of permanent manifestations and shifts in power.

When we refer to the class with the most resources, we will speak of the upper class, as compared to middle or lower class. When we refer to the power of groups or fractions, in this sense, we will speak of the dominant groups or fractions.

Bourdieu's theory on cultural power

Dominance and exclusion

The dominant class determines (by means of discussions between the various élites in the symbolic goods market) what are important meanings in the area of knowledge and culture and at the same time, by implication, what are less important or unimportant meanings. These meanings vary with time.

The dominant class consists of various sections or élites connected with Bourdieu's distinction between economic capital, cultural (including artistic and academic) capital and also social capital. The possession of economic capital means control of the economic means of production. This does not imply possession of taste (cultural capital) i.e. the means to have a say in what constitutes culture and what does not. Conversely, the possession of cultural capital does not necessarily imply the possession of economic capital. Nor does the possession of cultural capital automatically lead to membership of important relational networks (i.e. social capital). The question of what are important meanings is determined on the symbolic goods market. It is the outcome of a continuous struggle between and within the dominant class sections. The substance of the meanings that are considered important is very much subject to change and is largely historically determined.

Legitimization

The hierarchy of meanings developed by the dominant class is imposed on all children by means of a 'pedagogic authority'. Such an authority is necessary to legitimize the dominant culture as The Culture and to allow its imposition to be experienced as 'natural'.

Human beings enter into relations of inequality, dominance and

subjection with each other but at the same time such relations are not really accepted. Power relations, the exercise of power and force are subject to legitimization. Bourdieu distinguishes between material force, i.e. the kind of force contained in material relations (production) on the one hand and symbolic force on the other. The dominant class maintains its position of power through material as well as symbolic (cultural, educational, social) force and is able to achieve this by putting across the 'naturalness' of the prevailing order. This process requires legitimizing practices. Bourdieu considers the construction and the disposal of means for the legitimization of economic, cultural and social capital as another form of symbolic capital (Brubaker 1985). These have changed in the course of history. In earlier times the Church provided many forms of legitimization. In our days socio-scientific constructs are of great importance.

The imposition of dominant meanings does not automatically lead to their internalization by children. On the contrary, this process requires as much time and energy ('pedagogic work') as is needed for different habits to develop across the social classes or groups.

The theory assumes that these processes happen at all schools. Each child is confronted with the dominant culture and conforms to it sooner or later, that is, it accepts the dominance of the dominating culture and subjection of the cultures of other classes or groups. The period of inculcation depends on the kind of culture the child has received from the domestic environment.

The entire process takes place in an institutional framework that has at its disposal all kinds of ritual sanctions such as evaluations, non-promotion to higher forms, diplomas etc. for the educational establishment to make use of.

Comment

Bourdieu's theory invites the following comments on the matter of (a) cultural standards and (b) schools as institutions for the reproduction of cultural resources.

With respect to cultural standards we must be aware that in an analysis in terms of distance from necessity, we run the risk that the critical theory confirms what happens in the criticized social practice. In defining 'popular culture' as a strategic concept in terms of 'non-non-popular culture' all kinds of manifestations of 'popular' culture can be opposed in the context of a cultural

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Bourdieu's theory invites the following comments on the matter of (a) cultural standards and (b) schools as institutions for the reproduction of cultural resources.

With respect to cultural standards we must be aware that in an analysis in terms of distance from necessity, we run the risk that the critical theory confirms what happens in the criticized social practice. In defining 'popular culture' as a strategic concept in terms of 'non-non-popular culture' all kinds of manifestations of 'popular' culture can be opposed in the context of a cultural

standard (Frijhoff 1984: 22). The distinction between economic and cultural capital, however, makes it possible to analyse differences in taste – at least inside the dominant class – and in genres of legitimate cultural goods, i.e. the avant-garde market, the classical market and the 'gala' market (Bourdieu 1974: 12–13, Bourdieu 1980: 269–71). One might ask here how far Bourdieu's speaking in terms of the dominant culture refers to the situation which is typical for France. In that country Paris is so exclusively the metropole of art and science (very much like Amsterdam is the cultural centre of The Netherlands), and there are fixed routes for the appropriation of cultural capital: '*les grandes écoles*' and the universities. Besides, not in all countries is 'culture' (art and academic activities) as much respected as in France

Bourdieu's reproduction theory does not apply to all schools, but mainly to the market of élite schools, which has traditionally been Bourdieu's research area. Every child that attends an élite school (elementary, secondary or tertiary) will have to master the language and all the other parts of the dominant culture in its historical context and, where necessary, unlearn his or her own language or dialect together with all the other parts of the home culture, if he or she eventually is to become a member of the élite. At the other types of school in the totality of the market situation other processes are at work. To take a Dutch example, at one such school, from which pupils usually go on to a special form of secondary school (LBO; i.e. lower vocational training school) the pupils do not have to master the standard language in its entirety in order to move on. They do have to incorporate into their habitus that the standard language is THE language, in contrast to their own and their parents' 'inferior language' and that they themselves 'can't talk properly' (cf. the concept of 'dual consciousness' in Abercrombie *et al.* 1980).

Two processes, therefore, have to be carefully distinguished in Bourdieu's proposition that the imposition of dominant meanings does not in itself lead to the internalization of these meanings by children. On the one hand there is the appropriation of the dominant culture, on the other hand there is the acquisition of the dominance of the dominant culture and the inferiority of the other cultures.

The reason for this caveat lies in the question whether it is plausible that the dominant class, once it has determined the most important meanings, will impose these on everybody. This would

mean that everybody would have a chance of appropriating these meanings. It is more likely that the dominant class will reserve the appropriation of important knowledge for its own children and withhold it from the children of other classes, or distribute it sparingly. The dissemination is such in fact (e.g. by using Latin as the lingua franca) that pupils from classes other than the dominant class or groups come to regard themselves as incapable of appropriating the relevant knowledge ('this is not for us kind of people'). In the last few years Bourdieu has in fact made several pronouncements in a similar vein (cf. Bernd Schwibs's interview with Bourdieu in 1985).

The acquisition of 'cultural achievements' by children from classes other than the dominant class can be made difficult in more ways than one. One of the most conspicuous phenomena in this respect is the magic and the aura with which the learning of logic and mathematics has been surrounded for centuries. Universal areas of knowledge which are in fact easiest to learn by the very fact of their being logical count as the most difficult of all. In other words, not only their *contents*, but also the *relations* that individuals or groups may have with these areas of knowledge are transmitted selectively.

We assume that every social class possesses its own culture and its own schools-market for the reproduction of that culture. Parents are primarily concerned about reproduction of their own culture or lifestyle and its associated interests. The schools with the highest status occupy the position of power on the total market. This assumption obviates Archer's objection that Bourdieu's theory hardly pays any attention to the inequality-reproducing properties of the school system as a whole (Archer 1987). Her objection is correct in so far as it concerns the elementary level of the school system. Bourdieu pays much attention to the secondary and tertiary level (Bourdieu 1977: 141-76).

At schools other than those where aspiring members of the dominant class are educated, *different* cultures are transmitted. However, this is always accompanied by the acquired acceptance of the dominant culture as The Culture. Whereas it may be the done thing to take violin lessons at one school and to go to the New York Philharmonic, at another school playing the guitar or performing with the brass band may be in vogue. But across the various theoretical positions there is agreement that the first-mentioned choices are yardsticks for the best choices. The

somewhat altered theory, then, is that social control can be effected by, *inter alia*, the creation of differences between schools

The history of the appropriation and reproduction of knowledge and culture by the elites

The importance of education

Since cultural capital enjoys a higher prestige (varying with time and country) than economic capital, the economic section of the dominant class will search for ways of acquiring this form of capital too. Schools, in particular universities, are the obvious way (DiMaggio 1979, 1982, 1985). Moreover, in the schools themselves, in particular the universities, a distinction can be made between literary-artistic education and politico-economic education (Bourdieu 1979: 103, 1984: 92–3), which at least maintains the distinction between cultural and economic orientation within the field of cultural capital. At the same time, it is good to bear in mind that seniority, that is the extent and the length of the tradition in which people have ‘inherited’ cultural capital in their family, is in general more highly esteemed than cultural capital that is ‘newly’ acquired through education. This relativizes the role of education in this respect.

Bourdieu has elaborated the attitude of different fractions of the dominant class towards higher education. From this perspective we have analysed some developments in Dutch history.

Historical exploration

It was not until the end of the sixteenth century that the first universities appeared in the northern Netherlands. Their foundation was determined by the Estates of the Republic, which were controlled by patricians. Founding a university meant prestige. New universities in particular the liberal arts and medicine, were initially open to experimentation and were linked to a considerable network of extra-mural educational establishments and science-oriented social meeting places. Many layers of the population, the educated and the non-educated alike, took part in scientific activities. At this stage scientific theories, instrument making, observations, discussions, experiments and applied technology were all part of the same pursuit (Van Berkel 1985).

Generally, however, the new science at the universities was restricted to 'natural philosophy' and some theory formation. The main aim was to study theology, medicine and law. Latin remained as the lingua franca. The discipline of 'Dutch mathematics' (translated in Dutch at that time as 'wiskunde') became suspect because it was associated with the School of Engineering which had been founded in Leiden in the province of Holland in 1587. It was abolished in 1681. In Franeker, in the province of Friesland, there was the School of Geodesy which was somewhat better integrated in the university and existed until 1811.

In the course of the seventeenth century (the 'Golden Age' in Holland's history) the nobility gradually took a renewed interest in degrees. However, instead of the doctor's title, which had been appropriated by the bourgeoisie but which gave access to the privileges of the nobility in the middle ages, the aristocracy went in for the scarcer and more valuable licentiate. For the patricians (the rich merchants and, later, the bankers who ruled the Republic from 1600 onwards) the university was the way to acquire cultural capital through a degree in law. Their interest in university studies grew when the universities were more restricted to purely cultural functions. It is they who continued to propagate until far into the eighteenth century the studies of literature, law and philosophy as the most important dimensions of the university. They were opposed to the beginnings of scientific research, which was being advocated by the French through their 'Grandes Ecoles' and 'Académies' (not universities). The other sections of the Dutch bourgeoisie also attached considerable importance to university studies. They were entirely dependent upon studies in theology and medicine. However, their interest was not as great as that of the patricians, since the kind of studies to which they had access, although they might lead to a rise in social status, were nevertheless sensitive to fluctuations in the economy and hardly ever gave access to the higher administrative positions in the Republic. It could take some generations to achieve one of the higher administrative functions. The climb up the ladder would normally involve the following steps: first a study in theology, then a degree in medicine and lastly a degree in law (Frijhoff 1981). The non-patrician sections of the bourgeoisie as well as the lower ranked 'practitioners' such as solicitors, chartered engineers and surgeons gradually sought their fortunes in new, modern training courses, which were more practical and more oriented on natural science than the universities. This led to a decrease in the

number of students at the Latin schools and universities. Table 1 gives a summary of the developments for a representative Dutch town.

Table 1 *The social structure of successive generations of graduates at Zutphen, 1600–1799*

	Percentages of graduates in the years									
	1600 -24	1625 -49	1650 -74	1675 -99	1700 -24	1725 -49	1750 -74	1775 -99	Grad %	Stud N
NOBILITY										
<i>Protestant</i>	0	7.1	8.3	5.6	25.0	22.2	29.0	27.3	14.7	150
<i>Rom Cath</i>	0	0	0	0	*	0	*	*	0	17
Nob tot	0	5.4	6.9	5.3	25.0	20.0	29.0	27.3	12.9	167
BOURGEOISIE										
<i>Protestants</i>										
Patric	50.0	31.3	40.9	64.5	69.0	84.8	87.5	83.3	65.6	215
Others	33.3	32.6	28.3	43.1	41.0	64.0	78.8	57.1	47.1	306
Prot tot	42.9	32.0	32.0	51.2	52.9	72.3	83.1	69.2	54.7	521
<i>Rom Cath</i>	33.3	60.0	40.0	45.5	33.3	(100)	*	*	47.4	38
Bourg tot	41.6	35.3	32.9	50.5	52.1	72.6	83.1	69.2	54.2	559
Gen tot %	22.8	26.2	26.3	42.9	48.2	67.0	65.6	61.9	44.8	
N	42	122	114	112	83	94	96	63		726

* = no students
(Frijhoff 1981–1996)

When we compare, for instance, the sum total for the nobility with that for the bourgeoisie, we see that during the first half of the seventeenth century the proportion of graduates among students from the nobility varies from 0 to 6.9 per cent while for the bourgeoisie it ranges approximately from 33 per cent to 42 per cent. The differences between these groups increase enormously during the rest of the seventeenth and eighteenth century.

Besides the universities there were founded so-called 'learned societies', which advocated scientific research until far into the nineteenth century. Some patricians appreciated their importance but by and large these societies were supported by the other sections of the bourgeoisie. Since the Republic lacked a central government which could take the initiative in founding a National Academy, this type of 'competitor' for the universities did not

come into existence until the end of the eighteenth century. In view of the reluctance of the universities to admit a more scientific orientation, the more modern middle classes emerging in the eighteenth century looked for different means of education. A system of French schools was set up. The threat of a split in the *élite* (i.e. between those with a modern and those with a classical education) gave rise to a plan in the so called 'French Period' to found a mixed Latin-French school modelled on the French 'Collège' and on some *élite* institutions that had already been founded in the age of the Republic. It was never actually implemented. Besides the literary-juridical university (i.e. their 'cultural capital'), the patricians also held on to the accumulation and reproduction of their trade and banking capital. The industrial revolution developed relatively late in the Netherlands. As far as the reproduction of economic capital was concerned the industrial bourgeoisie emerging in the nineteenth century looked for other ways than via the universities. And this is still the case today (Frijhoff 1983a; Beekenkamp en Dronkers 1984).

At the end of the nineteenth century a 'solution' was found to the problem of the position of scientific research at the universities, along German lines. Purely theoretical and experimental science was considered worthy of the universities, as was pure mathematics. Mathematics is regarded as belonging to the domain of the exact sciences. Philosophy, as the mother of science, has not yet succeeded in effecting a marriage between the old 'humaniora' (logic and arts) and the new sciences (Van Berkel 1985).

Next to the literary-artistic culture an economic-political culture has arisen, as Bourdieu (1979: 103) calls it. Moreover, another culture has developed within the narrow confines of the Netherlands, which might be given the label of 'industrial-entrepreneurial' culture. Its reproduction takes place mainly outside the universities (and inside industry). In countries such as the United States and France there is less of a separation between an academic and an industrial (non-academic) *élite* (Bourdieu 1977: 168 footnote 7). (Apple (1982) mentions 'technical/administrative' knowledge in this connection.) The expensive American private boarding schools were founded at the end of the eighteenth century in order to bring the old and the new *élites* into contact with each other (Cookson and Hodges Persell 1985).

We assume that the more differentiated the *élite* market is, the less agreement there will be on what is good educational quality

and, as a consequence, the less dominant its ideologies will be for other classes than the dominant class.

A theory on the elementary-schools market

The market of schools

The market of élite schools is only a part of the totality of schools that function as one market in a given society. At the level of secondary education it is already customary in various countries to speak of a 'schools-market'. This is created with the aim of helping the pupils in the last year of elementary school and their parents to select a school of their choice. On the Dutch schools-market 'VWO' (secondary education that leads to a university education) enjoys the highest status and 'LBO' the lowest. An LBO education is often called 'left-over education'. Within every class there is competition between more economically and more culturally oriented schools. Within every status group there is internal competition, not only in the area of intramural but also of extramural activities (what kinds of school camps or school societies should be organised, where to go on school trips abroad etc.). In the last few years computers have acquired a great deal of symbolic value or status within schools (see Hodges Persell and Cookson 1987).

It is theoretically plausible that there also exists a 'segmented' school system at the level of elementary education (Ringer 1979) and that schools function on a market. Status would be of primary importance in such a system. The educational status of an elementary school would be determined by the status of the secondary schools for which it prepared its pupils. Schools with the highest status would occupy the positions of power on the market and function as models of sound education. In fact, the concept of 'academic status' or, more specifically 'educational status' is new to the Netherlands. The expression 'prep. school' ('opleidingschool') as such has been in use for a long time. It was coined in the 1920s, when parents from the upper echelons of society who feared the coming of the so-called 'unitary schools' – which would implement state education for all children – used freedom of education as guaranteed by the Constitution to found special 'neutral school societies' (see Jungbluth and Breemans 1984). These were schools

founded with the express purpose of training pupils for academically oriented secondary education (VWO). In addition to 'prep. schools' there came into being 'prep. classes'. This meant that at some schools, mostly village schools, at the end of the fifth form pupils were moved either to a 'prep. class', with the 'grammar school' (VWO and HAVO, formerly VHMO) as their destination, or to an ordinary class towards a lower form of secondary education (MAVO and LBO, formerly MULO and 'lower technical schools'). This use of the phrases 'prep. school' and 'prep. class' already indicates that the concept of 'preparation' was reserved for the higher path towards secondary education (i.e. towards VWO). The education received along the lower path (towards MULO or 'lower technical school') was never referred to as 'preparation'. This clearly shows once again the domination of VWO secondary education and the high status it enjoys as well as the elementary schools associated with it. Obviously there also exists a high degree of consensus about this matter since this exclusive application of the word 'preparation' to VWO secondary education has never been challenged. This in itself would seem to be a typical manifestation of the educational power enjoyed by the schools with the highest educational status.

On the basis of Bourdieu's theory we assume that elementary schools differ in what we have called '*educational status*'. It is derived from the level of secondary education for which the school predominantly prepares. The higher the level of this secondary education, the higher the educational status of the elementary school concerned. The school with the highest status possesses '*educational power*', that is, it defines the standard for '*sound education*'. The degree of educational status mediates the connection between the socio-economic status of the domestic background and the transition to a particular form of secondary education. This corresponds to what we shall call the '*educational domain*' of elementary schools. Educational domain refers to the specific '*area*' or range of secondary education for which the elementary school prepares. It is the most important aspect of the notion '*educational status*' since it forms the explanatory content of the mediating rôle this type of status plays in the influence of socio-economic status of the home on the transition to secondary education. It is also important in that the educational domain is a manifestation of a school's aims and thus of its own influence on students' destination. Thus educational status mediates the influence of the parents' orientation on their children (both their

already existing cultural resources and their relation to the dominant culture) and reinforces this influence.

Theoretically the educational status of elementary schools in the Netherlands in the 1980s might, with reference to the corresponding form of secondary education, be represented as follows, in descending order of importance:

preparatory for VWO	(= highest ES)
VWO/HAVO	
HAVO	
HAVO/MAVO	
MAVO	
MAVO/LBO	
LBO	(= lowest ES)

Legend

ES = 'educational status';

VWO* = gymnasium, lyceum: six years of secondary education, full qualification for university matriculation;

HAVO = five years; full qualifications for higher vocational training;

MAVO = four years; full qualifications for middle vocational training;

LBO = four years; lower vocational training (clerical, technical, agricultural, etc.)

(*No distinction has been made here between the various forms of VWO education and possible differences in literary-artistic orientation versus economic-political or economic-industrial orientation.)

The reference to the Dutch situation in the previous sentence is important since every country has its own hierarchy and tradition in the field of education. Until just after the second world war HAVO did not exist other than in a form of HAVO education for girls called MMS. With reference to the VWO/HAVO distinction there are plans at the present time to amalgamate these two forms of secondary education into a new type of 'lyceum'. As can be seen from the Legend above this will increase the distance to MAVO.

There are tendencies in Dutch society which could result in an extension of the hierarchy in both directions; upwardly through the foundation of international English-speaking schools

which would, for example, give access to the better American universities. This tendency is strengthened by the fact that there exist plans in the Netherlands (as well as in Great Britain) to introduce a common 'core curriculum' for all pupils in secondary education lasting three or four years. Some sections of the Dutch élite fear that such a measure might lower the level of education. Downwardly the hierarchy might be extended in the future through the emergence of so-called 'black' LBO-schools, which would cater mainly for ethnic minorities.

Parents' choice of schools

Following Boudon (1973) we conceive of parents' choice as a balancing of interests. In our theory this amounts to weighing the interests relating to the reproduction of the resources and the life-style of the parents' social class against other interests. At the first moment of choice, which is often hardly conscious, certain schools are automatically eliminated ('that's no school for us kind of people'). At the second, more conscious, stage different interests start to count. The first moment or stage, which is the more decisive of the two, is an aspect of what Bourdieu calls the 'habitus' of a social class. For Max Weber (1922) this mechanism of 'exclusion' constitutes the central characteristic of the concept of social class. It matters greatly of course whether possibilities are excluded because they are seen as involving 'overreaching' ('too expensive') or 'stooping down' ('too cheap'). In other words economic means are fundamental in the perception of what counts as a realistic possibility.

The weighing-up process of the second stage of choice involves various interests. For example, parents attach importance to the possibility for their children to mix with children from other social backgrounds. Or they may hold the view that there are more important things in life than super-achievements. Or they may want their children to achieve a higher social position than they themselves could ever have achieved. In these cases the parents' choice varies from being totally oriented towards class-reproduction to taking into account other interests while reproduction remains a possibility. For parents who belong to the professional groups with the lowest social status, schools which train for VWO, VWO/HAVO or VWO/HAVO/MAVO are automatically out. They mainly select elementary schools with LBO-status. However, in

principle, schools with MAVO/LBO, MAVO or HAVO/MAVO status may be considered by parents from this group since these also prepare for LBO. For such parents the possibility of LBO-training is the only condition of choice. From the other end of the socio-economic spectrum the same condition holds in reverse. The bottom line is HAVO/MAVO status because this still leaves the possibility of VWO-training. Parents of the upper class will differ most in their opinion on which is good education. As we have seen in our historical account the élites in the Netherlands disagree in this respect even more than the élites in several other countries do.

It is being assumed here that the educational status of an elementary school is a characteristic of that school. That is to say, the position occupied by the school on the status-scale relative to other schools must have remained stable over the years. The associated educational domain being the most important aspect of educational status, will also show a stable pattern. Only in this way can the school receive a specific label as to the kind of training it provides and, as it were, guarantees ('We educate for MAVO and LBO, but not for HAVO and VWO').

Presumably every school has its regular customers. That is, the composition of its pupil population shows a stable pattern in terms of socio-economic status. Now it is important to stress here that the assumed, fairly stable, relationship between school and school-population in terms of status should not be interpreted as a static relationship. On the contrary, we see this relationship as extremely dynamic in the sense that continual 'negotiations' concerning the status of schools take place between parents themselves, between parents and teams of teachers, and between parents, teachers and institutions such as school advisory services. Sieber's research (Sieber 1982) offers a telling example in this respect. At an elementary school in New York middle-class parents are constantly trying to see to it that their children receive a middle-class education (plus the associated expectations); that is, the kind of education not given to working-class children or children from a Puerto Rican background at the same school. In our own case study of a 'prep. school' the parents became very active in seeing to it that 'their' school remained their school just as the school advisory service was on the verge of persuading the team of teachers to extend the educational domain of the school from VWO/HAVO to VWO/HAVO/MAVO and thus lower its average educational status. The parents, who were all members of the school society managed to prevent the change after long

discussions. The headmaster resigned and the influence of the school advisory service decreased (Gernler 1987).

Another well-known phenomenon is the desire by 'white' working-class parents to keep their LBO/MAVO school all-white because they fear the arrival of 'black' pupils will reduce the status of the school. Sometimes they force the school to adopt streaming, sometimes they take their children away from school. It is sometimes the case that a school goes down in status because the staff see it as an advantage. In the Dutch situation this is a consequence of the fact that schools automatically receive (a lot of) extra material and manpower resources, which they are free to spend themselves, as soon as they reach a certain percentage of children from ethnic minorities, working-class backgrounds or single-parent families. These provisions are made in the context of the so-called Educational Priority Policy.

The stability of the *results* of the lively interactions concerning education is an indication of the great importance that parents and schools attach to the stakes in this contest, namely, the status of the school, the future status of the children and the parents' own status.


An alternative theory: Meyer, Boli and Ramirez

Introduction

This Bourdieu-inspired theory is confronted by an alternative theory. Whereas in the first theory the concept of unity is seen as an ideology with the function of legitimizing class differences, in the second theory the search for unification of the nation-state counts as the real basis of unitary (elementary) education. Literacy research in particular has been the driving force behind this theory. Boli and Ramirez (1985, 1987) propose that the origin and spread of mass education can be explained by the striving for unified nation-states in Europe. The European model of a national society originated out of three processes, namely, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the construction of the nation-state and the ascendancy of the market exchange economy. This idea of a national society is primarily based on the educability of the individual and the responsibility of the state. Religious and rationalistic egalitarianism led (at the end of the eighteenth century

and the beginning of the nineteenth century) to the construction of the modern individual. According to this ideology every rational human being is equal before the law, equal in politics and equal in education, which is regarded as necessary in order to shape people into active members of society, into citizens; that is, into members of society who can exercise their civil, political and social rights. It is the government's task to provide this (mass) education. Education, at least at the level of elementary education, is seen as an institution of integration. This makes egalitarianism into an ideology of social preservation. At the time of the Enlightenment there even was a conviction that rationality at the level of society would bring peace and progress for all. Ramirez and Boli summarize these ideas in the schematic representation of Figure 1.

The construction of 'the individual' and of the nation as a collection of individuals, the belief in individual and national progress, the ideas about the educability of Man and about the



(From F O Ramirez and J Boli 1987 10)

(* It should be noted that Ramirez and Boli use 'the myth of the individual' instead of 'the construction of the individual'. We prefer the latter because it is more general and captures the ideological function.)

Figure 1

state as guardian of the nation, all these conceptions originated against the background of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation on the one hand and the development of a capitalist free-market economy on the other. The Reformation meant that the dominant position of a unified Church – plus its unifying principles – was lost in Europe. The religious divisions created the need for a nation-state. The Reformation also brought with it a personalized form of religion in that every person was equal in the eyes of God and accountable to Him. However, this entailed the translation of the Bible as the word of God into the vernacular and the teaching of reading at schools. Also, the Reformed Church was democratic to the extent that people from all walks of life were allowed to sit next to each other in church and that the ministry, uniquely amongst the intellectual professions, was open to everybody. As a consequence it was regarded as having the lowest status of all the professions in intellectual circles (Idenburg 1953; see Frijhoff 1981). A further consequence of the Reformation was that for the first time special importance was attached to childhood as a time of education and guidance. In its counter-attack the Roman Catholic Church took over the orientation towards the socialisation of children and organisations such as the order of the Jesuits were particularly devoted to children's education.

The emergence of the market economy meant an increase in the fiscal powers of the state, developments in the law as well as the creation of a labour market. The development of a state bureaucracy created a need for professional administrators, which in turn led to a revaluation of (academic) education as a step on the social ladder.

The Enlightenment in Europe was characterized by a belief – based on rationalism – in social progress under the guardianship of the state (cf. Roche 1987). With the aid of popular education it would be possible for the state to serve the well-being of children, to break the poverty cycle into which many families had drifted throughout the eighteenth century and to create active and productive citizens.

With this theory Boli and Ramirez take up a critical position *vis-à-vis* those who see the emergence of 'popular education' mainly as a result of factors such as industrialisation, mass migration, periods of social unrest, or attempts by the dominant classes or groups to exercise discipline over others (cf. De Swaan 1988). It seems plausible to us that the origin of the nation-state and its associated ideas about unification have indeed been necessary

conditions for the emergence of mass education. But this does not imply, as we shall see, that reproduction of social inequality through differentiation has ended.

Developments in different countries

Each country has its own history of popular education. In France, for example, the development of the 'hautes écoles' and technological universities was, until far into the nineteenth century, of central importance in connection with its technical supremacy in war. In the Netherlands popular education was already a central issue at the end of the eighteenth century. Here, during the so-called 'Patriotic Period', it was 'The Society for the General Good' that strongly advocated popular education (Schama 1977; Van den Eerenbeemt 1963). This society could build on the democratic tendencies in Dutch society which can be traced back to the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. On the one hand there was the tradition of Calvinism, which, on account of the great importance that was attached to the reading of the Bible in the vernacular, propagated literacy on a large scale. On the other hand there was a rich tradition of public interest – founded and inspired by the non-university trained Simon Stevin – in the physical sciences. And this tradition was by no means male-exclusive. Women also showed great interest in scientific matters. This interest manifested itself in ladies' 'physics societies', reading societies, self-study and joint domestic study with brothers (Frijhoff 1983b: 9, 10). The learned societies, which should also be seen as a counter-weight to the literary culture of the universities (Frijhoff 1983a: 25) were much more open, more 'public' than the universities and Dutch was the means of communication. Debates about scientific and socio-political matters as well as literary lectures were central to the aims of these societies. The Society for the General Good built on this tradition and that of the Reformed Church. At the same time the Society was highly critical of the 'decadent' lifestyle of the aristocracy and the patricians in general. This innovative organisation, which had many members in important government positions and which had its social basis in the emerging bourgeoisie (the non-patrician sections of the old bourgeoisie and the 'practitioners') saw popular education as the most important tool in the forging of a new society. A new department of education was founded and state inspectors for

education were appointed. They were all members of the Society for the General Good, who were seen as the bearers of renewal in education. Teacher training colleges were founded to train the new teachers. On the Society's own presses new textbooks were printed which were based on the latest pedagogical theories (such as Pestalozzi's for example). The inspectors regularly held meetings at home with elementary school headmasters to discuss the most important topics in educational renewal (it may be noted in passing here that these meetings later formed the basis for a teachers' trade union).

The chief aim of education was seen as the intellectual development of children, with a view to their functioning as citizens of the new United Republic of the Netherlands (Van den Eerenbeemt 1977: 161; Kruithof 1980: 26). The new nation-state was to transcend religious divisions and to treat every member of society primarily as a responsible citizen, regardless of social class. Knowledge would lead to a virtuous life and ultimately break the poverty cycle, which had turned into inherited poverty in eighteenth-century Holland. In answer to a question set for a competition organised by the Society concerning the nature of popular education, Vatebender, the headmaster of a Latin school, suggested a 'unitary school' on the French model. One nation, one school seemed to be his motto. This is the most radical variant of the debate at that time. The 'unitary school' – which implied one type of education for everybody at the same type of school for everybody – had to be a boarding school according to Vatebender since otherwise influences from the family could not be eliminated. He himself was convinced that his plan was doomed to failure mainly because parents from different social backgrounds would refuse to allow their children to mix.

The form general education takes in a country will depend on social factors, such as religious divisions and forces which are directed towards the reproduction of social classes. The public sphere is continually threatened by forces from the economic and administrative sphere (cf. Habermas 1974, Hohendahl 1979; Giroux 1983). The situation in Poland provides a vivid example of this (cf. Buczynska Garewitsch 1985; Raad van Nationale Edukatie van Solidarnosc 1986; Rupp 1986). Boli and Ramirez let these forces come into effect no earlier than at the stage of secondary education. But they do not make clear why that should be the case.

In the Netherlands the compromise between unity and class reproduction was a form of unitary education that was adjusted to

each different social group. Different types of elementary schools were created. There were fee-paying schools as well as schools for the middle classes and 'the poor' (In an attempt in the nineteenth century to eliminate differences that were too obvious the subsidized elementary schools were numbered with Roman numerals)

In the 1920s there was a second period in which the idea of unity was pursued, this time by the political parties of the left. Completely open social recruitment (i.e. breaking the pattern of self-recruitment) became the social-democratic ideal (cf. Goldthorpe 1980). It started in the German Weimar Republic and later reached the Netherlands. The reaction of the Dutch élite was to found 'neutral school societies' (allowed by the Freedom of Education Act), which deliberately prepare for the highest form of secondary education (VWO). Educational societies allow parents to exert maximum influence and control on the schools.

From the period after the Second World War onwards there has been a continuous discussion in the Netherlands about the introduction of a form of integrated secondary education. Parental interest in comprehensive or middle schools is small however, as is the teachers' interest. In the debate references to a crucial factor in popular education, namely, the national interest (cf. 'a nation at risk') play only a minor role. This is in contrast to similar pleas at the time of the Society for the General Good.

The most recent government proposal concerns the introduction of a 'core curriculum' during the first stage of secondary education. However, this core curriculum can be reached along three different levels and is geared to the existing types of secondary school. Again this involves a compromise: unitary education, but class-adjusted.

This idea of unitary education is also only partly accepted in countries where extensive experiments have been carried out with middle schools. In France, for example, sector-schools were experimentally placed along district boundaries in order to achieve a mixed intake at the elementary schools. The phenomenon of 'bussing' is also indicative in this connection. In Great Britain the attempts at introducing unitary education have met with unsurmountable problems (cf. Rex and Tomlinson 1979).

Conclusion

In the light of these problems the most plausible conclusion is that

schools and parents have different views about the importance that should be attached to unitary education. One argument in favour of this conclusion can be found in the discussions and controversies surrounding the introduction of a Dutch form of comprehensive school or middle school. There are very few totally comprehensive schools in the Netherlands and there are very few parents who are in favour of such schools. There are many more 'single-stream' schools, that is, schools which only educate at MAVO or LBO level.

If the theory of Boli and Ramirez was correct, all elementary schools should be or turn into schools catering for a wide variety of abilities, populated by children from every socio-economic or ethnic background. In short elementary schools would prepare pupils for all the forms of secondary education (in ascending order of status: LBO, MAVO, HAVO and VWO). Such elementary schools could truly be called 'comprehensive'. But this seems to be a rather implausible prediction. We take the view that elementary schools differ on this point; that they differ in 'range' of training, varying from very narrow (those schools which prepare for one type of secondary education) to very wide (those schools which prepare for all types of secondary education), depending on the school's policy in this matter. According to this view comprehensive elementary schools are directed towards breaking through the pattern of social control by means of class reproduction and towards establishing a society based on the organizing principles of equality and citizenship. Such schools will attempt to attract a mixed intake.

An empirical investigation into the actual situation in the Netherlands

Hypotheses

In our research we have tested various hypotheses derived from these two rival theories outlined above. These hypotheses are.

- a The educational status of an elementary school mediates (reproduces) to a great extent the influence of the SES of the family background of the children on their secondary school destination

- b. The educational status of an elementary school reinforces this parental influence.
- c. The educational domain of an elementary school is the main part of the educational status of the school.
- d. The school-choice of the upper-class variates far more than the school-choice of the parents of the other classes.
- e. The more comprehensive an elementary school is, the less the secondary school destination of the pupils will be influenced by the SES of the family background.
- f. Educational status, educational domain, composition of pupil population in terms of social background, and comprehensiveness are (stable) school-characteristics

Build-up of the data base

By linking the data bases of the Department of Education of Middletown – a town of 250,000 inhabitants which we shall refer to as M – with those of the School Advisory Service Foundation and the Geographic Institute of the University of M, we have been able to build up our own pupils' data base. This contains the data of all the pupils who, first, lived in M in 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985 (hereafter to be referred to as 'the 1981-batch' etc.), second, attended the sixth form of some elementary school in M and, third, moved to a secondary school in the same year, in or outside of M. We also gathered the occupational data from the domestic backgrounds but only for the years 1983, 1984 and 1985. Some additional data exist for the pupils in question which were unused for this part of the research. These concern final test results (i.e. the results of the particular variant of a national proficiency and aptitude test (the 'CITO-test') used in M), age, sex, nationality, etc. Excluded from the research were pupils who lived in M but went to school outside M, as well as those who attended the sixth form of an elementary school in M but who did not live in M. Every elementary school in M was included in the research, about one hundred in all. This was the only way of involving the whole elementary school market in M in the research. Every batch contains about 2000 pupils, which amounts to between ten and eleven thousand pupils over the five years.

From earlier research (Rupp 1969) it had turned out that M is representative for the Netherlands as regards the SES-background of the pupils, the distribution of the schools over the various

socio-political divisions and the students' destination through to secondary education. This was still the case in 1985. In that year around 65 per cent of the elementary school population in the Netherlands moved on to VWO/HAVO/MAVO. The figure for M is roughly 70 per cent.

It should be stressed here that extrapolations from our research findings to the totality of the Dutch situation are possible only in the area of comparison between the schools as regards their educational status on the one hand and their orientation towards effecting unitary education on the other. Additional historical and also international comparative research would be necessary to place our data in a wider context.

The variables

The following variables are involved in the analysis.

- 1 *StuD* (= students' destination) i.e. the transition of pupils to a certain type of secondary education is the dependent variable.¹
- 2 '*SES-pup*', i.e. the socio-economic status of the pupils' domestic environment.²
- 3 The *SES-SCHOOL* variable was obtained by taking per school the arithmetic mean of the SES-data of one year-batch of pupils.
- 4 The *ES* ('educational status') variable was obtained by taking per school the arithmetic mean of the students' destination data of one year-batch of pupils.
5. The *ED* ('educational domain') variable was derived from those (adjoining) sectors of secondary education for which an elementary school trains less than 5 per cent of its pupils. It constitutes the mean of the other sectors. Immediately below we give an example of our sector classification.

VWO 1	VWO/HAVO 2	HAVO 3	HAVO/MAVO 4
MAVO 5	MAVO/LBO 6	LBO 7	

A school which trains less than 5 per cent of a batch for sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4 is assigned a value of 6 (i.e. the mean of sectors 5, 6 and 7).

6. The *CompS* (the comprehensiveness of an elementary school) refers to the number of different types of secondary education the elementary school prepares for.³

In our *analysis-at-pupil-level* we have regarded some school variables as 'pupil characteristics', on the assumption that a pupil's behaviour is partly determined by his or her (school) environment. In principle this assumption also applies to the SES of the pupil's domestic background, since this variable, too, concerns the child's environment (Dronkers and Schijf 1986). In order to avoid confusion with the analyses at school level we have added (pup) to a school characteristic at pupil level.

The *stability* of ES and CompS was calculated (at school level) over five years, whereas the stability of SES-SCHOOL was calculated over three years. This was done in two ways. First we checked by means of Pearson-correlation coefficients whether the positions of the schools remained identical in relation to each other. Stability implies a constant correlation of at least .80 as well as a bunching of r-values. We may assume that a school's ED will also be reasonably stable, albeit at a somewhat lower level, since we are only concerned here with one aspect of educational status. Secondly, we carried out a reliability test per school characteristic over five years to be able to check for the existence of erratic years. The Cronbach alpha results should also be at least .80.

Stepwise regression analysis and path analysis

The connections that we found between the variables for the *pupils* of the 1985-batch are represented in the correlation matrix in Table 2.

Table 2 *Correlation matrix for the 1985-batch*

SES-pup	32633			
ED (pup)	35179	.41657		
ES (pup)	46180	48030	76179	
CompS (pup)	.09694	07564	10254	20991
	StuD	SES-pup	ED (pup)	ES (pup)

LEGEND SES-pup = Socio-economic status pupil
ED (pup) = educational domain school (pupil)
ES (pup) = educational status school (pupil)
CompS (pup) = comprehensiveness school (pupil)
StuD = students' destination to secondary education

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In view of the fact that SES-SCHOOL (pup.) itself hardly contributes to the explanation of StuD variation, we omitted this variable from further analysis.

Table 3 *Variable means and standard deviations*

Variable	Mean	SD	N pup
StuD	4 6910	1.8209	2052
SES-pup	3.7836	1.1642	2052
ED (pup)	4 5750	6840	2052
ES (pup)	4 6910	8409	2052
CompS (pup)	2 6418	1 2455	2052

Step-wise regression yields the results set out in Table 4.

Table 4 *Effects of some variables on students' destination (regression coefficients, standard errors and, in parentheses, standardized coefficients)*

Independent variables	model		
	SES-pup 1	ED (pup) 2	ES (pup) 3
SFS-pup	501*** 327 (326)	340*** 348 (218)	214*** 348 (137)
ED (pup)		695*** 592 (261)	- 440 810 (- 017)
ES (pup)			885*** 676 (409)
Constant	276***	223	- 688
SE constant	129	250	241
R ²	106	163	228

*** The coefficient is significant ($p < .001$)

A path analysis produces the picture in Figure 2

As expected pupil-SES influences students' destination mainly *through* the educational status of the elementary school. Apart from this, SES itself does not greatly affect students' destination. It also turns out that the factor of 'educational domain' is mainly




Figure 2 Path analysis

Table 5 Direct and indirect effects of pupil-SES on students' destination

	[ES (pup), SES-pup]	[StuD, SES-pup]	[StuD, ES (pup)]
direct effect	48***	14***	40***
indirect effect	0	19***	0

*** The coefficient is significant ($p < .001$)

responsible for the mediating rôle of educational status. The educational domain of a school is also mainly responsible (50 per cent) for the direct influence of its own educational status on students' destination. The educational aims of an elementary school are expressed mainly in terms of its educational domain. Almost 23 per cent of the total variance in students' destination is explained ($R^2 = .228$). Almost half of it (11 per cent) is contributed by the SES of the pupil, 2 per cent by direct influence on StuD, 9 per cent by the educational status of the school. The latter variable explains a total of 21 per cent of the variation, 12 per cent in itself and 9 per cent in its mediating rôle *vis-à-vis* SES.

We have checked whether the general picture is in fact general, that is, whether it is valid for every relevant group or whether

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there is interaction between SES-pup and ES (pup). There appears to be no interaction at all, the picture is valid for every group.

Table 6 represents the relationship between the educational status of the attended school and the socio-economic status of the pupil's background. This table may be seen as a survey of the school-choices of the parents per SES-group.

Table 6 *Socio-economic status of pupils' social backgrounds and educational status of attended schools (numbers and percentages)*

	Educational status of attended school					Total
	VWO/ HAVO	HAVO	HAVO/ MAVO	MAVO	MAVO/ LBO	
SES-pup	(1 5-2 5)	(2 5-3 5)	(3 5-4 5)	(4 5-5 5)	(5 5-6 5)	
(high) 1	20 19 4 64 5	25 24 3 22 5	41 39 8 6 5	16 15 5 1 8	1 1 0 0 3	103 5 0
2	5 3 1 16 1	44 27 0 39 6	79 48 5 12 5	30 18 4 3 3	5 3 1 1 3	163 7 9
3	5 0 9 16 1	26 4 7 23 4	227 40 9 36 0	231 41 6 25 7	66 11 9 17 3	555 27 0
4	0 0 0	8 1 6 7 2	137 28 0 21 7	269 55 0 29 9	75 15 3 19 6	489 23 8
(low) 5	1 0 1 3 2	8 1 1 7 2	147 19 8 23 3	353 47 4 39 3	235 31 6 61 5	744 36 2
Total	31 1 5	111 5 4	631 30 7	899 43 8	382 18 6	2054 100 0

As expected the parents with the highest SES differ far more in school-choice than parents of other social classes.

We have omitted the results of our investigation with respect to the comprehensiveness of elementary schools. At a first glance our hypothesis seemed to be strongly confirmed. The wider the educational range the smaller the influence of pupil-SES on students' destination in the expected direction. The narrower the range, the stronger this influence was mediated by educational

status. However comprehensiveness appeared not to be a stable school-characteristic.

The stability of the school-variables

We calculated, at school level, the stability of the school-variables ES, ED, CompS and SES-SCHOOL. The first three of these over all the five years; the last one over three years because of missing data. The Pearson correlation results are summarized in Table 7.

Comprehensiveness appears not to be a school-characteristic. Educational status shows great stability, as does the socio-economic status of the school population. We carried out a reliability test for these variables and found a Cronbach's alpha of .95 for ES, of .97 for SES-SCHOOL and of .89 for ED. The educational domain of a school also turns out to be reasonably stable. The educational status of a school comprises more than the educational domain aspect alone. This additional factor contributes to the (higher) stability of the educational status.

Conclusions

The results of our Bourdieu-based empirical investigation into the actual social conditions indicate that what we have called 'the educational status' of elementary schools must be seen as a school-characteristic. In contrast to the opinion of Coleman (1966) and many researchers after him, differences between schools turn out to be of great importance in the explanation of social class differences in school careers, at least in the Netherlands. 'Keeping track' within elementary schools might be the most important mechanism in other countries (cf. Oakes 1985; Jungbluth and Breemans 1984). The significance of the variable for 'the explanation of background-related inequality in education can be made more precise by including the variable of 'educational domain' in the analysis. 'Educational domain' refers to the particular area of education – i.e. the particular area of the educational market in secondary education – for which an elementary school in fact prepares its pupils. Our research shows that the educational status of elementary schools can plausibly be regarded as a school-characteristic which, *inter alia*, 'translates' and thereby makes more intelligible the influence of social background on school careers. The unchanging nature of each

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Table 7 *Stability of the school-variables comprehensiveness, educational status, educational domain, and SES-SCHOOL (Pearson-correlations)*

	1981	1982	1983	1984
CompS				
(N = 95)				
1982	3271			
	p = .001			
1983	-.0954	-.0100		
	p = .179	p = .462		
1984	.3491	.4310	.0011	
	p = .001	p = .001	p = .496	
1985	.1332	.2034	.0232	.5495
	p = .099	p = .024	p = .412	p = .001
ES				
(N = 95)				
1982	.7835			
	p = .001			
1983	.7855	.8282		
	p = .001	p = .001		
1984	.7848	.7926	.8309	
	p = .001	p = .001	p = .001	
1985	.7400	.6903	.7955	.8383
	p = .001	p = .001	p = .001	p = .001
ED				
(N = 95)				
1982	.5762			
	p = .001			
1983	.5954	.6419		
	p = .001	p = .001		
1984	.6733	.6595	.7505	
	p = .001	p = .001	p = .001	
1985	.5494	.4737	.5849	.7273
	p = .001	p = .001	p = .001	p = .001
SES-SCHOOL				
(N = 95)				
1984			.9210	
			p = .001	
1985			.8968	.9330
			p = .001	p = .001

school's pupil population points in the same direction. With its educational domain (the most important aspect of its educational status) an elementary school guarantees that it will educate its pupils for certain types of secondary education and *not* for others. Schools with the highest educational status determine the

academic standards and control the educational market as long as they manage to maintain those standards. Education can contribute to maintaining the prevailing social order by allowing elementary schools to function on a schools market.

In their choice of school parents are mainly guided by interests related to the reproduction of their own social class. Only the class with the highest social status goes beyond this restriction. Some members of this class send their children to schools which do not lead to VWO (i.e. the highest form of secondary education). We want to investigate this matter in greater detail by making distinctions between various sections (those with a literary-artistic, economic-administrative, or an industrial orientation) to see whether each section has its 'own' elementary schools (cf. Kalmijn and Batenburg 1986). There is historical and empirical evidence that people in the upper class in the Netherlands are strongly divided about the standards for good education.

The schools' orientation towards social-class reproduction and, as a consequence, social control is once more confirmed by the unexpected results of our research based on Boli and Ramirez in the area of educational range (comprehensiveness). This variable turns out not to be a school characteristic. Elementary schools do not show a consistent pattern in this area and do not appear to have a policy concerning the desirability of aiming for a wide or narrow range. Variations in comprehensiveness within the limits of training domains, however, are perfectly consistent with educational status. The fact is that schools can maintain their status in various different ways; width may vary, status will not.

All in all we get the impression that (national) attempts at unitary education and the associated ideal of a 'unitary school' hardly affect the elementary schools. Nor do they seem to affect the parents. Rather, the emergence of 'black schools' on the one hand and 'expensive' English-speaking international schools on the other seems to indicate a polarization of social contrasts.

Analysis of historical data on the rise of mass education in the Netherlands largely sustains the theory of Boli and Ramirez. Their theory cannot explain, however, the social class-bound form that education has taken. Bourdieu's theory on the other hand is very well suited to explain those social class differences. So, finally the theory of Boli and Ramirez and that of Bourdieu are to be seen not so much as rivalizing but as complementary.

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Notes

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- 1 The values assigned to this variable are derived from the 'status-scale' we have created for secondary schools, as represented immediately below

HIGH

- 1 VWO
- 2 VWO/HAVO-comp(rehensive)
- 3 HAVO and VWO/HAVO/VWO-comp
- 4 MAVO/HAVO and LBO/MAVO/HAVO/MAVO-comp
- 5 MAVO and LBO/MAVO/HAVO-COMP and MIDDLE-SCHOOLS*
- 6 LBO/MAVO-comp
- 7 LBO

LOW

*Middle-schools originated from MAVO-schools in M

- 2 Bourdieu (1985) points out that the various élites are also in conflict with each other as regards the question of what constitutes the best stratification model. For the choice of stratification indicates which élite is regarded as the most important and hence as the most prestigious.

The city corporation of M uses the 1952 classification of occupations as drawn up by the National Employment Office. This yields the following status-scale:

HIGH 1 Academic work

2 Extremely complicated work

3 Complicated work

4 Semi-complicated work

LOW 5 Simple work

The designers of this model apparently consider 'academic work' so complicated that it cannot be captured by the label 'complicated'. In the Netherlands as well as in other Western countries the academic élite has so far been victorious in the battle about stratification. A university professor has more status than the president of a multi-national company.

The municipality of M also uses the categories of 'civil servants' and 'non-working persons', i.e. old-age pensioners, the unemployed etc. Considerations of privacy made the municipality disconnect the individual parents' occupations from their addresses. We did receive instead geographical coordinates for each pupil's home address and the composition of population and occupations contained within these coordinates. Each set of coordinates covers a Middletown area of 100 × 100 metres, which comes down to (a part of) a street or a block. The occupations of those who live within a given square are evaluated according to the above scale. In order to arrive at a SES value for the pupils, we took the following steps:

a Two occupational categories were left out of the calculations, namely, civil servants and persons without work. This latter category produces some distortion at the low status end.

b We subsequently added the coded occupations of the men who inhabited the coordinate squares to the pupils of one batch (1985). This yields the following figures:

occupation status 1	5%
2	8%
3	28%
4	27%
5	36%

We immediately recognise Boudon's classic division 10%, 30%, 60% in these figures

c We calculated for each pupil the average status of the occupations of the men inhabiting the relevant coordinate square. Since this type of calculation shows a distortion towards the middle, we constructed a cumulative-frequency distribution scale which shows the same distribution over the five scalar points as the addition of the square contents in b. This scale was also used for the other batches, which showed a practically identical distribution.

d The distribution scale mentioned in c was also used as a measure of the SES of a pupil's family. Our SES-measure is therefore a combination of the occupational status of the parents and that of the immediate environment. One might object that this measure is inexact, because we don't know precisely the occupation of a particular child's father. On the other hand however this way of measuring SES has great advantages, since the child's direct and every-day social environment is of great importance in this respect.

3 This variable also receives a scalar representation

WIDE

- 1 The school prepares for all types of secondary education
- 2 The school equally prepares for three types of secondary education
- 3 The school prepares for 3 types of secondary education, but one or two types dominate
- 4 The school equally prepares for two types of secondary education
- 5 The school prepares for two types of secondary education, but one type dominates
- 6 The school prepares for one type of secondary education

NARROW

In deciding whether an elementary school provided education for a particular type of secondary school, we took into account the number of pupils per class. 1 pupil was deemed sufficient per class of 8 pupils, 2 per class of between 9 and 12, 3 per class of between 13 and 21 and 4 per class of 22 and above.

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Some responses to economic change in Scottish farming and crofting family life, 1900–25

Claire Toynebee and Lynn Jamieson

Abstract

Our investigation of some of the processes involved in the emergence of 'the modern family' is based on evidence from oral histories conducted with people who grew up in Scottish farming and crofting families in the early decades of the century. After showing how peasant and capitalist modes of production shaped both family structures and strategies for getting a living, we examine some of the ways in which the encroachments of the cash economy helped create new forms of gendered inequalities. Our discussion concludes with an analysis of recent papers concerned with the ways in which families are embedded in community life and the implications for long term change in authority structures.

Introduction

There is a considerable degree of consensus on the dominant form of family in modern capitalist industrial societies according to both Marxists and functionalists (Harris 1983, Close, in Close and Collins 1985). In this family type, generation and gender provide the axes for internal differentiation. The household economy depends on money earned by adults, while domestic and child-rearing services are typically performed by adult women.

The emergence of this family form in capitalist industrial society is associated with widespread proletarianisation involving the separation of home and work, and the development of breadwinning and domestic roles for men and women respectively (Harris 1983; Zaretsky 1982; Hamilton 1978). It is also associated with urbanisation and with a process during which the family household became a 'private' unit concerned only with 'family

matters', segregated from wider kin, the social life of the locality and from the major forms of economic life (Harris 1983, ix)

This 'dominant family form' is, however, a sociological construct which can obscure considerable variation (Close 1985). Harris suggests that if we are to understand diversity in contemporary family life, it is important that we understand the impact of capitalism and industrialisation on a variety of family types since present family patterns are survivals and modifications of earlier ones (Harris 1983, 154)

In this paper, we will be describing and analysing a range of family forms existing in rural Scotland in the first couple of decades of this century using our own oral histories as evidence. The degree to which these families were engaged in capitalist production, and their relationship to capital, were crucially important indicators of their household division of labour and their lifestyle in general. Compared with their urban counterparts, many of the family and crofting families also experienced minimal separation of home and work, and in general, were deeply embedded in closeknit local networks. In many respects, they were atypical, both of their own time and ours.

In two important respects, however, these families were typical of others of their time in that they were adult-centred to a high degree, and parents were able to demand (and usually get) absolute obedience from their children (Jamieson 1983, 1987, Toynbee 1986; Jamieson and Toynbee forthcoming) at least until the children were able to support themselves. In later sections of the paper, we will show how parents and their grown children grappled with some of the problems of earning a living in a rapidly changing society in which the separation of home and work was proceeding rapidly.

Modes of production

In his empirical study of economic and social change in farming in north-east Scotland between 1870 and 1914, Carter (1979) distinguished carefully between the coexisting modes of production, peasant and capitalist. Peasant farming was grounded in subsistence production, with subsistence as a priority and the cash crop as subsidiary. Peasant farming was also characterised by the use of family labour, wherever possible. In contrast, capitalist production was oriented towards the market, towards maximisation of profit.

and the use of formally free labour (Carter 1979: 4-5, see also below).

The existence of a peasantry in late nineteenth- or early twentieth-century Scotland may be questioned by those who are persuaded by Macfarlane's research (1978). However, his work was concerned with the existence of a peasantry in England. Furthermore, Carter's findings and our own data are consistent with Shanin's general peasant type (1973). Here it is the farm, 'and nearly only the farm' which provides for both consumption needs and for the rent. Profit maximisation is rarely explicit at least in money terms. Peasants earn their livelihood directly from the land and the animals they raise. Traditional values encompassing economic reciprocity enables households to attain levels of self-sufficiency which they would be unable to reach alone. Horizontal social relationships are characterised by habitual personal contact, by lack of anonymity, and high level of homogeneity. Domination by outsiders in the form of landlords and others is an important feature of peasant life (Shanin 1973).

Our interviews were concerned with family and community life specifically and we did not ask questions about domination as such. Certainly rents had to be paid in cash necessitating involvement in the money economy. Carter's work specifically deals with the encroachment of the money economy as capitalist oriented farmers forced small farmers to either increase production – thereby exploiting their wives and children – or become proletarianised (1979). In the paper, we will show how this form of competition either forced young people to look to the market economy for employment, or how their perception of exploitation by parents led them to seek a new life far from their native homes.

The forty-five men and women interviewed for this present study were chosen on the basis of their childhood experience in families involved in modes of production more or less peasant or capitalist in character.¹ While we had little hesitation in assigning the families of wealthy 'gentlemen farmers' with large numbers of employees and house servants to the capitalist class, in other cases we found ourselves grappling with Shanin's 'marginal peasants', e.g. situations in which the steady incursion of the capitalist mode of production into an area had forced (or attracted) the inhabitants into taking wage labour or some other form of work to earn money. We found agricultural labourers who had a little land, and those almost able to support themselves with casual labour at some stages of the life cycle. There were distillery workers who kept

animals, and trades or craftsmen who used their croft land to supplement their earnings from their other work. Categorisation was further complicated by changes in the situation of individual families.

Like Carter, we do not use the term 'peasant' in any pejorative way, but as a concept to enable us to organise our data.

Crofting and family farming

Both of these types fall under the generic heading of peasant farming. By definition, both involved the labour of all household members in gaining the means of subsistence. In this sense, they were interdependent. Some of the crofters² survived off the produce of their land and fishing. Other crofters relied on regular or casual wage labour to make a bare living. Some retained their economic independence through such activities as running a tea room, taking paying guests in summer or plying a trade in addition to their work on the croft.

The term 'family farming' has been used to distinguish this kind of farming family from those associated with capitalist farming either as employers or employees of labour. In the day to day organisation of their work and subsistence living standards, the family farmers were broadly similar to crofters. They differed from crofting families in that they lacked the security of tenure offered by the Crofters Act (1886) and were therefore particularly vulnerable to competition as a result of more efficient farming methods and technologies, the vagaries of distant markets, and more heavily capitalised farming enterprises.

Capitalist farming

Among our informants, there were farmers owning their own means of production (except land, which was leased) employing workers on a permanent basis rather than casually or on a life cycle pattern (Laslett 1965). All were tenants to local or more distant, absentee nobility or gentry. Farms employing labour on a regular basis varied considerably in numbers of employees, size and profitability. On large farms, there was likely to be a grieve (farm manager) who was responsible for giving orders to workers. On the smaller ones, it was the farmer himself who did so, sometimes joining his workers in heavy manual chores which he, himself, would have learned in childhood. The chances are that on leaving

school he would have displaced the hired hand who would have had to find other wage work

Social context and relations of work

Our interviewees were chosen on the basis of their relationship to the means of production. They were born and brought up in three areas of Scotland which we knew would provide us with suitable subjects. These were the crofting areas of the Western Highlands and Islands, the north-east (including pockets of Inverness-shire and Morayshire) and the south-eastern Borders. These areas are culturally distinct, and correspond roughly with our sample of crofting, family farming and capitalist farming respectively. Nevertheless, as far as we can tell, our crofters and family farmers lived in the type of socially multiplex environment described by Shanin and summarised above (1971; see also Frankenberg 1966)

More specifically, crofters and family farmers lived in scattered settlements, sometimes in a village or hamlet. In most cases, the family involved had a long history in the area and were embedded in tight-knit social networks with people who were in a similar social situation to themselves, including kin

Among crofters and family farmers there was a high degree of overlap between domestic and productive activities, between work and leisure and interdependence at two levels (1) among family/household members and (2) other people in the community. However, individual members of crofting were employed in paid work which separated them physically from their immediate families and their kin. Where this involved leaving home for a time, economic and social reciprocity ensured the well-being of those left behind so that the shortfall in labour resources might be made up. This might take the form of a share of the fishing catch, produce, or help with cutting peat or other regular chores.

The situation on the Border farms was rather different. Married farm servants lived with their families in tied cottages within the confines of the farm itself, rather than in villages separate from their workplace as is common in many parts of Scotland. Single men and women workers sometimes lived with their parents, employed by the same person as their fathers wherever work was available. Others lived in the farmhouse itself or – in the case of some single men – in bothies, separate living quarters built specially for housing male employees. As we will see, the social

organisation of capitalist farming ensured a much sharper break between work and family life, between work and leisure and much more clearly ordered axes of differentiation along the lines of gender.

Let us now look at some of the major ways in which these families differed from what is considered the dominant type in modern society, from their social counterparts in urban Scotland and from each other.

Getting a living – peasant style

Resources varied from place to place according to limits set by climate, topography, the amount of land worked and opportunities for cash generating activities. The following case study is fairly representative of both crofting and family farmers in terms of the relations of work within the family and community. Their diet reveals something of the extent to which they were independent of provisions purchased by cash.

In this island crofting community, the people earned enough cash to pay the rent by selling their calves. Some also collected tangle (a form of seaweed) to make a little cash or added to their income by taking guests in summer, a not uncommon practice in the East Highland region too. Some of the men also went fishing independently, or as employees.

How did you manage to live off the land?

The only way . . . we depended on the cattle. We milked the cows and we made the butter and the cheese, crowdie, fed the calves. After we had taken the cream off [the milk], we gave the rest to the calves along with some [cattle] cake, and that kept them going. We have our own butter, salted in big jars, our cheese for the winter . . . we never had to go to a shop for butter or cheese. And the eggs, of course. We had hens – forgot about them. We sold the eggs – paid for the grocery bill with the eggs.

You would have had chicken meat?

Oh, yes. We always reared the chickens, and the cockerels we used to kill off when they were seven, eight weeks old – for the summer visitors you know.

What about flour and other cereals?

We used to get that in half-hundredweight bolls, oatmeal.

Everything was bought by the half-hundredweight. We killed our own cow, we salted it for the winter. Salt herring and killed a sheep and salted that for the winter. *Did you keep pigs?* No we didn't have pigs, no. We had rabbits of course. My father trapped them, all winter, that was the winter's work. *The boys?* Oh yes, my brother did.

What about shooting and fishing?

Mmmm yes, there would be poaching [laughter]. Geese, ducks, cormorants – they used to go and kill them, eat them. Eider duck. We were never hungry. Had plenty to eat. (MacDiarmid, b. 1925: crofter)

A major part of this family's income was from paying guests who came from the cities for a week or fortnight at a time during the summer. This family probably used cash more than other subsistence-level families since they earned it regularly. One or two families spun the wool from their own sheep and either knitted it up (for vests, socks, jerseys, etc.) or had it woven into tweed. Some grew their oatmeal as well as the food for the animals, caught and salted their own herrings in addition to making butter and crowdie (a form of cottage cheese). Others would have had to buy in the very basic food and clothing in general use. All the crofters used peat which the family cut, stacked and transported home when it was ready. Preparing the peat was a task likely to take them at least a month.

Mrs McDiarmid's mother supervised the running of the household, aided by three daughters and a girl and boy servant.³ Little supervising was necessary. As she said herself, 'We just seemed to know what had to be done'. She did housework, but also all the outside work as well, helping her father. She milked and fed cows, mucked out during the winter, fed calves and helped with the harvest. They grew all the hay and corn for the animals, 'No question of buying in'.

One particularly interesting point was made by several of our interviewees. No money was to be taken out of the farm or croft. If a woman wished to make jam, for instance, she would have to grow the fruit (or gather wild fruit) as well as having to earn the cash required for sugar either by bartering her own produce or selling it. As we shall see, later, adult children were not paid wages for their full-time labour.

Patterns of interdependence operated in all crofting communities and also within family units. Parents and children worked together

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though they did not necessarily do the same tasks. Work content was determined by age, generation and gender, though where a socially appropriate person was absent, someone else did the job. Adults generally, were in charge of the organisation of work (though among crofters, it was more usual for everyone to work on their own initiative, rather than on the basis of orders). Children's tasks varied with their strength and ability. Women and girls were involved in productive activity in the dairy, byre, fields, beach as well as in stacking and carrying peat in addition to domestic work. Men and boys *never* took part in household tasks. The care of young children seems to have been more the responsibility of their older siblings than that of their mothers, whose other duties kept them fully occupied virtually all their waking hours. Married women's work in crofting communities, and to a great extent among small farmers' wives as well, was therefore of a primarily supervisory and materially productive nature (Scott and Tilly 1980).

A high degree of interdependence was necessary to survival within each household unit, and also between units. This was emphasised by most of the crofters and to a lesser extent, family farmers. One of our crofting respondents told us about economic co-operation in his area, adding a comparison with the present time

Did you have any horses?

Yes, my father kept a horse, and a neighbouring crofter kept another horse and they teamed up for ploughing. With crofting, it was teamwork all along . . . they all helped each other out, shared their duties as best they could, gathering sheep for clipping, they all combined, clipped each others sheep, helped each other at haymaking. The corn was all cut by hand and hand sheafed, so they would club together for hand sheafing. A much more friendly and more neighbourly type of existence than it is today. They're all out for themselves today . . . Everyone's more independent today. In those days they were dependent on their neighbours, very dependent. There was more . . . community. (McKendrick, b. 1925: crofter)

Many of our respondents echoed his description and his sentiments, telling us of a range of cooperative enterprises. For instance, when a couple decided to marry, a house might be built from local stone and thatch entirely by kin and neighbours (unless

they were inheriting the family house in which case one spouse would move to the other's natal home); they would help each other with cutting and stacking of peat for the fire, the family of a wage-earning seaman would be supplied with produce and locally caught fish by neighbours (who could expect to share the seaman's short-lived prosperity on his return; women would swap eggs or lend a cockerel to improve her neighbours' stock ('men had nae interest at a' in hens') and when an animal was killed its meat was often shared. Women would also help deliver each others' babies, especially where a short labour and geographical isolation made it impossible for a midwife or doctor to be present.

The social relations of work in family farming and crofting communities differed from those of our other rural respondents in that work was influenced by nature, rather than by the employment contract.

The crofter isn't working for an employer. The crofter, I think you'll find is working to weather. If it was a good day you worked from dawn till dusk, if it was a bad day – as most of them are on the West Coast [laughs] – if the weather was good for haymaking, you got on with it as long as you could – we still do . . . If it's good weather, we work till ten or eleven at night. But then there were the long winter evenings. (McKendrick, b. 1925: crofter)

The character of work in these communities also differed from working for an employer in that there was considerable co-operation with neighbours, as well as a high probability that family members were working together. Furthermore, it was work which also had an element of leisure since people would chat and sing, while children might take time to play where conditions allowed for that. On the long, dark winter evenings, work and leisure were intertwined as the family sat by the peat fire, doing their knitting, spinning, making creels, repairing nets and so on. Commonly someone visited them as they would exchange stories or sing together turning the evening into a ceilidh.

In this section, we have tried to describe the essential characteristics of crofting and family farming work. These will later serve as a base for comparison with other family types. As we have seen parents were dependent on their children's labour, and husbands on their wives', while whole families relied on the reciprocal economic and social exchange with others in the community.

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We do not wish to give the impression that our subjects considered their rural upbringing to have been idyllic though some may have expressed alarm with what they saw as crass materialism and money-grubbing individualism in contemporary life. Interdependence in both family and community inevitably involved relations of power, of elders over younger people, of men over women and children. We were reminded of the strictures of sabbatarianism and more generally, the constraints of living in communities or farms far from the city lights, 'easy living' and the social buffers provided by differentiation and specialisation. The implications of one's material survival being at the mercy of the severe climate, stoney and infertile soil on the one hand, and demanding parents, capricious employers or distant markets on the other, were never far from our minds as we listened to our subjects' testimony. We did not find it easy to imagine what it would be like to endure a restricted diet of oatmeal, salted herrings and milk

Earning a living – farming

The social organisation of farming engendered divisions in social life not generally experienced by either crofters or family farmer's especially for agricultural labouring families on large capitalist enterprises where there was a high degree of social distance between the gentleman farmer and 'his' deferential men especially (Newby 1977). Employment conditions also ensured a physical division between the work of men and that of women and children.

Within the range of interview material at our disposal, we found some farming families whose division of labour and life style was roughly similar to that found among upper-middle-class urban professionals and business families, that is with a high degree of separation between home and work, and absence of wives and children from the productive work of the farm. We also found a few agricultural labouring families whose situation was somewhat similar to that of urban working class families, with a clear-cut household division of labour based on gender and generation. Girls in working-class households, urban or rural, were always involved in housework.

Among the wealthier farming families, wives and young children did not work on the farm at all. While their husbands managed their financial affairs through their estate managers and/

or grieves, wives managed the domestic side through instructions to servants. Children's time was likely to be spent playing, or in the company of tutors/governesses. Many went to boarding schools from an early age. Some young adults in elite rural families, especially elder sons and daughters, started to learn their adult roles on leaving boarding school or during school holidays when they reached the age of about fifteen. Much of the daily food was provided on the estate, grown by gardeners, or from the farm and dairy and produced by employees, rather than family members. It is important to note that in households like these, provisions were also brought in from afar and paid for in money.

Further down the rural social ladder, were other farming families employing labour, but with wives and children working to a greater or lesser extent on the farm. In cases like these, the wife and her growing daughters might make the family's butter and attend to the more specialised domestic work, leaving the menial jobs to a servant. On the farm itself, the sons would be involved in helping feeding animals, and other fairly routine tasks depending on age, ability and interest. Mr Veitch's father worked on the farm while his young son learned from him all the necessary skills for his future as a farmer. As the extract indicates, his responsibilities were heavy ones for a twelve-year-old, and his schooling was considered secondary to the serious business of animal husbandry.

I remember when I was a little boy, the time o' the lambin, – funny to say such a thing – my father said when I was afraid to put my hand in the ewe for lambin, 'ye've got a fine little hand, put your hand in a turn the lamb's head'. *You were doing that when you were a little boy?* Yes. *How old were you?* I don't know, mebbe twelve. I was walkin to E . . . w' sheep before I was twelve [nine miles].

When did you go to school?

Well, I got off school on a Friday to do that. That was a Friday market. *Was that allowed?* There was nobody else to do it . . .

I got it to do . . . No objections made. (Veitch, 1903: employer-farmer)

Agricultural workers families relied for their subsistence partly on their low wages, paid monthly or six monthly, and on a range of perquisites provided by their employer for the father's work. The perks typically included the tied cottage, potatoes, milk, and

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sometimes (oat)meal, firewood and coal. To supplement their income, agricultural labourers' families sometimes kept a cow, or more usually, a pig or two, whose ultimate fate was the family's bacon. The importance and implications for the domestic economy are illustrated below. We asked Mr Duncan about children's jobs

Did you milk cows?

Oh, aye, yes. All the time on the farm . . . oo had a cow o' oor own. We paid the fermer so much for the cow's keep . . . We had to pay the fermer for its meat, like. A cow to a family in they days was a great help. Milk . . . butter . . . cream. *And who made the butter and cream?* Oh, the mither. *That was the same in every family?* Yes. *Did she make cheese?* Well, we didnae anyway, I never saw them makin' cheese. *What about gathering wood?* I've seen the old wife [his mother] gatherin' up sticks, you know, on the roadside . . . *Not much wood?* Ye had to have coal [they had to pay for it -16/-, pretty near a week's wages (16/-d to 19/-d wages according to locals). (Duncan, b 1900 agricultural labourer)

Almost all of the agricultural labouring fathers had potatoes provided for their families and their pigs. They kept a vegetable garden and many of the mothers kept hens, a pig and/or a cow as mentioned above. A few mothers provided services to 'the big hoose', e.g. the provision of butter and cream when the gentry were in residence. As with crofters, home killed meat was likely to be shared with neighbours.

The range of perks and their ratio to wages varied enormously. In the case of one of the oldest interviewees, no money was earned at all by his shepherd father who had grazing rights for his own lambs, and whose money income came from the sale of the lambs. At the other end of the spectrum, one of the youngest interviewees' farm steward father had only the tied house with adjoining land. Apart from that his income was paid in cash. It seems that as the perquisites associated with agricultural employment were gradually phased out, families became more and more dependent on cash, and therefore on their earnings, especially the money earned by their father.

Compared with peasant families, there were fewer opportunities for wives or children of agricultural labourers to contribute to the domestic economy except in exercising their housewifely skills, or – in the case of girls – in helping their mothers around the house

Where possible, boys helped the family finances by rabbiting or fishing (see below), and there were reports of boys earning a little cash which was diverted into the common purse. Where the boy was employed on a casual basis on the same farm as his father, his wages were paid to the father. As mechanisation started to come in, the casual services of the dependants of agricultural labourers became unnecessary to the farmer. As a couple of our respondents observed, children were replaced by machines.

Farm servants' wives, several of whom had been agricultural labourers themselves, uniformly received their husbands' wages which had to be very carefully budgeted. Many items in their diet had to be obtained from the travelling horse vans which supplied groceries, butcher meat, fresh fish and so on. Big families, especially, found it hard to live and the rather high rates of residential mobility among those who were not farm stewards or shepherds (the rural labour aristocracy), is a reflection of their ill-fated efforts to improve their material conditions. An extra sixpence a week was considered sufficient incentive to change jobs.

There was a fairly high degree of separation of work, home and leisure despite living within the boundaries of the workplace. Agricultural labourers worked under their grieve for specific, regular (and long) hours, rather than according to weather although they were likely to have most of their meals at home. There was visiting between the cottages on the same farm, ceilidhs in vacant cottages or bothies, and a considerable degree of co-operation on a day-to-day basis among the women whose working conditions, like those of crofting women, were by no means socially isolated.

On the basis of the empirical material we have presented, it is clear that the household divisions of labour, the varying degrees of familial and community interdependence, reliance on cash on a daily basis, together with the absence of clear boundaries between work, leisure, and family life in most of our families differed substantially from the modal family unit in modern capitalist industrial societies.

Economic change and family relationships

Sociological accounts of change in family structure tend to treat family as the dependent variable. However, evidence from our

interviews suggests that the situation was very much more complex and that we must take account of values and beliefs which promoted resistance to change as well as those which served to encourage it.

The successful exercise of traditional authority seems to have been universal in that we have little evidence of challenges to parental power by children of school age either in this rural sample or in our other interviews (Toynbee 1986; Jamieson 1983, 1986, 1987; Jamieson and Toynbee, forthcoming). Where resistance or rebellion occurred it was usually in the context of what modern sociologists would call 'the transition from school to work' – though few of 'our' children knew such a transition. They had always worked. By exploring this 'transition', it is possible to gain some appreciation of the complexity of the processes through which parents and children resisted or accepted the alternatives open to them.

Goode (1963a, 1963b) has proposed that the response to widespread economic change associated with industrialisation was likely to be most immediate among the lower strata who could not control the future careers of their young adult children since they could neither provide them with a living in the form of a family business or farm, nor had they the necessary connections to find them a good job in the occupational hierarchy. As we will show, some of the 'lower strata' did manage to provide careers for their children through collective strategies, those with farms also had to educate children who would not inherit, and not all those who might have remained on the land did so.

It was clear from our data that four factors were of critical importance underlying the 'career decisions' of our respondents and their siblings, (1) the family's situation in relation to the mode of production (2) availability of viable alternatives in the form of access to gaining a living (3) the perceptions of both parents and children of their situation, and (4) the quality of the relationship between parents and child.

One of the most important outcomes of the rapidly increasing division of labour in society during the whole period of industrialisation was the opening up of job opportunities for people who might otherwise have been obliged to rely on the dubious beneficence of kin for access to the means of subsistence (Harris 1983; 65–70; Anderson 1971; Carter 1979). Some of our informants either inherited a farm or croft (or married a local farmer or crofter) thinking of no other possible future. It was

expected and hardly ever, or never questioned. Sometimes it was the case that grown-up children resented their harsh life on the croft or farm, especially where parents were particularly demanding and unjust. Where they perceived injustice they might have been prepared to put up with the situation, knowing that they would inherit – or like other children, leave home where employment was available.

One of those who never questioned his future was Mr Renton (born in 1912) who started paid work while he was still at school, in addition to helping his shepherd father with the mustering and dipping of sheep. On leaving school, he left the farm on which his father was employed to work to another farmer seventeen miles away (he was fourteen). His wages were always paid to his father. A few years later, he joined his father in working a small holding until his father's death twenty-four years later. In order to buy a bicycle, Mr Renton earned money by poaching and selling rabbits. Once again, money was not to be taken out of the farm. He was never paid by his father. The case was not unusual as far as lack of payment was concerned. Many of those people who stayed on crofts and family farms followed in their parents' footsteps, accepting their kin-based social relations of production as their ancestors had done, little affected by the changes taking place elsewhere.

Such a case was that of Mrs MacDiarmid. She enjoyed her work on the croft and stayed there as an adult, contributing to the household economy until she married (and established another crofting family). However, her elder sister was sent to university to become a teacher, a career path which involved a great deal of collective sacrifice from every member of the family. The elder sister was following in the footsteps of other crofting children who became geographically and socially mobile, part of a long tradition in the Highlands and Islands.

Many crofting children without educational qualifications would leave too, since the croft would not support them and there was no employment available locally. Like the children of poverty-stricken agricultural labourers, they too would settle in towns and cities, creating the next generation of urban working-class families.

Like agricultural labourers who were obliged to take their children from school as soon as possible, family farmers did so too, either to expand their existing family full-time work force or to allow them to sack the hired hand who was kept only until a child

was strong enough to take his place. This situation seems to be similar to Laslett's life cycle servants, co-resident non-kin, usually young people from other subsistence-level families who required to leave home, to be kept by another household and expected to remit money home (Laslett 1971). It should be noted that small farmers with employees typically replaced an employee with an unpaid son when he left school

Among our respondents, there were a couple of cases of women who had lived on their native crofts or family farms all their lives, keeping house for unmarried inheriting brothers, and working on the farm or croft. We were also told of cases where parents had exploited their adult children, keeping them on uneconomic farms as unpaid labourers in isolated areas where there was little paid work available, forbidding them to leave in the expectation of making more 'siller' [silver], thus hoping to avoid proletarianisation themselves (see also Carter 1979)

Among the more prosperous farmers employing labour, there was always a son who inherited the land, apparently glad to do so. All of our farmers' children said that there had either been some discussion of their future in terms of further education, or that they had been really keen to follow in their parents' footsteps, or that the future course of their lives had been taken for granted. There was some measure of choice too.

We had the impression that the further down the farming hierarchy, the more likely that the son had taken an active interest in animals and the outdoor life from an early age and the more likely that he chafed at having to attend school.

However, autonomy (in the sense that we understand it today), seems to have been lacking in their young adult lives. Even among the wealthy farmers, sons who stayed on the farm received no regular payment (money should not be taken out the farm), though they were provided with everything their parents felt they needed. None of the men who had been in this position seemed to chafe at the prospect of having no wages or discretionary income. It was a way of life they seemingly accepted, perhaps in anticipation of inheriting the farm and eventually, passing it on to their own children, or rather, their sons.

A good example is Mr Veitch, whose work as a boy was described earlier. His case is particularly interesting because of the discrepancy in treatment between himself and his four siblings, presumably resulting from the differing ambitions the parents had for their children. His childhood and youth were spent learning

from his father all the heavy, manual work associated with farming. He had always worked long hours as a boy, and left school early in order to replace one of the three hired men

Although his mother came from a socially prominent farming family with strong connections in the local town, she was also heavily involved in 'women's' farmwork, making butter and other produce for domestic use and to exchange for groceries. A maid was employed for housework. The working lives of these three closely resembled peasant farmers. By contrast, the three daughters and a younger son, neither worked on the farm nor in the house. The daughters who, like their mother, were highly musical, spent their childhood practising the piano and eventually went to London for training. The younger son was sent off to a public boarding school at an early age and became a lawyer like most of the men in his mother's family. It seems that the cost of educating the other children was borne by the parents and Mr Veitch, the son who eventually inherited. The others' futures were mapped out for them in towns and cities, in professional life or as middle class wives (where their musical talents were soon 'forgotten', according to their brother)

Generally the girls in prosperous farming families were destined for life as middle-class wives, spending their time between school and marriage in further education, assisting their mothers at home and taking part in genteel social activities. There also seems to have been a measure of choice for some of them.

Mrs Tanner was sent to a boarding college to learn horticulture and domestic science (and 'learn some sense', according to her brother – since all she really wanted was to break and ride horses). Another respondent, Mrs Roberts, took a medical degree having been encouraged to do so by an aunt, herself a practising physician. Although both families were socially prominent and the parents took a relatively liberal position on the question of their daughters' careers, their different sets of urban or rural based values clearly influenced the daughters' futures. In addition, their financial situation made it possible to educate or meet their daughters' wishes without personal sacrifice on the part of other family members.

No such choices were available to agricultural labourers children, or indeed to the children of crofters or poverty-stricken family farmers who invariably took what work was available to them and at the earliest possible time. Sons of labourers either 'worked to' their father's employer or as farm servants or labourers

elsewhere. Where there was a large family, daughters occasionally stayed at home to help their mothers, but most often took domestic work on a farm, with local gentry, or a middle-class family in town. Where there was a nearby town, children might find employment in the mills or some other form of work such as forestry or railway work which did not require special entry skills and which introduced them to the rural or urban proletariat.

Some of the respondents made it quite clear that although they (or their siblings) had excelled at school and had wanted to do something else, it was impossible for their parents to forego their earnings even where there were suitable openings for them, e.g. in the form of apprenticeships. None of our Borders respondents complained about lack of jobs. Farm hands and domestic servants seem to have been in demand at the time they were of an age to leave school. Unlike the Highlands and Islands, there seems to have been no tradition in the Borders – at least among our respondents – of sending promising children from poor families elsewhere, no established networks of surrogate parents to care for them. It may be that a long history of exploitation, the clearances and population pressure in the north and west of Scotland created the kind of conditions under which the people created the means to make it possible. Lacking any local employment, they had to find ways of getting their children 'out'. Since their only role models were the local minister, schoolteacher and doctor, those with high aspirations aimed for the professions.

It was not unusual for the children of agricultural labourers to travel far from their families, and many remitted part of their very modest wages in the same way in which they committed their labour as young children. Farm labourers, in most cases, could be sure that most of their children would leave home at an early age. Indeed, they needed them to go in order to make room for younger children (and sometimes ageing grandparents) literally. Some of our respondents' siblings migrated to towns eventually, others emigrated to British colonies or dominions.

Discussion and conclusions

In the earlier sections of this paper, we described family life in peasant and farming families in rural Scotland in the first quarter of the century, followed by an account of some of the factors contributing to the shape of our respondents' early adult lives as

workers and family members. Many of these people would, others of their generation, spend their lives in urban areas ; result of their geographical mobility – in search for a better than subsistence farming offered, to escape the clutches exploitative kin or simply to find employment not available in tl native localities. Together with the established urban populat they would produce the next generation of urban families, clc in form and content to 'the modern family' than those in wh they themselves grew up, but with considerable variability.

What does our evidence tell us about the emergence of 'modern family'. First of all, it is clear that at this period, peas and capitalist modes of production coexisted in Scotland. As observed earlier, these shaped different family structures as wel strategies for gaining a living. All family members contributed working the land and caring for the animals in peasant households regardless of gender or generation, though the content of tl work was gender related. In well-established 'bourgeois' farm families, however, the household economy depended on fathers' income-producing activities, i.e. children were not expect to contribute to their own keep. In this respect, they w structurally similar to urban middle-class families of their own t in which husbands were the sole breadwinners and wives , children economically dependent on them. Indeed, the depend position of children in these families was similar to that contemporary children.

Agricultural labourers' wives and children contributed econoc ically to the household through a range of activities describ above, taking what opportunities were available locally to try eke out a living. In some ways, their strategies and tac resembled those of the urban working-class respondents interviewed (Jamieson 1983, 1986, 1987; Toynbee 1986). Ab two thirds of the mothers in our urban Scottish working-cl sample were employed. Some were sole earners and others l part-time work of some kind. It was hard to find ways supplementing the father's wages which were often the sole sou of regular income until children grew old enough to be taken fr school. To be sure, about half of the working-class boys and ab a third of the girls did earn some money by taking casual jobs l paper runs and earning the odd penny where they could. As rural households this was handed over to the mother who hac budget very carefully, using all her domestic skills to make e meet (Roberts 1984).

Both a clearer separation between work (employment) and family life and a much clearer division of labour was observed in our urban households compared with the crofting and family farming ones in respect of both generation and gender, especially in (upper) middle-class households. Urban men, women and children earned their income in places away from their homes, dependent on money for their livelihood. However, it was clear that the higher up the social scale, the more likely it was that married women and girls were confined to housework and child-rearing. In upper-class families, rural or urban, much of the menial labour which would otherwise be done by women and children, was done by servants.

Ways of earning extra money or producing food for subsistence were far more circumscribed in the towns and cities, than in the country areas. It is interesting to note that our interviews with female urban respondents are replete with accounts of how their mothers dealt with the problems of large families and a low level of domestic technology. These accounts demonstrate the high degree of importance placed on domesticity among urban women and girls. They are absent from the testimony of virtually all our rural respondents and that of urban males who often dismissed our questions on women's (and girl's) work with vague references to being 'out' most of the time! Domesticity and breadwinning had become much more clearly differentiated in urban families, not only among adults, but also among children. In general, the division was most dramatic among the upper middle class.

Secondly, an important difference between the families who lived at subsistence level on crofts and family farms and all the others, was the importance of money, and therefore the reliance on wage labour and the breadwinner. It is likely that the encroachment of the cash economy in rural areas, already established in urban ones, opened the way to new forms of the gendered inequalities in the form of the power of breadwinners to dispose of their income as they pleased, and to use their free time as leisure, something else they felt they 'earned' as a result of their employment.

A universal practice among our agricultural labourers was the use of a common purse administered by the housewife. Roberts' study of Lancashire women at a similar period to our own (1984) has also observed the common purse and its management by married women on behalf of the household. She notes that married women, especially those with large families were the 'boss'

in the household, a situation probably similar to the mothers of many of our working-class respondents. However, we also know that mothers' control over income in urban working-class households was not total. Many young people 'paid board' when they reached their late teens or early twenties retaining the rest of their earnings.

Evidence is too scanty to do more than speculate about the process by which married women lost their control over the common purse to more powerful husbands. What evidence we do have suggests there may have been insufficient money for any disposable income among the great majority of our rural respondents' families. Few indeed of the rural fathers who were employees drank or had money (or time) to spend on themselves. It may be that it was only when the individual wage ('the family wage', considered sufficient to keep a man with dependent wife and children) rose in real terms, that the balance of economic power began to tip, as men used their privileged position to commandeer 'their' money. It was certainly the case that there were a couple of farmers with money to spare for 'the drink', and it was also considered a problem among some of our urban families (Toynebee 1986) whose total income came in the form of money – a more readily disposable commodity than potatoes or oatmeal! Money was also more easily spent where there was a nearby public house.

A third major difference between the majority of 'our' families and the dominant type in modern society, was the nature of the articulation of the family and community life. Harris suggests a strategy for distinguishing family forms in contemporary capitalist-industrial societies in which families cannot be distinguished on the basis of their relationship to the mode of production alone, since the vast majority of families are proletarian. He suggests that the social settings in which families are embedded are of crucial importance in this regard (1983: 133) (see also Elias and Scotson 1965).

Until recently, 'privatisation' has been generally viewed as a process during which working-class families have withdrawn from 'traditional' forms of community sociability into a privatised, home- and family-centred existence (Goldthorpe and Lockwood *et al.* 1968). However, papers by Devine (1988) and Crow and Allan (forthcoming) demonstrate that we can no longer allow the concept of 'privatisation' to detract us from a much closer investigation of what has been a complex and by no means unilinear process. Indeed further research is necessary.

Crow and Allan (forthcoming) quote recent research which shows that young couples today not only value a home of their own, but one in which they can live unobserved by others allowing them to exercise control over their own domestic affairs. They also make the crucial point that what evidence exists suggests that recognisably 'modern' ideals about home life existed up to one hundred years ago.

Devine's (1988) paper on privatism, based on qualitative interviewing of Luton working-class couples with children is also instructive. She argues that levels of sociability are governed by the responsibilities which both men and women must meet in raising children and getting a living. Nevertheless, sociability with kin and workmates is regarded as important by both men and women in the 1980s.

There seems to have been a temporary retreat for the earlier generation of working-class Luton-dwellers. Indeed, it may be that residential mobility creates temporary loss of sociability. Something of the sort is implied in Young and Wilmott's analysis of ex-Bethnal Greeners' women's neighbouring in Greenleigh (1962). Having previously experienced the congenial, close-knit relationships of Bethnal Green, they felt extremely isolated in their new shiny homes and anxious about possible criticism from the neighbours (see also Klein 1965).

The studies used by Crow and Allan and Devine, were all urban-based. Our data, both rural and urban, clearly demonstrate the importance of interdependence, of *both* economic and social reciprocity in the lives of those whose survival depends on co-operation. In rural areas, it was the basis of relationships with both kin and neighbours, and involved different generations. In urban areas it seems to have been largely confined to working-class women, not necessarily related by kinship, but by the very nature of their work enduring and sharing much in common. Just as studies of 'traditional working-class communities' show that men are more closely articulated into local networks where their jobs are similar to, and bring them into contact with other local men at work (Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter 1956), other factors such as residential stability and the social ties which develop with it are also likely to be present. Generalised reciprocity requires trust (Bulmer 1987: 161-71).

The articulation of family and community may be physical or figurative or both. The absence of physical boundaries between family and community, or their overlap, was well described by one

of our crofters who spontaneously remarked that people were *never* invited to the house. To 'invite' someone was to imply that they were not wanted at other times, a situation hardly conducive to reciprocity. Indeed, doors were never locked in crofting communities even when the family were out – someone might need to come in, to feed themselves or to warm themselves.⁴

In an earlier section we commented on the pervasive nature of traditional authority observed in all our families, rural and urban, working and middle class. In situations where kin and/or neighbours are obliged to co-operate in order to survive, they are also likely to have a stake in the nurture and training of children on whom they may well have to rely in the future. Conditions like these favour the consistent application of traditional authority, not only within the family, but by elders generally, neighbours as well as kin. It is reinforced through Church and school and articulated with other, related values such as attitudes to work and use of time (Jamieson and Toynbee, forthcoming). The legitimacy of parents is least likely to be questioned where the articulation of family and community is greatest.

Traditional authority was virtually universally applied among the people we interviewed in Scotland and in New Zealand, and in both rural and urban contexts, though the ways in which it was used by parents varied. We have dealt at length with shifts in parental authority in English-speaking societies in another paper (forthcoming), relating this to broader social and economic changes arguing that in general, parents now seek much closer identification with their children.

New forms of parental authority and control are the outcome of some of the processes discussed in this paper, about the effects of changes in families' relationships to the mode of production and the nature of the household economy with its variable divisions of labour; with the effects on families of the increasing importance of the money economy and dependence on wage labour. Our material has enabled us to show how decisions were made about the future of young people in a changing society, early twentieth-century rural Scotland. The urbanisation and proletarianisation of people like our respondents and their siblings must have created acute social difficulties for them, at least initially. Lacking the means to pay for services, and easy familiarity with urban values and standards, some people at least would have tried to distance themselves from their neighbours. This could occur, for instance, where they were afraid of being labelled as 'yokels', or in their not

knowing 'the ropes', not coming up to local expectations of 'respectability', not knowing what local expectations actually were.

Variations in their family structure and emotional content can be theorised in terms of the variables we have suggested based on Harris's work (1983). There is still a great deal of research to be done in this area. There is also a considerable body of sociologically based literature which is suggestive of the course of change in family structure and content (Klein 1965, Frankenberg 1966, Bell and Newby 1971, Bulmer 1987) as well as recent studies dealing with historical change (Anderson 1980; Carter 1979, Stephenson 1984; see also BSA 1988 'History and Sociology' conference papers). These help confirm the diversity of family life both in the past and in more recent times. If we were to divert some of our attention away from 'the modern family', we would appreciate its variability more

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Notes

1 This study was conducted jointly by the authors during the sabbatical leave of Claire Toynbee at Edinburgh University from July 1986–January 1987. The sample of forty-five rural informants was selected on the basis of our theoretical categories. While we make no claims to representativeness, we consider that the number of case studies for each type was sufficient for this exploratory work. 'Rural Scotland' covers a huge range of geographical, social and cultural variations. Our informants were born in one of three areas (1) the Gaelic-speaking Western Highlands and Islands, (2) pockets of Speyside (Inverness-shire) and Moray in which stock-rearing and feeding is the predominant farming activity, and (3) the S-E Borders especially in areas devoted to hill-sheep (see Fenton and Walker 1981).

In general, our methodology and general approach derives from the work of Paul Thompson (1977) whose interview schedule formed a common basis for conducting the oral histories. In our previous, independent Ph.D. research we obtained material from rural New Zealanders and from urban dwellers in both societies. In both cases, these people came from a range of class situations. In all, usable interview material from 210 men and women born before about 1912 was achieved, 85 from New Zealand and the remainder from Scotland.

Our interview schedule contained questions about the composition of the household, kinship and parents' background, household work and the division of labour, leisure and community life including Church and to the general area of growing up and earning a living as a young adult.

Memory is always selective. What is remembered depends heavily on initial perception and on the retention of images. We perceive only what is within our own realm of experience as well as that which is important to us. For instance, our interviews reveal important differences in the accounts of men and women in relation to the work associated with domestic labour. Lack of space precludes an extended discussion of the reliability and validity of our data, but our methodology has been most specifically guided by Thompson (1978, see also Plummer 1983: 100–6).

- 2 We are defining crofters as persons whose legal access to their land was defined under the Crofters Act (1886). Under the Act, crofters enjoy security of tenure, a 'fair' rent, the right to bequeath the croft to a member of the family.
- 3 To the modern reader, the presence of a servant might convey the idea that this was a middle class family. This was not the case. There were few servants in crofting or family farming households. Servants were likely to be children from large local families whose parents were relieved of the need to feed them. The reader is referred to Laslett's (1971) writings on life cycle servants, a quasi-employment situation for children and young persons prior to taking up other forms of work (though some might remain unmarried within such a situation), associated with the preindustrial household production unit and a solution to the problem of balancing production/consumption with life cycle crisis. Harris considers this as being an incipient form of wage labour in which the (father) head of the household production unit wielded authority over *all* household members in work as well as family matters (Harris 1983: 107).

It is not without interest that among the fourteen or so cases of New Zealand family farmers interviewed by Toynbee (1986), that several of her respondents or their siblings were engaged in this kind of work prior to marriage or inheritance of the family farm or prior to taking conventional employment in the formal economy. It seems likely that the age-old practice of using life cycle servants lingered longer in places where (1) parents felt that this was an acceptable solution to their problems of making ends meet, (2) there were no other forms of employment opportunities open to young people.

- 4 The necessity of locking doors and fear of strangers is something which was commented on by many of our aged rural respondents during our chats after the interview had been taped. It is taken for granted among our urban contemporaries.

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Preaching to the converted: conversion language and the constitution of the TV evangelical community

Chris Wright

Abstract

A paradox is noted in the presentation of conversion in TV evangelism, this is that although the necessity of being converted is a common theme it is clear that the evangelists are aware that their audience is already converted. An attempt is made to resolve the paradox by showing how TV evangelists use conversion language as rhetoric to legitimate their role and the rationality of the organisation which they represent. It is further shown how this legitimisation is itself made possible through another use of conversion language which creates a sense of moral community embracing evangelists, organisation and audience as co-partners in the shared project of conversion. Finally, it is shown how the presentation of TV evangelism as the central ritual of a moral community generates a further conversion rhetoric which depicts the community as both exclusive of and yet open to non-members, a contradiction which is resolved through the establishment of distinctive roles within the community related to the activity of winning converts.

'Are there addicts and people who are drunk who are going to wake up in the middle of the night and turn to their TV sets for some kind of comfort . . . are these people worth anything still? . . . Like Abraham . . . will you save them for our sakes?' (Fund-raising Telethon, Station WSFJ, 1 April 1987)

American TV evangelism has been perceived as a novel development in mass media use which has potentially wide-ranging implications for generating cultural and political change (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983; Hadden 1983, 1987). This judgement is typically based on the view that, as the term implies, 'TV evangelism' is the use of the medium to alter the audience's

opinions to those of the evangelist. Therefore, the significance of TV evangelism for the ideological and institutional structure of society lies in its potential to convert the audience. Critics implicitly accept that this is both the goal and effect of this type of programme in their demands for equal air time for dissenting views and in their criticism that TV evangelism contravenes accepted norms of ideological neutrality in the televisual media ('In the Name of God', CBS, 13 May 1987).

It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the effectiveness of TV as a means of gaining converts. Rather, I intend to show that conversion of the audience cannot be a reasonable goal for TV evangelists and that they themselves recognise this is so. Consequently it will be necessary to describe and account for the prominence and persistence of conversion language in TV evangelism. This will be accomplished by, finally, locating the function of such language in both structuring the interaction between evangelist and audience and in the construction of the evangelical community.

Data relevant to these arguments are taken from 90 hours of popular day-time broadcasting on independent Christian station WSFJ, in central and south Ohio, during April, July and August 1987. The daily programmes monitored in late March and early April were, Richard Roberts 'Hour of Power', James Robison 'Daily Restoration', Jimmy Swaggart 'God's Plan for the Ages', Pat Robertson '700 Club', the flagship of his Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), 'Praise The Lord' (PTL) hosted by Richard Dortch; Station WSFJ 'Telethon'. The Sunday programmes monitored during July and early August were, Jimmy Swaggart 'Television Outreach', AMG International 'New Directions', Candi Statton 'New Directions'; Kenneth Copeland 'The Believers Voice of Victory', D. James Kennedy 'The Coral Ridge Pentecostal Church' and Jerry Falwell 'Old Time Gospel Hour'.¹

The paradox of conversion

The method of analysis adopted is that of rational reconstruction. It is assumed that evangelists are purposive agents and that their behaviour is directed in a logically coherent manner to the achievement of their goals. Their statements will be used to identify their goals and the means used to achieve them.

It is initially necessary to show that conversion is presented as

their goal by TV evangelists. Such phrases as 'the great commission to take the world for Christ' (Oral Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 31 March), 'the purpose of the Gospel is to change lives' (Rex Humbard, PTL, 6 April), and references to their desire 'to win souls for Christ' (Don Stanley on Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 6 April) were commonplace. Jimmy Swaggart's injunction to his audience, 'You don't need commitment, you need to get saved' is typical (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 31 March). Some evangelists have defined TV itself as a God-given technology to spread the Gospel (Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 31 March, Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 2 April; see also Frankl 1987, Robertson and Buckingham 1972). Without exception all evangelist programmes ended with an appeal to the audience to make a decision for Christ, for instance, 'If you have not received Christ as your Lord and Saviour you ought to receive him right now' (Jerry Falwell, 'Old Time Gospel Hour', 5 July). 'If you are not under the protection of the Blood you'd better run . . . you'd better hurry There is no other safety, there is no other shelter but the Cross of Jesus Christ There's a new name written in Glory and it's yours' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 19 July) This was followed by a response prayer led by a tearful Swaggart acknowledging sin, requesting forgiveness and ending ' . . . I am saved'. Similarly, Ben Kinchlow appealed to his audience 'God never fails us he loves you Jesus has taken the rap for you he's offering a pardon to you accept Jesus as your personal saviour' (700 Club, 6 April) Public speakers for TV evangelism make the same point Ben Armstrong executive secretary of National Religious Broadcasters has described religious TV as a 'recruiting agency for the local church', and Billy Graham has declared that religious TV's 'real converts are coming not from the traditional churches but from commercial TV whose diet of secular programming leaves viewers starved for spiritual nourishment' (Abelman and Neuendorff 1985, 90 and 99)

Social scientists endorse this view that a goal of TV evangelism is to win converts. Goethals' judgement is typical, 'While the style of evangelists vary, the conversion experience is central to their message' (Goethals 1985: 152; see also Hunter 1985; Hadden 1983). Hoover notes the close association between the number of converts made and an evangelist's status within the born-again community (Hoover 1987; see also Marsden 1980) and Abelman and Neuendorf clinch the obvious centrality of conversion by providing quantitative evidence that conversion related topics, e.g.

'being-born again', 'saved', 'missionary activities' were among the most frequently utilised on religious TV (Abelman and Neuendorf 1985; 104).

However, the same social scientific literature indicates the existence of a paradox in the claim that religious TV seeks to make converts. This is that, as the evidence shows, the evangelists' TV audience is overwhelmingly composed of the already converted. Demographic similarities between watchers of religious TV and 'born-again' Christians have been noted by many researchers (Frankl and Hadden 1987; Abelman and Neuendorf 1985; Gaddy and Pritchard 1985; Quebedaux 1974). Research has also shown that the religious TV audience is disproportionately composed of those holding orthodox religious beliefs, in particular those who have had a conversion experience (Gaddy and Pritchard 1985), who declare religion to be very important in their lives and who regularly attend a fundamentalist church or are fundamentalist inclined members of a mainstream church (Bourgault 1985). Similar conclusions have been reached by Hoover (1987), Korpi and Kim (1986), Tamney and Johnson (1983-84), Gaddy (1983-84), Mobley (1983-84), Stacey and Shupe (1982) and, in Sweden, Petersson (1986). Indeed, so familiar is this knowledge that Frankl and Hadden (1987) cite as evidence of the triviality of the Annenberg report its discovery that religious TV watchers are more likely than the average American to be Bible readers. Wuthnow also identifies such findings as 'no surprise', asserting that religious TV draws its audience largely from among those whose 'devout commitment to traditional religion was sufficient to motivate their time energy and financial contributions towards the televangelist's natural audience - the niche of convenience - an umbrella under which the remnant of God's people could come together' (Wuthnow 1987; 133; see also Hunter 1985; 297). Indeed, Gaddy locates the religiously committed nature of the audience by reference to conversion, '... it is those already converted who are most likely to view ... (selection) increases the possibility that the fraction of the audience who are eligible for conversion will be converted because of the religious predisposition suggested by their viewing behaviour' (Gaddy 1983-84; 290). Surprisingly almost all social scientific commentators have failed to note the problem central to this paper; given that the religious TV audience is largely composed of the already converted why is the necessity of conversion such a major theme in these programmes?

The sole consideration of this problem is by Korpi and Kim who

assert that producers of televangelism may be disappointed 'because their success is not due to their work but to audience members already established religiousness' (Korpi and Kim 1986; 417). That is, TV evangelists persist in preaching conversion to a converted audience because they are ignorant of its religious dispositions. This is an appealingly rare explanation for social scientists, we know something that the actors don't. Unfortunately, as the following evidence shows, it cannot be sustained.

The believing audience

It is clear from their statements that TV evangelists know they are addressing an audience of sympathetic believers. All speakers appeared to assume that their audience accepted the authority of Scripture, that miracles happen, that God not only hears prayer but literally speaks to people and that it is reasonable to account for personal troubles by reference to Satanic activity. For instance, the Oral Roberts ministry is built upon the practice of faith healing and a 'signs and wonders' theology. This ministry's 'Hour of Power' shows routinely included prophetic utterances and claims of faith healing achieved through the programme. An evangelist told how God shook a friend awake and told him to write to the evangelist in prison and on the same show a writer of Christian children's stories reported hearing from God 'in that clear authoritative voice' (Don Stanley and Beverley Capps Burgess, 'Hour of Power', 6 April). Kenneth Copeland held an on-stage conversation with God, 'Now hear me out - Nah I ain't gonna say that there Lord - (laughs) - it'd better be left unsaid Lord' (Kenneth Copeland, 'The Believer's Voice of Victory', 19 July). In none of these or many other similar instances was there any admission that such statements required justification for a sceptical audience. Rather these were assertions, often supported by studio audience applause, of what we all know.

Evangelists do not just assume that theirs is a sympathetic audience they also explicitly address their TV audience as co-believers. Phrases such as 'Praise the Lord, child of God' (Biblical Economics, WSFJ, 31 March), 'it is not easy for the child of God, you the viewer . . . ' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 8 April), 'believers like you' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 26 July), 'Stay on the word, you got saved on it - was that hard to do?' (studio audience 'No') (Kenneth Copeland, 'The Believers'

Voice of Victory', 26 July) were common to all programmes. Extended statements were made which identified values believed to be shared with the audience clearly distinguishing between them and non-believers. Thus, a presenter referred to April Fool's day as 'the atheist's holiday . . . there are very few atheists' (Telethon WSFJ, 30 March) and Jimmy Swaggart instructed his audience, 'You must love, you must pray for, you must be kind to unbelievers . . . love these individuals, be kind and gracious . . . but tell them the truth otherwise their blood will be required at your hands' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 9 April). Swaggart addressed his audience through their religious affiliation, jabbing his finger at the camera, directing his remarks at '(You) Pentecostals, you Methodists, you Nazarenes' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 19 July). Preachers also invoked the religious commitments of their audience to identify shared interests and values. Thus James Robison told his audience, 'It is time for God's people to come out of the closet, out of the churches and change America. We must do it . . . we have got to get involved . . . we are losing our children, our homes. Everyone of us as believers has to assume our God given responsibility' (James Robison, 'Daily Restoration', 2 April). Jerry Falwell similarly instructed his audience on their religious duties as believers already, ' . . . when you became a Christian you became a minister of the Gospel . . . God called you . . . You're in forever . . . enjoy the trip' (Jerry Falwell, 'Old Time Gospel Hour', 26 July).² Clearly the TV evangelists know their audience but this compounds the original problem; given that TV evangelists are not ignorant that theirs is a believing audience, how is it possible to account for their use of two apparently contradictory languages, one which defines the central commitment of evangelists to be the work of conversion and the other which recognises that the evangelist's audience is already saved?

Conversion language as social rhetoric

My attempt to resolve this problem will concentrate on the evangelists' uses of these apparently opposed languages in their self presentation to their audiences. That is, conversion languages will be interpreted as rhetorics, goal-directed persuasive languages. Through these rhetorics evangelists seek to provide viewers, who typically neither know nor interact with each other, with a set of

beliefs, commitments and interpretations of the world through which they may perceive themselves as not merely TV watchers or even as members of an audience but as a community whose collective endeavour is the support of those persons and organisations which are presented as representing the interests and ideology of the community. It will be shown that conversion, far from being an incidental or marginal theme in these rhetorics, provides the foundations on which this social reality is constructed by the evangelist and offered to the audience for legitimation. Thus I intend to go beyond the individualism typical of rational reconstruction to show how, in their rhetorics, TV evangelists present their audience with a set of recommended roles and relationships which, if enacted, would generate in practice a structure, the moral community, whose current existence is necessarily assumed in this same rhetoric. That is, I intend to show how the moral community of the saved, as a set of structured relationships, may be constituted through rhetorical presentations of the interaction of its members (Giddens 1984, 1979)

It is therefore necessary, as the first step in this argument, to show that conversion rhetoric is seen by TV evangelists to be powerful for the audience, that is, it has the capacity to justify the activities of both persons and organisations

TV evangelists routinely drew attention to the impact of their own conversion experience as establishing their right to preach the Gospel. For instance, Jimmy Swaggart told the childhood story of his being prevented by God from going into a cinema, a sinful place for conservative Pentecostals. As he waited to pay his money the ticket-reel jammed, 'The Holy Spirit spoke again. I grabbed my quarter, I suppose that was the evangelist in me even then. . . I didn't know about sin but sin-nature was broken' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 31 March). Jerry Falwell's statement at the end of a hymn, 'I accepted Christ during the singing of that hymn . . . I've never regretted it once' must be placed in the context of the recent publication of his autobiography which he promoted by emphasising scandals in his family's history, his own pre-conversion misdemeanours and the effect of his own conversion, 'Some bad stories in here . . . it may ruin me. After reading it you may stop supporting me but I'll take that chance' (Jerry Falwell, 'Old Time Gospel Hour', 19 July). Similarly, two guest singers on Richard Roberts show recalled their marital problems and attempted suicide fourteen years before but, 'our greatest songs have been written since the Restoration' (Buck

and Dottie Rambo, Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 3 April) The perceived legitimating role of the conversion experience for a believing audience is graphically displayed in TV evangelists' reference to this event in their own lives as a means of rebutting criticism. During the time he was being criticised for his flamboyant attempt to raise \$6 million for medical missions, Oral Roberts invoked his own conversion through the experience of curing himself through prayer from TB at the age of 17, continuing, 'I represent the sick discontented and afflicted people all over the world and I will not give up just to get these critics off my back' (Oral Roberts on Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 30 March). Similarly, when Jimmy Swaggart was being criticised for his role in the PTL scandal his wife Frances, accusing the critics of being 'enemies of world evangelization', declared 'God has put in (Jimmy) an unshakeable faith. We trust and know God is going to see this ministry through' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 26 July)

However, the most extended accounts of personal conversion were provided by the guests on 'chat-show' style evangelist programmes. These typically took the form of often harrowing first-person accounts of lives which had been afflicted by attempted suicide, illegitimacy, child-abuse, adultery, alcoholism, drug-addiction and criminality. From these depths of despair and hopelessness the speaker had been redeemed by the 'born-again' experience, '. . . letting God come through to us' (Lee Ezell, PTL, 9 April) which typically involved an act of direct divine intervention. Thus Arthlene Stanley described her experience after her evangelist husband's disgrace and suicide, 'I landed on my knees at the foot of the Cross . . . and came out of man-made legalism . . . Jesus came in and said "Honey, you tried, you couldn't do it, I'll do it . . . I conditioned you, I'll be with you"' (Arthlene Stanley, PTL, 10 April). Similarly, a former pharmacist, drug-pusher and addict described how his conversion during his imprisonment followed his praying for help after which he found in a trash can a Gideon bible opened at John chapter 3. This in itself would be an indication for the audience of divine intervention as the 16th verse of this chapter, 'For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life', is the central biblical text for evangelicals. 'Jesus literally walked through steel bars that day into my life. brother Richard . . . resurrected me a new creature in Christ' (Don Stanley, Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 10 April). These

testimonies typically concluded with guidance to the audience, 'Forgiving is for ourselves not others . . .' (Lee Ezell, PTL, 9 April), 'God transformed you. Can God do it for others?' 'I know he can; just give it to Him' (Richard Roberts, Candi Statton, Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 10 April)

These stories should be seen as exemplary histories for a believing audience and as such provide double legitimation. The first was for the person giving the testimony, presented as one saved from a life of sin by divine intervention who can therefore speak from experience, as one 'anointed' or 'touched'³ by God for the believing community. I draw this conclusion because almost without exception those giving the testimonies were themselves evangelists or writers of religious books. In all these instances the testimony was followed by an endorsement from the show's host of the testifier's evangelistic campaign or by an appeal for the audience to buy the book. The programmes also benefited because the testimonies provided the human interest stories which are a major audience attraction (Bourgault 1980) and yet, since invariably these speakers did not have their own TV shows, they were not competing for audience with the programmes on which they appeared and could be safely endorsed.

However, the exemplary status of these speakers also provided legitimation for the organisations which promoted the programmes. I draw this conclusion from the fact that testimonies generally provided support for the current policy and ideology of the relevant organisation. For instance, in early 1987 the Heritage organisation which produced the PTL show was in crisis due to a drugs, sex and finance scandal involving the show's presenters. PTL responded to this through a series of devices emphasizing the centrality to Christian life of 'Forgiveness' and the necessity to avoid condemnation of the fallen brother or sister. For instance, a garden at its theme park, Heritage USA, was re-modelled to spell out 'FORGIVENESS' and dolls modelled on the show's former hostess, Tammy Bakker, were sold wearing a sash inscribed 'FORGIVEN'. All conversion histories presented on PTL at this time told the same basic story of how the speaker had not been fully born again until they had forgiven those who had injured them, thus providing authoritative endorsement of the Heritage organisation's survival strategy. The most graphic of these testimonies was from a man who had not found peace with God until he had forgiven his father's murderer. Indeed, the testifier had written to the killer asking his forgiveness for the hatred which

the testifier had held toward him (Adolph Coors, PTL, 8 April). Other testimonies concerned the forgiveness of an unfaithful spouse, abusive parent and unkind friends. Also in 1987 the Oral Roberts organisation was in a financial crisis occasioned, in part, by heavy investment in its City of Faith hospital, to which had recently been added a drugs and alcohol rehabilitation centre, located in Tulsa, an area already well endowed with hospitals (Harrell 1985). The perceived authority of the conversion testimony is indicated by the fact that almost all the testimonies on the Richard Roberts show during this period referred either to a miraculous healing which had brought the testifier to Christ or of a life previously given over to drugs and alcohol now redeemed by an acceptance of Jesus. Indeed, singer-evangelist Candi Statton concluded her testimony with an explicit endorsement of the new rehabilitation centre and at the end of each testimony Richard Roberts offered his own booklet on drug and alcohol abuse, 'You can be free again'.

The central point to be made about this use of the conversion testimony is that in noting that it endorses the effectiveness of the organisation we must also recognise that this effectiveness is itself, for the believing audience, indexed by its production of converts. For example, the healing centre is presented as worthy of support not only because it heals but because it converts. Thus, the authority of the conversion testimony is reflexive; it legitimates the organisation which produces conversions of which, on occasions, the actual testimony is an instance.

It is therefore relevant that speakers for evangelical organisations legitimate their educational, medical, media and entertainment activities to their TV audience by invoking the success of these apparently non-religious activities in winning converts. Thus, Richard Roberts announced that over 5,000 people had been converted in one week by the Power Team group of students from the Oral Roberts University (Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 2 April). Franklin Graham thanked PTL partners for their contributions to the Samaritan's Purse medical missions in Ethiopia and Kenya as a consequence of which, 'Out of 16,000 patients (in a Kenyan hospital), 10,000 have made a decision for Christ' (studio applause) (PTL, 30 March). Throughout April the 700 Club ran items commending the work of its media off-shoot Middle-East TV because of its success in achieving conversions, with Pat Robertson claiming that 80 per cent of the station's regular viewers had made a decision for Christ, 'this has never happened in the

Arab world before' (700 Club, 30 March). Jimmy Swaggart defended his Child Care International aid project against media criticism by asserting that the attack '... is not on me but against our success in spreading the Word' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 2 April). Similarly, at a time when the Heritage organisation was being criticised for financial irresponsibility, a studio guest on the PTL show, Rex Humbard, stated that he had been using money donated by PTL to buy air-time in Japan, 'the greatest missionary field in the world'. The show's host then listed the amounts given to mission projects by the organisation saying, to the camera, 'You need to know we have been planting seeds' (Richard Dortch, PTL, 6 April)

However, this account of personal and organisational legitimisation through conversion rhetoric is inadequately one-sided. Legitimation does not exist until it has been conferred and this necessarily involves interaction between those claiming justification for action (evangelists, organisational spokesmen) and those with the power to confer or withhold justification of that action (audience). Therefore, if legitimisation claims are to be endorsed there must exist, as a necessary condition, agreement between the partners on the proper goals of action. This is more likely to be established between those engaged in the same projects, those whose actions are oriented to the same goals. It is therefore relevant that TV evangelists routinely address their audience as partners in the shared project of conversion. For instance, the testimony on the 700 Club of an ex-heroin addict who had recovered after receiving Jesus at a mission partly funded by the Club's Operation Blessing was followed by the show's host saying to camera, 'You helped to achieve this. Operation Blessing funded the start-up costs for this ministry' (Pat Robertson, 700 Club, 8 April). The head of Christian TV station WSFJ asserted that those who give to the station, 'share' in the rewards of conversions brought about by programmes' (WSFJ, 31 March). Thus the evangelists in claiming legitimisation from their audience told that audience that it also was engaged in the activities for which the evangelist sought justification and support. The audience members were being invited as believers to approve themselves in supporting the evangelist's work of conversion.

The recognition that evangelists seek legitimisation and consequent material support from their audience by defining conversion as their shared goal, thus identifying their audience as interaction partners, indicates the plausibility of developing an interpretation

of conversion rhetoric as being, like any other form of interaction, a network of social exchange between the partners. In order to develop this perspective it is necessary initially to identify the benefits offered to the audience in exchange for their legitimization of and support for the evangelist.

The conversion project as exchange

Those evangelists who endorse 'seed-faith' or 'prosperity' teaching,⁴ notably Roberts and Copeland, promised material benefits as divine rewards but this is not a generally accepted rhetoric and is bitterly denounced by other evangelists, notably Falwell and Swaggart.⁵ However, a conversion history told by Copeland illustrates a theme common to all TV evangelist rhetoric. He reported the experience of a 'backslidden' Christian businessman whose business had recovered after his conversion quoting the man, 'I had come to rely on God's faithfulness . . . he was going to bring us through' (Kenneth Copeland, 'The Believers Voice of Victory', 12 July). This story does more than promise material rewards or demonstrate the reality of conversion, it also asserts that conversion works in the sense that it improves lives. Conversion is presented not just as a change in belief but as a change of life for the better in that the convert's behaviour conforms to the expectations of the believing audience. This audience is therefore being told that its way of life works; it is superior to and winning out over secular rivals. Thus, conversion histories do not simply tell of unbelievers brought to faith but of persons living unacceptable lives whose behaviour now exemplifies the success of the evangelical norm. The testimony cited above of the ex-heroin addict makes the same point. The testifier had been driven to drug abuse by the violence of his father but 'Jesus helped me' and he recovered without withdrawal symptoms. His father, seeing the change in his son, also went to the mission and is now saved; his mother, who had endured violence and infidelity saw the change in her husband and is now also saved (700 Club, 7 April). Other conversion stories carried the same theme. An abusive man who drove his wife to suicide has sought forgiveness and is now a loving and kindly father who 'has not missed church for a year' (PTL, 31 March); a convicted member of a spy-ring who helped sell military secrets to the Russians has been born-again and is now reconciled with the family members who turned him in and has won the admiration of his father, the head of the

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ring (700 Club, 7 April); a woman made pregnant as a teenager through rape committed by her father had decided after reading Scripture not to have an abortion but to have the baby adopted. Years later this same child who had become a charismatic Christian sought out her mother who is now herself converted and happily married (PTL, 9 April). A Chicago street-gang member found the courage to leave his companions after accepting Christ (700 Club, 6 April). These stories do more than record a change in belief, they also illustrate the benefits of adopting the values and practices of the born-again community, patriotism, respect for law, traditional loving family relations, opposition to abortion⁶ (Abelman and Neuendorf 1985; Hadden 1987). This was clearly expressed by a Youth for Christ evangelist's comment on the testimony of the former gang member, 'You can't just shove jobs and money at 'em; you gotta change them from the inside, they gotta come back and evaluate their culture'.

It is now apparent that the legitimating capacity of the conversion event derives from the generation of distinct but mutually supporting rhetorics appropriate to the respective location of each set of actors in the interaction between evangelist, organisation and audience. The personal testimony which presents conversion as *experience* establishes the evangelist giving the testimony as an authentic speaker. The same type of event is presented by speakers for the evangelical organisation as an *achievement* which establishes the effectiveness of the organisation and, therefore, the rationality of supporting it through donations, etc. The believing audience is presented with conversion as an *occasion to celebrate* that change in others which confirms the superiority of the born-again way of life. This is not to deny the possibility of contradiction between each group's orientation to conversion. For instance the typical testifier's account of conversion as an act of divine spontaneity is in potential conflict with the organisation's presentation of conversion as the outcome of intentional, rational human planning. However, it is not in the interests of the interacting partners to recognise such problems or, if they do, they must raise them in a manner capable of reaffirming their shared assumptions. Thus, James Robison combined both divine and organisational rhetorics when he accounted for the PTL scandal as an instance of God's 'refining fire' the effect of which would be to enable the organisation to preach the gospel more effectively (James Robison, PTL, 2 April).

It is therefore necessary, having described how conversion

rhetorics legitimate the roles of these typical actors, to clarify why this form of legitimation is possible. It has been established that a network of interaction is made possible between these actors which is predicated on their shared commitment to the reality of conversion. This complementarity of the meanings of conversion for each set of actors results in a situation in which each set in affirming the rationality of its own beliefs and activity will implicitly endorse the grounds of the rationality of the other actors' beliefs and behaviour. This argument presents conversion rhetorics as not simply shared by different groups of born-again believers but as constitutive of a closed, self-reinforcing system of interaction between self-conscious actors. Evangelists, evangelical organisation and audience are presented to each other through conversion rhetorics as a moral community of consociates. This community is defined by the assertion among its members of the reality and utility of life-transformations achieved through acceptance of those religious beliefs which distinguish the community from the rest of society.

However, there is an immediate objection to this argument that the legitimating capacity of conversion rhetoric is rooted in its being constitutive of the moral community of the saved. This is that the classical conception of the moral community (Durkheim 1915; Toennies 1955) emphasises its dependence on structural conditions which permit stable, long-term and wide-ranging face-to-face interaction. Durkheim located the causes of the decline of moral communities in both the geographical expansion of societies and consequent anonymity of social relationships and also in the extension of the division of labour which tends to limit possible interaction between individuals to isolated and isolating segments of their activity (Durkheim 1964, see also Bellah *et al.* 1985). How then can television which permits only non-reciprocal interaction and ephemeral involvement be the medium for the constitution of a moral community? Similarly, members of moral communities share central values (Parsons 1964) yet it is sociologically well-established that the process of rationalisation, typical of modern societies, displaces value criteria as grounds for action with a calculus of goal-oriented efficiency. The principal structural carriers of this process are said to be bureaucratic organisations which require dispassionate decision-making and science-based technologies which depend upon the practice of value-neutral expertise (Weber 1978, 1948). Modern communications systems, including television, are controlled by bureaucratised organisations

whose media involvement is only one in a range of interests and whose officials deploy diversified technical expertise.⁷

The implications of these theoretical traditions for an interpretation of the structural significance of contemporary evangelism has been developed by Hunter and applied to TV evangelism by Frankl. In this interpretation TV evangelism, despite the rhetoric of revivalism, is an accommodation of the religious tradition to a secular social and cultural structure. Evangelism is organised on bureaucratic principles; officials and technicians must be capable of performing their roles regardless of the depth of their religious fervour. Religious TV shows and networks must maintain their audience share and balance their books even if this means, as Pat Robertson did, cancelling a failing religious show and replacing it with a more popular light entertainment programme. Television itself is a distancing medium lending itself to impersonal relationships between performer and audience which is itself composed of privatised individuals. These constraints result, according to Hunter, in an accommodation of evangelicalism to modernity as it develops into a rationalised, depersonalised religion dominated by calculated routines, e.g. the steps to salvation, which implicitly deny the efficacy of the supernatural in human affairs (Hunter 1983, Frankl 1987).

In developing the argument that TV evangelism seeks to establish a moral community among evangelists, evangelical organisation and believing audience, I do not deny the accuracy of this account of the process of institutionalisation. Rather I wish to present the devices through which TV evangelists attempt to create a sense of moral community as responses to the rationalising and distancing effects of the medium. In particular, I wish to argue that the theme of conversion is peculiarly central to this endeavour because it is presented in TV evangelism as an act of divine intervention. As such it is both definitive of the distinction between the religious way of life and modernity and a means of maintaining supernaturalism as a public rhetoric. The much-commented upon practice of TV evangelists in asking their audience to touch the TV set as a means of establishing contact with or gaining healing from the evangelist is only the most graphic of a set of devices through which evangelists seek to deny the distancing effect of the medium by presenting the technology as a means of direct communication linking believer and evangelist. It is therefore unsurprising that TV evangelists are seeking ways to utilise the new interactive television technology.

The constitution of the community of the saved

Obvious attempts to personalise relations with their audience can be seen in typical practices of the evangelists such as reading out viewers' letters, speaking to camera of 'our friends', 'our partners', 'the folks in the studio and the folks at home', assuring audience members that the evangelist is 'speaking to them personally'. A line in the 700 Club's signature tune 'so much more than a TV show we are a family together' expresses a common theme. However, not only are such devices found in secular programming, their presumed effectiveness by TV evangelists seems to presuppose an already established shared identity. It is therefore necessary to show both how TV evangelists can be seen as attempting to establish a moral community embracing their audience and the role of conversion rhetoric in this construction of the social reality of the born-again. As Towler has pointed out, the establishment of a communal identity is both peculiarly required and problematic for the born-again,

those whose religiousness is dominated by the experience of having been converted must forever draw and re-draw the dividing line between themselves and the rest, between the saved and the damned. The boundary of a sect is clear but the boundary which surrounds conversionists is not and therefore its existence needs to be marked. (Towler 1984: 49).

I intend to show how the rhetoric and ideology of conversion itself establishes such boundaries. Nevertheless this intention must seem deficient because conversion, by definition, involves disruption in collective identity, a bringing into the community of the saved those who were previously outsiders. Therefore, the main objection to my interpretation can be identified; how can the same ideology of conversion be both definitive of the exclusive identity of community members and also present the community to itself as open to outsiders? As a consequence, the plausibility of this argument depends on showing how conversion rhetoric, as the use of conversion ideology in interaction, orients members of the believing community to outsiders as potential members in such a way as to maintain the boundaries of the present community. It is therefore necessary to consider how the potential member, the 'pre-convert', is presented to the believing community through

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conversion rhetoric in such a way as to maintain the present boundaries of the community. In particular I intend to demonstrate the devices in the rhetoric of TV evangelism which effectively exclude pre-converts from the community by providing them with an identity which is spoilt through being the negation of that which defines the community's members

This exclusion of the pre-convert invoked two typical criteria of distinctiveness, the geographical-cultural and the moral-cultural. Geographical-cultural exclusion identifies pre-converts with distant and exotic foreigners. All evangelist programmes emphasised their fund-raising for foreign missions and identified those parts of the world in which their organisations were active claiming many thousands of converts. The identification of pre-converts with the exotic elements of non-American life was explicit in many of these presentations, for instance Swaggart's sermon in which, pointing at the camera he declared, 'You in Japan, you in the Philippines, you in Laos, you in Cambodia, you in Africa, you in Central America . . . no longer do you have to tremble before witch-doctors. Are you not a son or daughter of Abraham?' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 5 July). Indeed, it is a striking confirmation of this device for excluding pre-converts that the only preaching, during the research period, which centred on appeals to the immediate audience to be converted was the only instance of preaching before a foreign congregation. This was a Swaggart sermon in which he declared the religiously alien nature of his foreign audience,

'Most people don't know of Jesus' first coming let alone the second. That's the reason for the telecast, that's why I'm here in Santiago, Chile (applause) . . . God told Jimmy Swaggart to leave America and take the Gospel all over the world to every continent and people. We're going to do it, we're going to take it to Africa, we're going to take it to Asia, we're going to take it to the Far East'. (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 2 August)

This identification of pre-converts with exotic foreigners, in sharp distinction to the assumption of common identity shared with the domestic TV audience, was found in the programmes of other evangelists. A film on evangelism in India described the population as 'burdened by superstitions deriving from Hinduism . . . sacred cows while people starve' but there had been an overwhelming

response to evangelism (AMG, 'New Directions', 10 April). When Pat Robertson was asked about his vision for the future of the Christian Broadcasting Network he referred to 'increasing our international outreach . . . people out there who need Jesus . . . living under oppression and demonic powers' (700 Club, 10 April). An evangelist, reporting preaching to African heads of state, gave as her reaction to meeting the Ghanaian leader, 'Rawlings looked wild', continuing, 'I didn't know what to say but the Holy Spirit takes over . . . I heard these words coming out of my mouth, "Chairman Rawlings I have come here to tell you that God loves you . . . Jesus loves you so much . . . I love you" He said, "You knocked the wind out of my sails"' (applause) (Daisy Osborne, Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 7 April). The exclusion of foreign pre-converts from the community of the domestic audience was accomplished, not only by identifying them with ignorance and bizarre beliefs and behaviour but also by presenting them anonymously. They were invariably non-participants in the exchange between presenter and audience. Their lives and experiences were reported by evangelists, members of the believing community, or represented as statistics. The only exception to this generalisation corroborates the thesis. This was the story of Linn Yann a Cambodian girl who recounted her experiences as a refugee. However, she is not only now a believer but is living in America having been sponsored for naturalisation by an evangelical organisation and is to be the subject of a Disney movie. She is now one of 'us' and may, therefore, speak (AMG, 'New Directions', 19 July).

The second categorisation of pre-converts which excludes them from the community of the saved is moral-cultural. We know that evangelicals and fundamentalists, compared to the general American population, are supportive of the traditional family, of the institutions of law and order and more critical of deviant sexuality and the use of alcohol or drugs (Abelman and Neuendorff 1985, Hunter 1987, 1985). It is therefore relevant that TV evangelism identifies American pre-converts with infringers of these values, in particular homosexuals, criminals and addicts. Pat Robertson, citing testimony from an AIDS victim said to have benefited from 700 Club counselling, declared 'People in other areas are looking to us for help . . . (there has been) a 63 per cent increase this year in calls from sexual deviants saying, "Please we want spiritual help, our life-style is not the answer. We want to know Jesus Christ." . . . It's happening with suicides, alcoholics and family

break-ups' (700 Club, 3 and 10 April). James Robison declared during an attack on Dallas city council toleration of public displays of homosexuality, 'There's hope for homosexuals and criminals through Jesus Christ' (James Robison, 'Daily Restoration', 2 April). Richard Roberts claimed that through the Oral Roberts' University sponsored campaign in Tulsa high schools, 'Some of the roughest, toughest people in Tulsa are being brought in and born again' (Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 30 March) and the 700 Club's report on gang warfare in Chicago led up to the statement of a born-again former gang-member, 'I did not receive a conscience until I received the Lord' (700 Club, 6 April). Jimmy Swaggart asked his audience to pray for a pastor opening a church in Times Square, New York, 'the modern Babylon' (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 6 April) and neatly combined both methods of exclusion in his story of the conversion of a Peruvian communist guerilla leader (Jimmy Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 5 July). Thus, viewers are enabled to confirm their self-identity through contrast with the negative characteristics of the pre-convert.

As with foreign pre-converts the domestic variety were also reported on and did not speak. The only exception to this was a 700 Club film report on Chicago street gang warfare which, using the show's 'magazine format', included interviews with current gang members. Nevertheless the point of the item, the necessity of conversion as a means of escaping the gang environment, was made by a (middle-aged) Youth for Christ evangelist. However, one aspect of the exclusion of foreigners did not apply to domestic presentations. This was that first-hand accounts were given by former criminals and addicts who had themselves been born-again. These persons were now members of the community of the saved but their presentation of self was highly ambiguous in that their personal histories recalled and displayed a time when they had been excluded from the community. Consideration of this issue will enable the resolution of the problem noted earlier that evangelists typically draw attention to their pre-conversion failings and that this surprisingly seems to legitimate their role as speakers for the evangelical community. This is relevant because it was overwhelmingly evangelists who gave these first-hand accounts of pre-conversion life outside the community.

It must be noted that it is a structural requirement of the moral community that the purity of the relationships between its members be protected, often through isolation, from the polluting

effects of non-members. This is particularly applicable to the experience of the evangelical community in America which as a consequence of political and institutional defeats in the early decades of this century developed the ideology of pre-millennialism which presents the world outside the evangelical community as fallen and doomed to imminent destruction. This ideology therefore encourages separation from the world (Marsden 1980; d'Souza 1984). In these circumstances it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the cognitive and structural boundaries of the community and, as a consequence, interaction across the boundaries will tend to be seen as problematic or even dangerous and is often stylised so as to maintain distance from the outsider (O'Toole 1975).⁸ Typically, non-stylised interaction becomes, as far as possible, the responsibility of a group of community members who enjoy a distinctive and often ambiguous status within the community which immunises them against the pollution of the outsider. I suggest that evangelists constitute such a group because they display through their conversion histories the ambiguity of having once been members of that fallen world. Thus as those with personal knowledge of the evil ways of the world, hence their emphasis on, to the believing community, scandalous pre-conversion behaviour, and yet also as those who have rejected that world and overcome its temptations they can safely mediate between the born-again community and hostile, ignorant outsiders. Further, in their personal histories of conversion the evangelists embody the community's collective ideal history of being called out of a sinful world and its anticipation of the future, of a world overcome and transformed by the believing community. Thus the evangelists not only represent the community to the world, they re-present the community to itself; this is the basis of their authority within the community.

I have shown that the born-again are constituted as a moral community in the rhetoric of TV evangelists; that this rhetoric defines and protects the community's boundaries with the world, that the ideology of conversion provides the self-definition of community members and that it also structures the community itself. These conclusions permit the resolution of two remaining problems in this interpretation of conversion rhetoric.

The community of the saved- 'closed and open'

The first of these was noted at the outset. I have claimed that conversion rhetoric as deployed in TV evangelism excludes the pre-convert through devices of cultural distancing thus preserving the integrity of the collective identity of the community. Yet, previously, instances were cited of appeals by TV evangelists to their audience of believers to be converted. How is it possible to reconcile these references to the audience as outside the community with the argument that conversion rhetoric defines and constitutes an inclusive moral community of the saved for this same audience? This aspect of conversion rhetoric cannot be dismissed as insignificant; such appeals are to be found in every programme.

The crucial feature which makes this form of conversion rhetoric appropriate to a believing community is its location at the end of programmes. This is significant for two reasons. First, moral communities are carriers of tradition, a system of shared, inherited and approved beliefs and actions, which provides members with a collective history and, therefore, a shared personal identity of what it is to be, in this case, 'saved'. The tradition continued through TV evangelism is that of the great 19th century urban revivalist movements of Finney, Moody and Sankey, Sunday and the travelling tent-evangelists of the 1920s and '30s (Marsden 1980). The invariable conclusion and high-point to these revivalist gatherings was the altar-call, an appeal to those who had been converted during the meeting to come forward in public declaration of their faith. The location of the prayer of conversion at the end of TV evangelist programmes, combined with appeals to converts at home to contact the organisation's counsellors, is a continuation and affirmation of this shared tradition and therefore, for the believing audience, evidence of the authenticity of the TV programme as a descendant of the community's founders. Further, the location of the acknowledgement of non-members at the end of the programme ensures that the assumption of common belief and purpose which informs the rest of the proceedings is not called into question as would be the case if it were located at the beginning or disrupt the celebration of shared tradition which would happen were it placed within the programme. Thus the location of the conversion prayer at the conclusion of collective celebration symbolically separates the faithful community from the unsaved viewer while, through acknowledging the existence of

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the unsaved, it identifies the community's boundaries. This reflexively legitimates the strategy of evangelism endorsed in the TV programme for the boundaries of the faithful community, although known, are not fixed, it is the joint project of believer, evangelist and organisation to extend the community's boundaries by converting the world.

However, it is noticeable that the TV audience has a specific and limited role in this project, it is to assist from a distance by helping the approved organisation which actively engages in conversion work. Audience members do not convert others they, for instance, join the 700 Club and help 'the millions who desperately need to know Jesus Christ will give them peace and heal their hurt' (700 Club, 31 March and continuous). Out of all the innumerable appeals for donations to assist evangelical organisations on only one occasion were believers in the audience urged themselves to seek out potential converts. I believe we can account for this division of labour by reference to the requirement to preserve the social integrity, the 'purity', of the community. Some activities, notably those through which collective identity is expressed, must be distanced from the pollution of contact with the unsaved. That is, the community's boundaries must not only be extended they must also be celebrated and protected, the former goal presupposes interaction with the unsaved, the latter goal separation from them. As a consequence conversion work, actual interaction with the unsaved, must be carried on 'backstage' out of sight of the community.

The recognition that this conflict of goals is resolved through the legitimisation of exclusive roles within the community of the saved, evangelists as licensed boundary crossers, believing audience as insulated supporters, raises the final problem for this interpretation of the saved as constituted as a moral community. I have identified in conversion rhetoric a legitimisation of the roles within the saved community of evangelists, organisations and audience as partners in conversion. A surprising omission from this list is the TV programme itself. In fact there were very few references to conversions, particularly within the domestic audience, which had been achieved directly by the programme and these few were presented tersely. In its trail of forthcoming attractions on CBN, the 700 Club promoted a show by impressionist Fred Travelina, 'who met the Lord while watching the 700 Club'. Nothing more was said about the occurrence of this conversion, instead the presenter extolled Travelina's make-up technique, the absence of

sexual innuendo in his performance and anticipated awards for the show (Tim Robertson, 700 Club, 9 April). An introduction to a Swaggart programme included a brief film clip in which a woman stated, 'I have been saved because of Jimmy' It was not made clear whether this was through a TV transmission, a revivalist meeting, a book or contact with one of the other Swaggart organisations (Jimmy Swaggart, 'God's Plan for the Ages', 6 April). James Robison, during an appeal for funds identifying the 'blessings' from partnership in his programme as such things as personal happiness and healed marriages, referred to a nine-year-old child who had received Christ through his programme. No development of this point was made and Robison continued by telling his audience that his ministry created 'the desire for the right kind of church in their area . . . we inspire pastors and their wives' (James Robison, 'Daily Restoration', 2 April) In the more detailed presentations of converts made through programmes there seemed to be a denial, not found in other accounts of conversion, of the pre-convert's separation from the community. Richard Roberts told of a man saved from drug dependence after watching the show but made the point that the man at the time was a nominal Christian (Richard Roberts, 'Hour of Power', 7 April) Similarly, Ben Kinchlow told of a woman dissuaded from suicide and asking God for a new life after watching the 700 Club but the point was made that she had previously been healed by God of TB 'but had not fully given her life to him' (Ben Kinchlow, 700 Club, 8 April), that is she was already a marginal number of the community This is almost the total number of citations of conversion of programme viewers during this period and their mode of presentation indicates a minimalisation of the significance of these events.

However, there were a few conversions credited to evangelist programmes which were presented more fully and which seemed to refer to the conversion of those entirely outside the community Nevertheless in all these accounts the preconvert's action in watching the programme was, significantly, presented as unintentional or abnormal. Jerry Falwell, during a fund-raising appeal for his Liberty University, told the story of a potential suicide who accidentally saw an un-named TV evangelist and was saved. The man went to Liberty University and is now a Baptist minister in Maryland (Jerry Falwell, 'Old Time Gospel Hour', 2 August). During an appeal for funds for the Swaggart organisation Frances Swaggart read out a letter from a former prostitute who had been

raped as a child and had been a prostitute since the age of 14. She had been invited to live with a family and one day had turned on the TV set and saw Swaggart preaching. At the end of the programme she knelt in prayer, 'for the first time in her life she is free . . . As you can see lives are being continually saved' (Frances Swaggart, 'Television Outreach', 19 July). Jimmy Swaggart himself told the story of an ex-convict who 'had watched Jimmy Swaggart just to curse him . . . he was strung out on drugs, alcohol, hate . . .' The man was walking out through the door when 'I pointed my finger through the set and said "You can run but you'll never outrun Jesus Christ" (applause) That man was knocked to his knees . . . sensed the power of God . . . could not rise . . . promised to serve God if he was released from drugs and alcohol' (Jimmy Swaggart 'Television Outreach', 5 July) The account was preceded by film of the man with Swaggart in El Salvador where he had provided money to build six schools.

The attractions of such 'accidental' conversions for the believing audience has been noted by Hoover, 'Conversion stories which seem to carry most for viewers are those where such incidental or accidental viewing leads inexorably to a profession of faith or personal salvation' (Hoover 1987, 139). The recognition that the audience is presented in TV evangelism with an image of itself as a moral community enables us to account for the acceptability, perhaps the necessity, of only accidental conversions being achieved through the programme. TV evangelism, I have argued, is a gathering of the born-again from which non-members are excluded thus enabling the constitution of the saved as a community. It is inconsistent with this perception for the unsaved to be regular or routine viewers of evangelist programmes. As a consequence either the separation of unsaved viewers from the community must be minimised by defining them as near members, 'nominal Christians', or their participation in the programme must be marginalised as abnormal or accidental. Through these devices the purity of the interaction of the celebrating community can be maintained. The Swaggarts, in the cases cited above, combined both devices so that even 'accidental' converts were not entirely estranged from the community; the prostitute was living with a 'saved' family and the ex-convict's wife was herself saved and a 'fighter'.

Conclusion

It is now possible to conclude this paper by showing the constitution of social organisation and personal identity which made possible the quotation with which it began, 'Are there addicts and people who are drunk who are going to wake up in the middle of the night and turn to their TV sets for some kind of comfort . . . are these people worth anything still . . . Like Abraham . . . will you save them for our sakes?' The audience is addressed collectively as believers for whom the conversion of those identified by a way of life which is the negation of their own is unquestionably a legitimate goal. This involvement of such miserable persons in the activities of the community is accidental, 'waking up in the middle of the night', but the community must have the resources to take advantage of these accidents. This is the role of the faithful audience; to provide the resources for others, the evangelists who may safely interact with the unsaved, to direct to these outside the community, 'will you save them for our sakes?'

I have argued that TV evangelism does more than simply presuppose the existence of a community of believers. It also deploys a rhetoric and ideology of conversion through which that believing community can be constituted and mobilised as a self-conscious, inclusive social movement. It is therefore consistent with this practice of the institutionalisation of the 'saved' identity that the leading TV evangelist organisations have expanded out of the media into the provision of schools, universities, leisure parks, conference centres, publishing houses and popular entertainment. These developments enable the collective expression of the reality of the community of the saved to be extended into more aspects of the everyday life of believers and thus enable the more complete routine re-creation of the community in the everyday lives of its members.

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Notes

- 1 These programmes were selected in order to cover, in the first set, the period after the breaking of the PTL scandal in order to identify the methods used by TV evangelists to repair the damage from this episode. The Sunday programmes were selected to cover the period on and in the weeks following the July 4th holiday in order to identify the extent to which programmes adopted patriotic themes and symbols over the holiday period. Although data relevant to both issues were identified, the persistence and consistency of conversion rhetoric in all programmes during both periods was apparent and raised more interesting theoretical issues concerning the nature of legitimation and the generation of structured social relationships.
- 2 This contrasts with the depiction of previous generations of urban revivalists such as Billy Sunday in Marsden (1980).
- 3 These and similar terms were routinely used by programme hosts in referring to their guests.
- 4 Seed-faith (Roberts) or 'prosperity-teaching' (Copeland) proposes the existence of a covenant between God and believer such that whatever is given in faith to the work of spreading the gospel will be returned many times over to the believer. This theology was initially popularised by Oral Roberts through such devices as promising to reimburse donations to his ministry which in the course of the next twelve months had not been followed by the donor's receipt of money, many times greater than the original donation, from an unexpected source.
- 5 The controversial status of seed-faith/prosperity teaching is indicated by Swaggart's condemnation of it as 'blasphemy' (sic) and Falwell's criticism that it treats God 'as a slot machine, put in a dollar get out ten dollars' (Falwell, 'Old Time Gospel Hour' 26 July).
- 6 These histories also indicate an ideology commonly expressed in TV evangelism that women are naturally virtuous. As a consequence women's role in these histories is either that of passive victims of male vice or promoters and validators of the conversion of others.
- 7 This may be true of all evangelism and not of current TV evangelism alone. However, this itself is significant because it has often been argued that modern technology, including communications technology, transform and undermine traditional religious ideologies through imposing on them the conditions of technical rationality. The fact that recognisably old-time religion has enthusiastically adapted modern communications to itself indicates the limits of such technological determinism. A similar point is made by Arjomand in relation to the use made of modern communications by movements of Islamic revivalism (Arjomand 1986).
- 8 It is common for recruits to counter-cultural ideological movements to be perceived as sources of contamination and consequently accorded a subordinate status which identifies their limited competence within the group (Daner 1975). Similarly new members of the evangelical community are accorded the status of 'Babe in Christ', one who has yet to learn the rules of the community.

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Age relations in an English church*

Dorothy Jerrome

Abstract

Age identities are a product of negotiation between acquaintances and intimates. The negotiation takes place against a background of assumptions about appropriate ways of moving through the life span. This study of ageing in the context of an English church shows how organisational needs must be taken into account in understanding the ageing strategies of participants. The paper is based on fieldwork conducted in the south of England in 1985-6. The analysis draws on the literature of social gerontology which is mainly American. It is part of a larger ESRC-funded study of the social construction of old age in Britain.

Introduction

The analysis offered in this paper is part of a broader discussion of age identities and how they are constructed. In 1985 I began a study of ageing in the context of personal relationships. (The research was funded by the ESRC grant No. GO1250005, as part of the First Ageing Initiative.) My assumption was that age roles are to a large extent the product of negotiation between acquaintances and intimates in a variety of settings. The negotiation takes place against a background of common assumptions about normal and appropriate ways of moving through the life span, of treading what Plath (1982) calls the cultural pathways of ageing. For the precise way in which the experience is influenced by members of the social network, I felt the need to focus on the conversations, social routines and rituals of everyday life. Like Vesperi, I sought to discover the cultural construction of old age where it unfolds, 'in the interstices of daily living, in the commonplaces of conversation,

and the "informal formalities" of social interaction' (Vesperi 1985).

Of the range of informal relationships, I thought that those based on choice might be particularly revealing. Patterns of voluntary association – from informal, dyadic relationships between friends to membership of formally organised clubs and societies – might indicate something about the salience of age as an organising principle, the extent to which age differentiation is a feature of social life in our community, how age roles are constructed and learnt, and how other people influence our views of ourselves as ageing individuals.

The literature of social gerontology suggests that people generally choose to associate with peers (Fry 1980). In British society, friends are normally age mates, and voluntary organisations – particularly those with expressive rather than instrumental goals – are homogeneous in age terms. Since I was interested in old age in particular, the focus of the study was old people's clubs and other age-graded organisations. The material I gathered dealt mainly with social processes in the elderly peer group but was partly concerned with interaction across age lines. Accounts of the experience of ageing among elderly peers have appeared elsewhere (Jerrome 1985, 1986, 1988, 1990). This paper concentrates on the experience of people in an age-mixed organisation containing a number of age-specific groupings: an English church.

An integrated community

Stamford Road Methodist Church has 123 adult members and a youth wing or junior church of about 40 children. The majority of members are middle-aged and older, and women outnumber men by 2:1. The gender imbalance is pronounced in the forties, where divorce largely accounts for women on their own, and the sixties, where their ranks are swelled by the never-married and the newly-widowed. Widowhood and women's greater life expectancy lie behind the preponderance of very old women. More fundamental reasons for the imbalance in sex and age in church membership lie in social and cultural developments in British society through the course of the last sixty years, changes which we can only note here. The contemporary appeal of organised religion to older people and women can be explained in a number of ways. A full

discussion of the benefits of church membership appears elsewhere (Jerrome, in press).

Table 1 *Age distribution of church members 1984–85*

	Men	Women	Total
18–19	1	–	1
20–29	5	7	12
30–39	6	7	13
40–49	2	8	10
50–59	9	10	19
60–69	2	11	13
70–79	11	18	29
80 and over	3	23	26
Total	39	84	123

At a weekly gathering of adherents on a Sunday morning, spatial arrangements indicate a number of bases for identification. Seating preferences reflect affiliations based on kinship, friendship, organisation membership and cohort. Generally, the pews on the left are occupied by children and young adults (the Sunday school or junior church sit in front, their parents and their parents' friends behind), the right by the very old, and the centre sections by the ages in between, with some very old included among them.




Figure 1

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A number of overlapping social networks based on kinship, locality, cohort, membership of church associations and adherence to a set of values create a cohesive and close knit unit with historical depth and permanence. The existence of multigenerational and intermarried families has produced an extensive kinship network. There are nine two-generation families, seven three generations and seven of four or more generations, the upper and lower levels absent through death or detachment. Twelve families are linked by marriage one, two or three generations back. Some of them are now almost extinct through low rates of marriage and the tendency for younger generations to move away or reduce their involvement in the church.

The As and the Bs, for instance, intermarried in the 1950s. The Bs are also linked to the Js by marriage. One very elderly remains and so does an elderly never married B, a middle-aged woman and her husband. The B children are not practising Christians and are bringing up their own children outside the church. The Cs and Ds and the Ks and Ls also became linked by marriage in the 1950s, a glorious time in the history of the church when the legendary youth club was one-hundred strong and spilled over from the pavilion on the left. Several of today's middle-aged couples met in the youth club during that time. The younger Cs and Ds, Ks and Ls have also moved away, though their parents remain. One of the Cs had married an H a generation earlier, and another of the Hs had married a G. The Fs and Es intermarried in the 1920s and 1930s.

Occasionally, marriages still take place between church families but the youth club is non-existent and there are relatively few young people of marriageable age. Two young people from the D and E families have recently married but they do not attend church.

The links established by these families currently involve more than twenty people, mostly in their fifties and seventies. But friends of relatives and relatives of friends ensure that each is embedded in an extensive and closeknit network. Apart from these intermarried families and others of more than one generation there are four pairs of elderly sisters and two sets of elderly brothers.

The majority of younger people are not linked by kinship to older members but have offspring who attend junior church and belong to the youth organisations. Their entry to church came through their children rather than through birth or marriage.

Members are linked also by physical contiguity. Most live

within a mile of the church in houses which they own. The majority of the older people, particularly the women – who tend not to own or drive cars – live in Edwardian terraced houses within yards of the church. Some moved in as children when the area was first developed round the turn of the century. Other old people and most of the younger ones live in a 1930s residential area half a mile away. The size of the older contingent was reduced substantially a few years ago when the only bus travelling along Stamford Road was withdrawn. A few of the more affluent people have moved slightly further afield to more modern, semi-detached houses and purpose-built flats. Some have left the area altogether but continue to travel back once or twice a week.

To these ties of kinship and neighbourhood are added those of age and gender. Neighbours are often members of the same cohort with common interests derived to some extent from a shared past. Informal meetings between friends and formal gatherings of the peer group contain an element of reminiscence, the conversations dwelling on shared experiences: courtship and marriage in the 1920s, the onset of parenthood and other family events and current health issues; and knowledge of the local area as it used to be. Most formal groupings in the church are age-graded – though not officially – so that age interests and organisational involvement overlap. The women's fellowship, for instance, is predominantly elderly, with nineteen out of the twenty-one who regularly attend being in their seventies and eighties. The age distribution of the men's fellowship is similar: over half are over seventy, the rest late middle-aged. The young women's organisation, more a club than a fellowship, is dominated by women in their fifties and sixties. The children's organisations are by definition youthful. Of the remaining adult organisations, only the drama and singing group has an even spread across three decades: 30s, 40s and 60s.

Shared leisure activities extend beyond the church. Both older and younger women engage in activities of friendship and the former also go to a series of meetings together. There are four women's fellowships in the neighbourhood with a substantial overlap in membership among the older female population. Half of the members of the Stamford Road women's fellowship are in addition attached to local old people's clubs and lunch clubs. Several cook for the church's own lunch club and one or two attend as beneficiaries.

Church members share a basic orientation: they are joiners. They follow a particular life style which supplies the challenge and

security necessary throughout the life cycle (Gordon, Gaitz and Scott 1976). Through membership of the church and its affiliated organisations they achieve personal autonomy and meaningful integration. Some people are more involved than others in terms of the amount of lifespace occupied by church affairs. Into this category come the very old and those middle-aged people still in employment whose leisure time is dominated by church work. For the very old, the church is the main social arena.

A moral community

Members of the church regard themselves as a family, in principle and in practice. Like the ideal family, the congregation is mixed in age and its constituent parts are bound in a special relationship of co-operation, positive intervention, conciliation, the sharing of resources, and mutual enjoyment. One of the main committees, consisting of representatives from the eighteen affiliated organisations, is known as the Family Committee. Each constituent unit of the church family is required to contribute to the church's income and undertake a range of tasks. The failure to participate adequately (the scouts, for instance, proved unreliable in taking their turn at the monthly coffee morning) earns criticism as failing to recognise the privileges and responsibilities of family membership. Intervention in internal affairs is justified in the same way. The notion of a church family is expressed in the annual pastimes – the church quiz and the church picnic. At a Christening service, when the birth of a baby is formally acknowledged, the infant is ritually carried up and down the aisles in full view of the congregation, to 'meet its new family'.

The imagery of the family is used to express and confirm unity, obedience and security. The Mother's Day service, for instance, invokes parallels between God's family, the Holy family and the human family of the church. The address on this occasion focuses on the home as the seat of affection and source of support, haven in a harsh world, microcosm of the Christian community. At the women's anniversary service, similarly, the Holy Family is presented as the model for the earthly one. At Easter, the imagery of the family is used to describe the loneliness of God at the loss of his only son and, by implication, the waywardness of his earthly offspring.

A second unifying principle is that of fellowship. All acts of

worship or business or convivial occasions in the church are ritual gatherings of believers. They meet 'in fellowship': in a climate of spiritual communion and solidarity. Other central values include growth and creativity – in nature and in the family, of the self and the life of the church. Loyalty, commitment and perseverance are also esteemed. They are the antithesis of self interest, a principle which is inimical to the caring roles which members are encouraged to adopt both inside the church and outside it. The emphasis on service to the community is reflected in the committee structure and the allocation of resources – time, energy and money – to projects of a charitable nature.

A crucial value is that of conciliation, which is reflected in the conduct of inter-personal affairs and can be translated into a set of personal standards: modesty, humility, non-assertiveness, discipline, self-control and tolerance. There should be no conflict in the church, or indeed any assertive behaviour likely to undermine the community. Conflict is dismissed and breaches are minimised in the use of diminutive terms: 'niggles' to describe criticism of the committee structure, 'kerfuffle' – vigorous disagreement over the solution to a perennial problem in a women's organisation; and 'naughty' to describe a committee member who unilaterally acted in breach of the constitution. Assertive people are criticised as 'strong minded'. Criticism is classed with gossip and indifference as 'weeds which must be rooted out'. The norm of passivity and a non-critical stance reduces the likelihood of confrontations and preserves the highly consensual style of discourse.

This set of beliefs corresponds closely to what other commentators have identified as central to Christianity. The Christian ethic stresses relationship: to God, to other individuals, to the community. It lays emphasis on concern, which is universal and expressed in compassionate and selfless service. According to Gerard (1985) the central notions are a personal God, family relationships and a community of faith. The Christian outlook is characterised by irrepressible good will and a concern for the welfare of others. Christians are to be models of compassion, forgiveness and responsibility. They should refrain from passing judgement and show forbearance when others exhibit weakness. Commitment to these principles is a source of comfort, refuge and strength.

Activities and rituals

Participants in church affairs identify three sets of interrelated activities: spiritual, financial and social. The church resembles both a business and a community association with a budget and array of affiliated organisations. It is also a spiritual entity, an organisation which offers an integrated system of beliefs and a means of expressing them in ritual performance. Its orientation is thus both instrumental and expressive. To achieve the ultimate goal – the extension of God's kingdom on earth – the church seeks to promote its presence in the community by enlarging its membership and expanding its material resources. It must maintain its viability in relation to equivalent units (other churches in the local Methodist circuit) by recruiting and socialising younger generations.

Expressive goals include spiritual and emotional gratification, summed up in the concept of fellowship. The activities of fellowship are intrinsically rewarding. The intensity of individual involvement varies with the need for relaxation, diversion, development, creativity and transcendence, the typical goals of expressive voluntary organisations (Gordon, Gaitz and Scott 1976). Some adherents are more likely than others to have these needs met. But for all participants the church offers a sense of belonging, a meaning for existence and a framework in which to interpret experience.

The balance between instrumental and expressive goals is problematic. Instrumental goals are elevated in importance to justify the allocation of resources. On one occasion the younger women's group and the scouts both wished to occupy the large hall on the same evening. The excessively conciliatory stance of the women made the task of reaching a decision harder than it might have been. In the event the claims of the women's group, which was growing, were accorded priority over those of the scouts, whose numbers were shrinking, on the grounds that the former was working more effectively to extend the influence of the church in the neighbourhood. This argument over the use of limited physical space was conducted in terms of the need to promote The Work rather than the personal satisfaction to be gained by the rival contenders.

Such decisions are made in the name of fellowship; the instrumental orientation of the church is placed constantly in a

spiritual context. Interpersonal conflict and confusion over aims is minimised by frequent reference to God being in control and influencing decisions.

The instrumental goals of the church are themselves difficult to achieve, given the resources available. Despite egalitarian principles, a substantial amount of responsibility falls to relatively few people. To understand the pattern of decision-making, the sorts of conflict which arise and the manner of their resolution, we must consider the organisational structure and goals of the church in some detail.

Structure and process

To achieve its various ends the church is formally organised in a hierarchical structure with three tiers, or six if the local, district and national management levels are included (see Figure 2). Within the church, management is in the hands of a council of senior officers, representatives from the seven church committees and elected members of the congregation, twenty-six altogether. Each church committee has a chairman and secretary, a number of special officers and representatives from the other committees. The Family Committee, for instance, consists of a range of church officials and representatives from each of the eighteen affiliated groups. These, in turn, have their own organisers and office holders. The women's fellowship has fifteen named positions. Not formally involved in the committee structure but overlapping in membership are the door stewards, lunch club cooks and their assistants, and the coffee morning organiser. The total number of committee posts, including the council members, senior officers and seven church committees exceeds 150, to be undertaken by a total of 123 church members. With the addition of the other formal roles and those in the affiliated organisations the total number of jobs involved in running the church is about 235.

This organisational structure is imposed from above in the form of a Constitution established by the National Conference and interpreted by the Minister, who is an acknowledged expert on constitutional matters. In addition to the committee structure an important rule governs the pattern of involvement in church work. The Six Year Rule limits the time a church office may be held to a maximum of six consecutive years. Two years must elapse before re-election to the same office.




Figure 2 Church organisation 1983/84

The Six Year Rule reduces the pool of potential office holders considerably. Together with the elaborate committee structure it produces a substantial overlap in committee membership. In consequence, the weight of church management, particularly burdensome during the strenuous round of meetings at the peak of the committee cycle, falls on relatively few shoulders. The 150 committee posts are carried by 48 people, concentrated in the 45–65 age group. Before considering the implications of this distribution, a further point needs to be made about the aims and organisation of the church.

To achieve the organisational goals, members must come forward in sufficient numbers to fill the array of committee posts. For its success, the church requires a pool of potential office holders and sufficient interest among members to participate in its management. The need to meet these organisational requirements is pressing. The task of attracting newcomers and grooming them for office is a general responsibility. In the meantime, committee work is viewed as an individual obligation to be undertaken willingly and borne stoically with the minimum amount of discord.

In the ideology of the church, with its emphasis on harmony and consideration for others, there is no acknowledgement of the need to settle conflicts of interest. But conflict exists in a number of spheres. There are difficulties in role definition, failures in role performance and struggles for power. Confrontations over such matters are regarded as un-Christian and their incidence is curtailed. The pressure of committee work leads to resentment and other unacceptable sentiments. But the eruption of discontent is prevented by frequent references to family and fellowship, to the rightness of individual responsibility, the efficacy of prayer and the importance of The Vision. At each meeting, particularly during the peak of the committee cycle in February, there is potential confusion about the range of issues and the appropriate set of principles to bring to bear on proceedings. The problem is minimised not by ritualised role changes but by informal acknowledgement of time and place. '*What committee is this? Oh, so that's where I am tonight!*', was a remark made at the start of the Finance Committee meeting, one of three held that week. It conveyed both confusion and resentment. The problem is acknowledged also in the ritual opening prayer which establishes the context of the discussion and expresses faith in divine guidance through the tasks (albeit of a secular rather than a spiritual nature) of the evening.

The expression of conflict is curtailed by rituals of fellowship. Prayer, conducted with a prescribed posture, seating patterns, rituals of closure such as the valedictory 'Grace' and informal partings, rituals of group allegiance (which are most powerful in the gatherings of the elderly peer group), hymn singing, and frequent references to divine control, all symbolise the special relationship which exists between members. Through such ritual performance members reiterate their belief in continuity and their capacity – with divine help – to transcend personal frustration and interpersonal difficulty. Uncertainty about the outcome of the considerable personal sacrifice involved in church work, and the threat posed to the survival of the church by cultural forces and rival personal commitments, are defied in collective and highly repetitive religious ritual (Myerhoff 1984).

Everyone has a part to play in advancing the aims of the church. Officially neither age, gender nor any other ascribed characteristic is a barrier to participation. There is an expectation that all will behave appropriately, take on tasks when they are the best qualified or there is no one else to do them; and if necessary give them up in the interests of effective management. Any member qualifies for office, for the Methodist church is a democratic organisation with a marked absence of hierarchy.

In this egalitarian framework neither spiritual qualifications, age, gender, nor political skill, serve as a basis for status distinction. The Minister, referred to by some men as 'the Governor', speaks with authority only on constitutional issues. His spiritual qualifications are to some extent rivalled by those of the lay preachers – unordained men and women – though his superior knowledge of the Bible is acknowledged.

The significance of age

Age is not a criterion of worth, nor is it officially a basis for action and association outside the youth movements. But there is an understanding of church work in terms of shifts in personal time. The pattern of involvement in different age groups and through the lifespan of particular people suggests that activity is age-specific. People progress from infancy to old age through a number of stages. The church career begins with inclusion on the Cradle Roll. The final stage is initiated by death and terminated when references to the departed cease.

The stages of the typical church career are most clearly discernible from the lives of the oldest members and their ancestors who, it would appear from church records, have trodden the same path before them. Records of office holders in the 1950s, for instance, indicate kinship ties with current incumbents. The younger people's paths are slightly different, unsurprising in view of changes in employment patterns and gender roles. In addition to cohort differences, factors such as gender, marital status, education, health and family responsibilities make a difference. At each point in the church career some members leave and others join.

The church career starts with membership of the Sunday school and boys' or girls' brigade. The brigades are for many the gateway to church membership, administration and senior leadership roles. An alternative route used to be through the youth club, which in the decades after the war was responsible for the introduction of several new members through courtship and marriage into church families. Those young people went on to membership of the appropriate church organisation: the Young Wives' Group (now called Feminine Focus), the men's fellowship. They ran the brigades and taught in the Sunday school. Junior church work, variously described as 'wonderful service' and 'hard labour' is highly esteemed. Sunday school teaching can span several decades of adult life and when it does the individual is publicly honoured as a major contributor to the socialisation of the young and hence the continuity of the church. Membership of the various church organisations, similarly, can extend from early adulthood to old age. Elderly men and women continue to support the brigades, the men wearing their badges and the women watching daughters and granddaughters engage in familiar displays.

Through leadership in the organisations and involvement in low level church work (for instance, standing at the door on a Sunday morning to welcome attenders and distribute hymn books, the work of the door stewards) a church member becomes visible and liable for more and more committee work. Engagement in minor church work in early middle age (or even earlier, if a young person can be persuaded to take it on) is a rite of passage for church managers. The role of society or vestry steward – one of the senior posts – is regarded as interesting and challenging, 'running the show', a link between minister and members. These days it may be taken on relatively early. Three of the six stewards in 1986 were in their 30s; the others ranged in age from 50 to 73. More

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experienced members take on jobs which involve representing the church at meetings of the circuit.

By the time old age is reached, a man will have held most offices in the church, some several times. He continues to serve on committees, attend church and social functions. Those old men who have been active in church affairs occupy the role of elder statemen. They sponsor young people into minor office and groom them for heavier responsibilities. Most of the members of the men's fellowship have held strategic roles on church committees. Several continue to do so. Others undertake different tasks: playing the piano, editing the church newsletter, organising the door rota, addressing the women's fellowship.

An old woman is less likely to have been involved in committee work. She continues her pastoral work (visiting the sick), helps deliver the church newsletter and attends meetings of her organisation. Collectively, the older women have been displaced by the younger women who take on such jobs as repairing hymn books. The two groups co-operate for special acts of worship – Mothering Sunday, the Women's World Day of Prayer – and for domestic activities such as the provision of refreshments at church social events.

Involvement in charitable activities both inside and outside the church is a feature of women's lives from early middle age onwards. Most of the younger women have full or part-time jobs and dependent children. Their limited disposable time is occupied with the pursuit of leisure activities through the church – drama, singing – and outside it. In middle age, part-time employment is either extended or complemented by voluntary work, in a range of national charities. Middle-aged women (40s, 50s, 60s) are active in church organisations and involved in minor office. The never – or formerly – married are more actively involved and more likely to occupy senior roles than their counterparts with dependents.

The younger men's time is taken up with paid employment which limits the opportunity for church work, though they take part in committee work and patronise or help to run their children's organisations.

Upon death, the elderly church members join the Communion of Saints. Thanks are offered in prayer for their fellowship, service and salvation. They are remembered not only in prayer but in legend, in reminiscence among friends and peers and in the use of their (sometimes substantial) legacies. Some elderly people are more likely than others to qualify for this treatment. An important

criterion seems to be success in the performance of age roles; the extent to which old people behave as expected, and in such a way as to advance collective interests.

The stages of the church career do not directly correspond to age grades. The rules governing movement from one to another are unclear. The timing of transitions tends to be a personal and individual matter rather than something which involves the age set as a whole (though this statement needs to be qualified in relation to the older and younger women's organisations). Movement which in some societies is institutionalised is here a matter for individual negotiation. The introduction of the Six Year Rule to limit the tendency of old people to hang on to office provides an exception.

Several aspects of the age grade system are problematic. Age norms tend to be unclear. Such rules as there are present a model of age which does not always accord with individual capacity. The age system is to some extent a ranking system which creates discontinuities of status through the individual lifespan. The absence of clear guidelines for behaviour at particular ages gives scope for manoeuvre. But the extent to which church members at different points in the church career are able to define their situation is limited by a set of sanctions applied generally by the younger against the older to keep them to a prescribed path. Patterns of deference can be understood in the light of the organisational goals of the church, but they heighten the ambiguity surrounding age. I shall deal with these issues in turn.

Problems of placement

The term 'old' is ambiguous. Eighty-two year old Mrs E is an active church worker. She spends much of her time visiting 'old people' who are chronologically her junior. She uses the term old to mean frail: old here refers to health status rather than age. Sixty-year old Pat, mainstay of the drama group, has leapt on and off the stage for forty years. She is made ruefully aware of her relative position in the age hierarchy when one of the men, a few years her junior, warns her to be careful. It is a reminder of the discrepancy between how she feels and others' view of her. Coming to terms with being treated as 'old' when one feels young is one of the existential dilemmas of ageing in our culture (de Beauvoir 1977).

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But the positions of relative youth and age are retained as the generations move through time together. Pat's friend Jane, at 50 only ten years her junior, belongs to a different generation. 'The same age as me? Certainly not! She was in my Sunday school class!' Here, social rather than chronological or physical age determines how the two women encounter one another.

A brief and rapid exchange at a meeting of the Worship Committee illustrates the variety of meanings attached to age:

R: Is she (the proposed speaker) an old person?

S: Oh quite young.

G: Careful! (mind who you're calling old!)

O: People can be old at 20 or 60.

The earlier speakers refer to chronological age and seek to establish that of the visitor in relation to their own: age is relative. The third comment implies that 'old' is an insult. The fourth suggests that 'old' describes a kind of behaviour of which anyone is capable.

Officially, as I have noted, age is not an organising principle or criterion of worth. An ideology of family and fellowship unites people across the generations. Distinctions are made on the basis of adherence to a set of values and perfection in the performance of Christian duty. So 85-year-old Mrs A who is retiring, and 39-year-old Mr L, who is leaving the area, are thanked in identical terms in the newsletter for their service to the church, despite the large gap in their ages and periods of involvement.

But while in theory age boundaries do not exist, in practice popular stereotypes come into play and conventional attitudes to ageing abound. Youthful views of age focus on its negative aspects. The old are perceived as conservative, unsociable, rigid, lacking in concentration, even unable to run their own affairs. The old are less inclined to view the young in the church stereotypically, since in crucial ways they do not conform to age norms. They are, in fact, 'a lovely group of young people', a source of pride and satisfaction to their elders for having avoided 'all the nasties' of the modern world to which their contemporaries have fallen victim. Of young people in general, old people in the church are more tolerant than their peers outside it, though in both cases a strong sense of moral superiority over younger generations pervades their thinking.

The belief that age is no barrier to participation is used to

incorporate rising generations and keep the old – those who are functional at least – in office. There is the expectation that the old will perform side by side with the young, there is, as we have seen, a powerful need for them to do so. This expectation is justified by the fact that responsibility is shared and by the common belief (from the commanding heights of middle age) that the old have more time to spare. The expectation is resisted hard by most, in the name of age: they have done enough, are 'past it'.

Age is used to justify individual activity and inactivity. Everyone in the church uses age to defend their position: to stay in office, to give it up, to refuse to take it on, to get others to carry on as before. Hilda and Bill, joint secretaries of the old people's club, were glad to give up work-related responsibilities when Bill retired from his job. 'When you get older, you've done your bit, you want to stop'. On retirement, however, they acquired a new reference group in relation to whom they were relatively young. On the grounds of their youth they were persuaded to take up office again, reluctantly.

Grace and her friends in the women's fellowship use age as an excuse for refusing to take on the job of secretary: 'We don't want the responsibility at our age . . . We're getting near the end'. They maintain that the elderly incumbent who is several years their senior and anxious to retire, should stay on. They have, in fact never done these things but now use age to justify their position. C.H. gave up Sunday school teaching because he was getting too old. 'When you get near sixty you lose your exuberance. It's time to give up working with children . . . Well, it takes a lot of time . . .' As this example suggests, age is a socially acceptable excuse where more selfish motives – boredom, changing priorities – are not.

Age is used to get older people to stay in office or take on jobs. Old Mr R., a widower suffering from age-related handicaps, wants to give up playing the piano for the Sunday school and does not think he should have to represent the stewards again in the church quiz. But he is not allowed to opt out of either, in the latter case being told in no uncertain terms that he knows more than the rest of them and 'shouldn't try to get out of it'. The assumption underlying the pressure applied to the old is that they need an occupation, have plenty of spare time, and are not the best judges of their own capabilities. The pressure is supported by an ethic of service, by the cultural emphasis on activity, on doing rather than being – and the requirement that unattached people in our culture justify their existence by being useful.

To an outsider it might seem that an elderly incumbent is hanging on to office. In reality it is often the case that others are refusing to let them go. This applies only to those old people whose continued activity is functional. The activity principle – the belief that successful ageing demands an active and involved life – is applied inconsistently to promote the interests of the organisation. It is not advanced in the case of the few old people who cling to their roles to satisfy their own needs for an active and purposeful existence. Those old people who conform to expectations, on the other hand, are objects of veneration, 'wonderful' people (see Jerrome 1990 for a definition of such terms) even legends in their own time. 'Mr and Mrs J? They *are* the church as far as I'm concerned', exclaimed an enthusiastic forty-year old. In general, this young women's view of old age was stereotypically negative and her remark created an impression of a pair of cardboard cutouts, part of the church in the same way as the pews and the bookstall. But her sentiments on this point were widespread, reflecting the value of such old people to the church community. Embodiments of Christian principles at the end of exemplary lives, they are cultural resources in themselves. Patterns of deference in speech and action (Maxwell 1986, Christiansen 1981) mark them out clearly and in contrast to those old people who fail to live up to expectations. The latter are the target of derogatory remarks, the butt of jokes, their speech legitimately interrupted, their protestations ignored, their assertions discredited. The experience of old people in the church supports the view that the charisma of old age is embedded in performance (Spencer 1987).

Two apparently contradictory positions underly people's ageing strategies: older people ought to be active; and ageing is an excuse for inactivity. The former position is held by old and young but by the latter particularly when the old person in question plays an indispensable role in the church. The second view is offered, again, by people from middle age onwards to limit their activities. But youthful intolerance of old people who plead advancing years suggests that age can be invoked only by younger people, not by older.

* The contradictory use of age reflects the cultural vagueness surrounding this dimension of experience. The absence of clearly-defined roles and points of transition offers scope for innovation and manoeuvre. This freedom is more likely to be exploited when the age transition involves some discontinuity in status: from a valued and privileged position to a less esteemed one; or when

shifts in personal time are difficult to accommodate for other reasons. The collective response to those who resist upgrading or seek it too soon is determined by a range of influences. The popular concept of successful ageing, with its stress on activity and independence, is combined with the Christian values of co-operation, creativity and service. These, in conjunction with the needs of the church for an active and willing membership to achieve its various ends determine the outcome of placement negotiations. Some examples might usefully illustrate the process of age placement and the advantages conferred by ambiguity

'You mustn't grumble' Mrs E. is in her mid-80s. She lost her husband a year ago, a much-loved man whose reputation survives him. Mrs E took over his distribution of the church magazine when he died, but when people see her on the doorstep they only tell her how much they miss him. She joined the younger women's group to alleviate the loneliness of the evenings and otherwise is occupied with visiting the sick, helping with her sister in the lunch club and acting as secretary of the older women's group

She took on the job six years ago to help the incumbent, a sick woman who died shortly afterwards. Under threat from the minister to close the fellowship if no one volunteered, Mrs E offered to succeed her and has been secretary ever since. She is troubled by a weight problem and failing memory and for several years has tried to give it up. 'I do forget things, I *have* forgotten things! It's a worry!' But no one else will take the responsibility. While women younger than she plead old age as a reason for not offering to replace her, it is not a sufficient excuse for Mrs E. They egg her on with a chorus of encouragement: 'Go on, you *know* you can do it!' With the threat of closure hanging over the fellowship she wearily accepts another term of office. Mrs E wishes to be upgraded but her sense of duty and the need to be useful are exploited to keep her in a position which is functional to the organisation.

'Well, I feel old, anyway!' Mr R., a widower in his early 70s, is in a similar position. He wishes to retire from a number of commitments, one of them editing the church newsletter. This is an activity which he values but feels he should relinquish out of a sense of duty to the young. More affected than most by the ageist attitudes in the wider society, he has a low opinion of himself as an ageing individual. He is a sad figure, negative about his own abilities and extremely conscious of his own advancing years. He talks about ageing constantly and views it as an entirely negative

experience. His self-denigrating remarks meet with impatience rather than sympathy, for he performs his various tasks competently and to that extent is a valued member of the community. He wishes to be upgraded but cannot persuade others to take him seriously. 'I think you should go on till you drop', remarks a younger woman discussing Mr R's case 'He would have had an awful shock if his resignation *had* been accepted!' says another, knowingly.

'They shouldn't rush me' Bob is a young man in his 30s. He spent his early years involved with another local church then, after lapsing in his teens, joined this one through his children. He plays a valued part in the boys' brigade which takes up several evenings a week. Also important is his contribution to the upkeep of the building: his skill as an electrician makes him an asset to the Property Committee. Bob is being eyed with great interest by the older members of the church, particularly the men's group which is in desperate need of new blood. He and one or two other young men can occasionally be prevailed upon to join the older men when their small choir needs to be boosted for a special occasion, such as the annual men's service. But they know he is too busy to join the fellowship on a regular basis. Those old men who take their sponsorship role seriously know that they must be patient.

None the less, he is in demand for more committee work. He feels he is being rushed to take up positions for which he is not ready. The old men regard him and his peers as the hope of the future. For Bob that is a strange experience: 'I regard *my* children as the hope of the future!' The product of a culture in which one is not encouraged to project oneself into the future in a personal sense, or to identify with older people, he cannot conceive of a future in which the church depends on him and his peers for management. The pressure to move up is uncomfortable. The imminent departure from the brigade of one of his sons makes it harder to resist upgrading. He is being asked to consider joining the vestry stewards. (Note: a few months after the fieldwork Mr R. died still in harness, and Bob took his place among the stewards.)

'I must be busy'. One of the few old women heavily involved in committee work is 85-year-old Mrs N, a widow born into methodism and brought up in the church. Church business now occupies her five days a week. She attends meetings of the women's fellowship and church services. She comes also to supervise the cleaning, arrange the flowers, inspect the building (in her capacity as a property steward) and arrange room bookings as

keeper of the church diary. She also takes her turn at running the lunch club one week in four. She sits on a variety of committees. During the peak of the cycle in the spring she is occupied by meetings several evenings a week.

She has not always been so busy but is reluctant to slacken the pace of her activities. Boredom, loneliness and pain (from an illness suffered since childhood) are minimised by the ceaseless round of church business. There is virtue also in the accomplishment of daily routines and the completion of an impressive range of tasks. It is with pride that Mrs M. exclaims, 'I am too busy to look out of my sitting room window!'

Several years ago she gave up the secretaryship of the women's fellowship as she 'was getting on', and took on the treasurer's job instead. She left the choir too, for 'when people are past it they should give up!' But she shows no inclination to reduce her commitments in other areas, where her performance causes concern to younger church workers. Giving up singing protects her from the knowledge that she is hanging on too long elsewhere. Mrs N continues to do the things she enjoys, and the value attached to activity and service in a context of life-long co-operation makes it difficult for others to intervene. By applying the activity principle selectively she is able to beat younger people at their own game. Her attempt to delay upgrading – old age brinkmanship (Plath 1982) – works.

Mrs N is on the threshold of extreme old age. She is between the stages of active involvement and inactivity before transition to the communion of saints. She is kept at the brink by resisting physical frailty and hanging on to her responsibilities in the church: positive signs of her relative youth and capacity. Mrs N's old-age brinkmanship reflects her view of herself as an active and independent person pursuing a continuous course through time. Other members of her network, under biographical imperatives of their own, have a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation. The dispute over Mrs N's placement is intimately connected to their own needs and relative positions. The problems of definition (am I old, or simply late middle-aged?) and those of placement (at what point have I crossed from one grade to the next?) are settled collectively within the circle of intimates, the others in our convoy (Abrams 1980; Plath 1982) whose lives run parallel to our own, who age with us (Hareven 1980 refers to the 'schools of fish who swim the river of biography with us'). Together these people decide which actions are culturally authorised

and establish the life course pathways or 'long term guidelines that self and convoy mutually apply to their actions as they plot their collective course down the biographical current' (Plath 1982).

Each transition from one point of the life span to the next is built upon a number of thresholds, some standardised, some open to negotiation. The close association between definitions of 'old age' and 'ill health' in our culture (Jerrome 1989 and 1990) indicates the importance of health issues in ageing. Physical disability is a major threshold in the transition to old age. It is also one capable of manipulation. Health and illness are not clearly defined aspects of reality (Herzlich 1973). Up to a point, Mrs N can deny her physical symptoms and remain in the age grade she prefers. It worked the opposite way for Mr R, who was unable to convince others of the extent of his frailty.

The strong element of negotiation implied in this view of ageing in the church departs from the rigid notion of age roles evident in some of the gerontological literature. The experience of ageing described here, involving the concept of a life text in which individuals interpret norms and have scope for manoeuvre offers a particular view of movement through the lifespan. It is in contrast to Neugarten's cognitive timetable with its prods and breaks which propel an individual through a series of age roles (Neugarten and Hagestad 1976). The difference is one of theoretical emphasis. Attention has shifted from the regulation of progress through age grades to the self-awareness of ageing (Spencer 1987). The focus in this paper is on the personal strategies employed to regulate progress through culturally defined life stages, and the responses of significant others to attempts to delay or hasten upgrading. It focuses on the close connection between personal biography, cultural pathways and organisational requirements.

Conclusion

Ageing in the context of a group such as this – age-mixed, with a history extending over several generations and a future promised in the commitment of younger members – is a distinctive experience. People at different stages of the church career hold reciprocal expectations. Despite the unique setting experienced by each cohort the older provide role models for the younger. Involved in a system of interlocking roles and overlapping networks, the church member enjoys a highly integrated existence.

Age relations in an English church

Each is part of a collective endeavour and can engage in purposeful action: to learn and pass on The Truth and build up the church through its constituent organisations. Each has the opportunity to give, serve and conform to Christian standards of morality

The old have value for the young as living legends, points of reference in their own struggle to lead Christian lives. Young people acquire virtue through their concern for and practical support of a group whose dependency is a stigma in social intercourse outside the church (Clark 1969)

The benefits are mutual. Compared with old people in other settings, members of the church are privileged in a number of ways. Their presence is crucial for the accomplishment of the various instrumental and expressive goals of the church. They have 'sown seeds', and are invited to see their current, frequently marginal experience in the context of involvement between the generations. They have helped to socialise the young to the demands of the Christian life and through them enjoy a sense of continuity.

In this paper I have not discussed the process of peer grouping, which occurs within the formal organisations and informal friendship networks. The importance of peer group rituals in addressing issues of continuity and change, and conceptions of the nature of time, have been dealt with elsewhere (Jerrome 1988, in press). The historical development of each age-graded association raises important questions about the relationship between social change and personal development, which, again, it has not been possible to raise here. But I hope to have given some insight into the way membership of the church structures the ageing experience and how people at different levels of the church career influence each other's perceptions of the ageing process. More generally, the paper illustrates how age is used to legitimate convenient social arrangements

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Extended review: Class and stratification in Britain

Colin Bell

Social Class in Modern Britain

Gordon Marshall, Howard Newby, David Rose and Caroline Vogler, Hutchinson, London, 1988, £25.00, xv + 314 pp.

Social Stratification and Economic Change

David Rose (ed.), Hutchinson, London, 1988, £9.95, 303 pp.

This review of these two very important books is unfortunately late and I owe the authors, editors and readers an apology. Such are the pressures of the current academic life that no one should contemplate taking on extra work right at the beginning of an academic year. And yet I now know something that I did not know then, about the use and demand for these two books that indicate quite strongly that the publishers have got it wrong. It has been known by my colleagues that I had copies of both – there has been a constant demand for *Social Class in Modern Britain* (SCMB) which at £25.00 even they were most certainly not going to buy. It has immediately and effortlessly established itself as *the* source of up-to-date relevant material over a surprisingly wide range of topics. The first such survey of Mrs Thatcher's Britain – it was carried out in 1984

Its tables have been devoured (and I must say frequently simplified) and put on over-head projector slides. I mention this at the outset because I want to stress that the book is, apart from its contribution to an astonishingly wide range of debates, genuinely useful for teaching *at all levels* – from first year to doctoral programmes. This is a significant achievement and as such it has few peers in the British empirical literature – and yet is destined for a while at least to be unavailable to most readers especially undergraduates if this particular publisher's past policies on

paperbacking are anything to go by.¹ *Social Stratification and Economic Change* (SSEC) which is available as a £9.95 paperback has I have to report excited nowhere near the same kind of attention – perhaps because the reprinted articles were known to the specialists already and the original articles are slightly dated and in some cases superseded by a more major publication based on the particular research project on which it is based. And surprisingly I found that they hung together less well than I had expected as a collection given that they emerged out of the famous ESRC Social Stratification seminar from people who know each other well and would consider themselves to be close professional colleagues. As is well known the members of that seminar are sensitive to often levelled accusations of elitism and exclusivity. The editor could perhaps have strengthened his defence against the charge of anti-feminism if there had been more than two – out of nineteen, contributors who were female. And yet in my experience of that seminar these papers *are* representative of both its concerns and membership – at least as they were around 1981 and 1982. I must say though that with this edited collection and Ray Pahl's *On Work* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988) with Duncan Gallie's *Employment in Britain* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988) we have suddenly become brilliantly served in this area. The last two do seem to be in a much better position to rebut accusations about anti-feminism in the commanding heights of British sociology in terms of focus and contributors than does the volume David Rose has edited.

I

What, amongst the many rich and varied arguments that are empirically well substantiated in SCMB is now clear is that John Goldthorpe's sociology cannot avoid the force of that judgement. I will use this as an example of the power and the utility of Marshall *et al's* approach. I could have chosen others, e.g. the class dealignment and voting debates. At the heart of the empirical problem of studying stratification in terms of occupation and employment is what do you do about the 30 per cent of a general sample of adults who are not in formal employment and so cannot be directly given a class location (however calibrated on whoever's scale). This *practical* problem has great theoretical significance. This is what is usually referred to as 'the unit problem'. For John

Goldthorpe the conjugal family remains the unit of class fate, class formation and class action. That resolutely defended position already damaged by Heath and Britten (1984) and Stanworth's (1984) well known position that women's restricted employment opportunities are a consequence of the operation of class rather than the outcome of negotiations within individual marriages which because of conventions about family responsibilities, place women in subordinate positions to their husbands.² Goldthorpe revised his conventional approach when he located whole families in the class structure according to the social class of the family member who has the fullest *commitment* to the labour market. You may well ask along with Marshall *et al* how that is to be measured? The latter can vindicate Goldthorpe in part when (on p. 70) they show that wives' reported voting behaviour is more a function of their husbands' class position than their own occupational experience. However they go on to write that 'it seems to us, class systems are structured by sex in ways that clearly affect the distribution of life chances, class formation, and class action among women and men alike' (p. 73). They explicitly part company from Goldthorpe here because they see that 'classes and class phenomenon are conditioned by the peculiar pattern of women's participation (however intermittent) in the market for paid labour' (ibid). Very powerfully their data show that no more than 1 per cent of men in any social class category had ever been required to leave paid employment because of domestic responsibilities, whereas 36 per cent of the service class, 41 per cent of the intermediate class and 47 per cent of the working-class women had experienced at least one such interruption to their work careers. Their argument with Goldthorpe is a subtle one but in the end they are drawn to call his exclusion of sexual segregation from the legitimate concern of class analysis as 'unwarrantably conservative' (p. 83). They make the strong (and it seems to me well substantiated) statement that 'class structures, and the market processes behind them, are . . . 'gendered'. It is not 'social actors' that are distributed via the market through the places of the structure: it is men and women' (p. 84). They make a telling and wickedly provocative characterization of Goldthorpe's approach. It is, that it is as if he had looked at social mobility in South Africa and

found that the chances of a white man from a service-class background reaching a service-class rather than a working class

destination, as compared to those of a white man from a working-class background reaching a service-class rather than a working-class destination, were the same as those for black men in the service-class and working-class making the same transitions – and concluded, on this basis alone, that blacks could be safely excluded from any investigation into social mobility in South Africa since the study of whites alone would yield a comprehensive, intelligible account of the class processes in that society, and one which was unlikely to lead to any 'very misleading conclusions'. (p. 112)

And so the authors ask.

Can class analysis sensibly exist in the sort of conceptual vacuum that prevents its practitioners engaging with crucial factors (such as gender and race) which are interwoven with class in the real world? Should we really be *that* limited in our aspirations? We think not. (*ibid.* emphasis in the original)

If much of SCMB will make uncomfortable reading at Nuffield that is as nothing to the discomfort it will have caused at Madison. Even as an ebullient an operator as Erik Olin Wright must be stopped in his tracks by some of the book. In some ways he was one of the originators of the project as a whole for one of the stimulations was to take part in the international project that he initiated researching class structure, and class consciousness (in nineteen countries at the last count). So Marshall *et al.* always were committed to fielding some common questions about production, ownership and labour.

Central to Wright's thesis (and his findings in the USA) are arguments about the proletarianization of the class structure. Central to Marshall *et al.*'s position is that 'the issues of demographic and socio-political class formation that are involved [over proletarianization] are best resolved on empirical rather than theoretical grounds' (p. 54). They have great fun – and so can we, when they run the Registrar General's occupational classification against John Goldthorpe's and both against Erik Olin Wright's. They find, somewhat startlingly, that 6 per cent of Wright's proletarians finished up in Goldthorpe's service class. They discovered that 'Almost every RG occupation is to be found in every Wright class. Conversely, Wright's workers, semi-autonomous employees, and manager/supervisors appear in every RG social

class. The two schemes are simply incommensurable' (p. 27). That last word is very interesting because incommensurability is a quite precise characteristic of a clash between paradigms in Kuhnian terms. Of course I am aware that it is currently fashionable to say that Kuhn does not apply to sociology. Yet we do seem to have at least *four* apparently incommensurable ways of going about doing normal sociological research into stratification being practised here. With the exception of Marshall *et al.*'s own they are unable to speak to each other. Rather, they grumpily hold to their positions and doubt the adequacy of the methods of their critics – they even doubt their motives, both political and social scientific. This is of course just what happens when paradigms 'shift'. And as is equally well known those in the superseded paradigms not only do not give up easily, for they have too much invested, they often don't give up at all. Paradigms die with their practitioners – beliefs and faith rather than reason and science prevail. Marshall *et al.*'s achievement is that they have quietly, subtly and practically shifted the study of social stratification – and wonderfully they have been able to do this by having better, wider and more complete explanations for the 'puzzles' thrown up in the previously existing paradigms. John Goldthorpe's Weberian sociology, Erik Olin Wright's increasing economic structural marxist sociology, and the official Registrar General's occupational classification – the weakest and least theorized of the three and characterized by an increasingly unhelpful taxonomic fiat.

Marshall *et al.* surmount these three precisely because they wished to *practise* class analysis rather than argue about theoretical rationales – they are impatient (thankfully) with essentialist definitions of class. Is this finally the end of the long shadow cast by Poulantzas that has so blighted the field? For the Essex team, 'the most important question is, in our view, an empirical one' (p. 26). Precisely because they are pluralist and eclectic, but very, very systematic and have a clear focus on the *utility* of these approaches in *practice* (that word again) they can go beyond the others and, just as Kuhn describes, their carefully empirically based paradigm takes over the others and makes them henceforth essentially *unnecessary*. For me at least the dedication of SCMB to John H. Goldthorpe and Erik Olin Wright is deeply ironic for this book is writing them out of sociological history.

Marshall *et al.* for example say rather gently that they are concerned about the operationalization of some of Wright's concepts yet it is clear that he himself compromised his entire

intellectual project through the constraints that he allowed to be imposed by the practicalities of doing the research. Marshall *et al.* surmounted those constraints – avoiding for example the forced coding of particularly difficult occupations such as teachers and nurses. (Is it an accident, I ask in passing, that gender rears its head here too?) It is the up front importance given to such issues in SCMB that makes it so much the superior to those they criticise especially Wright. He is seen in the end as rather conventionalist, a bit like the census or Blau and Duncan. SCMB does pay attention here because ‘ultimately . . . it is these sorts of coding decisions that determine the allocation of respondents to class locations’ (p. 42). On class and occupational divisions as a whole SCMB much prefers Goldthorpe to Wright for instance:

The fact is that Wright’s operational definition of the bourgeoisie is derived from a nineteenth century conception of family proprietorship which is wholly inadequate to the study of class processes in a late twentieth century capitalist economy Goldthorpe’s notion of a ‘service class’, though less tidy as a concept since it embraces both normal employers and employees, seems much closer to the reality of modern corporate Britain.

And in a manner that is absolutely characteristic of SCMB they add ‘It is certainly a more *practical* proposition in survey research of the type in which both he and Wright are engaged’ (p. 59, my emphasis) And Goldthorpe’s conclusions on proletarianization are preferred too SCMB reports no evidence that working-class locations are expanding, no reduction in social mobility chances, routine clerical workers are not deskilled and in all their main socio-political characteristics the intermediate class *are* different from the working class. And anyway ‘on *practical* grounds alone his (Wright’s) schemes are of doubtful value’ (p. 139, my emphasis).

In their analysis of class consciousness they address the important issue of consistency of their informants’ views – only 56 per cent are consistent, say, on attitudes to economic recovery (p. 173). Whilst Goldthorpe’s scales explain more of the variance, Wright is seen by now as ‘theoretically naive’ as well as ‘empirically unconvincing’ (p. 179). There is though nothing in SCMB that suggests that the ‘world view of individuals display that degree of coherence and completeness’. Rather ‘class consciousness . . . is characterized by its complexity, ambivalence and

occasional contradiction' (p. 87). On this Marshall *et al.* must be seen as the culmination of the tradition of Lockwood, Parkin, Mann and indeed Newby's earlier work. This is the British contribution to the understanding of class consciousness. And, most importantly, to our understanding of the possibilities of political action. Quite simply there is a lot to play for by the political parties. The future is open. Marshall *et al.* reconceptualize 'the problems of class consciousness as the attribute of the collectivity (class practices organised by parties) rather than of individuals (the developing subjectivity of groups of class members)' (pp. 193–4). This is a very important shift in thinking. In a key passage they tell us that

The changing forms of distributional struggle are not a matter, at least primarily, of altering individuals awareness but are, instead, more a question of straightforward organizational capacity. Lower-class meaning systems carry no particular implications for social integration unless they are seen in their changing organization contexts. (p. 222)

So 'go for it Neil' they are saying. There has been no demise of social class and so whilst there is no space here to detail it their data should discomfort many British political scientists too. They in effect accuse them of misreading the evidence on dealignment for example. There is, they say, 'no evidence for the demise of class identities' (p. 268). They, in a fashion that will be familiar to readers of this review by now see many 'seemingly esoteric matters of methodology' as 'critical to the argument itself' (p. 229). Though they did get caught out by taking the rise of the Alliance seriously. And if you survey even 1,770 people you can't actually say anything about the ruling class who are completely absent from SCMB – and again what is happening north of the Caledonian canal? We have fantasies up here, in Edinburgh, of surveying *just* north of that waterway.

A small quibble about this £25.00 volume, the manuscript of which we are told was produced by Gordon Marshall on his Amstrad PCW 8256. For all that, it is referenced in the most irritating way. There are footnotes in the text – to the end of the chapter where you will find for example 'Crompton 1979' whereupon you have to turn to the bibliography which is some forty pages into the text as it is followed by a long technical appendix. Why on earth the footnotes were thought necessary I

cannot imagine as Crompton (1979) in the text would have been quite adequate. Quite rightly the questionnaire is here but if it is thought to be worth reproducing at all (and surely it is) it should have been reproduced as it actually existed – not as a retyped list of questions. We cannot see the actual structure of the questionnaire when it is done like that. Surely modern reprographics are up to copying the real questionnaire.

That said SCMB is a *tour de force* of class analysis. It represents the very best sociology produced in Britain and is of the highest international standard. The seeming trajectory of influence – from LSE to Nuffield has led on to Essex. This book alone would have convinced us all that Essex deserved the first social science Interdisciplinary Research Centre (IRC). That one of the authors is now the most powerful social scientist in the land also seems right and proper.

II

In SSEC the papers that have been published before are first Goldthorpe's 'Intellectuals and the working class in modern Britain' – originally given as a lecture at Essex. He is out to exorcise historicism, wishful or otherwise. It is a wonderful paper to teach sociology from, linking, as it does, a characteristically firm grasp of theory with a demand for evidence. Secondly, there is Lockwood's 'The weakest link in the chain? Some comments on the Marxist theory of action'. It is a fragment of the long promised major Lockwood project on theories of schism and solidarity in society. 'The burden of (his) essay is that the main weakness in the link between Marxist theories of system and social integration is to be found in the persistence of a basically utilitarian action scheme' (p. 92) i.e. Marxism's difficulty over normative determinants. It is a very demanding piece of writing. Thirdly, Marshall's 'Some remarks on the study of working-class consciousness' links the previous two in a way and explores whether research on the working class is up a cul-de-sac. It was clearly a deck-clearing exercise for SCMB which represents the breakout, revival and advance beyond rather exhausted reiterations of workers' instrumentalism on the one hand and workers' ambivalence on the other. SCMB does make this essay rather unnecessary though. The fourth essay in the Theoretical Issues section is Pahl and Wallace's 'Neither angels in marble nor rebels in red: privatization

and working class consciousness'. It argues further that privatization too cannot carry the explanatory burdens placed upon it. Gender comes in for the first time here because they in effect (on the basis of their Sheppey experience) redefine the term as domesticity. Again though the sociological world has moved on. Pahl and Wallace's chapter is a critique of an earlier formulation by the Essex team who then moved on and produced SCMB. The significant emphasis on class consciousness as an attribute of collective action in SCMB is, in part, a response to Pahl and Wallace. These four chapters together provide a sophisticated analysis of the structure → consciousness → action model we all use and as such is very valuable.

There are six empirical chapters. Westergaard, Noble and Walker's 'After redundancy: economic experience and political outlook among former steel workers in Sheffield' (on which there is now a book) finds that unemployment is not a radicalizing experience. Harris and Lee's 'Conceptualizing the place of redundant steelworkers in the class structure' (on which there is another book) is on Port Talbot material and introduces the ESRC Stratification Seminar to the notion of 'chequered' work histories, i.e. alternating periods of short-term employment and unemployment. Marshall, Rose, Newby and Vogler's 'Political quiescence among the unemployed in modern Britain' (on which there is SCMB) shows the familiar lack of mobilization and lack of change of perceptions as a result of becoming unemployed. Blackburn's 'Ideologies of work' provides another adroit account of why the disadvantaged accept their social situation as opposed to trying to change it. I am slightly unfairly picking on this paper as there is a similar problem with several of them. It is their ephemerality which can be caught with sentences like 'if unemployment continues to grow' (p. 246). Scase and Goffee's 'Tackling subordination during economic decline: a pattern of business proprietorship among women' (now another book) has to be welcomed for directly focusing on the overall class situation of women. Their work puts some empirical flesh on the usually starkly skeletal arguments about the unhappy marriage between Marxism and feminism. Elliott, McCrone and Bechhofer's 'Anxieties and ambitions: the *petit bourgeoisie* and the New Right in Britain' argues that rather than finding their place in the sun under Mrs Thatcher the *petit bourgeoisie* have continued to feel as threatened as ever. The spectacular absence here and in any other chapter in SSEC is any reference at all to ethnicity. It is also absent from

SCMB but we are promised that 'race' relations will be tackled in a subsequent volume. There is no conclusion to SSEC but it has a useful expository introduction from David Rose.

There is actually a very interesting book to be written on the history of ESRC Social Stratification Seminar since 1972 but this is not it. The six empirical papers are characteristic of its phase in the early '80s. The very exciting *Gender and Stratification* edited by Rosemary Crompton and Michael Mann (1986) was produced from the same seminar as a reaction to its characteristics in the early 80s. SSEC is a reminder of that time. I just cannot see it doing so well as *Gender and Stratification* or either of the Pahl or Gallie edited volumes referred to earlier, let alone SCMB but I am making some very exacting comparisons.

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Notes

- 1 *Social Class in Modern Britain* is now published in paperback by Unwin Hyman at £10.95
- 2 A. Heath and N. Britten, (1984), 'Women's Jobs Do Make a Difference', *Sociology*, vol. 18, no. 4
- M. Stanworth, (1984), 'Women and Class Analysis', *Sociology*, vol. 18, no. 2

Book reviews

Man, His Nature and Place in the World

Arnold Gehlen, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988, \$50 00, xxxvi + 418 pp.

Man is the English translation of the 1974 edition of *Der Mensch*, but the original work, from which the final text was eventually constructed, first appeared in 1940 and was constantly revised in response to criticism (for example by Konrad Lorenz). Gehlen's work is an 'elementary anthropology' which attempts to lay a fundamental basis for the human and social sciences in the unique biological character of human beings. One should say at once that Gehlen's approach has little in common with sociobiology and that he was specifically critical of any evolutionary scheme which attempted to trace human ancestry back to the great apes. As such, Gehlen's sociology of Man was a contemporary contribution to the tradition of philosophical anthropology and phenomenology which had been developed by F. J. J. Buytendijk, J. J. von Uexküll, Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, but the fundamental roots of this tradition reach backwards through Ludwig Klages to Friedrich Nietzsche. From the perspective of the history of ideas, Gehlen's basic idea (that Man is biologically unspecialized and in Scheller's terms 'world-open' because Man has no species-specific environment and must therefore become a creature of discipline) proved to be crucial in shaping the contributions of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann to the analysis of *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), and to the sociology of religion. Gehlen's intellectual influence was of course freely acknowledged (Berger and Kellner 1965). In Germany, Gehlen's ideas were influential in the work of Hans Bahrdt, Helmut Schelsky and Friedrich Tenbruck. Although Gehlen influenced a number of

sociologists who are often regarded as conservative social theorists, he was also influential in the development of Jürgen Habermas's contrast between the public and the private realms in his *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (1962); of course Habermas has attempted to distance himself from the romantic critique of capitalism in *Lebensphilosophie* (Klages), symbolism (the George Circle) and philosophical anthropology (Gehlen).

It is difficult to discuss Gehlen's work without reference to the context of his academic career in Nazi Germany, more generally, the political and ideological implications of the whole tradition of philosophical anthropology are highly ambiguous. Gehlen (1904–76) became in 1934 professor of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, replacing Hans Driesch who had been forced into early retirement by national socialists because he was a 'pacifist' Gehlen who had become a member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party in 1933 expressed his indebtedness to the fascists in his inaugural lecture on 'The State and Philosophy' After the War, Gehlen was removed from his post, but, after much dispute, he acquired a position in the sociology department of the Aachen Technical University (1961–9).

Gehlen's elementary anthropology clearly contains a conservative message. Because Man, in Nietzsche's phrase, is a 'not yet determined animal' who has an 'open world', he must constantly create his own world by the construction of institutions and therefore he must be dependent for a long period of socialization. Powerful cultural symbols and social institutions are necessary to regulate and discipline Man, who is a being equipped with a superfluity of desires. Because 'simply staying alive is man's ultimate challenge' (p. 55), he requires discipline, education, and imprinting from institutions. Indeed man is 'a being of discipline' (p. 52). As a result Gehlen saw great dangers in modern life; large cities bring about the moral disintegration of regulative institutions, resulting in 'a free-floating, unrestrained libidinal excess of impulses' (p. 49).

Gehlen's elementary anthropology has additional conservative implications, because of the problems associated with the concept of 'Man'. The translators introduce an apologetic comment about the translation of *Mensch* as Man and admit that Gehlen clearly meant to use 'man' and 'he' in a gendered fashion. Although all languages are gendered, some are more gendered than others; it would have been more useful therefore to draw attention to the fact that the gendered character of the German language is almost

unavoidable – the contrast between *herrlich* (marvellous, majestic) and *dämlich* (stupid, dumb) being a case in point.

Although these problems could be elaborated endlessly, Gehlen's *Man* as a perspective on the sociology of the human condition is a book of enormous interest, scope and philosophical insight. *Man* addresses the problems of the origin of language, evolution, symbolism, discipline and imagination. Gehlen starts with a theory of action, because man is an acting being (*handelndes Wesen*), but Gehlen avoids the hyper-rationalist assumptions of conventional voluntaristic action theory by placing the embodiment of humans at the centre of his analysis. As an active being, time is crucial to this world of Man who acts towards the future. Humans are threatened by the burden of their memories (they are nostalgic creatures) and by the abundance of everyday sense-experiences. They must find relief (*Entlastung*) from the openness of the world's possibilities; habit and habitual action provide a necessary relief from the chaos of life's endless potentialities. Similarly imagination (by fictional trial and error situations) is also an example of relief from the immediate. Religion as an institution is also related to imagination as relief, namely to the uncomfortable-ness and indeed world homelessness of humans. Although these institutions arise out of human actions in response to their natural incompleteness, institutions come to assume an autonomy of their own; law, religion and morals are social facts.

This translation is important, therefore, on three counts. First, it is a testimony to the importance of what we might call the romantic-right critique of capitalism. Secondly and relatedly, it is yet further evidence of the continuing impact of Nietzsche on contemporary social theory. Finally, it is a particularly important historical document for sociologists who wish to understand the roots of the 'social constructionist' position in the sociology of knowledge.

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Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies

Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, £25.00, xi + 227 pp.

This book's cover displays a quote from Emile Durkheim 'Without symbols, social sentiments could have only a precarious existence'. On the inside flap, it is stated that the contributors to this volume offer a radically different approach to Durkheim, because of their emphasis 'on Durkheim's later work, in which he shifted to a symbolic theory of modern industrial societies that emphasized the importance of ritual and placed the tension between the sacred and the profane at the center of society'. The contributors include Professors Alexander, Hunt, Tiryakian, Rothenbuhler, Wallace, Hartley, Collins, Muller, Dayan, and Katz.

Mr Alexander sets the tone in the introduction when he asserts that 'late Durkheimianism' emphasized a 'distinctively cultural program for sociology' (p. 2), a program that found its way directly or otherwise into the works of Saussure, Foucault, Shils, Bellah, and some others. He ends his introduction with the claim that,

For all of this, Durkheim's later work contained a program which must be revived. In a fragmented way it has been at the heart of cultural analysis all along. In a more explicit form it can revitalize the practice of sociology today (p. 15).

In my opinion, Professor Tiryakian offers the most original, exciting, and scholarly application of this new approach to Durkheim. He analyses the revolutions that have occurred recently in Iran, Nicaragua, Poland, and the Philippines in relation to Durkheim's scattered discussion of the French Revolution and 'collective effervescence' found in *The Elementary Forms*. He differentiates between the nation as sacred and the state as profane entities, and draws the conclusion that in all these revolutions 'the state had become phenomenologically differentiated from, and in fact pitted against, nation; the religious factor was important in launching the process of dedifferentiation as a process of societal renewal' (p. 52). Professor Hunt's essay on the importance of the notion of the sacred to the French Revolution compliments Tiryakian's argument.

An essay on the ritual and religious elements of friendship by Professors Wallace and Hartley is also worth noting, although it is very brief. Professor Müller's essay on the 'legitimation crisis' is an

exciting attempt to contrast Habermas and Durkheim. His conclusion is ponderous:

Habermas's insistence on the consensual founding of new values through discourse free of social and political determination seems more than ever like a philosophical abstraction. It is only because individuals adhere to a moral community that they are able to agree upon rationally generated norms and decisions. It is their faith in the moral superiority of reason, not their insight into the cognitive superiority of reason, which enables individuals of a modern society to engage in rational action. (p. 147)

However, as one approaches the end of the book, the scholarship seems to give way to something else. In his essay entitled, 'The Durkheimian tradition in conflict sociology', Professor Collins begins with the sentence, 'Of the great classic figures of sociology, at the present time Durkheim's reputation is the lowest' (p. 107). Durkheim, or 'Mr. Sociology' as he is nicknamed by Collins, 'is the anti-Christ' for humanists (p. 107) and 'a sexist of a rather traditional sort' according to feminists (p. 119). It is not clear whether Mr Collins wishes to help Durkheim's tarnished reputation, or tarnish it further. I could not detect a scholarly argument nor the point of his essay.

I was surprised by some non-scholarly, unsubstantiated statements by Mr Alexander in his closing chapter. For example 'Durkheim's religious sociology is certainly wrong' (p. 190). One can refer to epistemological, empirical, logical, or other problems with a theory, but it is not apparent how any theory – and especially one put forth by 'Mr. Sociology' – is simply 'wrong'. And who is 'right'? The answer is, Parsons – of course. According to Mr Alexander, 'As a general theory, indeed, Parsonian functionalism seems in all these respects to be superior to Durkheim's later theory' (p. 190) and Durkheim's 'profound empirical insight can be understood *only* by reconceptualizing it, specifically by using it to critique and reorient the generalization – specification theory of the Parsonian tradition' (p. 212, emphasis added). Why should the Parsonian reading be the *only* way that Durkheim's thought can be understood?

Although I admire the scholarship of these authors for the most part, and am in basic sympathy with their goals, I would be remiss as a reviewer if I did not comment on the failure of Alexander and

some (though not all) of his contributors to offer a comprehensive, contextual reading of Durkheim. Instead, one is presented with an American, specifically Parsonian, Durkheim. This is evident not only in Mr Alexander's explicit remarks, but in the focus on the supposedly 'late' Durkheim, and the almost exclusive concern with the American 'symbol' as opposed to the term that Durkheim preferred to use, the French *représentation*. At best, the notion of symbol ties Durkheim to some contemporary theorists, as Alexander demonstrates. But, the notion of *représentation* and its German equivalent of *Vorstellung* tie him to his colleagues and predecessors: Bergson, Freud, Jung, Ribot, Wundt, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the founders of *Volkerpsychologie* and their linguistic studies, even German romanticism as it mingled with Cartesianism.

More important, the notion of *représentation* dissolves the artificial distinction between the early and late Durkheim that seems to permeate this volume. As any Durkheimian scholar knows, Durkheim was writing about *représentations* in relation to culture from his earliest pieces written from 1886 to 1888 concerning his studies of and with German scholars and their studies of culture, especially Wundt, Wagner, Schaeffle, and Schmoller. Readers will probably appreciate this volume more if they consider that Durkheim's religious, moral, and cultural interests appear long before his 1912 *Elementary Forms*. In his rabbinical background that stressed the universality and persistence of religious beliefs; in his encounter with Fustel de Coulanges whose studies of *The Ancient City* stressed the role of religion in society; in the ethical foundations of the Third Republic; in his reviews of Spencer (1886), Guyau (1887), and Wundt's 1886 *Ethik*; in his writings on the scientific study of morality; in the religious nature of what he termed 'the cult of the individual'; and so on through his 1912 masterpiece. In sum, Professor Lémert's statement on the back flap of the jacket that this volume 'could well propel neo-Durkheimianism to the same level of importance as the neo-Weberian and neo-Marxian movements' may come true only if Durkheim's 'symbolic' sociology is addressed comprehensively and contextually. Mr Alexander and his contributors unwittingly undermine the originality and import of their discovery of Durkheim's cultural sociology through their almost exclusive focus on the so-called late Durkheim, the notion of symbol, and neo-Parsonianism.

Max Weber: An Introduction to His Life and Work

Dirk Kasler, translated by Philippa Hurd, Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £29.50, paper £8.95, xiv + 287 pp.

Over the last decade studies of Max Weber and the origins of social science have begun to chart a new course. One important aspect of the change has been an attempt to recover the central problems of a particular scientific questioning, together with the intellectual and institutional contexts in which the new sciences of our century emerged. Instead of imposing a specific intention, such as formulation of a 'theory of action', investigators have sought to gain detailed knowledge of their predecessors' own aims and problematics, which can then be made available for reflection and criticism. In Weber's case such efforts at recovery have assumed monumental proportions, requiring reclassification and collation of his published oeuvre from 1889 to the posthumous texts, identification of professional and personal involvements, characterization of the sociocultural and scientific-institutional milieu, and the reintegration of 'life' and 'work'.

Well-received when it was published ten years ago, Dirk Kasler's study belongs to the new direction in theoretical criticism. Its purpose is the presentation of Weber's major sociological work in a concise, yet comprehensive format that takes into account important biographical and intellectual points of reference – a combination testifying to Kasler's belief that 'more than in the case of most academic authors, we can only readily understand the evolution of Weber's work if we are aware of the events which shaped his life' (p. ix). For this English translation the author has updated his useful Weber bibliography and has added some references to English language versions of Weber's writings. The result is an effective and readable 'introduction', a compendium more balanced and compact than Bendix's 'intellectual portrait', that will be welcomed by students and teachers seeking a lucid guide through the labyrinth of Weber's prose, interests, and published works.

Kasler's eight-chapter treatment is grouped under four themes: a brief tour through formative episodes in Weber's life, three central chapters on major aspects of his sociology from the 'early writings' to *Economy and Society*, a separate examination of methodological problems, and a brief conclusion on the significance and reception of his work. One striking feature of these discussions is the juxtaposition and sequential thematic analysis of texts drawn

from different periods of Weber's life, including most importantly the often forgotten formative years before 1900. This procedure encourages a more authentic, coherent, and comprehensive view of Weber's lifework than is usually achieved, and it permits follow-up by those in search of deeper understanding. For Käsler a unifying point of view on this diverse body of thought is established by his own *sociological* interest, and by the special 'form of "mediation"' rather than the 'self-contained theory' (pp. 214–15) disclosed in Weber's writings. The numerous complex mediations between 'understanding' and 'explanation', 'action' and 'order', 'material' and 'immaterial', 'individual' and 'society', '*Vergemeinschaftung*' and '*Vergesellschaftung*', etc., reveal for Käsler both the 'sociological' and the 'classic' Weber who will continue to provoke new discussions and lead our inquiries beyond the boundaries of narrow disciplinary specialization.

The advantage of Käsler's perspective, then, is that it expands the horizon of our knowledge and interest in the Weberian corpus. Not everything is included, of course: Weber's politics and political writings are left for others to address. But the source and direction of Weber's lifelong orientation to 'modernity', the fateful problems created for world civilization by economic rationalism, and the consequential sociological interest in matters of 'life-conduct' are made crystal clear. This 'introduction' thus contributes to renewal of the spirit of questioning that gave classic social thought its power of attraction and that still governs its vitality and future.

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Lawrence A Scaff

Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation'

Peter Lassman and Irving Velody with Herminio Martins (eds), Unwin Hyman, London, 1989, £28 00, xvii + 220 pp.

During the winter of 1917–18 at the request of the Free Students' Union in Bavaria Max Weber gave a public address on the pursuit of academic knowledge and the responsibilities of German university teachers to their students in this regard. This address appeared in print in 1919 and was reprinted in 1922 in the collection of essays by Weber on the logic and method of cultural

and social science, put together by Marianne Weber after her husband's death. The first English translation of the address, by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills under the misleading title of 'Science as a Vocation', appeared in England in 1947 in a selection of writings from Max Weber's works which included only this address from the 1922 collection. In presenting a new translation of it by Michael John the editors of this present collection of extracts have kept this misleading title, for all that they are quite aware that the German term, *Wissenschaft*, has 'a much broader meaning' than the English term, science (p. 164). Although perhaps the alternative version, 'Scholarship as a Vocation', used in the chronology of Weber's life at the back of Harry Zohn's 1974 translation of Marianne's biography of Max, does not quite fit the bill, it comes much closer to the spirit of what Weber had to say in his address than the implication that at the centre of his mind he had had the possible appeal of only the natural and social sciences for the students in his audience.

The very inexactness of the German word is especially relevant in the present context because of the editors' surely quite reasonable conviction that in the address Weber set out 'themes for debate which are recognizably those discussed in the work of our own contemporaries' (p. xvii). By this claim, however, they do not mean to refer to discussions about the threat to academic scholarship, posed by the Thatcher reaction. Rather what they think as central is what they interpret as the misdirection taken by American sociologists in their studies of the work of natural scientists, influenced apparently by the Parsonian notion of Weber as an 'action theorist' (p. 161) and by the Mertonian desire to write a 'Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Science' (p. 165). What they have set out to do in this book, therefore, is to draw attention to those, allegedly almost forgotten, aspects of the address which gave rise immediately in Germany to a controversy which lasted for at least twenty years and is still, they believe, relevant today.

The first terms of this controversy appear to have been set by Erich von Kahler, whom they describe as a 'writer and cultural critic', (p. 205) and who had had a book published in 1920 under the title, 'Das Beruf der Wissenschaft'. Passages from this book, translated by R. C. Speirs, are reproduced directly after Weber's 'Wissenschaft als Beruf'. Unfortunately, no abstract of the book is included and it is not possible from the way in which the translation is presented to determine how the passages in question fit into the general framework of von Kahler's arguments. What is

clear, nevertheless, is that it was his book rather than Weber's address which provoked the earliest stages of the controversy. Translated extracts from another book, on the educated (*Gebildeten*) and their disparagers, published by a political economist, Arthur Salz, in 1921 include references to von Kahler's 'crass factual misunderstanding' of the scholarly tradition to which Weber had referred (p. 51), to von Kahler's own 'crasser imaginary fiction (not to use the word "arrogance")' about 'the certainty of the instincts' (p. 52) and to the 'superficial intellectualization of life' which von Kahler had ascribed to Weber (p. 55).

Ernst Troeltsch, similarly, in an article on the revolution in 'science' in the same year also referred to the 'consistently polemical manner' in which von Kahler had formulated his statements as 'counter-statements to the exposition by Weber (p. 58). What von Kahler seems to have claimed was that Weber was quite wrong in criticising the youth of the day for rejecting 'die Gedankengebilde der Wissenschaft'¹ – translated here as 'the thought processes of science' (p. 15) and by Gerth and Mills as 'the intellectual constructions of science'.² This, Weber had said, was seen by them as an 'unreal world of artificial abstractions' from which they were now delivered to return to their own nature and with it to nature itself (pp. 15–16). What von Kahler asserted that they were rejecting was the 'old science . . . of *causality and systematic consistency* without acknowledging the authority of anything from outside its own domain' (p. 35). This they were replacing by a new 'science' or perhaps 'a new form of religion . . . a reunification with mighty powers', a new spirit sensing 'a new, corporeal, organic being that is in the process of emergence' (p. 44). As the philosopher, Max Scheler, put it in a paper in 1922, extracts from which are translated here, von Kahler was 'quite unaware of the grotesque nature of his attempt to completely reconstruct the foundations and methods of the common enterprise of two thousand years of Western history' (p. 87).

What was at issue in these papers, that is to say, was not what the editors refer to as 'the moral, political and epistemological transformations effected by the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' (p. 168), but the rejection by von Kahler and others like him of the scholarly tradition which in the Western world dates back at least to the revitalized study of Greek literature and philosophy, carried out by the scholars in the Renaissance universities over a century earlier. This is why the term, science, in this collection of translations is misplaced.

Indeed, the editors themselves half recognize this by their formulation of Weber's fundamental question: 'how then is the scientist or scholar to justify his (or her) own activity?' (p. 196), for this question applies just as much to the teacher of history or literature, of mathematics or philosophy, as it does to whoever carries out research in one of the natural or social sciences and teaches the findings of such research in university courses.

The Bavarian students had apparently wanted Weber to discuss the question of how it was possible to have a calling for science (*Wissenschaft?*), education, art or politics without flight from the world or accommodation to it.³ Although he did not raise this question specifically in his address, he clearly distinguished the academic responsibility of university lecturers inside the classroom from their civilian responsibilities in the political world outside it. Thus,

if in a public meeting one talks of democracy, then one makes no secret of one's personal attitudes; indeed, to take sides clearly is one's damned duty and obligation in this context. The words used are not means of scientific (*wissenschaftlich*, sc.) analysis but means of winning over the attitudes of others politically. They are not ploughshares for loosening the soil of contemplative thought; they are swords against opponents, instruments of struggle. On the other hand it would be outrageous to use words in this way in a lecture or in the lecture-room . . . the true teacher will guard against imposing any attitude on the student, whether explicitly or through suggestion.

What is demanded of the academic is the

intellectual integrity to see that the establishment of facts, the determining of logical and mathematical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, is one thing; while answers to the questions of the *value* of culture and its individual components, of how one should act in the cultural community and in political associations are another. (p. 20)

Hence, although a devout Catholic and a freemason, say, will never make the same evaluation of the content of a course on the forms of the church and the state, or on the history of religion, 'the academic teacher must wish and demand of himself that he is

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useful to both with his knowledge and methods' (p. 21). In brief, Weber believed that the justification for the academic pursuit of learning (*Wissen*) lay in the clarity of thinking which it contributed to its students. This implied neither flight from the world, nor accommodation to it, but a recognition of the consequences of both.

Obviously, in a review of this length some of the other important misunderstandings of Weber's position, and comments on it, which are raised in the selections from the eleven contributors, translated here by R. C. Speirs, Erica Carter and Christopher Turner, must of necessity be ignored. Nor has much been said about the essay by Peter Lassman and Irving Velody which concludes this book. This has been the case especially because the burden of this review has been to emphasize the perennial importance of the question raised by the Bavarian students. Academics and politicians, scientists and artists alike should regularly ask themselves why they devote so much of their life's attention to the pursuit of a single calling. This review has also emphasized the contribution made to an answer to this question by Weber in 'Wirtschaft als Beruf' and in his slightly later public address on 'Politik als Beruf', also originally published in 1919 and reprinted in 1921 in a collection of his political writings. The special merit of the Gerth and Mills's translation of the 'Essays' was that it published these addresses together. The serious demerit of this book is that it has separated them once again and has set the first in the context of a controversy which turned attention from this question.

The editors believe that the history of sociology and of the human sciences generally is relevant for understanding their position in the contemporary world. It is difficult to appreciate how they consider this diffuse and apparently haphazard selection of passages about what Weber had to say can be regarded as history in that sense, for all that they might throw light on the ideological history of the Weimar republic. Surely now is the time for Weber's two addresses to be published once more together, perhaps with discussions by contemporary scholars on the nature of learning and politics as vocations in order to bring the issues tackled by Weber into direct confrontation with present-day concerns. There should certainly be room for the scholarship of Lassman and Velody in such a compilation.

J. A. Banks

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Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals

Zygmunt Bauman, Polity Press, Oxford, 1987, £25.00, 209 pp.

This is a remarkable, successful and thought-provoking book. Probing, suggestive, erudite and lucid, it offers a sharp-eyed and salutary examination of the intersections of power and knowledge in the West since the Enlightenment. It is concerned with several grand and overarching themes: the rise and institutionalization of the condition of 'modernity'; the corresponding emergence and consolidation of a 'modern' strategic vision, and of a privileged social fraction – the intellectuals – whose historical task has been to articulate and defend this vision, and the encroaching obsolescence of this discourse of 'modernity' and of the 'classical' self-fashioned role of intellectuals as legislators in the contemporary – 'post-modern' – era. It is Bauman's assumption that any adequate narrativization of the trajectory of Western intellectualism must take into account 'changes in the relations between the industrialized West and the rest of the world, in the internal organization of Western societies, in the location of knowledge and knowledge-producers within that organization, and in the mode of life of the intellectuals themselves'.

The central thrust of *Legislators and Interpreters* is historical and critical. Chapters two through seven offer a re-reading of the Enlightenment against the grain of its own still dominant self-presentation. Noting that the Enlightenment 'has entrenched itself in our collective memory as a powerful drive to bring knowledge to the people, to restore clear sight to those blinded by superstition, to give wisdom to the ignorant, to pave the way for . . . progress', Bauman argues that its central ideological tendencies were, rather, statist, authoritarian and disciplinary: 'under closer scrutiny, the substance of enlightened radicalism is revealed as the drive to

legislate, organize, and regulate, rather than disseminate knowledge'. The discourse of les philosophes emerged in response to a crisis of government in the seventeenth century. This crisis was brought about by the transformation of traditional social relations and, above all, by the new reality – experienced by the ruling classes as a severe threat – of concentrations of 'masterless men' in rapidly expanding urban centres. Enlightenment thought was able to theorize a solution to the 'problem' posed to the ruling classes by these demographic upheavals attendant upon the rise of capitalism. It did so by assuming the standpoint of social reproduction: it preached both the rationalization of state power, and the socialization from above of those subject to it, 'the people'. The 'project of the Enlightenment', as Bauman puts it, was two-edged, geared simultaneously towards 'reorganizing the state around the function of planning, designing and managing the reproduction of social order' and towards creating 'an entirely new, and consciously designed, social mechanism of disciplining action, aimed at regulating and regularizing the socially relevant life of the subjects of the teaching and managing state'.

Drawing on a variety of social historical writings, Bauman describes the ferocity of the 'modern' assault on 'traditional, self-managing and self-reproducing' local cultures. The domestication of *les classes dangereuses* – the construction of 'the people' as modern subjects, subordinate to the newly universalistic state and its intellectual discourse of reason and order – was secured through a brutal violence similar in its range and effects to colonial violence. Enlightenment was to the greater European populations what Orientalism as characterized by Edward Said has been to the greater populations of the 'non-West': 'a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'.

The function of intellectuals in modernity has been to administer and defend this 'style'. Discussing the ways in which intellectuals have tended to define their own practice, Bauman shows that such definitions have invariably had one – and only one – thing in common: they have rationalized the separation between intellectuals and 'the rest of society'. Nor has this distinction been merely a taxonomic one. Rather, it has entailed a marked hierarchy of social status. Intellectuals have tended to define their own practice as uniquely valuable. Between mental labour and manual labour as these have been conceived by intellectuals, there has been a marked asymmetry. By virtue of the circumstances of their social placement, moreover, intellectuals have been able to legitimize

their self-understandings and to disqualify – as *irrational* or *ill-conceived* – countervailing visions. Bauman describes the power of intellectuals in this respect as ‘proselytizing’:

proselytizing power does not necessarily aim at remoulding [its] subjects after its own image, and thus dissolving the difference between the two modes of life. What it does seek, remorselessly and uncompromisingly, is the recognition by its subjects of the superiority of the form of life it represents and derives its authority from.

Intellectuals have been able to function as legislators in modernity because they have been able to construct themselves in the public sphere as needed specialists, experts, exponents and representatives of a superior mode of life.

The final chapters of *Legislators and Interpreters* are concerned with the ‘fall of the legislator’ and the corresponding ‘rise of the interpreter’ in contemporary society. Bauman insists that although historical developments – chief among them ‘the “shrinking” of Europe, and the humbling of the values with which it grew used to identifying itself’ – have rendered the ethnocentrism of the discourse of modernity transparent, and have therefore shattered its claims to universalism, the discourse of post-modernity ‘does not abandon the universalistic ambitions of the intellectuals towards their own tradition; here, [intellectuals] retain their meta-professional authority, legislating about the procedural rules which allow them to arbitrate controversies of opinion and make statements intended as binding’. Nevertheless, the problematization (not to say overthrow) of modernist assumptions has led intellectuals to embrace a new way of thinking about their own practice, a mode that Bauman labels interpretive.

Legislators and Interpreters is an important and politically incisive study. Theoretically, I wonder why Bauman chose not to talk about Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, a work at once close to and radically at odds with his own line of argument. I also feel that Bauman’s account of postmodern aesthetics is too centered upon developments within fine art and architectural practice, and is committed, therefore, to judgements that might not be sustainable with respect to cultural practice in the literary, musical or other fields. Yet both for its central theses as well as for its brilliant set pieces – the reading of Paul Radin’s anthropology, the setting of material, socio-economic limits to the

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reach of 'consumer society' and its ideological dynamic of 'seduction' – the book should be read by all who work in the human and social sciences.

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Neil Lazarus

The Nature of Power

Barry Barnes, Polity Press, Oxford, 1988, £27.50, xiv + 205 pp.

This elegant book is one of the most important contributions to the study of power, and indeed to social theory in general, that has appeared in the past decade. It is tightly, almost sparsely, written, and manages, in less than two hundred pages, to sketch out the framework of a substantially new theory of power.

Barnes is a realist: he argues that power is a structural object which exists and can and should be studied independently of its effects. This position sets him apart from such writers as Dahl or Wrong, and indeed from much contemporary social theory. By contrast Barnes applauds Parsons who also adopts a realist theory of power, treating it as the political equivalent of money. For Parsons, just as an agent may have money, so he or she may have power. Just as the value of money rests upon its continuing capacity to secure goods and services, so the 'value' of power rests upon the capacity to secure the performance of political obligations. However, though the realism of Parsons's theory is attractive, Barnes argues that there is much that is wrong with his theory. It is, as many commentators have indicated, very restricted in scope, limiting power to the explicitly political. In addition it rests upon and assumes a pre-existing normative social order. As is well known, there are many difficulties in assuming such an order. Barnes reviews these at some length and accepts that they are insuperable. Accordingly, he concludes that Parsons's theory of power fails. A well founded theory of power will, he argues, rest upon a more satisfactory account of the social order. For Barnes it will rest not on the following of internalised norms, but rather on calculative (though not necessarily self-interested) action. His argument, and what he seeks to show, is that:

social order is constituted of calculative action and that all we need to refer to in order to make it intelligible is the basic

characteristics of human beings generally and the knowledge carried by those human beings who constitute the order. (p. 32)

Calculation rests upon cognition. Barnes's first task is thus to reinterpret the social order as a cognitive order. 'Socialisation' should not be seen, as in Parsons's scheme of things, as a preliminary to the social during which norms are injected into people. Rather it forms an integral part of social action. We learn, we act and we routinise many of our perceptions and responses as we manage our way through daily life. Accordingly there is, says Barnes, no basic tension between calculative action and conformity. We calculate in terms of our (socially derived) knowledge of the social and recognise that nonconformity is usually costly. Language here is the paradigm: we know, for instance, that it is usually disadvantageous to speak Finnish in the United Kingdom. Co-ordination is better served by speaking English. Hence we have a 'norm', calculatively derived and maintained. And, furthermore, this knowledge is self-referring: it is valid because it is generally accepted.

In general, says Barnes, order is thus a benefit rather than a cost to both individuals and the community. It enables, it opens up capacities for action that would otherwise not exist. To say this is not, of course, to take a view about the desirability of the social order in question. The existing system of co-ordination and the way it distributes costs may not be fair at all. That is another matter. Neither is any particular form of the social order inevitable. Concerted deviance from 'norms' is always possible though it may be difficult because acting in concert in other ways is often awkward to co-ordinate and risky for those who set it in motion.

If society is a distribution of self-referring knowledge then Barnes argues that power may be treated as a characteristic of that distribution. This is because, for him, power is a generalised capacity for action that rests upon the deployment of routines. *All* members of a society, even the least privileged, are to some extent empowered by their membership of it. They have some capacity for action, they can command some routines. Barnes's view of power is thus non-zero sum. To say this does not, however, mean that power is distributed equally. What Barnes calls 'powers' or 'power-holders' have greater discretion in their deployment of routines than others. They are able to make choices just as they are able to arrange for routines to be switched on and off.

In many ways, then, Barnes's theory of power is thus not so far from common sense. Power is real, it does exist. It is a potential that may or may not be used. It may be possessed. It is unequally distributed. Unlike common sense, however, his theory tells us what social power is : it 'is the capacity for action embedded in the society, the capacity implicit in the existence of a shared distribution of knowledge' (p. 59). Again, in some ways it is consistent with received sociological opinion – for instance in treating discretion in the deployment of power as an attribute of individuals, though the power itself derives from social relations. At other points – for instance when Barnes insists that power can be treated independently from its effects – the approach breaks with current sociological common sense.

As I have mentioned, this book is tightly written. Indeed it is relentless in the quality of its argument. In a short review it is quite impossible to do that argument justice. There is much, much more: an embryonic theory of agency; a discussion of techniques of delegation used by powers; a distinction between empowering and authorisation which turns around the degree of discretion that is delegated; a careful analysis of the techniques used by powers to divide and rule; and equally interesting study of the production of collective goods – the so-called 'free rider' problem. There is, in short, much that Barnes touches upon, often in an avowedly preliminary manner, that calls for exploration.

I want to conclude by touching on Barnes's use of the sociological literature. Parsons and a section on Weber aside, he offers little detailed discussion of the work of other sociologists. It is not, however, that he does not know the literature. This unusual style is deliberate. As he notes in the Introduction, 'the potency of the thought of the ancestors is greatest if one forgets that they are there' (p. xiv). The result is a narrative that draws upon sociological resources to offer a penetrating account of the social order and power. To repeat, it is one of the most important contributions to social theory of the decade.

University of Keele

John Law

Bureaucracy and Political Power

B. C. Smith, St Martins Press, New York, 1988, £30.00, paper £12.95, xv + 263 pp.

Bureaucracy

David Beetham, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987, £17.50, paper £4 95, 173 pp.

While we tend to think of bureaucracy as an outmoded issue of sociology, with the recent publication of two important books on the subject – *Bureaucracy* by David Beetham and *Bureaucracy and Political Power* by B. C. Smith – we may be witnessing something of a revival in interest. These books, although very different in scope and content, both contribute considerably to the body of knowledge on the topic.

Of these two books, *Bureaucracy and Political Power* is the more specialist work. Structured in three main parts, the opening chapters deal with relationships between bureaucracy and other political institutions, the middle chapters with the idea of the bureaucratic system as a political system, and the final section with the viability of alternatives to bureaucracy.

The aim of the book is to go beyond standard Weberian (and post-Weberian) explanations and to consider the thesis that bureaucracy is not so much a neutral administrative medium of government but rather a tool of purposive political action. Emphasis is placed on the idea of bureaucracy as a political dimension of public administration, and this is developed through a series of comparative studies of theories of bureaucracy and of political practice in various types of regimes. This analysis sees comparisons of the role ascribed to bureaucracy in different theories of the state, and contrasts theory and practice, exploring in particular the political assumptions which underpin differing sociological perspectives of bureaucracy. The author argues against the relativism of much sociological theorising on bureaucracy and instead advocates the primacy of a realist and largely structuralist mode of analysis. In so doing, he argues that we should not attempt to disassociate bureaucracy from the structure of political power in society – despite the attempts of liberal pluralist ideology to prescribe a passive role for administrative state apparatus. Smith is concerned to disentangle the web of relationships between bureaucracy and explicit political activity. He feels that the practice of 'bureaucratic politics' has led to

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various interpretations being placed on the role of bureaucracy, in both capitalist and socialist societies, as liberal and Marxist orthodoxies become modified by experience.

In contrast, David Beetham's *Bureaucracy* represents more of a textbook than a treatise. For a textbook, however, Beetham's book is somewhat unusual, in being comprised of only three (albeit long) chapters. In chapter one Beetham considers Models of Bureaucracy, and in so doing evaluates the relationship between bureaucracy and administrative efficiency. In this chapter he concentrates on definitions of bureaucracy. He argues that current definitions of the concept are not arbitrary or haphazard but derive significance from the context of four particular academic disciplines: comparative government, the sociology of organizations, public administration, and political economy. Beetham suggests that in comparative government we find the 'standard' usage of the term, i.e. bureaucracy as a type of political system which experiences, quite literally, 'rule by the bureau', from the sociology of organizations he suggests we find that usage which derives from Weber, i.e. bureaucracy as not so much a type of government, but more a system of administration carried out on a continuous basis; from public administration he suggests a usage which implies that bureaucracy indeed means *public* administration, and from political economy one in which bureaucracies are considered primarily in economic terms, according to the source of their financing. Beetham notes that although each of these disciplines produces its own definition of bureaucracy, and its own point of contrast with the non-bureaucratic, nevertheless, underlying these differences are certain common themes. Notable here are e.g. a concern to define the meaning of administrative efficiency and to specify the conditions for its realization, and a desire to understand how bureaucracies function in practice, and how the manner of their functioning affects organizational goals and policies.

Having set the stage by discussing issues of bureaucratic functioning, in chapter two Beetham moves beyond this to an analysis of (Theories of) Bureaucratic Power and its expansion over the course of the twentieth century. Here he considers two main paradigms for explaining bureaucratic power: The first is Weberian political sociology, with its location of bureaucracy at the centre of the modernization process, its analysis of its source of power in the monopoly of knowledge and organization, and its distinctly liberal concern about the expansion and concentration of

this power within the political domain. The second is Marxist political economy, with its location of bureaucracy in a theory of capitalist development, its analysis of power as constituted by the ownership and control of the means of production, and its definition of bureaucracy as the form of administration characteristic of a class-divided society.

Finally, this contrasting of Weberian and Marxist paradigms gives way (in chapter 3) to a discussion of Bureaucracy and Democratic Theory. Here, Beetham offers a critical analysis of these different accounts of bureaucracy within a more philosophical mode of discourse, and from the standpoint of a democratic theory that requires 'both an understanding of bureaucratic operation and the conditions of administrative efficiency, and an analysis of bureaucratic power, incorporating both liberal and Marxist insights'. Indeed Beetham feels that only through an attempt to develop such a synthetic appreciation – i.e. by situating the concept within the social sciences, by engaging both Weberian and Marxist paradigms, and by understanding the relation of these factors to the 'practical interests of major social groupings' – can we hope to arrive at 'an adequate theory of bureaucracy'.

As suggested, both these books represent welcome additions to the literature on the sociology of bureaucracy. In Smith's work we have a powerful and detailed analysis of the phenomenon of bureaucracy as an aspect of political power in society. It is recommended to all those interested in the complex relationships between bureaucracy and other political institutions. Beetham's analysis, while more general and introductory in tone, is also extremely valuable, especially for its contrasting of major perspectives, its attempt to bring rigour to the process of definition, and for the clarity of its style. Both books are recommended.

University of Keele

John Hassard

Power and Prestige in the British Army

R. G. L. von Zugbach, Avebury, Aldershot, 1988, £19.50, ix + 192 pp.

Whilst there is an ever growing sociological literature on one of the pillars of the British state's stability, the police, the same cannot be said of another pillar, the armed forces. In effect what literature

there is on the latter is both scant, diverse and often quite dated. This is in direct comparison to the sociological literature examining the American armed forces, which is vast. There is then no real tradition of sociologists examining the British armed forces, certainly not in any empirical sense, mainly due to problems of gaining access to a traditionally closed institution. Hence any newcomer to such a thin literature is a welcome addition, and von Zugbach's study of power and prestige in the officer corps is certainly so.

The author sets out to challenge the view that the social organisation of the army is monolithic and homogeneous. This, he claims, may well be so at a superficial level, but within that structure there is a complex system of subcultures displaying large amounts of difference in terms of power, prestige and function. His central aim is to show that the army (in effect the officer corps, for this is where the real power resides) is not only vertically but also horizontally differentiated. This horizontal differentiation is shown to be based upon the different amounts of power the various component parts have managed to accrue historically. In military parlance these parts are termed 'arms', thus there are 'teeth' arms (infantry, artillery, armour, combat engineers) and 'tail' arms (technical and support provisions, ordnance, signals, transport and medical services, etc.). The author charts the distribution of this power amongst the various arms, to determine where real control of the army structure lies. The first three chapters of the book are devoted to a systems analysis of the army's organisation. Von Zugbach initially presents the army's formal hierarchical structure, its chain of command, etc. He then follows with an examination of how such a structure is horizontally differentiated by a number of factors which cut across the seemingly clear hierarchical structure. These factors which cover such features as direct military policy inputs (covering topics such as welfare/discipline), technical inputs concerning combat and preparation for it, and regimental inputs which constitute particular cultural elements which soldiers use to ground their identity in, and contrast it with members of other units. Thus, a soldier is not primarily a soldier but rather a guardsman, a para, or whatever. The cohesion and tensions of these three sets of inputs are examined in great detail at both higher (command) and lower (unit) levels of organisation. The result is a picture of great complexity wherein individual army units exhibit a unique and distinct character; a character which is determined by which

particular set or sets of inputs dominate in any particular case.

In the remainder of the book, the author examines the various social processes which underlie the aforementioned inputs. He examines in turn officer selection, training and socialisation, and the social background of generals, and how such processes are enacted under the conditions of everyday unit life. The conclusions he reaches are valuable and interesting albeit perhaps not surprising given what is known about the processes of social closure evidenced by elites in other parts of British society. Basically, von Zugbach concludes that the army is dominated by officers who are members of the teeth arms. Within this group there resides an even smaller number who belong to specific elite units (e.g. Household Cavalry, The Guards Division, the Royal Green Jackets). Prestige, status and power are located primarily with sections of the officer corps who inhabit or who have inhabited such teeth arm units. The more power such teeth arm officers hold, the less their counterparts in the tail arm components of the army possess. Thus, teeth arm ideology in terms of ideas and assumptions come to dominate policy making decisions within the military system. This is clearly indicated by the author's research which shows that between 1965 and 1978 over 50 per cent of those attaining the rank of general had an elite teeth arms background. The elite within the officer corps still come from a particularly privileged background. A high degree of educational exclusivity is evident in the author's analysis, in terms of particular prestigious public school backgrounds being heavily correlated with membership of the elite units of the teeth arms. The socialisation process of officers at the Royal Military Academy (Sandhurst) is seen to reflect the primacy of teeth arm values. Thus, even if officers are not assigned to teeth arm units, they are socialised to accept or at least to defer to their primacy. Additionally, the culture of the socialisation process of Sandhurst, von Zugbach illustrates, is similar to the culture of public schools. Hence, this gives candidates from such an educational background a head start in the competition to be assigned to teeth arm and ultimately elite units. The writer concludes that the social make-up of the officer corps has changed, in as much as that more lower middle-class individuals are now recruited into it. However, these individuals are, he shows, predominantly lodged in parts of the military system where they can constitute no real threat to established patterns of power. Thus their predominance in supply and service arms. Alternatively, if such individuals are assigned to

teeth arm units, they are effectively subordinated to the latter's ideology by an ongoing socialisation.

Historically speaking, the lower middle-class 'newcomers' to the officer corps have been effectively channelled away from the centres of power in the military structure. Therefore, whilst the army has opened its selection and recruitment procedures to a wider public, what the author calls a process of 'damage limitation' (p. 4) has taken place. Thus, despite the fact that the modern military structure needs a more diverse blend of skills and talents than it previously did, despite the fact that it needs officers with a technological training, this has not altered the balance of power within the army. For, as von Zugbach illustrates, the officer corps elite is itself dominated by generals who have an infantry background. All other technologies (signals, etc.) are subordinated to infantry technology, and nothing could be more traditional in terms of the reality of soldiering or the organisational ideology which supports that reality.

What criticisms arise of the work are not so much to do with its substance, but rather with its method. For periodically throughout the book the author makes reference to individual or groups of officers he has interviewed for the study. These 'facts' pop up in the text in an uncoordinated fashion, leaving the reader with little idea of the representativeness of such interviewing. In addition, it is obvious from the work that the author was granted the most open kind of access to the army, yet this methodological penetration of a traditionally closed institution is not trumpeted at all! One then begins to wonder why, and a closer reading of the text reveals possibly that the author was an actual serving officer whilst conducting the study. Or perhaps he was a researcher employed by the Ministry of Defence during this period (his own work in the bibliography seems to indicate this). One is obviously mindful of the constraints publishers place upon additions to texts, however, a brief appendix or some relevant footnotes would have easily satisfied the queries of the methodologically obsessed! Whatever, these criticisms are minor points, for the book is a valuable addition to a thinly researched field, given the last empirical work on the officer corps was Otley's research over twenty years ago. Those interested in the cohesion of the state, complex organisations, the military, or even the educational backgrounds of certain sections of the privileged, should find this book interesting.

Landlords and Capitalists: the Dominant Class of Chile

Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratchiff, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988, £25.20, paper £7 30, xxiv + 288 pp

The work for this study began in the 1960s and aspects of it have already appeared in journals. Along the way participants in the research have written on other facets of Chile, and Zeitlin, in particular, has produced a major study of the civil wars in Chile in the nineteenth century which provides a necessary companion to the present book. Thus, what on first sight seems to have been a book extraordinarily long in the making, turns out to be part of a wider examination of class relationships and their historical transformations.

The authors set out to discover the 'inner relations of Chile's dominant class' (p. xx) via a detailed examination of those involved in the top thirty-seven nonfinancial corporations, the leading commercial banks, the largest landowners and the top foreign-owned corporations. This involved tracing kinship relations between some 6,000 close relatives of managers and top investors in the mid 1960s. The significance of the book lies in its substantive findings, its distinctive methodology and its careful use of concepts of class analysis. Less elaborated are its insights into the social dynamics of Chile lying behind the reaction to Allende's socialist government and the persistence of military dictatorship over sixteen years.

A brief summary of such a meticulous study necessarily misses nuances and the strengths or weaknesses of some of the empirical support. The dominant class is linked together through 'kinecon groups' which have common economic interests and close kinship relationships. Managers in large corporations may not themselves own shares but 'chances are even or better that a higher executive is in a close capitalist family' (p. 95). Through uncovering such connections the authors show that corporations which at first appearance seem to be management controlled using Berle and Means's criteria, in fact are controlled by kinecon groups.

It is through establishing connections between different branches of capital that the argument is advanced most strongly. From Marx onwards, Marxists have hypothesised potential conflictual relationships between banking, industrial and landed capital. In Chile, there are close interconnections between those controlling and owning banking and industrial capital. These finance capitalists are more wealthy than ordinary corporate executives and are

'members par excellence of the nation's capital-owning families' (p. 138). In Latin America, the position of the landowning groups has been fiercely debated, both in terms of their significance for any capitalist development and in terms of their roles in political conflict. Here it is convincingly argued that landowners do not stand apart as a separate group or class: 'the principal capital-owning families are also simultaneously landed families' (p. 175) and this has considerable significance for general debates over the nature of Chilean politics and society. Further, these landed capitalists have been disproportionately prominent in Chilean politics, because of their potential self-contradictory class position and because of their overview position within the class as a whole.

Another possible conflict within the dominant class is that between domestic and foreign capital. But in the 1960s, the top Chilean firms were largely free of foreign ownership whilst Chileans, especially those belonging to political families, were significantly involved in ownership of the large foreign corporations operating in Chile. Thus the capitalist class may comprise different class segments but these have 'tended to have coalesced into a single, indissoluble, dominant class' (p. 10).

The major methodological message is that such class analysis depends not just on looking at the position of individuals but of family and kinship groups. Uncovering this network is 'painstaking, tedious, detailed, time-consuming, and exhausting' (p. 56), and the impression is that the authors would not have embarked on this study if they had fully appreciated what it involved. In the main text and appendices they give good guidelines to others wishing to repeat the investigation in other countries and to compare with similar studies. They also provide enough detail and examples for readers to follow the complex intermarrying relationships of some of the most important families, although maybe not enough to capture the full richness of an important historical and contemporary process.

Such data as these are not easy to present and although the authors keep the argument going, detailed reading is at times inevitably as tedious and painstaking as the research process. This does enable the reader to appreciate the complex detective work which has gone into this and to marvel at the researchers' patience. But this is the price for receiving the most thorough empirical investigation of a number of issues which in the Latin American literature have been debated more around rhetoric and assumptions than sustained scholarly analysis. Any disagreements about the

class structure of Chilean society must now make reference back here.

At the end it is a disappointment that no attempt is made to point to possible developments since the 1960s. Zeitlin and Ratcliff indicate that the strength of reaction to Allende is partly explained by the cohesiveness of the dominant class, some would take this further and argue that faced with such a class Allende was doomed without confronting their power directly. But there are no suggestions as to the fate of this dominant class in the last decade and a half. From what we know in general, its cohesiveness remains, but will we have to wait for another twenty years to affirm that? At least this study means that, in the case of Chile, if researchers are allowed to operate freely again, they can use this exemplary source to arrive at a far speedier answer.

Staffordshire Polytechnic

Alan Sillitoe

Women's Attitudes Towards Work

Shirley Dex, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1988, £27.50, paper £9 95, x + 187 pp

The topic of women's attitudes towards work was approached by this reviewer with a certain amount of trepidation, no doubt due to memories of ploughing through pre-feminist industrial sociology texts, which were saturated with machismo assumptions about men's greater attachment to the world of work and, by contrast, women's seeming inability to keep their minds on the job at hand whilst distracted by thoughts of what to feed the family for tea. Togetherness amongst men on the shop floor, in dockland, or down the mine was lovingly portrayed as working-class solidarity whilst, amongst women, it was taken as evidence of their need for female gossip partners and a good natter over the workbench rather than the garden fence – but definitely not the stuff out of which oppositional working-class culture is forged.

Thankfully, Shirley Dex's impeccably well-researched and carefully argued study of women's orientations and attitudes to work, together with its measured assessment of the relation between changes in women's labour force participation and their attitudes towards work, lays to rest any vestigial ghosts of that machismo industrial sociology tradition. Shirley Dex has made yet another valuable contribution to the study of women's employment.

This is, as I have said, a carefully researched book and a reviewer is bound to attempt to do justice to the wealth of source material and broad-ranging sweep of Shirley Dex's discussion. First, on the basis of a useful comparison of post-war surveys of women's attitudes towards work, Dex establishes that, even in the 1940s, these were complex. So Dex does not fall into the trap of contrasting 'traditional' with 'modern' attitudes, but argues that there always have been women with positive attitudes towards women's employment. Now there are simply *more* of these women, which also means that women are now less likely to disapprove of married women with children going out to work. Dex's analysis of the Women and Employment Survey (WES) data reveals that women's orientations to work have much in common with those of men, but also produces an additional orientation, the 'convenience' orientation. This is held by a small group of women more likely to be married, to have dependent children and to be working part-time. As Dex notes, this orientation fits the stereotypical view of women as marginal workers with domestic responsibilities being primary. None the less, this was a small group of 8.2 per cent of working women, and generally women can be described as having instrumental, economic, solidaristic and bureaucratic orientations to work to some degree, and as exhibiting social-instrumental and personal-instrumental orientations with the most frequency.

Industrial sociology texts have for the most part talked in unisex terms of 'workers' (usually meaning men) or assumed gross stereotypes of women, such as lacking commitment to work, working for pin money, to find a husband or to even buy cosmetics. Dex's factor analysis of the WES data takes us way beyond these previous limitations, asking not only whether women do have orientations to work, and, if so, what factors determine these, but also examining women's attitudes towards the home, towards traditional gender roles and towards independence. The heterogeneity that emerges from this analysis is fascinating and serves to dispel any lingering gross stereotypes, including the assumption that young childless women have a gigantically different, i.e. more instrumental orientation, to work than older women with children. So what determines women's orientations to work? Dex argues that generational factors are important, the trend having been towards less traditional, more independent and more work-oriented women, as we would expect. Other significant determinants of attitudes were life-cycle effects from family

formation, past working experience and present employment status. In view of the complex attitudinal picture that emerges, Dex is able to roundly refute any mono-causal temptation to read off women's attitudes towards gender roles and towards employment from the fact of childbirth.

Dex devotes a whole chapter to the relation between women's attitudes and whether they work part-time or full-time. Again, Dex explores the possible complexity of the relation between the fact that women work part-time and the attitudes they hold, as Dex's own analysis as well as other studies reveal a relationship between traditional attitudes and part-time working. But to what extent are women constrained in their choice of hours of work, and do their hours of work reflect their attitudes, or are their attitudes a product of their circumstances? Dex explores heterogeneities within the part-time group, the extent to which part-time work is voluntary or constrained and also considers the causal relationship between women's traditional attitudes and hours of work. The strongest influence is found to be wanting or needing extra money. What does emerge clearly is that a woman's decision to work fewer hours is heavily constrained by child-care problems rather than the simple presence of children. Indeed, Dex, although generally cautious about declaring a direction of causality between attitudes and behaviour, concludes by arguing that attitudes have a far greater effect on women's decision to go out to work in the firstplace than they do on the decision to work full- or part-time.

Shirley Dex concludes by urging caution in reading off attitude change solely from changes in employment patterns. After all, she observes wryly, were men to find themselves solely responsible for child care and domestic work, then we might well expect some change in *their* attitudes.

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Anne Witz

Gender Segregation at Work

S. Walby (ed.), Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988, £25.00, paper £8.95, 190 pp.

Coming a decade after the most widely cited publication of Heidi Hartmann's famous 'job segregation' article, this volume will have

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been eagerly anticipated as an indicative statement of subsequent work in this area. The book does go some way to meeting this expectation and Hartmann's work is duly acknowledged by most contributors.

While there are some broad brush strokes, on the whole the theorising is specific, interesting and fairly modest. There is also a good range of contemporary and historical empirical material, though a good deal of this has appeared in different form elsewhere. A perennial difficulty in publications such as this is that of maintaining the focus among contributors on the organising theme, in this case on occupational segregation. By most standards, the editor has done a good job in this respect and in only one of the pieces did I find the connection a little tenuous; but this paper, on the Trade Union response does have other compensations.

While it made some useful general points, the introduction might have given a fuller and more critical overview of the state of the art given the importance of this area. The summary of individual contributions does no more and no less than is customary in such works but this does mean that both the analytic continuities and contradictions of the assembled work are rather glossed over. Clearly a body of knowledge is emerging but even if directed by the feminist project it is still pretty eclectic. Some evaluation of what is to be gained from closure theory, for example (as in Ann Witz's study) relative to an interest perhaps in a more thoroughgoing examination of sexuality (as might be derived from the paper by Elizabeth Stanko) would have been very instructive. More formal and systematic attention might also have been given to conceptual and methodological aspects of the notion of job segregation itself. On the whole, a fairly empiricist approach prevails and only the papers by Cynthia Cockburn and Olive Robinson raise this as a methodological issue. None of the papers refer to the OECD index of occupational segregation for example. Yet clearly, while segregation is a strong term, most discussion is concerned with varying degrees of segregation and, as is pointed out, this varies with the level of empirical focus. The more specific the field of view, the more gender segregated it is likely to appear.

Five of the papers in the collection may be seen as primarily concerned with developing theoretical argument, though they do this in relation to a range of empirical evidence. Sylvia Walby provides a critical overview of the relevance of labour market theories in understanding job segregation. In finding them wanting,

she pursues the theme evident in a good deal of contemporary literature (and her own book from which the article draws heavily) and plays down the role of household divisions in any understanding of segregation at work. Thus, she emphasises the independent and generative power of patriarchal interests and relations in paid work, and indeed their impact on domestic life. The two most instructive papers in my view were those by Witz and Cockburn who focus on specific instances of patriarchal action in occupational politics using historical and contemporary evidence respectively. A critical evaluation of neo-Weberian closure theory provides Witz with various concepts of gendered occupational closure with which to analyse processes of occupational segregation in medical occupations. Such closure strategies are shown to have structured effects for vertical and horizontal segregation in these occupations. While the success of closure strategies of this sort is seen to depend on the structural context of patriarchal capitalism, the discussion in fact carries little indication of the articulation of these occupations with capitalism. Nevertheless, what makes gender struggles in this area of particular significance is of course that medical men became increasingly important in the regulation of sexuality, and in the generation of meanings of gender and thus in gender differentiation. It is not clear how useful this battery of notions would be in other occupational and employment contexts but the essay's insistence on the clear specification of concepts is noteworthy.

Cockburn also situates her discussion in terms of the familiar distinction between horizontal and vertical segregation. By now also familiar is Cockburn's capacity to pick through the sinews of complexity to produce some compelling insights. Interestingly, in this particular case this is achieved without recourse to the term patriarchy. The hierarchisation and segmentation of collective effort characteristic of capitalist exploitation provides a labyrinth of vertical and horizontal escape routes for men faced, for example, with feminisation of jobs in times of restructuring. Where there is union organisation among men there can be fierce resistance, of course, but outward and upward moves from vulnerable workplaces or occupations is also ubiquitous. In focusing on the micropolitics of gender relations in workplaces, attention is also drawn to the processes whereby people and jobs and the things around them are actively gendered. This emphasis on what might be seen as the 'creative' aspect of gendering is crucial in the understanding of the reproduction of divisions in

changing conditions. Cockburn then rightly calls attention to the symbolic order of gender though it is not clear what kind of theory of symbolism might be developed or appropriated in this light.

Jane Mark-Lawson's contribution focuses usefully on the interactive relationship between the sexual division of labour in paid employment and local political processes. In comparing the towns of Nelson and Luton in the interwar period she shows that, to coin a phrase, occupational politics and the role of women in them, do not stop at the factory gates and indeed they react back on job segregation. Both the predominance of women in the local industry of weaving in Nelson and their strong presence in local labourist politics projected service provision into the mainstream of political contention where the main institutional actors all anticipated the significance of women's interest in support services. The resultant relatively high level of provision helped in turn to maintain the position of women in paid work. While Luton women were not entirely passive politically, roughly speaking the situation there was the reverse. This insertion of the role of locality in the understanding of occupational politics is important. However, this paper for one seemed to suffer from the need to condense much empirical information. Hence while the general argument of the paper was compelling, in my reading there were some omissions of detail which allowed some doubts to remain. For example, the author claims that the growth of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in Luton was premised on hostility to women but though this is easy to believe it is not adequately demonstrated in the paper.

Finally in this clutch of papers is Middleton's analysis of gender based occupational specialisation in the countryside in feudal England. This chapter is directed at the twin inadequacies of labour market theories of segregation and the related contradictions in the use of 'patriarchy' in some marxist feminist accounts. Gender divisions are shown not to have been a function of 'conditions of entry' or related more specifically to domestic divisions of the household. While there is no denying the facticity of patriarchal relations or the ubiquity of gender divisions of labour these may not be appropriated simply to a view which sees patriarchy as an explanation independent of the mode of production. Middleton thus adopts a one (if complex) system position on the relation between class and patriarchy but much of the argument concerns the faulty reasoning of a genre of feminist theorising. Clearly, one should adopt a keen eye for tautology (and there is at least one gem in this volume) but Middleton's claim that the

categories of class are theoretically contingent whereas 'this is hardly true for the distinction between men and women' makes more commonsense than heuristic sense and begs the question of the adequacy of gender theory.

A further three papers concentrate attention on particular aspects of the segmented labour market for women. Olive Robinson provides an excellent discussion of the growth of part-time work which manages to be both concise and comprehensive. Her insistence that the growth of part-time work is itself an integral and sustaining part of the structure of occupational segregation is well made. The reasons for the remarkable growth of this almost entirely gendered sector of employment are located firmly in demand side economics and the organisational use of labour. While the impetus for part-time employment is shown to be relatively independent of the rhythms of full-time employment, the situation of part-time workers on any number of counts is predictably worse than that of full-time women. Anti-discrimination legislation via its effect on employer strategies is also shown to have worked against the interests of women, further segmenting the labour market. Robinson discusses adroitly a range of reasons why part-time work is 'created for women' but there is too easy an elision into 'flexibility' as a denominator of these themes. Part time employment is a structural imperative in much service sector work in which the thorough and implicit gendering of the job outweighs considerations of dispensability.

While it is true that women's quantitative grasp of employment has been enhanced significantly in the last two decades the same cannot be said in qualitative terms. This is particularly evident in respect of part-time workers but Ken Roberts and colleagues note this trend more generally. More to the point, their survey of employment and training practices in the youth labour market indicates this is not likely to change without focused and trenchant action. Employer strategies and perceptions are in this case also seen as instrumental in the reproduction of job segregation – and in terms of the way the labour market operated these perceptions coincide with employers' real interests. Recruitment and training processes reflect a demand for gendered labour and as is well known the impact of government sponsored youth training is to reproduce rather than challenge such predispositions. In any event the attempt to interpellate young males and females into the labour market on more equal terms will fail when the labour market is already structured in terms of gender. Alongside

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such findings the authors also point more generally to the increasing absurdity of any view of the working class which identifies its core with male workers in manufacturing.

Institutional racism at the level of the state and labour market provides the context for what Annie Phizacklea shows to be the differential impact of recession and restructuring on minority women. Within the subordinated segment of women's employment Afro-Caribbean and Asian women have been effectively restricted to ethnically specific 'niches'. When these fail in recession to provide full-time employment, such women are unable to move into other areas of women's employment, even part time work. Afro-Caribbean women are more likely to experience this in terms of unemployment whereas many Asian women are drawn into super-exploitative forms of manufacturing (including homeworking and 'self employment') in the ethnic economy where patriarchy controls in family and community are mobilised in work discipline.

The role of sexual harassment at work in 'keeping women in and out of line' is explored by Elizabeth Stanko. The article is a useful consolidation of a number of important themes identified elsewhere especially in the early work of Catherine Mackinnon, though unfortunately the references to this chapter, apart from those to the work of Stanko herself, are somewhat dated in comparison with the others in the volume. The precise relationship of sexual harassment to job segregation is, as she argues, rather complex and cannot be readily separated from more diffuse forms of sexuality embodying unequal power relations, which are implicit in many gendered work roles in both traditional and more recently created occupations. While sexual harassment evidently represents a potential and actual cost for women prepared to challenge extant job structures, the discussion of other connections with job segregation is rather elliptical.

Finally, Valerie Ellis gives a thorough and up-to-date survey of the status of questions of equality in formal trade union policy in Britain. While, according to much other evidence, the chasm between policy commitments and everyday practice remains wide this is a remarkably sanguine account. At the formal level there has been much movement and when a major union places issues of job segregation on the standing orders of negotiators, union strategies cannot reasonably be dismissed simply as posturing, though clearly base camp is still firmly located in the foothills.

In sum, this volume consists of a set of well coordinated, informative and interesting papers. It is difficult to see how it could

avoid a prominent position in undergraduate courses in the sociology of inequality and work.

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Michael Filby

Falling from Grace: The Experience of Downward Mobility in the American Middle Class

Katherine S Newman, The Free Press, Collier Macmillan, London, 1989, £18 50, xiv + 320 pp

Katherine Newman's book reports on a study of a much neglected area in sociology – downward social mobility. She analyses the experiences of employed people, their wives and children in America who find themselves caught up in sudden downward social mobility. Downward mobility is defined in the study as dramatic loss of income, as a result of redundancy or divorce, although Newman points out that this inevitably means a loss of status. Newman establishes from statistical data that downward mobility as a result of dramatic loss of income is not an isolated phenomenon in America but a serious problem in the 1970s and 1980s.

The book reports on an ethnographic study that involved Newman in carrying out in-depth interviews with 150 men, women and children and undertaking some participant observation. Her sample can be divided into four main groups – managers and their families, air traffic controllers, blue-collar workers from the Singer factory and divorced women and their children. She argues that the downward mobility is not experienced in the same way by everyone – a number of factors mediate the experience both between different groups of workers and between family members at different stages of the life cycle.

The managers were all members of the 40+ Club in New York, a self-help group for redundant ex-executives, had generally been unemployed for some time and had difficulty in getting re-employed. Apart from the economic problems consequent on losing a highly paid executive job, Newman argues that these ex-executives suffered a loss of purpose and of a sense of self. Despite their experiences, and the fact that their redundancy was often a result of mergers or of cut-backs because of a firm's financial problems, they continued to accept the American ideology of meritocracy and individual effort. This meant that they blamed

themselves for their situation – it was because they were not the right sort of person, because they did not work hard enough, that they had been made redundant and could not find a new position.

The families of redundant managers were also affected, not only because of the gradual erosion of their former life style, but because of the changes in their father/husband and consequent changes in their lives. Initially parents made considerable efforts to conceal and shield their children from the economic problems they were facing. An important strategy adopted was to keep up appearances and to keep the family home. Many of the executives' wives sought paid employment. They were little prepared for this, however, few having qualifications or recent work experience, having devoted themselves to home-making. Some resented having to find work, others refused, but a few found a new confidence in being 'the breadwinner'. The reactions and experiences of children depended on their age at the time their father was made redundant and their position in the family. Older children frequently helped the family practically and materially – working their way through college and sending money home, for example.

The other two groups of workers studied by Newman experienced redundancy and loss of income in very different ways from the executives – air traffic Controllers sacked by Reagan for taking illegal strike action, and blue-collar workers at the Singer factory who lost their jobs when the factory was closed down. Newman argues that this is because they shared their experiences with others in a community and did not blame themselves for their loss of employment. While they shared the economic problems of the former executives, they did not experience the same loss of identity and sense of self-worth that the executives did.

The final group studied by Newman was divorced women – mothers and their children. She suggests that the women can be divided into two groups: older women who had been brought up in the 1930s and who had teenage children at the time of their divorce, and younger women who had been raised during the 1960s and had young children at the time of their divorce. The older women had a 'domestic ideal', did not want to be breadwinners, and had few qualifications for getting employment. The younger women embraced the liberal ideologies of the 1960s and adapted to 'new' situations by taking on anti-materialistic ideologies. They also had more relevant skills and qualifications for gaining employment on the labour market. Both groups of

women suffered economic hardship as a consequence of divorce and had difficulty getting alimony and child maintenance payments from their former partners. The older women wanted to be dependent on and cared for by a man, the younger tended to enjoy having control over finances and spending and were less certain that they would re-marry if the opportunity arose.

The reactions of the children to the divorce and loss of financial status also related to their age. Young children tended to be sympathetic to their mother and developed very strong ties with her. However, they rejected her anti-materialism and wanted economic success. Adolescent children tended to be less concerned with their mothers' problems and more tied up in their own. If their mothers stayed in the family home they wanted to retain their former life style and put pressure on their mothers for money and clothes. If they moved with their mothers to a lower-status neighbourhood they had problems 'fitting in' and making friends in their new surroundings.

Newman concludes by arguing that downward social mobility is a social problem – one that needs a collective response. She argues that making workers redundant is a waste of talent and the atmosphere of uncertainty created when workers are made redundant does little to engender worker loyalty and commitment.

The account in this book of downward mobility is gripping and moving. The ways in which men, women and children experience sudden loss of income and status are graphically described, as are the associated feelings and frustrations. The analysis and arguments are supported by quotations from the interviews, which brings the text alive and gives it a vividness often lacking in statistical analysis.

Having said this, I felt uneasy when I had finished the book. I was not certain how secure the foundations were for many of the conclusions, and categories seemed to be too tightly drawn. Newman tells us little about the methodology or about the 150 people she interviewed. She does not make it clear how many people were interviewed in each group she studied, and the quotations in the book seem to come from a very small number of people. The argument that all managers blamed themselves or that the divorced women fell into two distinct groups suggested a tendency not to look for contradicting data in the interviews.

Despite my reservations about methodology, this is a book well worth reading. Also, it is to be hoped that it will be followed by other ethnographic studies of upwardly and downwardly mobile

people. It was pleasing to me that this study did not concentrate just on men, or even those in employment, but recognised that downward mobility affects the whole family and that different members of the family experience the financial loss in different ways. The inclusion of divorced women not only demonstrated graphically the ways in which society creates the economic dependency of women on men, but also the ways in which that dependency continues after marital breakdown because of structural factors.

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Pamela Abbott

After Redundancy

John Westergaard, Iain Noble and Alan Walker, Polity Press, Oxford, 1989, £27.50, xii + 205 pp.

This book reports the findings of a survey of just under 400 of the 600 workers made redundant by a private steel company in Sheffield in 1979. The majority of these redundancies were classed as 'voluntary', and this being so, a number of the study's findings were to be expected: there was a high representation of middle aged and older workers with a long history of continuous service in the firm (over 65 per cent had ten years or more, and over 40 per cent had twenty years or more), and a high incidence of withdrawals from the labour market, notably through early retirement, (40 per cent were economically inactive three years after redundancy, 17 per cent through early retirement). The sentiments behind these figures are expressed for the older workers on page 40: 'I felt I needed a good rest. I'd done my service and it was great to be able to relax.'

Given these characteristics the findings on political responses are, to my mind, unsurprising. One focus for the research reported was the question of whether workers in a town with a solid, left-wing, Labour Party tradition, would show a decisive move leftwards in political attitudes when personally confronted with the effects of economic decline. In fact, there was a move to the right. There was a 'slippage' away from the Labour Party that was most marked among non-manual workers and least marked (though present) among the unskilled. There was also, despite a general acceptance of the need for trade unions, a marked hostility to 'aggressive' trade union action. This 'anti-militancy' (p. 162) is

explained by reference to the fact that the firm was paternalistic in nature, and that workers had experienced clashes with pickets in the course of the national public sector steel strike in 1980.

There may, however, be other reasons not explicitly considered by the authors, for the absence of any more militant posture by their respondents. The figures given in the opening of this review are an indication of how cleverly large scale redundancies have generally been handled; the majority accepted 'voluntarily', and 40 per cent withdrew from the labour market. In other words, they renounced their hopes or claims for finding a job. There was also a general expression of satisfaction with the level of the redundancy payments. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the workers concerned would express feelings of radicalism or trade union militancy, or even support for ideas about fighting job loss. They had passed-up the chance to put such feelings into action, and would, I presume, be more likely to put their energies into reconstructing their life and a version of the past which says that it could not have been other than it was.

The findings and conclusions on the labour market outcomes of the workers made redundant I find somewhat confusing, and slightly inconsistent. We learn that one third found jobs before the redundancies occurred and that early search (i.e. prior to redundancy) paid off in employment results. The workers adopting this approach were differentiated by skill, 80 per cent of skilled blue collar and staff workers started early, and only 50 per cent of the unskilled. This early search was also found to yield better results for skilled and non-manual workers. These and other figures lead the authors to conclude:

'As the overall labour market tightened, its segmentation also became more pronounced' (p. 53) producing 'class conditioned divergences' in the experience of redundancy. We later learn (p. 85) that: 'This division of class-related chances is partly responsible for the creation of the two distinct groups among our informants - the long-term employed and the long-term unemployed.' They also conclude that the sample showed a 'class differential in the difficulty of obtaining employment' (p. 85)

In contrast to the findings of Harris *et al.* (1987), post-redundancy status seems to have been relatively stable, unchanged after three years for 45 per cent, with 31 per cent experiencing only one change. A rather different complexion is put on these results, however, when we are later told (p. 85) that 24 per cent of those who found employment again were redundant once more within

three years, and that the data: 'underline . . . the enhanced insecurity of all who found jobs again'.

It was also puzzling to find that skill turned out to be a considerable advantage in finding employment subsequent to redundancy, at least until we learn (p. 86) that 49 per cent of all those securing work did so in steel despite the severe decline experienced in that industry (p. 87). I was, however, interested in the high level of downgrading – 39 per cent of all who found employment, 56 per cent of the semi-skilled, and a 'a third or more' (p. 173) of skilled blue collar workers. I would have liked more information on the precise role of skill in gaining employment.

One gap in the research which could have been usefully filled concerns the question of how people found access to employment. There is a hint (p. 54) that 'informal' means may have been more successful than 'official' channels but no data are provided. We do not therefore know how means of access and skill do or do not correlate, or how important different means are. This should surely be a central focus for any post-redundancy study, especially given the growing emphasis on 'availability' for work and the responsibility of the claimant to prove 'active' search. It may not be the 'active' search which pays off.

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Lydia Morris

In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy
Charles S. Maier, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987,
£25.00, paper £8.95, x + 293 pp

Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance Between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe

Charles S. Maier (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, £30.00, paper £10.95, ix + 417 pp.

These two contributions to the Cambridge studies in modern political economies usefully illustrate the intellectual merits and inevitable weakness of a political-economy perspective on the current conjuncture of *fin de siècle* capitalism. In *In Search of Stability* (hereafter ISS), Professor Maier provides us with six

articles and a conclusion, which have been published between 1970 and 1986; the result is a remarkably coherent view of the processes and conditions which have or have not contributed to the socio-political stability of the western democracies since the end of World War Two. While historians have often taken stability as a form of societal inertia which requires no explanation, Maier asserts correctly that 'stabilization is as challenging a historical problem as revolution' (ISS, p. 154).

These essays are organized around three major questions. (1) what mixture of constraint, legitimate representation and material reward supports stability? (2) what conditions undermine stability? and finally (3) what international and global political conditions influence intra-state stability? The particular strength of Maier's answers to these questions lies in his ability to combine a thorough historical understanding of post-war conditions with a comparative perspective on basic issues in the political economy of capitalism. In the process, he offers us a number of valuable insights into the ironic convergences of ideology and worldviews between the right and the left in European politics. For example, starting at the end of the nineteenth century, there was a widespread intellectual movement to regard 'Society as a factory' such that one solution to social stability would be perfect management. While Fordism and Taylorism were seen in New York and Moscow alike as 'solutions' to both the social and production problems of industrial systems, European fascism fused technologism and managerialism to glorify the Social Engineer as the saviour of society. Like Saint-Simonianism, fascism saw money lenders, the old classes and traditional elites as social parasites on the new machinist order. These fascist doctrines combined a neoliberal commitment to the economic emancipation of the entrepreneur with a faith in planning as an answer to the economic crises which had (especially in Germany) been the principal cause of social instability in the 1930s.

Rhetoric to one side, the actual economic performance of the fascist societies by comparison with Britain and the United States has been a topic of much debate and dispute. In Italy the rhythm of industrial growth does not appear to have corresponded to the political fortunes of the Fascist regime. Germany suffered most from the Depression, but also enjoyed a remarkable recovery. Although rearmament did not trigger the German recovery, it probably sustained economic growth after 1935. Again the Anglo-Saxon image of German bureaucratic efficiency probably owes

more to Weber's iron-cage metaphor than to reality; Maier points out for example that centralized planning in Germany up until 1942 was fragmentary; by contrast, in Britain the system of committees and joint boards proved relatively efficient and flexible. Although fascist ideology pointed to more discipline and regulation of labour as part of the productivist ideology, in fact Britain 'produced more rationalized human resource policies than did Nazi Germany' (ISS, p. 114).

The same planning mentality also shaped much of America's global strategy for postwar international harmony and economic growth. The Marshall Plan was not only a recipe for international harmony, but also an answer to the waste produced by unrestrained market competition in a liberal regime. American government elites 'viewed the transition to a society of abundance as a problem of engineering, not of politics' (ISS, p. 130). The main obstacle to stability and plenty was monopoly. Thus, decartelization was a major strategy for the democratization of postwar Japan and Germany. At the same time, under the general umbrella of expanding international trade and currency stability, the US sought to dominate the world economy, but this aim could only be achieved if the developed world could afford American goods. The price of American success was major overseas aid and assistance. However, while the US contributed massively to postwar economic growth, the internal redistribution of national wealth via welfare measures failed to change significantly the patterns of social inequality, which remain a major factor in political instability. The prospect of working-class revolutions in Europe constituted a real threat, which required a social contract based on material rewards in exchange for industrial peace. This solution, however, also presupposed a strong balance of payments, vigorous exports and capital investments, but export competitiveness also required relatively low European wage settlements. Ultimately 'a growth-organized welfare capitalism' (ISS, p. 176) had to depend on what Maier calls 'the politics of productivity'.

The paradox of European stability is that it has rested largely on a trilateral association of America, Germany and Japan. However, the corollary of the politics of production has been a politics of inflation, in which the continuity of political stability appears to be possible only if current demands for consumption are deferred in the interests of continuing economic growth. The pursuit of economic growth is thus an alternative to the continuing dominance of tradition and elite privilege (namely conservatism) and to the

violent suppression of class rivalry in the interests of national authority (namely fascism).

If we regard the creation and maintenance of publics as in fact the creation of political life such that the public = the political, then the *Changing Boundaries of the Political* (hereafter CBP) is an issue of crucial interest to any social scientist who wants to understand the sources of stability of political systems. CBP is a collection of essays which survey the variable fortunes of the political by analysing in theoretical and substantive terms the changing relationship between politics, civil society, the state and the economy. The topics covered include new social movements since the 1960s (Claus Offe), religious transformations (Suzanne Berger), the developmental patterns of various welfare states (Massimo Paci), domestic spaces (Laura Balbo), the boundaries of health care (Paul Starr and Ellen Immergut), the politics of science (Gerald Feldman) and international relations (Miles Kahler).

ISS and CBP owe a great deal to the economics and political philosophy of Albert O. Hirschman, insofar as they attempt to provide historical and sociological reflections on the macro-conditions of exit and voice in twentieth-century capitalism. Political loyalties are the uncertain outcome of short- and long-term trade-offs between the rewards and costs of social membership. Thus, the persistence of inequality in a democracy may be tolerable for the masses provided that, at least in the long-run, economic growth offers the prospect of prosperity, when employment provides participation in rising standards of living. These processes of pragmatic commitment have to be seen in the context of an unstable relationship between inflationary pressures and welfare benefits. These relations (which are essentially about citizenship representation and the secular limits of economic expansion) receive their most systematic elaboration by Maier (ISS, pp. 225–73) and John Goldthorpe (CBP, pp. 363–407).

Sociologists will note the absence of any real discussion of how culture contributes to social stability. In addition, the division between the public and the private is as much about culture as it is about politics. It is the variable cultural mixture of *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* across European societies, which in part explains variations in the nature of publics within the political arena. Another criticism is that a political-economy perspective has not proved useful in predicting cultural factors in political life. The future of European political instability, both East and West, may come to depend more on the volatile fusion of religious (particularly

but not exclusively Islamic) fundamentalism, regional ethnicity and cultural nationalism. Finally, political scientists will note the absence in ISS and CBP of an analysis of three changes in global politics which are questions of present and future stability: (1) the breakup of the American-German-Japan triangle; (2) the emergence of a politics of the global ecology; and (3) the collapse of East European social stability which Stalinization made possible at a human cost which has proved too great in the long-run. However, to misquote Keynes, short-term stability may depend on the fact that in the long-term we are all dead.

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The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left
Stuart Hall, Verso, London, 1988, £24.95, paper £8.95, vii + 283 pp

The long running debate as to the analytical status of Thatcherism, what it stands for, who it represents, what it's trying to do – if anything, has often taken the form of an opposition between those who see it as a watershed in British politics and those who emphasise the continuities. Now there can be no doubt that an examination of the last ten years of rule by Mrs Thatcher's government would reveal a number of *ad-hoc* policy measures, numerous examples of statecraft and even – God forbid – compromise and retreat. Also evident would be a particular style of government, of leadership, and manipulation of the unwritten constitution. This is because the Thatcher governments, like all governments before them, have displayed characteristics which have an inflection of their own, but also, those which have been evident in and have permeated government for many years.

Is that all there is to it though? Is this 'evidence' that the present conjuncture is part of the same old game and we can rest easy with the knowledge that the game can stop – go with minor alterations to the political scene? Stuart Hall in *The Hard Road to Renewal* is adamant that it is not. The present scene he argues is different. The crisis of post-war social democracy has meant that the old ways of doing things that people had faith in, have, due to the experiences of the last twenty-five years, fallen into a disfavour that now provides the possibilities for a discursive reconstruction of popular world views. Thatcherism, Hall argues has been

sensitive to popular fears and anxieties and has attempted to reconstruct commonsense world views in terms of how they should be resolved. This reconstruction to date has been towards a society based on the 'free economy – strong state' dichotomy.

Thus while Thatcherism may often appear to be statecraft it has more coherence, it is a project with aspirations to install a strong state which has popular support and would be therefore hegemonic rather than dominant. By being hegemonic it will last. Now by project Hall doesn't mean there is a master plan or scheme with a checklist which the New Right can tick off against to indicate its progress. But it is a project none the less and the Left should be cognisant. For it is the Left that Hall addresses as the second theme of his book and in fact describes the hegemonic project of Thatcherism and the crisis of the Left as two sides of the same coin. It is at the level of discourse, Hall argues that the Left has failed to grasp the import of Thatcherism. The Left rather than tinkering with outdated ideas should take account, as Thatcherism has, of the changing shape of British society and develop new ideas which relate to people in these new circumstances rather than defend the old, which are unable to inspire. The Left, according to Hall, must learn from Thatcherism but first it must see it for what it is and at the present it is Thatcherism which is on the high ground in that 'war of position'.

Hall is fairly explicit on theory – unlike some others in the 'project' school – and answers many of the criticisms which have been fired at him over the years. He does not for example argue – as he is often accused – that Thatcherism is hegemonic merely that it is trying to be so and that it is doing a better job than the Left in this respect. The oft supposed abandonment of class is also an unfair slight. Hall's emphasis on the discursive aspect of Thatcherism, he is at pains to stress, is but a redressing of the balance to a neglected area and is in no way intended to represent a comprehensive analysis of the subject. Hall is thus reiterating, to those on the Left who never listen, that to exclude on one level does not mean its importance is necessarily negated. However, I do feel there is some tension here in Hall's method. Despite a quite correct refusal to acknowledge any form of economic determinism, regardless of how relative its autonomy, Hall stresses Gramsci's 'decisive nucleus of economic activity'. Important, interrelated, a component part? Yes. 'Decisive'? In what way? He does not elaborate. This tension I feel creeps in with Hall's increasing use of discourse analysis *à la* Laclau and Moufe

and his attempt to reconcile it with the older conceptions of what class is despite his recognition of the changing nature of what class is becoming.

The Hard Road to Renewal is a compilation of essays that I am glad to see as a book. Hall's contribution to the debate on Thatcherism as is evidenced by this book has been significant. He has showed a prescience largely unparalleled and developed a method of growing influence in the social sciences. In terms of style the text is – due to the fact that the book is a compilation – a little repetitive at times but the polemical and journalistic feel to it makes for a relatively easy read.

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Ross Coomber

Material Culture and Mass Consumption

Daniel Miller, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, £25.00, viii + 240 pp.

Emerging 'somewhat violently abstracted' (p. 214) out of Hegel, Miller insists that the old enemies 'subject' and 'object' are in fact friends, their alienation one from another being fostered by Marx's misreading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* – a misreading compounded by various modernist and postmodernist cultural theories. Once Marx had slipped 'alienation,' 'fetishism' and 'reification' between the subject and the object (in this instance between the worker and his product) it became easy for others to forget that Hegel's term 'objectification' is the very antonym of 'estrangement'. Where Marx saw 'rupture', Hegel noted a moment of distanciation through which the subject should recognize the object as her own projection onto history (p. 24) once seen as that which results from human activity, the object adds to the self-consciousness and potential freedom of the subject.

In such a light the postmodern riddle, 'Which came first the commodity or the consumer?' is irrelevant; neither has priority since each is implicated in the other (p. 52). Where Baudrillard *et al.* would argue for a theory of consumption in which the consumer is all but consumed, leaving only a conduit through which flow 'patterns of consumption . . . determined elsewhere' (p. 165), Miller cites the Mod and the Vespa. Italian designers developed the scooter as 'the feminine equivalent of the more macho motorbike' (p. 169). Set within 'the emergent polarities in British

youth cultures' the Vespa was redesigned by the Mods to stand for 'continental "soft"' as opposed to 'American "hard"' (p. 169). Hegel has been blunted to pass into Hebdige but Miller's point remains valid, he seeks to establish that consumers have a considerable 'degree of autonomy' in how they use goods (p. 168). Arguably, the infant in the sweetshop who asks for a mixed bag of snakes, flying saucers, vampires and bones uses those high colour, additive loaded 'inedibles' because she likes sweets that upset her parents: 'While the sweets are produced for mass consumption . . . it would be equally hard to argue that the result is the responsibility of either some evil genius at the production end or some demonic child at the consumption end' (p. 168). Instead, within 'a child's culture' a sugar machine-tool takes its sweet meaning from 'the mutually constituted relationship of two sets of interests and self images' (p. 168).

Miller's deployment of James on 'inedibles' is typical: *Material Culture and Mass Consumption* uses ethnographic resources to challenge the prevalent approach to consumption which has tended to emphasize objects over subjects. Contemporary theory, following Barthes, Baudrillard and Haug, sees commodity culture as a monolith, focuses on the point of sale, affirms consumer responsiveness to market initiatives, and narrows 'need' into whatever capital can invent and inject in the search for greater profit (pp. 144–5). Hegel, Piaget, Klein, Simmel, Munn and Bourdieu are massed against this annihilation of the subject, and are employed to make the point (among many) that consumer culture is only singular if viewed myopically from the viewpoint of exchange.

Miller's critique is based on a number of simple but extremely effective tenets: for 'commodity' he reads 'object of consumption' (p. 192), arguing that while Commerce considers the item in the shop window as a price, the purchaser, having purchased, experiences 'objectification' and engages in a labour of recuperation which 'translates the object from an alienable to an inalienable condition' (p. 190). The consumer works to 'recontextualize' the object (p. 190), and thereby potentially negates capital's pre-emptive predication, i.e. the commodity as a second skin of promise created by the copy writer's wildest hope and set within a 'life style'. Consumption is therefore read as symbolic labour, productive of a 'material culture' within which consumers remake themselves through things (understood not as a stalking horse for profit but as more or less appreciated social relations). The

position enables Miller to counter Marx's orientation to production as the locus of 'self' formation and to dismiss what he calls Romantic claims for 'an essentialist natural self masked by the artificial nature of culture as commodity' (p. 193)

From this, it will be shown that, ironically, it is only through the creative use of the industrial product that we can envisage a suppression of any autonomous interest called capitalism, and that only through the transformation of the state's services can the state also be reabsorbed as an instrument of development. In short consumption is a major factor in the potential return of culture to human values. (p. 192)

The validation of consumption as a site for symbolic self creation is easier for those who consider that they live in a Post Fordist culture. The triumphalist technocratic logic of Fordism tried, between 1920 and the early 1960s, to create a 'homogenized and consistent market' in which social differences were suppressed to enable longer factory runs and higher profitability (p. 10). The dream of the single market (and perhaps even of postmodernism as its fabulist) was interrupted – or so Miller's story runs – by 'the emergence of a new ethnicity and general social diversity' (p. 212). Post Fordist capital needed the micro-chip and the technology of the shorter run to keep up with its 'fluid target populations,' with the 'new ethnicity' and gender diversity (p. 10). It follows that 'Late capitalism may have had to adapt to, rather than be the cause of current social trends' (p. 213). *Material Culture and Mass Consumption* is very much a Post Fordist work, good on gaps, margins and the varied sites of consumer labour; whether these are to be found in the interstices of the market (pigeon fancying or DIY) or where the state provides goods (public housing, hospitals, school rooms) one senses that Miller has the ethnography and could bring it to bear in revelatory ways. What he does not have, or at least has not used significantly, is a grasp of the wider history of economic transitions. His preferred sites for the production of the 'culture [of] human values' are also 'holes' into which late capital, eager for the spatial 'fix' of a new market, might flow (the specialist magazine, Home Base). Miller knows this, and reiterates that he is developing an ideal model rather than representing general practice (p. 216): yet all too often he appears to generalize from his eater of 'inedibles' or his gardener working in the informal economy (pp. 211–12). For example, discussing the

consumer's use of goods offered by the National Health Service and the education system, Miller argues that his 'stress on consumption is justified partly by its previous neglect, but also by the contention that it is in this area that the strategies of recontextualization are at their most advanced. This is to say that consumption is now at the vanguard of history, and provides insights into the further transformation of areas such as welfare and the workplace' (p. 213). The claim, respecting state provision, seems historically and theoretically naive; indeed, Aglietta's *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation* substitutes for Post Fordism the term Neo Fordism: it is part of Aglietta's case that capitalism may 'escape from its contemporary organic crisis' by contracting 'public initiative[s] in the production of collective goods and services'.¹ The school and the hospital, in this reading, become gaps into which finance capital (aided by the state) *must* flow if it is to heal itself

I would like to have seen Miller's striking version of consumption theories set within the context of the work of Ernst Mandel, Michel Aglietta and James O'Connor. Only when a redemptive ethnography of consumerism is informed by a broader structural history of economic imperatives will the full materiality of our culture emerge from 'mass consumption'. Miller has redeemed a part of that materiality, for which he is to be greatly thanked

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Richard Godden

Note

1 Michel Aglietta, *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation* (New York, Verso, 1979), p. 385

Sport, Politics and the Working Class. Organized Labour and Sport in Inter-War Britain

Stephen G. Jones, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988, £25.00, xi + 228 pp.

Sport, Politics and the Working Class is the first in a series entitled 'International Studies in the History of Sport'. It is a well-written and impressively researched piece of work which probes in a lively and intelligent way an aspect of modern socio-cultural development

that has received comparatively little attention from academic historians up to now. Its main focus is on the attitudes towards sport of trades unionists and other working-class activists in the inter-war years, together with their policies and actions in this sphere. Among other things, it manages to shed light onto such hitherto neglected issues as the communist dominated British Workers' Sport Federation, formed in 1923, and the rival, social democratic National Workers' Sports Association, formed in 1930. Jones's account of the struggles between these two organizations and of their eventual unification as part of the fight against fascism makes fascinating reading. So does his comparative analysis of the workers' sports movement in Britain and its (usually more successful) continental counterparts. Especially interesting and valuable in this connection are his accounts of the cross-channel sports contacts of workers between the wars. However, although Jones manages to avoid ethnocentrism in treating such issues, he does arguably fail to appreciate the oppositional significance of the embrace specifically of 'sport' by organizations such as the German Workers' Sports and Gymnastic League, founded in 1893 and the largest workers' sports organization outside the Soviet Union. That is to say, not only was this organization, as Jones notes, founded as a result of Bismarck's anti-socialist laws and the fact that social democratic clubs were expelled from the *Turnverein* movement – the nationalist and specifically German gymnastics movement founded by Friedrich Jahn – but its members deliberately adopted characteristically English and, in that sense, at the time 'modern' sporting terms and forms. In doing so, they drew upon themselves the wrath of nationalists who described, for example, the workers' football by such scathing terms as *Fusslummelei* ('foot-ruffianism').

However, perhaps the most interesting and illuminating aspect of Stephen Jones's study is his analysis of the growing role of the state in British sport between the wars and of the concern of far from insignificant numbers of trades unionists and Left-wing politicians to make a policy impact in this regard. His conclusions here are diametrically opposed to those of John Hargreaves in his *Sport, Power and Culture* (1986). Thus, whereas Hargreaves argues that there was little state intervention in sport in Britain in the 1920s and 30s and that the British Left in that period by and large ignored the growing significance of sport in working-class people's lives, Jones convincingly demonstrates that, to a not insignificant extent, the reverse was the case in both respects. A

few selected examples must suffice to illustrate this here. For example, from the mid-1930s, the Ministry of Labour channelled funds into sport for the unemployed and, in England and Wales between 1914 and 1937, there was an almost fourfold rise in public expenditure on parks, pleasure gardens and swimming baths. Also directly or indirectly of significance were such pieces of legislation as the Physical Training and Recreation Act (1937), the Education Act (1918), the Public Health Act (1931), the Right of Way Act (1932), and the Access to Mountains Act (1939). Similarly, although he does not by any means seek to deny either the fact that the majority of British workers unquestioningly accepted the dominant sporting forms or that, in a period of high unemployment and mounting fear of war, sport and leisure were not major concerns of the Left, Jones does successfully demonstrate *via* a series of well-documented examples that they were by no means as marginal as Hargreaves seems to imply. Just one of the many fascinating pieces of information recounted by Jones in this connection concerns the 'Soccer for Sixpence' campaign initiated in 1929 by Alec Macleod, Chairman of the London Labour Party Sports Association. 'It is scandalous', said Macleod, 'that football clubs should spend their large surpluses in securing "fashionable" players under the transfer system instead of improving their accommodation or reducing their prices' (pp. 106–7). This campaign, of course, came to nought but the very fact that it was launched at all suggests that Hargreaves has exaggerated the degree to which members of the Left in that period were duped by 'hegemonic forces'. Stephen Jones provides a plethora of other examples which point in the same direction.

Although *Sport, Politics and the Working Class* is highly successful as social history, as sociology aspects of the analysis are more problematic. Jones's embrace of Gregor McClennan's 'pluralist Marxism' in his approach to the state certainly constitutes an advance over more mechanistic versions. However, his approach to issues of 'structure' and 'agency' more generally is arguably less successful. More particularly, he repeatedly conceptualizes these issues in dichotomic, dualistic terms, in that way getting into avoidable difficulties. For example, he writes of human agents as being able to 'intervene in social processes and transform them' (p. 6) as if social processes were somehow more than and apart from the patterned interweaving of individual actions. Jones refers to Philip Abrams's discussion in *Historical Sociology* (1982) of the difficulties that are posed in this regard. Surprisingly, however, he

fails to mention Abrams's suggestion (pp. 231–9) that Norbert Elias has gone further than most towards producing an empirically-based theoretical synthesis of 'agency' and 'structure'. Perhaps if he had grasped this, Jones might have been able to produce a more accurate account of the work done in the sociology of sport that uses Elias's 'figurational' approach?

It is not my intention in advancing these criticisms to detract from the value of Stephen Jones's work. The general editor of the series, James Mangan, expresses the hope that the series will help to reduce the 'myopia' of academic historians regarding the socio-cultural significance of sport. If all the future contributions to the series are only half as good as that of Stephen Jones, it will, I am sure, go a long way towards realizing that aim. My only regret is that Stephen Jones was tragically killed shortly after completing his manuscript. We have been robbed of a highly creative scholar who would surely have made many more important contributions to this and other fields.

University of Leicester

Eric Dunning

English Football and Society, 1919–1950

Nicholas Fishwick, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989, £25.00, xii + 164 pp.

This slim volume confirms the late, but now undoubted establishment of British academic involvement in the study of sport in general and football – the (once?) national pastime and (present?) obsession of politicians – in particular. It is the second book in the International Studies in the History of Sport series, edited by James (Tony) Mangan. The book follows on the heels of noteworthy contributions to the history of British football (soccer) by Tony Mason, Wray Vamplew and, most well-known among sociologists, Eric Dunning and his associates. *English Football and Society* is a revised version of an Oxford D.Phil. thesis and strenuous efforts are made in the introduction to stress that it is a work of social history, not historical sociology.

The aim of Fishwick's book is to 'study what football meant and why it mattered' (p. xii) in the rather under-researched years between the two World Wars. Emphasis is placed on the effects of society on football and chapters are concerned with junior (non-league rather than school) football, the major professional clubs,

the spectators, the professional footballers themselves, the mass media, gambling and a final chapter on football, politics and society. The book is highly readable and carries a useful bibliography

Sports sociologists will probably be disappointed in this book. The author does not nail his flag to any particular theoretical mast and readers expecting a refinement of Eliasian approaches (as in Dunning's work) or an application of structuration to sport (as in the work, for example, of Richard Gruneau), will not find it here. The book tends to be descriptive and, at the same time, is somewhat ambitious in trying to cover such a broad spectrum. Given the thorough treatment of hooliganism by the Leicester group it is not surprising that Fishwick has nothing new to tell us about this ongoing moral panic.

Fishwick's problem of coverage is partially solved by taking three sample localities, (Sheffield, Swindon and Oxford), each of which had different footballing traditions. In this approach lies one of the strengths of the book since Fishwick is able to contrast areas within which the sport developed. Using local newspaper sources, local authority and parliamentary publications and interviews with (former?) fans, players and managers, he is able to provide a sense of why one place developed professionalism before another. Given the absence of a 1930s version of *Rothman's Football Yearbook*, data from the *Athletic News* and the *Footballer's Who's Who* are used to show that the shift in the 'production' of professional players from north-east to south was well under way in the inter-war years. These regional dimensions are to be welcomed in a subject which is all too often treated aspatially.

As well as frequent allusion to, and use of, *Pink and Green 'Uns*, Fishwick makes considerable use of sources which are these days more likely to be found in jumble sales than university libraries, books such as *I Lead the Attack*, authored by the former Aston Villa and Wales centre-forward, the brylcreamed Trevor Ford. This reviewer had assumed that this player and his book had been doomed to total obscurity but the contents of such invariably ghosted autobiographies are used to good effect to illustrate, for example, the almost explicit sexism in inter-war football. It is to be regretted that the latter-day voice of the 'insider', the fanzine, did not exist in the 1930s to aid the interpretation of what the game meant to those who watched from the terraces.

But Fishwick's research does demonstrate how the dominant groups (the BBC for example) were gradually incorporating the

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people's game in the inter-war period. If television is the principal medium by which football is communicated (and interpreted) today, from 1927 to the 1960s it was the wireless, in competition with the newspaper, which gradually became the major communicator of football's facts, leaving the 1938 film 'The Arsenal Stadium Mystery' and the *People* and the *News of the World* to increasingly provide the sensation. Fishwick clearly shows how during the period under study both 'bourgeoisification' and 'nationalisation' were taking place in English football, on the one hand the game being incorporated into acceptable cultural forms and on the other experiencing a reduction of localism in media coverage. Although the dispassionate, discriminating spectator may not yet have emerged, the foundations of the 'brave new football world' of the 1980s had been set.

A final chapter in *English Football and Society* deals with football, politics and society. Fishwick does not dodge the well-worn thesis of football as social control but he seems unaware of the work of Roy Hay, for example, whose work on Scottish football suggests that far more people were simply not interested in the game than Fishwick would imply. Likewise, the Depression is not ignored but its effects on sport are less well covered than elsewhere, notably in Gareth Williams's work on rugby in inter-war South Wales.

This reviewer would have liked a little more on football in schools, the school-club nexus, the recruitment and migration of players and the effects of clubs on the localities in which they were sited. We know from Simon Inglis's work, for example, that ground relocation was sometimes induced by the pressure of local residents who saw football as a nuisance to be sited in someone else's back yard. Any academic work on social aspects of sport is to be welcomed, it is likely, however, that Fishwick's book will be enjoyed more by historians than sociologists.

University of Keele

John Bale

The Restructuring of American Religion Society and Faith since World War II

Robert Wuthnow, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988, £13.90, xiv + 372 pp.

This is the first major interpretational monograph from the Princeton Project on Studies in Church and State. The aim of the

Project is to examine 'the interaction of religion in its political environment' (p. ix), mostly in the United States. One of the problems with such an investigation is, of course, that the USA has not had an established church in the same way as virtually every other first world, and many second and third world countries have had Specialists on American religion, and Wuthnow is no exception, are quick to point to the distinctiveness of their field of study. Yet, viewed from the east side of the Atlantic, the well-told story of American religion given in this book is redolent of the same stories of European – and especially North European – nations. All that has to be changed is the timeframe.

Wuthnow's argument is clear and concise. Interpretations of American religion have been dominated by the concept of denominationalism in which church life from the colonial period to the middle of this century has been regarded as built upon ecclesiastical fragmentation – religious pluralisation. The individualistic, competitive and frontier spirit of American economic and social development was mirrored in religion, allowing for not only church schism but also creativity as exemplified in the 'New Religions'. So fragmented did the churches become (over 200 major denominations by 1900) that doctrine could not separate them. American religion was fragmented by class, race or region (Niebuhr), or by a cultural tripartism between Protestant, Catholic and Jew (Herberg). But Wuthnow argues that this structure of American religion no longer holds. Since 1945, he persuasively demonstrates the decline of social, racial and regional divisions between churches, the decline of tripartite tensions (principally Protestantism versus Catholicism), and the rise of inter-church discourse within Protestantism. What is displacing it, he says, is the rise of a conservative-liberal split which transcends denomination and religious tradition, visible in a focusing of religious tension upon contemporary political issues ranging from civil rights and race in the 1960s, through Vietnam, and onto an agenda of issues which includes homosexuality and abortion.

Wuthnow marshals his evidence with majestic mastery to illustrate these developments. He progresses painstakingly through each theme, rehearsing the evidence from his own and others' research. Minor criticisms might be levelled. Surprisingly little is said about ethnicity and religion, and some of the great mass of statistical evidence, culled from census and opinion-poll data, might have been tabulated to relieve monotony. But these are minor quibbles in what is otherwise a convincing narrative.

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But three more serious interpretational shortcomings emerge. An important sub-theme running throughout the book is the numerical stagnation and decline which have emerged in American religion since the late 1950s. Levels of observance and commitment have started to fall appreciably for the first time in American history. Wuthnow assesses various causes. He is particularly keen to demonstrate the effects of increasing educational standards upon religious change, and shows how higher education, which correlated in the 1950s with high religious commitment, now correlates with low commitment. But the major cause he discusses, with a chapter devoted to it, is technology. In his analysis, religion (especially in the form of Bellah's civil religion) formerly provided the central legitimation for the American mythology of freedom. But change during the post-war period means that 'now freedom is symbolized by the computer revolution, the information revolution, the medical technology revolution, and the video revolution' (p. 292). This seems an unsophisticated conclusion to the volume, lacking the firm empiricism evident elsewhere. Why should this particular technological revolution be any more profound in its adverse impact upon religion than previous ones? Why should it not have instigated the same effects elsewhere? Why should technology be seen as more significant now than social developments which demonstrably affected people more greatly before?

The second problem is the one that still afflicts American sociologists of religion more greatly than European historians and sociologists: secularisation theory. Wuthnow accepts without demur that the US developed this century as a highly secular society, but one in which religious adherence and observance still continued to grow until comparatively recently. American secularisation theory has for too long side-stepped the definitional conflict implicit in this. The functions of ethnicity and civil religion in sustaining the visible relevance of religion are used as little more than legitimation for what constitutes the greatest inherent contradiction in the social-scientific study of religion.

This connects to the third fault: the assumption that religion occupies a unique ideological place in American culture and society. No serious attempt is made to seek international parallels to the US experience. If we are to treat the study of religion as a social science, then it is unacceptable to constantly express the national uniqueness of religious changes. Whilst this volume does tell us much about how post-war American religion has been restructured, it skates round the most fundamental question: why

did American organised religion only start its numerical decline in the late 1950s instead of in 1850–1920 as in most similar industrial nations in Europe? In this context, the restructuring Wuthnow finds in American religion during its first decades of decline since the 1950s are worth comparing with the similar restructuring in British religion during its first decades of decline in 1890–1925

At the end of the day, it must be said that Wuthnow's volume is more about church and society than church and state. But this does not detract from a work of considerable scholarship which challenges the contemporary relevance of prevailing approaches to American religion.

University of Strathclyde

Callum G. Brown

Homoeopathy and the Medical Profession

Phillip A. Nicholls, Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1988, £27.50, 298 pp.

The *Punch* cartoon reproduced on the cover of this book would seem to suggest that the struggle for pre-eminence between the homoeopathic and allopathic systems of medicine in Britain has always been an unequal one; the contents however reveal that for several decades in the nineteenth century homoeopathy posed a real and popular alternative to allopathic treatment. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century the theories and methods of the two systems could hardly have been more opposed to each other. Allopathic medical practice still favoured 'heroic' treatments, often drastic interventions involving bleeding and violent purgatives, whereas homoeopathy (in spite of some departures from pristine Hahnemannian doctrine) adhered to the principle of *similia similibus curentur*. In a situation of relatively free competition between the two systems the public eventually made clear their revulsion to the violent interventions of allopathy and for a time there seemed a real possibility that the latter might be eclipsed by homoeopathic practice. That this did not take place in the end is due to a number of factors, not least, according to Nicholls, the tendency for allopathy to adopt covertly certain aspects of homoeopathy as it was currently practised. Homoeopathy itself had around the same time adopted some of the more successful practices of the allopathic system, although the attacks launched by allopathic professional associations ignored this eclecticism and

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castigated the system as though there had been no change or advance since Hahnemann.

Although Nicholls appears to have a particular interest in these developments of the mid nineteenth century, he successfully shows that there has been a continual dialogue – and indeed dialectic – between the two systems. This book however is not simply a history of ideas, for the author links the rise of homoeopathy and its contest with allopathy to the social context within which they contested, especially developments in the organization of the medical profession and changes in its social status. What is lacking perhaps is attention to the reasons for which state recognition of homoeopathy became the issue at stake (and not just recognition by allopaths). It is the fact that in most industrialized countries the state confers official recognition on only one system of medicine, or recognizes others only marginally or grudgingly, that determines the form of the present conflict. One hears homoeopaths complain of government policy or legislation, and one hears them complain of their non-recognition by the orthodox medical profession, but one does not hear them complain of a lack of patients or that allopathy is stealing their legitimate trade. The fact that state sanctioned pluralism in health services has not been regarded as a possibility in western countries, leading to 'non-orthodox' systems of medicine enjoying a politically marginal position, is a crucial aspect of the social context of the dialectic which Nicholls describes.

One very important lesson for the sociologist which this book conveys very clearly is that systems of medical practice are frequently more eclectic and permeable than their theories and rhetoric would suggest. It is very tempting to treat non-orthodox systems of medicine in rather the way that some sociologists have treated religious sects, i.e. as bounded groups, relatively impermeable both at the level of social relations and at the level of ideas. As Nicholls points out, the homoeopathic community does have some sect like properties, yet he also shows that it cannot be treated as a watertight intellectual domain. Hahnemann's more metaphysical ideas were very much in tune with some aspects of German idealist philosophy of his time. Today homoeopathy provides a vocabulary of harmony, balance, moving with nature, what Nicholls calls a 'green' vocabulary which has resonances with wider movements of protest. 'Green medicine will cultivate a green politics. Natural holistic medicine is thus in tune with a politics of protest that goes far beyond targets merely medical'

(p. 285). The nineteenth-century eclecticism which Nicholls describes certainly continues today; some GPs do practise homoeopathy or other forms of complementary medicine alongside their allopathic practice, in spite of the official attacks on such medical systems conducted by the BMA.

In terms of denseness of historical and sociological description, Nicholls's account of homoeopathy's development in the twentieth century is not equal to his description of the crucial decades of the mid nineteenth century. However the entire book is written with wit and vigour and constitutes a useful contribution to medical sociology.

University of Keele

Ursula M Sharma

Social Work and Received Ideas

C. Rojek, G. Peacock and S. Collins, Routledge, London, 1988, £9.95, viii + 198 pp.

Social work students are constantly exhorted to demonstrate their ability to 'relate theory to practice'. More accurately, according to Rojek, Peacock and Collins, they are required to show that they have learned 'to speak and write in officially approved ways, that is to speak and write in the discourse of social work' (p. 133) *Social Work and Received Ideas* argues that social workers – whether they choose to describe themselves as 'traditional' or 'radical' – use language as more than a neutral means of communicating their professional understanding of the real world. Rather, professional language itself shapes social workers' understanding and constructs the relationships of power within which they function

The book's methodology is that of discourse analysis – an approach now common-place in many areas of sociological enquiry, but from which social work has hitherto escaped. Such an approach moves social work theory beyond the tired polarisation whence emanate the opposing models of the traditional, psycho-analytically-orientated caseworker and the radical, politically-aware non-interventionist

In exploring the well-rehearsed shortcomings of the traditional model of social work, the authors challenge the power of professional jargon to misrepresent traditional social work as a 'seamless web of logic and enlightened practice' (p. 44). They argue that many of the key terms which constitute the so-called

their values of social work are ambiguous, vague and contradictory
The book then outlines with helpful clarity three alternative radical positions - progressive (social work seen as a 'catalyst for social change'), reproductive (social work seen as being ineluctably wedded to the needs of capitalism) and contradictory (social work seen as both reinforcing and undermining capitalism) (pp 52-3). But radical social work, it is argued, has failed to fulfil its early promise, because social work clients are no less suspicious of terms like 'alienation', 'belonging' and 'equality of opportunity' than their predecessors were of 'individualisation', 'acceptance' and 'self-determination'. In short, both models of social work are criticised because 'before the problem is encountered, the language has a solution' (p. 69).

Feminism, it is then argued, has made a major contribution to the development of social work theory and practice because it has shown 'unequivocally that gender is a form of communication' (p. 77). So much of social work is about the role of women - as workers and as clients - and so little of this has been acknowledged by either traditional or radical social work theory. But the danger of a feminist approach to social work is that it posits a unified object of discourse - the oppressed woman - who exists no more universally than the 'alienated' or the 'insightless' man.

In *Social Work and Received Ideas*, Rojek *et al* argue that all social work models are rooted in the orthodoxy of humanism - a belief in the existence of "man" as the possessor of universal, undifferentiated desires, needs and capacities' (p. 143). By contrast, discourse analysis, through the process of deconstruction, uncovers the inescapable fragmentariness, contradiction and incoherence of the human experience. Consequently, social work may be viewed as a far more fragile enterprise than hitherto. Its 'secure' knowledge and value bases are exposed as responses to 'needs' which do not arise naturally from within the client but which are constructed through the language of social work itself. Relations between social workers and their clients are seen as relations of power - not in the Marxist sense of class relations, but in the Foucaultian sense of the disciplinary society which: '(a) creates abnormality, by specifying the nature of the pathological; and (b) imposes solutions on the client by its access to the institutions of discipline, punishment and moral regulation' (p. 132).

In the final chapter of the book, the authors attempt to deconstruct the 'social' in 'social work'. They do so by locating social work within 'modernism', which they define as 'a form of

social consciousness which views itself and the world as dynamic, many-sided, fragmentary, and discontinuous' (p. 161). They then proceed to argue for a model of social work which encourages maximum participation of workers and service users, with the expressed aim of engendering positive attitudes towards diversity in society. The arguments are complex and require, one suspects, rather more space than they are given in this book. There is a danger that the overall impact of the final chapter – with its quest for an overarching theme – is one which ironically contradicts the book's prime thesis that 'there can be no fixed or definite solution to a problem because there is no fixed and definite order in society' (p. 162).

Social Work and Received Ideas offers a clear and exciting new framework within which social work students can analyse social work orthodoxy and understand the practices with which they are required to engage. Only one section in the book appears to have been misguidedly included. The treatment of received ideas in the Probation Service is very unsatisfactory. The omission of any reference to the Service would have been quite acceptable, since this is a book about social work in general and not about any particular social work agency. The inclusion of a very brief and superficial section on 'Probation and After-Care' (a title which, in any case, has been obsolete for several years) was a mistake. It exposes the authors to criticism ranging from the relatively trivial point made above to a more serious allegation. This is that they have totally ignored the significant linguistic debates that have surrounded the 'care and control' dichotomy, from which emerged the discourse of 'Alternatives to Custody' which dominated the Service in the years following the 1982 Criminal Justice Act and the Home Office's Statement of National Objectives and Priorities in 1984.

Social Work and Received Ideas is an important and ambitious book, which will appeal particularly to social work educators. Its arguments are not always convincing, but one senses that it will prove significant in stimulating fresh thinking about the role of social work in the late twentieth century.

University of Keele

Anne Worrall

Book reviews

The Logic of Social Welfare: Conjectures and Formulations

Brij Mohan, Harvester Wheatsheaf/St Martin's Press, Hemel Hempstead and New York, 1988, £29.95, xii + 148 pp.

This is an unusual book. One of the misfortunes for the reader is that the 'logic' referred to in the title does not appear to have been the author's guiding principle in construction and presentation of arguments. Indeed Mohan's conjectures and formulations are so deeply embedded in a stream of consciousness style of writing that they may remain inaccessible to all but the most careful reader.

The book starts with a chapter in which social welfare is apparently revisited. What this amounts to, in fact, is a rather partial review of recent and contemporary literature on the philosophy and ideology of welfare and an attempt to define terms. Here, as elsewhere in the book, the author expresses what I believe to be his underlying premise, that increasing wisdom, vision and understanding represent the logic on which social welfare institutions are built worldwide. For sure the contending 'logics' of marxist, technocratic determinist and neo-liberal understandings are presented. The western crisis of welfare is acknowledged but the chapter, like the book as a whole, is underpinned by a belief in the creation of global welfare through an informed and rational social conscience. Mohan might believe that social policy is 'a science and art of the possible' (p. 10) but it is quite clear that he concurs with Morris's judgement that 'social policies are identified as those through which government seeks to correct inequities, to improve the condition of the disadvantaged, and to provide assistance to the less powerful' (Morris, 1979 cited on p. 10). It may be this uncritical and idealist conception that leads to the promotion of such claims as the following. 'The emergence of social welfare as an institution and ideology is perhaps the greatest event in the history of civilization' (p. 2). It is certainly the case that, throughout the rest of the book, the author's analysis is rooted in the conviction that 'nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come'. His appeal is for the vision and creation of 'responsible societies' worldwide. Such responsible societies are those in which 'a sense of common responsibility binds the collectivity of roles together' (p. 27), societies which see the need for *institutional* rather than *residual* welfare states. Such societal organisation is, or will be, 'a consequence of moral and rational dimensions of human thinking' (p. 27). The growth of social conscience, an inevitable result of this

moral/rational calculus, leads or will lead to Rawls's well organised society regulated by a collectivist conception of justice

And yet, as the author reminds us in chapter three, the development of welfare states thus far has been affected by conflicting logics: the dialectic of welfare 'undergirding the dual forces of destruction and well-being' (p. 36). Far from welfare states being the outcome of a rational and moral consensus about human need they might instead be, in part, the result, as O'Connor suggests, of attempts to reconcile the dual 'needs' of capitalist societies to promote capital accumulation and social/political legitimation.

Mohan is aware that what he believes to have been the *intentions* of the founding parents of welfare states – amelioration of diswelfares, if not the promotion of equality and justice – have not been matched in outcome terms. He is, like Mishra, further aware that differences in the nature and scope of 'welfare states' are at least, in part determined by the composition and ideologies of ruling elites in different countries.

None the less such awareness appears to be fundamentally absent from the general thrust of his arguments and prescriptions for future global welfare development. Equality and justice are to be the twin pillars on which global as well as national welfare systems are built. Those values, rooted in what Mohan regards as 'human communalities' (p. 98), are to apply in the place of the divisions of class, gender, culture, 'race' and national identity that characterise our present day world. They and the welfare societies which consequently emerge from their operationalisation are to be fostered by the development of strategies of mutual understanding. Welfare professionals are to be involved in processes of 'critical reasoning' for the solution of 'dehumanizing conditions' (p. 9) to aid such strategies.

What the author constructs is a vision of global welfare, a vision in which 'our painfully divided world under ominous threat of total destruction' (p. 100) is saved by an intellectual and moral recognition of our 'oneness' (p. 100). As a piece of exhortation it is infectiously evangelical in its fervour. Welfare replaces religion as the vehicle of global salvation, peace and justice. Welfare workers carry out the priestly functions of this secular religion. Critical reasoning will result in a victory in the battle of ideas for a rational and informed consensus about satisfaction of needs for the world's people. It is the power of ideas that will make the capitalist or imperialist lion lie down with the oppressed lamb. Analysis of the

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human condition and what Mohan calls 'cross-national consciousness' replace religious ideology as the mechanism by which swords will be replaced by ploughshares. A beautiful vision! In its simplicity, faith and ignorance of the profound political struggles needed to achieve even part of this project, it constitutes a voyage of hope rather than a piece of sociology. In the last sentence of a book published just before the 1987 British general election, David Harris wrote the following 'As the dusk falls on Thatcherism, social democracy spreads its wings'. In a sometimes seemingly hopeless world we need our visionaries, however misguided Mohan, like Harris, maps out attractive future scenarios. Unfortunately, like Harris, he sees evidence of the future in the present. Now that really is the stuff of visionaries!

University College of Swansea

Michael Sullivan

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